Match trusted proxies as IP addresses

set_trusted_proxies() compared addresses as strings, so a proxy listed
as 10.0.0.2 was not trusted when a server listening on both IPv4 and
IPv6 saw it as ::ffff:10.0.0.2, and two spellings of one IPv6 address
did not match either. The listed addresses are now put in one spelling
when they are set, and so are the connection peer and each
X-Forwarded-For hop before they are looked up; an IPv4-mapped IPv6
address becomes its IPv4 address. The README now documents the setter.

httplib.h

@@ -10670,6 +10670,32 @@ inline bool is_ip_address(const std::string &host) {
          inet_pton(AF_INET6, host.c_str(), &addr6) == 1;
 }
 
+// One spelling for an IPv6 address, and the IPv4 one for an IPv4-mapped IPv6
+// address, which is how a dual-stack socket reports an IPv4 peer. Anything
+// else, including an address with a zone ID, is returned as it is.
+inline std::string canonical_ip(const std::string &addr) {
+  struct in6_addr addr6;
+  if (addr.find('%') != std::string::npos ||
+      inet_pton(AF_INET6, addr.c_str(), &addr6) != 1) {
+    return addr;
+  }
+
+  char buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+  if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&addr6)) {
+    return inet_ntop(AF_INET, &addr6.s6_addr[12], buf, sizeof(buf)) ? buf
+                                                                    : addr;
+  }
+  return inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &addr6, buf, sizeof(buf)) ? buf : addr;
+}
+
+// `trusted_proxies` holds canonical_ip() spellings.
+inline bool is_trusted_proxy(const std::string &addr,
+                             const std::vector<std::string> &trusted_proxies) {
+  if (trusted_proxies.empty()) { return false; }
+  return std::find(trusted_proxies.begin(), trusted_proxies.end(),
+                   canonical_ip(addr)) != trusted_proxies.end();
+}
+
 // Resolve where a client should connect for `host`, honoring a user-supplied
 // hostname-to-address map. `host` itself is never rewritten, so it keeps
 // supplying the Host header and SNI; only the connection target changes.
@@ -13823,7 +13849,11 @@ inline Server &Server::set_header_writer(
 
 inline Server &
 Server::set_trusted_proxies(const std::vector<std::string> &proxies) {
-  trusted_proxies_ = proxies;
+  trusted_proxies_.clear();
+  trusted_proxies_.reserve(proxies.size());
+  for (const auto &proxy : proxies) {
+    trusted_proxies_.push_back(detail::canonical_ip(proxy));
+  }
   return *this;
 }
 
@@ -15010,12 +15040,7 @@ get_client_ip(const std::string &x_forwarded_for,
   // returned as the client.
   for (size_t i = ip_list.size(); i-- > 0;) {
     const auto &ip = ip_list[i];
-
-    auto is_trusted_proxy =
-        std::any_of(trusted_proxies.begin(), trusted_proxies.end(),
-                    [&](const std::string &proxy) { return ip == proxy; });
-
-    if (!is_trusted_proxy) { return ip; }
+    if (!detail::is_trusted_proxy(ip, trusted_proxies)) { return ip; }
   }
 
   // Every hop was a trusted proxy; fall back to the first entry.
@@ -15147,11 +15172,8 @@ Server::process_request(Stream &strm, const std::string &remote_addr,
   // Only honor X-Forwarded-For if the peer on the actual TCP connection is
   // itself a trusted proxy. Otherwise any direct client could spoof
   // remote_addr simply by sending an arbitrary X-Forwarded-For header.
-  auto is_trusted_peer = std::any_of(
-      trusted_proxies_.begin(), trusted_proxies_.end(),
-      [&](const std::string &proxy) { return proxy == remote_addr; });
-
-  if (is_trusted_peer && req.has_header("X-Forwarded-For")) {
+  if (detail::is_trusted_proxy(remote_addr, trusted_proxies_) &&
+      req.has_header("X-Forwarded-For")) {
     // Some proxies append the address they observed as a separate
     // X-Forwarded-For field line instead of extending the one the client sent
     // (e.g. HAProxy's "option forwardfor"), so the whole combined value has to