Merge commit from fork

* Ensure payload_max_length_ is respected for compressed payloads

* Fix Denial of service (DOS) using zip bomb

---------

Co-authored-by: Hritik Vijay <hey@hritik.sh>

httplib.h

@@ -8982,14 +8982,11 @@ inline bool Server::read_content(Stream &strm, Request &req, Response &res) {
           strm, req, res,
           // Regular
           [&](const char *buf, size_t n) {
-            // Prevent arithmetic overflow when checking sizes.
-            // Avoid computing (req.body.size() + n) directly because
-            // adding two unsigned `size_t` values can wrap around and
-            // produce a small result instead of indicating overflow.
-            // Instead, check using subtraction: ensure `n` does not
-            // exceed the remaining capacity `max_size() - size()`.
-            if (req.body.size() >= req.body.max_size() ||
-                n > req.body.max_size() - req.body.size()) {
+            // Limit decompressed body size to payload_max_length_ to protect
+            // against "zip bomb" attacks where a small compressed payload
+            // decompresses to a massive size.
+            if (req.body.size() + n > payload_max_length_ ||
+                req.body.size() + n > req.body.max_size()) {
               return false;
             }
             req.body.append(buf, n);