Relax limits imposed by d/t/functions.d/ip-addr.patterns in Debian autotest.

This merges security fixes for CVE-2023-50387 and CVE-2023-50868

Keytrap - extreme CPU consumption in the DNSSEC validator.

CHANGELOG

@@ -32,6 +32,38 @@ version 2.90
 	--filter-rr=ANY has a special meaning: it filters the
 	answers to queries for the ANY RR-type.
 	
+	Add limits on the resources used to do DNSSEC validation.
+	DNSSEC introduces a potential CPU DoS, because a crafted domain
+	can force a validator to a large number of cryptographic
+	operations whilst attempting to do validation. When using TCP
+	transport a DNSKEY RRset contain thousands of members and any
+	RRset can have thousands of signatures. The potential number
+	of signature validations to follow the RFC for validation
+	for one RRset is the cross product of the keys and signatures,
+	so millions. In practice, the actual numbers are much lower,
+	so attacks can be mitigated by limiting the amount of
+	cryptographic "work" to a much lower amount. The actual
+	limits are number a signature validation fails per RRset(20),
+	number of signature validations and hash computations
+	per query(200), number of sub-queries  to fetch  DS and DNSKEY
+	RRsets per query(40), and the number of iterations in a
+	NSEC3 record(150). These values are sensible, but there is, as yet,
+	no standardisation on the values for a "conforming" domain, so a
+	new option --dnssec-limit is provided should they need to be altered.
+	The algorithm to validate DS records has also been altered to reduce
+	the maximum work from cross product of the number of DS records and
+	number of DNSKEYs to the cross product of the number of DS records
+	and supported DS digest types. As the number of DS digest types
+	is in single figures, this reduces the exposure.
+
+	Credit is due to Elias Heftrig, Haya Schulmann, Niklas Vogel,
+	and Michael Waidner from the German National Research Center for
+	Applied Cybersecurity ATHENE for finding this vulnerability.
+
+	CVE 2023-50387 and CVE 2023-50868 apply.
+	Note that the is a security vulnerablity only when DNSSEC validation
+	is enabled.
+	
 	
 version 2.89
         Fix bug introduced in 2.88 (commit fe91134b) which can result

debian/changelog

@@ -1,9 +1,19 @@
-dnsmasq (2.90~test4-1) experimental; urgency=medium
+dnsmasq (2.90-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  [ Sven Geuer ]
+  * Relax limits imposed by d/t/functions.d/ip-addr.patterns to allow for
+    successful tests on ci.debian.net.
+
+ -- Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>  Wed, 14 Feb 2024 11:33:14 +0000
+
+dnsmasq (2.90-1) unstable; urgency=medium
 
   [ Simon Kelley ]
   * New upstream. (closes: #1033165)
   * Move hard-coding of Lua version from the upstream Makefile
     to  d/rules.
+  * Security fixes for Keytrap - DNSSEC validation CPU exhaustion.
+    CVE-2023-50387 and CVE-2023-50868
   [ Sven Geuer ]
   * Introduce autokpgtests per d/tests/* (closes: #1034135).
   * Switch to dpkg-source 3.0 (quilt) format (closes: #1007041).

debian/tests/functions.d/ip-addr.patterns

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-?: veth1@if?: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UP group default qlen 1000
+*: veth1@if*: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UP group default qlen 1000
     link/ether ??:??:??:??:??:?? brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff link-netnsid 0
     inet 192.168.142.?/29 brd 192.168.142.7 scope global dynamic veth1
        valid_lft 3[56][0-9][0-9]sec preferred_lft 3[56][0-9][0-9]sec

