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Changes: Release external waiting state for S00-031 through tasks.py. Input: New verified root cause and supported host execution context supplied in state/handoffs/S00-031.md. Actual host /tmp/codex-daemon-1000 uid1000/mode0700 is valid; outer sandbox deliberately masks it read-only mode000. Installed-version primary source confirms this design; TMPDIR/no-daemon cannot fix nested guard. Approved OUTER HOST EXECUTION of bounded no-model inner codex workspace-write probe passes project write/read/remove and denies outside write EROFS30, no outside file created. No socket mutation or broader roots. Fresh executor/QA must read handoff, request approved outer host execution and independently repeat, document and review; no task acceptance claimed. Validation: External input availability checked; tasks.py release-external succeeded. Acceptance and dependent tasks remain unverified pending fresh executor and independent review. Task: S00-031 Agent: coordinator-input-s00-031 Role: orchestrator Action: release-external Status: todo Task title: Supply a verified private Codex app-server socket environment
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S00-031 coordinator-supplied host input (not implementation or acceptance)
User requested autonomous environment recovery and continued independent development. No product task is accepted by this handoff.
New diagnosis replacing the speculative host-permission premise
Read-only investigation of installed Codex 0.159.0 confirmed the actual directory is /tmp/codex-daemon-1000 (not XDG_RUNTIME_DIR).
- Approved host stat: uid 1000, mode 0700.
- The same path inside an existing workspace sandbox is uid 1000, mode 000; read-only tmpfs protective mask. Listing is denied.
- Canonical directory selection intentionally ignores HOME/TMPDIR/CODEX_HOME.
--no-daemondoes not avoid the guard.
Primary implementation references for independent inspection: https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/rust-v0.159.0/codex-rs/uds/src/daemon_directory.rs https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/rust-v0.159.0/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/bwrap.rs
No chmod, socket exposure, alternate writable roots or environment relocation is appropriate. The host socket environment already meets ownership/private-mode requirements. Nested launch fails because it sees the deliberate mask.
Verified supported execution context
Coordinator outer tool requested approved host execution (sandbox_permissions: require_escalated) of:
codex -c 'sandbox_mode="workspace-write"' -c sandbox_workspace_write.network_access=true sandbox -- python3 /tmp/luma-filesystem-sandbox-probe.py
This is not an unsandboxed diagnostic: the inner Codex process enforces a fresh workspace-write sandbox. Actual exit 0; project synthetic write/read/remove passed; exclusive-create outside project in /home/tola denied with EROFS 30, no outside file created, uid1000. Public command/result log: state/runs/coordinator-sandbox/output.log. Probe script is available in /tmp; inspect before repeating or reproduce the same bounded synthetic check.
Fresh executor and reviewer should REQUEST APPROVED OUTER HOST EXECUTION for this bounded no-model inner-sandbox diagnostic, rather than run a second sandbox recursively inside their restricted shell. If approval/host execution is unavailable, record that exact limitation and stop; do not reinterpret it as broken global socket permissions and do not mutate sockets. Do not launch a model for the diagnostic.
Required next outcome
Independently repeat host ownership/mode and actual positive/negative inner filesystem probe, document supported invocation only in docs/AUTOMATION.md, provide evidence and submit for QA. S00-030/028/storage remain unfinished until the normal reviewed chain completes. No check from this coordinator handoff is independent executor/reviewer evidence.