Fuzz Server::handle_file_request through a mount point backed by a temporary directory that holds symlinks escaping the mount root, one of them into a sibling directory sharing its name prefix. Abort if a token stored outside the root appears in a response. The seeds are based on those of #2661.
Move FuzzedStream into fuzzed_stream.h so that both server fuzzers share it, and add FuzzableServer::MarkAsRunning(), without which a server that is not listening writes no file.
Feed the event stream to the parser in chunks and abort if the reported events, ids and retries differ from parsing it in one piece. Also run with a length limit to cover the early-stop path.
Add websocket_fuzzer covering frame reading, UTF-8 and close payload validation, and the upgrade response parser. Add websocket_fuzzer.options to raise max_len above the 64 KiB frame length boundary.
The server fuzzer's stream exposed no buffered data, so the fast path of
stream_line_reader::getline was never fuzzed. Hand out what a read
pulled in beyond the bytes asked for, as SocketStream does.
str2tag_core is recursive (one frame per character), so a long runtime
input such as a fuzzer-supplied Content-Type would overflow the stack.
Rewrite the runtime entry point str2tag() iteratively while keeping the
recursive constexpr str2tag_core for compile-time UDL evaluation. The
hash output is unchanged for all inputs.
Same root cause as #508342856 (fixed in 2d2efe4): an oversized
Content-Length value (here 4467440718547775) caused res.body.reserve()
to attempt a multi-petabyte allocation. The UBSAN fuzzer job surfaced
it as a std::bad_alloc-driven abort, while the ASAN job for #508342856
reported it as allocation-size-too-big. The payload_max_length_ cap
introduced in 2d2efe4 already addresses both.
A malicious or malformed server response with an enormous Content-Length
header (e.g. 20000000000) caused the client to call res.body.reserve(len)
with the untrusted value, triggering OOM before read_content's
payload_max_length_ check could take effect. Cap the pre-reservation
at payload_max_length_, since reading more than that is never useful.
- Replace is_readable() with wait_readable() and is_writable() with
wait_writable() in the Stream interface.
- Implement a new is_readable() function with semantics that more
closely reflect its name. It returns immediately whether data is
available for reading, without waiting.
- Update call sites of is_writable(), removing redundant checks.
* *Add server fuzzer target and seed corpus
* Add fuzz_test option to Makefile
* Fix#685
* Try to fix Github actions on Ubuntu
* Added ReadTimeoutSSL test
* Comment out `-fsanitize=address`
* Rebase upstream changes
* remove address sanitizer temporarily
* Add separate Makefile for fuzzing
* 1. Remove special char from dictionary
2. Clean fuzzing/Makefile
* Use specific path to avoid accidently linking openssl version brought in by oss-fuzz
* remove addition of flags
* Refactor Makefile
* Add missing newline
* Add fuzztest to github workflow
* Fix
Co-authored-by: yhirose <yuji.hirose.bug@gmail.com>
yhirose