man/dnsmasq.8

@@ -931,6 +931,15 @@ Authenticated Data bit correctly in all cases is not technically possible. If th
 when using this option, then the cache should be disabled using --cache-size=0. In most cases, enabling DNSSEC validation
 within dnsmasq is a better option. See --dnssec for details.
 .TP
+.B --dnssec-limits=<limit>[,<limit>.......]
+Override the default resource limits applied to DNSSEC validation. Cryptographic operations are expensive and crafted domains
+can DoS a DNSSEC validator by forcing it to do hundreds of thousands of such operations. To avoid this, the dnsmasq validation code
+applies limits on how much work will be expended in validation. If any of the limits are exceeded, the validation will fail and the
+domain treated as BOGUS. There are four limits, in order(default values in parens): number a signature validation fails per RRset(20), number of signature validations and
+hash computations per query(200), number of sub-queries to fetch DS and DNSKEY RRsets per query(40), and the number of iterations in a NSEC3 record(150).
+The maximum values reached during validation are stored, and dumped as part of the stats generated by SIGUSR1. Supplying a limit value of 0 leaves the default in place, so
+\fB--dnssec-limits=0,0,20\fP sets the number of sub-queries to 20 whilst leaving the other limits at default values.
+.TP
 .B --dnssec-debug
 Set debugging mode for the DNSSEC validation, set the Checking Disabled bit on upstream queries, 
 and don't convert replies which do not validate to responses with

src/cache.c

@@ -834,7 +834,18 @@ void cache_end_insert(void)
   if (daemon->pipe_to_parent != -1)
     {
       ssize_t m = -1;
+
       read_write(daemon->pipe_to_parent, (unsigned char *)&m, sizeof(m), 0);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
+      /* Sneak out possibly updated crypto HWM values. */
+      m = daemon->metrics[METRIC_CRYPTO_HWM];
+      read_write(daemon->pipe_to_parent, (unsigned char *)&m, sizeof(m), 0);
+      m = daemon->metrics[METRIC_SIG_FAIL_HWM];
+      read_write(daemon->pipe_to_parent, (unsigned char *)&m, sizeof(m), 0);
+      m = daemon->metrics[METRIC_WORK_HWM];
+      read_write(daemon->pipe_to_parent, (unsigned char *)&m, sizeof(m), 0);
+#endif
     }
       
   new_chain = NULL;
@@ -853,7 +864,7 @@ int cache_recv_insert(time_t now, int fd)
   
   cache_start_insert();
   
-  while(1)
+  while (1)
     {
  
       if (!read_write(fd, (unsigned char *)&m, sizeof(m), 1))
@@ -861,6 +872,21 @@ int cache_recv_insert(time_t now, int fd)
       
       if (m == -1)
 	{
+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
+	  /* Sneak in possibly updated crypto HWM. */
+	  if (!read_write(fd, (unsigned char *)&m, sizeof(m), 1))
+	    return 0;
+	  if (m > daemon->metrics[METRIC_CRYPTO_HWM])
+	    daemon->metrics[METRIC_CRYPTO_HWM] = m;
+	  if (!read_write(fd, (unsigned char *)&m, sizeof(m), 1))
+	    return 0;
+	  if (m > daemon->metrics[METRIC_SIG_FAIL_HWM])
+	    daemon->metrics[METRIC_SIG_FAIL_HWM] = m;
+	  if (!read_write(fd, (unsigned char *)&m, sizeof(m), 1))
+	    return 0;
+	  if (m > daemon->metrics[METRIC_WORK_HWM])
+	    daemon->metrics[METRIC_WORK_HWM] = m;
+#endif
 	  cache_end_insert();
 	  return 1;
 	}
@@ -1893,6 +1919,11 @@ void dump_cache(time_t now)
 #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
   my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("queries for authoritative zones %u"), daemon->metrics[METRIC_DNS_AUTH_ANSWERED]);
 #endif
+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
+  my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("DNSSEC per-query subqueries HWM %u"), daemon->metrics[METRIC_WORK_HWM]);
+  my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("DNSSEC per-query crypto work HWM %u"), daemon->metrics[METRIC_CRYPTO_HWM]);
+  my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("DNSSEC per-RRSet signature fails HWM %u"), daemon->metrics[METRIC_SIG_FAIL_HWM]);
+#endif
 
