Verify the server certificate during the handshake on OpenSSL

The OpenSSL client finished the handshake with SSL_VERIFY_NONE and
checked the server certificate only afterwards, so it presented its
client certificate to a server that then failed verification. With a
server certificate verifier that accepted, wolfSSL did the same. Verify
the chain, and the host name, during the handshake on every backend,
keeping the built-in verdict when a verifier runs alongside it. On
OpenSSL a session verifier, which may accept a certificate the built-in
check rejects, still decides after the handshake.

A certificate that fails the built-in verification now reports
CertVerifyFailed, or HostnameMismatch for its name, in ssl_error() on
every backend, where OpenSSL left it 0.
This commit is contained in:
yhirose committed 2026-10-21 22:13:22 -04:00
1 parent fd5dd79bd2
commit fd71c11e0e
3 files changed
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@@ -15808,9 +15808,9 @@ TEST(SSLClientTest, ServerCertificateVerificationError_Online) {
// OpenSSL: X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT (18)
// Mbed TLS: MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED or similar flags
EXPECT_NE(0UL, res.ssl_backend_error());
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<int>(tls::ErrorCode::CertVerifyFailed),
res.ssl_error());
#ifdef CPPHTTPLIB_OPENSSL_SUPPORT
// For OpenSSL, ssl_error is 0 for verification errors
EXPECT_EQ(0, res.ssl_error());
#if !defined(_WIN32) || \
defined(CPPHTTPLIB_DISABLE_WINDOWS_AUTOMATIC_ROOT_CERTIFICATES_UPDATE)
// On non-Windows or when Windows Schannel is disabled, the error comes
@@ -15834,9 +15834,9 @@ TEST(SSLClientTest, ServerHostnameVerificationError_Online) {
// Verify backend error is captured for hostname verification failure
EXPECT_NE(0UL, res.ssl_backend_error());
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<int>(tls::ErrorCode::HostnameMismatch),
res.ssl_error());
#ifdef CPPHTTPLIB_OPENSSL_SUPPORT
// For OpenSSL, ssl_error is 0 for verification errors
EXPECT_EQ(0, res.ssl_error());
#if !defined(_WIN32) || \
defined(CPPHTTPLIB_DISABLE_WINDOWS_AUTOMATIC_ROOT_CERTIFICATES_UPDATE)
// On non-Windows or when Windows Schannel is disabled, the error comes
@@ -16252,6 +16252,55 @@ TEST(SSLClientServerTest, ClientCertStillRequiredAfterVerifyCallbackCleared) {
});
}
// The client verifies the server certificate during the handshake, so a
// server that fails the check never gets the client certificate, even when a
// verifier of the client's own accepts it
TEST(SSLClientServerTest, ClientCertNotSentToUnverifiedServer) {
struct Case {
const char *trusted_ca;
const char *host;
Error error;
};
// cert2.pem names localhost: the first client does not trust it, and the
// second trusts it but asks for another name
for (const auto &c :
{Case{CLIENT_CA_CERT_FILE, "localhost", Error::SSLServerVerification},
Case{SERVER_CERT2_FILE, "example.com",
Error::SSLServerHostnameVerification}}) {
for (auto with_verifier : {false, true}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(std::string(c.host) + (with_verifier ? " +verifier" : ""));
SSLServer svr(SERVER_CERT2_FILE, SERVER_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE,
CLIENT_CA_CERT_FILE);
ASSERT_TRUE(svr.is_valid());
std::atomic<bool> got_client_cert{false};
ASSERT_TRUE(tls::set_verify_callback(svr.tls_context(),
[&](const tls::VerifyContext &) {
got_client_cert = true;
return true;
}));
auto port = svr.bind_to_any_port("127.0.0.1");
ASSERT_LT(0, port);
thread t = thread([&] { svr.listen_after_bind(); });
svr.wait_until_ready();
SSLClient cli(c.host, port, CLIENT_CERT_FILE, CLIENT_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE);
cli.set_hostname_addr_map({{c.host, "127.0.0.1"}});
cli.set_ca_cert_path(c.trusted_ca);
if (with_verifier) {
cli.set_server_certificate_verifier(
[](const tls::VerifyContext &) { return true; });
}
auto res = cli.Get("/");
EXPECT_FALSE(res);
EXPECT_EQ(c.error, res.error());
svr.stop();
t.join();
EXPECT_FALSE(got_client_cert);
}
}
}
void UpdateCertsPemWithClientCA(SSLServer &svr) {
std::string cert_pem, key_pem, ca_pem;
read_file(SERVER_CERT_FILE, cert_pem);