Install one verify callback on every Mbed TLS session

Every session now gets mbedtls_verify_callback(), which reads the user's
callback from the owning context when the handshake runs. The
has_verify_callback flag and the separate hostname-masking callback are no
longer needed, and a callback set after a session was created is still
honoured.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WGAYpQgXt95LdDQcJYgjB8
This commit is contained in:
Claude committed 2026-10-16 18:57:00 +00:00
1 parent 65dbca0afe
commit 5d10095944
1 file changed
+8 -33
+8 -33
View File
@@ -4014,7 +4014,6 @@ struct MbedTlsContext {
mbedtls_pk_context own_key;
bool is_server = false;
bool verify_client = false;
bool has_verify_callback = false;
// Set by tls::set_verify_callback().
VerifyCallback verify_callback;
@@ -20425,16 +20424,6 @@ inline void mbedtls_clear_cn_mismatch(uint32_t *flags) {
*flags &= ~static_cast<uint32_t>(hostname_mismatch_code());
}
// Verify callback used when hostname verification is disabled for a session
// that has no user-supplied verify callback of its own.
inline int mbedtls_mask_hostname_mismatch_callback(void *data,
mbedtls_x509_crt *, int,
uint32_t *flags) {
(void)data;
mbedtls_clear_cn_mismatch(flags);
return 0;
}
inline int mbedtls_verify_callback(void *data, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
int cert_depth, uint32_t *flags);
@@ -20836,7 +20825,7 @@ inline void set_verify_client(ctx_t ctx, bool require) {
} else {
// If a verify callback is set, use OPTIONAL mode to ensure the callback
// is called (matching OpenSSL behavior). Otherwise use NONE.
mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&mctx->conf, mctx->has_verify_callback
mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&mctx->conf, mctx->verify_callback
? MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL
: MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE);
}
@@ -20870,13 +20859,11 @@ inline session_t create_session(ctx_t ctx, socket_t sock) {
mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(&session->ssl, &session->sock, impl::mbedtls_net_send_cb,
impl::mbedtls_net_recv_cb, nullptr);
// Set per-session verify callback with session pointer if callback is
// registered
// Set the per-session verify callback. It looks up the context's user
// callback, if any, when the handshake runs, so it does not matter whether
// set_verify_callback() is called before or after this session is created.
session->ctx = mctx;
if (mctx->has_verify_callback) {
mbedtls_ssl_set_verify(&session->ssl, impl::mbedtls_verify_callback,
session);
}
mbedtls_ssl_set_verify(&session->ssl, impl::mbedtls_verify_callback, session);
return static_cast<session_t>(session);
}
@@ -20902,19 +20889,8 @@ inline bool set_sni(session_t session, const char *hostname,
msession->hostname = hostname;
if (!verify_hostname) {
msession->suppress_hostname_mismatch = true;
// If a user verify callback is already wired for this session,
// mbedtls_verify_callback() masks the mismatch flag itself before
// consulting it (see suppress_hostname_mismatch above) - reinstalling it
// here would be redundant. Otherwise install the self-contained masking
// callback.
if (!msession->ctx->has_verify_callback) {
mbedtls_ssl_set_verify(&msession->ssl,
impl::mbedtls_mask_hostname_mismatch_callback,
msession);
}
}
// mbedtls_verify_callback() masks the mismatch flag for this session
if (!verify_hostname) { msession->suppress_hostname_mismatch = true; }
return true;
}
@@ -21592,9 +21568,8 @@ inline bool set_verify_callback(ctx_t ctx, VerifyCallback callback) {
auto *mbed_ctx = static_cast<impl::MbedTlsContext *>(ctx);
mbed_ctx->verify_callback = std::move(callback);
mbed_ctx->has_verify_callback = static_cast<bool>(mbed_ctx->verify_callback);
if (mbed_ctx->has_verify_callback) {
if (mbed_ctx->verify_callback) {
// Set OPTIONAL mode to ensure callback is called even when verification
// is disabled (matching OpenSSL behavior where SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set).
// The callback itself is wired per session in create_session().