   blockdata_report();
   my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("child processes for TCP requests: in use %zu, highest since last SIGUSR1 %zu, max allowed %zu."),
@@ -2052,6 +2083,11 @@ static char *edestr(int ede)
     case EDE_NO_AUTH:                     return "no reachable authority";
     case EDE_NETERR:                      return "network error";
     case EDE_INVALID_DATA:                return "invalid data";
+    case EDE_SIG_E_B_V:                   return "signature expired before valid";
+    case EDE_TOO_EARLY:                   return "too early";
+    case EDE_UNS_NS3_ITER:                return "unsupported NSEC3 iterations value";
+    case EDE_UNABLE_POLICY:               return "uanble to conform to policy";
+    case EDE_SYNTHESIZED:                 return "synthesized";
     default:                              return "unknown";
     }
 }

src/config.h

@@ -22,7 +22,10 @@
 #define EDNS_PKTSZ 1232 /* default max EDNS.0 UDP packet from from  /dnsflagday.net/2020 */
 #define SAFE_PKTSZ 1232 /* "go anywhere" UDP packet size, see https://dnsflagday.net/2020/ */
 #define KEYBLOCK_LEN 40 /* choose to minimise fragmentation when storing DNSSEC keys */
-#define DNSSEC_WORK 50 /* Max number of queries to validate one question */
+#define DNSSEC_LIMIT_WORK 40 /* Max number of queries to validate one question */
+#define DNSSEC_LIMIT_SIG_FAIL 20 /* Number of signature that can fail to validate in one answer */
+#define DNSSEC_LIMIT_CRYPTO 200 /* max no. of crypto operations to validate one query. */
+#define DNSSEC_LIMIT_NSEC3_ITERS 150 /* Max. number if iterations allowed in NSEC3 record. */
 #define TIMEOUT 10     /* drop UDP queries after TIMEOUT seconds */
 #define SMALL_PORT_RANGE 30 /* If DNS port range is smaller than this, use different allocation. */
 #define FORWARD_TEST 50 /* try all servers every 50 queries */

src/dns-protocol.h

@@ -112,8 +112,11 @@
 #define EDE_NO_AUTH        22  /* No Reachable Authority */
 #define EDE_NETERR         23  /* Network error */
 #define EDE_INVALID_DATA   24  /* Invalid Data */
-
+#define EDE_SIG_E_B_V      25  /* Signature Expired before Valid */
-
+#define EDE_TOO_EARLY      26  /* To Early */
+#define EDE_UNS_NS3_ITER   27  /* Unsupported NSEC3 Iterations Value */
+#define EDE_UNABLE_POLICY  28  /* Unable to conform to policy */
+#define EDE_SYNTHESIZED    29  /* Synthesized */
 
 
 struct dns_header {

src/dnsmasq.h

@@ -757,6 +757,9 @@ struct dyndir {
 #define DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC      0x0040 /* No NSEC */
 #define DNSSEC_FAIL_NODSSUP     0x0080 /* no supported DS algo. */
 #define DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY       0x0100 /* no DNSKEY */
+#define DNSSEC_FAIL_NSEC3_ITERS 0x0200 /* too many iterations in NSEC3 */
+#define DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET   0x0400 /* bad packet */
+#define DNSSEC_FAIL_WORK        0x0800 /* too much crypto */
 
 #define STAT_ISEQUAL(a, b)  (((a) & 0xffff0000) == (b))
 
@@ -794,7 +797,7 @@ struct frec {
   struct blockdata *stash; /* Saved reply, whilst we validate */
   size_t stash_len;
 #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC 
-  int class, work_counter;
+  int class, work_counter, validate_counter;
   struct frec *dependent; /* Query awaiting internally-generated DNSKEY or DS query */
   struct frec *next_dependent; /* list of above. */
   struct frec *blocking_query; /* Query which is blocking us. */
@@ -831,6 +834,12 @@ struct frec {
 #define LEASE_HAVE_HWADDR  128  /* Have set hwaddress */
 #define LEASE_EXP_CHANGED  256  /* Lease expiry time changed */
 
+#define LIMIT_SIG_FAIL    0
+#define LIMIT_CRYPTO      1
+#define LIMIT_WORK        2
+#define LIMIT_NSEC3_ITERS 3
+#define LIMIT_MAX         4
+
 struct dhcp_lease {
   int clid_len;          /* length of client identifier */
   unsigned char *clid;   /* clientid */
@@ -1240,6 +1249,7 @@ extern struct daemon {
   int rr_status_sz;
   int dnssec_no_time_check;
   int back_to_the_future;
+  int limit[LIMIT_MAX];
 #endif
   struct frec *frec_list;
   struct frec_src *free_frec_src;
@@ -1415,10 +1425,12 @@ int in_zone(struct auth_zone *zone, char *name, char **cut);
 /* dnssec.c */
 #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
 size_t dnssec_generate_query(struct dns_header *header, unsigned char *end, char *name, int class, int type, int edns_pktsz);
-int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class);
+int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name,
-int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class);
+			  char *keyname, int class, int *validate_count);
+int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name,
+		       char *keyname, int class, int *validate_count);
 int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int *class,
-			  int check_unsigned, int *neganswer, int *nons, int *nsec_ttl);
+			  int check_unsigned, int *neganswer, int *nons, int *nsec_ttl, int *validate_count);
 int dnskey_keytag(int alg, int flags, unsigned char *key, int keylen);
 size_t filter_rrsigs(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen);
 int setup_timestamp(void);

src/dnssec.c

@@ -424,12 +424,24 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, int
   return 1;
 }
 
+int dec_counter(int *counter, char *message)
+{
+  if ((*counter)-- == 0)
+    {
+      my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, "limit exceeded: %s", message ? message : _("per-query crypto work"));
+      return 1;
+    }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
 /* Validate a single RRset (class, type, name) in the supplied DNS reply 
    Return code:
    STAT_SECURE   if it validates.
    STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD if it validates and is the result of wildcard expansion.
    (In this case *wildcard_out points to the "body" of the wildcard within name.) 
    STAT_BOGUS    signature is wrong, bad packet.
+   STAT_ABANDONED validation abandoned do to excess resource usage.
    STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is returned in keyname)
    STAT_NEED_DS  need DS to complete validation (name is returned in keyname)
 
@@ -444,10 +456,10 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, int
 */
 static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, int type, int sigidx, int rrsetidx, 
 			  char *name, char *keyname, char **wildcard_out, struct blockdata *key, int keylen,
-			  int algo_in, int keytag_in, unsigned long *ttl_out)
+			  int algo_in, int keytag_in, unsigned long *ttl_out, int *validate_counter)
 {
   unsigned char *p;
-  int rdlen, j, name_labels, algo, labels, key_tag;
+  int rdlen, j, name_labels, algo, labels, key_tag, sig_fail_cnt;
   struct crec *crecp = NULL;
   short *rr_desc = rrfilter_desc(type);
   u32 sig_expiration, sig_inception;
@@ -467,7 +479,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
   rrsetidx = sort_rrset(header, plen, rr_desc, rrsetidx, rrset, daemon->workspacename, keyname);
          
   /* Now try all the sigs to try and find one which validates */
-  for (j = 0; j <sigidx; j++)
+  for (sig_fail_cnt = daemon->limit[LIMIT_SIG_FAIL], j = 0; j <sigidx; j++)
     {
       unsigned char *psav, *sig, *digest;
       int i, wire_len, sig_len;
@@ -654,19 +666,37 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
 
       if (key)
 	{
-	  if (algo_in == algo && keytag_in == key_tag &&
+	  if (algo_in == algo && keytag_in == key_tag)
-	      verify(key, keylen, sig, sig_len, digest, hash->digest_size, algo))
+	    {
+	      if (dec_counter(validate_counter, NULL))
+		return STAT_ABANDONED;
+	     	      
+	      if (verify(key, keylen, sig, sig_len, digest, hash->digest_size, algo))
 		return STAT_SECURE;
 	    }
+	}
       else
 	{
 	  /* iterate through all possible keys 4035 5.3.1 */
 	  for (; crecp; crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now, F_DNSKEY))
 	    if (crecp->addr.key.algo == algo && 
 		crecp->addr.key.keytag == key_tag &&
-		crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
+		crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class)
-		verify(crecp->addr.key.keydata, crecp->addr.key.keylen, sig, sig_len, digest, hash->digest_size, algo))
+	      {
+		if (dec_counter(validate_counter, NULL))
+		  return STAT_ABANDONED;
+		
+		if (verify(crecp->addr.key.keydata, crecp->addr.key.keylen, sig, sig_len, digest, hash->digest_size, algo))
 		  return (labels < name_labels) ? STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD : STAT_SECURE;
+		
+		/* An attacker can waste a lot of our CPU by setting up a giant DNSKEY RRSET full of failing
+		   keys, all of which we have to try. Since many failing keys is not likely for
+		   a legitimate domain, set a limit on how many can fail. */
+		if ((daemon->limit[LIMIT_SIG_FAIL] - (sig_fail_cnt + 1)) > (int)daemon->metrics[METRIC_SIG_FAIL_HWM])
+		  daemon->metrics[METRIC_SIG_FAIL_HWM] = daemon->limit[LIMIT_SIG_FAIL] - (sig_fail_cnt + 1);
+		if (dec_counter(&sig_fail_cnt, _("per-RRSet signature fails")))
+		  return STAT_ABANDONED;
+	      }
 	}
     }
 
@@ -681,30 +711,36 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
          STAT_OK        Done, key(s) in cache.
 	 STAT_BOGUS     No DNSKEYs found, which  can be validated with DS,
 	                or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not valid, bad packet.
+	 STAT_ABANDONED resource exhaustion.
 	 STAT_NEED_DS   DS records to validate a key not found, name in keyname 
-	 STAT_NEED_KEY  DNSKEY records to validate a key not found, name in keyname 
 */
-int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)
+int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name,
+			  char *keyname, int class, int *validate_counter)
 {
-  unsigned char *psave, *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
+  unsigned char *psave, *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1), *keyaddr;
   struct crec *crecp, *recp1;
-  int rc, j, qtype, qclass, rdlen, flags, algo, valid, keytag;
+  int rc, j, qtype, qclass, rdlen, flags, algo, keytag, sigcnt, rrcnt;
   unsigned long ttl, sig_ttl;
-  struct blockdata *key;
   union all_addr a;
-  int failflags = DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG | DNSSEC_FAIL_NODSSUP | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOZONE | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY;
+  int failflags = DNSSEC_FAIL_NODSSUP | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOZONE;
+  char valid_digest[255];
+  static unsigned char **cached_digest;
+  static size_t cached_digest_size = 0;
 
-  if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 ||
+  if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 || RCODE(header) != NOERROR || !extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
-      RCODE(header) == SERVFAIL || RCODE(header) == REFUSED ||
-      !extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
     return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY;
 
   GETSHORT(qtype, p);
   GETSHORT(qclass, p);
   
-  if (qtype != T_DNSKEY || qclass != class || ntohs(header->ancount) == 0)
+  if (qtype != T_DNSKEY || qclass != class ||
+      !explore_rrset(header, plen, class, T_DNSKEY, name, keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt) ||
+      rrcnt == 0)
     return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY;
 
+  if (sigcnt == 0)
+    return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG;
+  
   /* See if we have cached a DS record which validates this key */
   if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_DS)))
     {
@@ -713,7 +749,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
     }
 
   /* NOTE, we need to find ONE DNSKEY which matches the DS */
-  for (valid = 0, j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0 && !valid; j--) 
+  for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--) 
     {
       /* Ensure we have type, class  TTL and length */
       if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
@@ -724,7 +760,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
       GETLONG(ttl, p);
       GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
  
-      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen) || rdlen < 4)
+      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
 	return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
       
       if (qclass != class || qtype != T_DNSKEY || rc == 2)
@@ -733,97 +769,133 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
 	  continue;
 	}
 
+      if (rdlen < 5)
+	return STAT_BOGUS;  /* min 1 byte key! */
+                  
       psave = p;
       
       GETSHORT(flags, p);
       if (*p++ != 3)
-	return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY;
+	{
+	  p = psave + rdlen;
+	  continue;
+	}
       algo = *p++;
-      keytag = dnskey_keytag(algo, flags, p, rdlen - 4);
+      keyaddr = p;
-      key = NULL;
+      keytag = dnskey_keytag(algo, flags, keyaddr, rdlen - 4);	      
+      
+      p = psave + rdlen; 
 
        /* key must have zone key flag set */
-      if (flags & 0x100)
+      if (!(flags & 0x100))
-	{
-	  key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p, rdlen - 4);
-	  failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NOZONE;
-	}
-      
-      p = psave;
-      
-      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
-	{
-	  if (key)
-	    blockdata_free(key);
-	  return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-	}
-
-      /* No zone key flag or malloc failure */
-      if (!key)
 	continue;
       
+      failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NOZONE;
+      
+      /* clear digest cache. */
+      memset(valid_digest, 0, sizeof(valid_digest));
+      
       for (recp1 = crecp; recp1; recp1 = cache_find_by_name(recp1, name, now, F_DS))
 	{
 	  void *ctx;
 	  unsigned char *digest, *ds_digest;
 	  const struct nettle_hash *hash;
-	  int sigcnt, rrcnt;
 	  int wire_len;
 	  
-	  if (recp1->addr.ds.algo == algo && 
+	  if ((recp1->flags & F_NEG) ||
-	      recp1->addr.ds.keytag == keytag &&
+	      recp1->addr.ds.algo != algo ||
-	      recp1->uid == (unsigned int)class)
+	      recp1->addr.ds.keytag != keytag ||
-	    {
+	      recp1->uid != (unsigned int)class)
-	      failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY;
+	    continue;
 	  
 	  if (!(hash = hash_find(ds_digest_name(recp1->addr.ds.digest))))
 	    continue;
-	      else
+	     
 	  failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NODSSUP;
 	      
+	  if (recp1->addr.ds.keylen != (int)hash->digest_size ||
+	      !(ds_digest = blockdata_retrieve(recp1->addr.ds.keydata, recp1->addr.ds.keylen, NULL)))
+	    continue;
+
+	  if (valid_digest[recp1->addr.ds.digest])
+	    digest = cached_digest[recp1->addr.ds.digest];
+	  else
+	    {
+	      /* computing a hash is a unit of crypto work. */
+	      if (dec_counter(validate_counter, NULL))
+		return STAT_ABANDONED;
+	      
 	      if (!hash_init(hash, &ctx, &digest))
 		continue;
 	      
 	      wire_len = to_wire(name);
 	      
 	      /* Note that digest may be different between DSs, so 
-		 we can't move this outside the loop. */
+		 we can't move this outside the loop. We keep
+		 copies of each digest we make for this key,
+		 so maximum digest work is O(keys x digests_types)
+		 rather then O(keys x DSs) */
 	      hash->update(ctx, (unsigned int)wire_len, (unsigned char *)name);
 	      hash->update(ctx, (unsigned int)rdlen, psave);
 	      hash->digest(ctx, hash->digest_size, digest);
 	      
 	      from_wire(name);
 
-	      if (!(recp1->flags & F_NEG) &&
+	      if (recp1->addr.ds.digest >= cached_digest_size)
-		  recp1->addr.ds.keylen == (int)hash->digest_size &&
-		  (ds_digest = blockdata_retrieve(recp1->addr.ds.keydata, recp1->addr.ds.keylen, NULL)) &&
-		  memcmp(ds_digest, digest, recp1->addr.ds.keylen) == 0 &&
-		  explore_rrset(header, plen, class, T_DNSKEY, name, keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt) &&
-		  rrcnt != 0)
 		{
-		  if (sigcnt == 0)
+		  unsigned char **new;
-		    continue;
+		
-		  else
+		  /* whine_malloc zeros memory */
-		    failflags &= ~DNSSEC_FAIL_NOSIG;
+		  if ((new = whine_malloc((recp1->addr.ds.digest + 5) * sizeof(unsigned char *))))
+		    {
+		      if (cached_digest_size != 0)
+			{
+			  memcpy(new, cached_digest, cached_digest_size * sizeof(unsigned char *));
+			  free(cached_digest);
+			}
+		      
+		      cached_digest_size = recp1->addr.ds.digest + 5;
+		      cached_digest = new;
+		    }
+		}
+		    
+	      if (recp1->addr.ds.digest < cached_digest_size)
+		{
+		  if (!cached_digest[recp1->addr.ds.digest])
+		    cached_digest[recp1->addr.ds.digest] = whine_malloc(recp1->addr.ds.keylen);
+	      
+		  if (cached_digest[recp1->addr.ds.digest])
+		    {
+		      memcpy(cached_digest[recp1->addr.ds.digest], digest, recp1->addr.ds.keylen);
+		      valid_digest[recp1->addr.ds.digest] = 1;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	  
+	  if (memcmp(ds_digest, digest, recp1->addr.ds.keylen) == 0)
+	    {
+	      /* Found the key validated by a DS record.
+		 Now check the self-sig for the entire key RRset using that key.
+		 Note that validate_rrset() will never return STAT_NEED_KEY here,
+		 since we supply the key it will use as an argument. */
+	      struct blockdata *key;
+	     	      
+	      if (!(key = blockdata_alloc((char *)keyaddr, rdlen - 4)))
+		break;
 	      	      
 	      rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class, T_DNSKEY, sigcnt, rrcnt, name, keyname, 
-				      NULL, key, rdlen - 4, algo, keytag, &sig_ttl);
+				  NULL, key, rdlen - 4, algo, keytag, &sig_ttl, validate_counter);
 	      
-		  failflags &= rc;
-		  
-		  if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_SECURE))
-		    {
-		      valid = 1;
-		      break;
-		    }
-		}
-	    }
-	}
 	      blockdata_free(key);
-    }
 	      
-  if (valid)
+	      if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_ABANDONED))
-    {
+		return rc;
+	      
+	      /* can't validate KEY RRset with this key, see if there's another that
+		 will, which is validated by another DS. */
+	      if (!STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_SECURE))
+		break;
+	      
 	      /* DNSKEY RRset determined to be OK, now cache it. */
 	      cache_start_insert();
 	      
@@ -847,23 +919,22 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
 		  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
 		    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
 		  
-	  if (qclass == class && rc == 1)
-	    {
 		   psave = p;
 
-	      if (qtype == T_DNSKEY)
+		   if (qclass == class && rc == 1 && qtype == T_DNSKEY)
 		     {
 		       if (rdlen < 4)
-		    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
+			 return STAT_BOGUS; /* min 1 byte key! */
 		       
 		       GETSHORT(flags, p);
-		  if (*p++ != 3)
+		       if (*p++ == 3)
-		    return STAT_BOGUS;
+			 {
 			   algo = *p++;
 			   keytag = dnskey_keytag(algo, flags, p, rdlen - 4);
 			   
-		  if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p, rdlen - 4)))
+			   if (!(key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p, rdlen - 4)))
-		    {
+			     return STAT_BOGUS;
+			   
 			   a.key.keylen = rdlen - 4;
 			   a.key.keydata = key;
 			   a.key.algo = algo;
@@ -875,8 +946,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
 			       blockdata_free(key);
 			       return STAT_BOGUS;
 			     }
-		      else
+			   
-			{
 			   a.log.keytag = keytag;
 			   a.log.algo = algo;
 			   if (algo_digest_name(algo))
@@ -885,19 +955,16 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
 			     log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %hu, algo %hu (not supported)", 0);
 			 }
 		     }
-		}
 				  
-	      p = psave;
+		   p = psave + rdlen;
-	    }
-
-	  if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
-	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
 		}
 	      
 	      /* commit cache insert. */
 	      cache_end_insert();
 	      return STAT_OK;
 	    }
+	}
+    }
   
   log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DNSKEY", 0);
   return STAT_BOGUS | failflags;
@@ -916,9 +983,11 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
    STAT_BOGUS       no DS in reply or not signed, fails validation, bad packet.
    STAT_NEED_KEY    DNSKEY records to validate a DS not found, name in keyname
    STAT_NEED_DS     DS record needed.
+   STAT_ABANDONED   resource exhaustion.
 */
 
-int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)
+int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name,
+		       char *keyname, int class, int *validate_counter)
 {
   unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
   int qtype, qclass, rc, i, neganswer = 0, nons = 0, servfail = 0, neg_ttl = 0, found_supported = 0;
@@ -943,7 +1012,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
     servfail = neganswer = nons = 1;
   else
     {
-      rc = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname, NULL, 0, &neganswer, &nons, &neg_ttl);
+      rc = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname, NULL, 0, &neganswer, &nons, &neg_ttl, validate_counter);
   
       if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_INSECURE))
 	{
@@ -977,6 +1046,8 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
       
       for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount); i++)
 	{
+	  unsigned char *psave;
+
 	  if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
 	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
 	  
@@ -988,14 +1059,15 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
 	  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
 	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
 
+	  psave = p;
+	  
 	  if (aclass == class && atype == T_DS && rc == 1)
 	    { 
 	      int algo, digest, keytag;
-	      unsigned char *psave = p;
 	      struct blockdata *key;
 	   
-	      if (rdlen < 4)
+	      if (rdlen < 5)
-		return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
+		return STAT_BOGUS; /* min 1 byte digest! */
 	      
 	      GETSHORT(keytag, p);
 	      algo = *p++;
@@ -1006,7 +1078,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
 		  a.log.keytag = keytag;
 		  a.log.algo = algo;
 		  a.log.digest = digest;
-		  log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %hu, algo %hu, digest %hu (not supported)", 0);
+		  log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS for keytag %hu, algo %hu, digest %hu (not supported)", 0);
 		  neg_ttl = ttl;
 		} 
 	      else if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p, rdlen - 4)))
@@ -1027,16 +1099,13 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
 		      a.log.keytag = keytag;
 		      a.log.algo = algo;
 		      a.log.digest = digest;
-		      log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %hu, algo %hu, digest %hu", 0);
+		      log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS for keytag %hu, algo %hu, digest %hu", 0);
 		      found_supported = 1;
 		    } 
 		}
-	      
-	      p = psave;
 	    }
 	  
-	  if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
+	  p = psave + rdlen;
-	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
 	}
 
       cache_end_insert();
@@ -1139,6 +1208,7 @@ static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, const char *b)
     }
 }
 
+/* returns 0 on success, or DNSSEC_FAIL_* value on failure. */
 static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, unsigned char **labels, int nsec_count,
 				    char *workspace1_in, char *workspace2, char *name, int type, int *nons)
 {
@@ -1158,12 +1228,12 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
 
       p = nsecs[i];
       if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10))
-	return 0;
+	return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
       p += 8; /* class, type, TTL */
       GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
       psave = p;
-      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, 1, 10))
+      if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, 1, 0))
-	return 0;
+	return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
 
       /* If NSEC comes from wildcard expansion, use original wildcard
 	 as name for computation. */
@@ -1191,12 +1261,13 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
 	{
 	  /* 4035 para 5.4. Last sentence */
 	  if (type == T_NSEC || type == T_RRSIG)
-	    return 1;
+	    return 0;
 
 	  /* NSEC with the same name as the RR we're testing, check
 	     that the type in question doesn't appear in the type map */
 	  rdlen -= p - psave;
-	  /* rdlen is now length of type map, and p points to it */
+	  /* rdlen is now length of type map, and p points to it 
+	     packet checked to be as long as rdlen implies in prove_non_existence() */
 	  
 	  /* If we can prove that there's no NS record, return that information. */
 	  if (nons && rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_NS)) != 0)
@@ -1207,25 +1278,25 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
 	      /* A CNAME answer would also be valid, so if there's a CNAME is should 
 		 have been returned. */
 	      if ((p[2] & (0x80 >> T_CNAME)) != 0)
-		return 0;
+		return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
 	      
 	      /* If the SOA bit is set for a DS record, then we have the
 		 DS from the wrong side of the delegation. For the root DS, 
 		 this is expected. */
 	      if (name_labels != 0 && type == T_DS && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_SOA)) != 0)
-		return 0;
+		return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
 	    }
 
 	  while (rdlen >= 2)
 	    {
 	      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
-		return 0;
+		return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
 	      
 	      if (p[0] == type >> 8)
 		{
 		  /* Does the NSEC say our type exists? */
 		  if (offset < p[1] && (p[offset+2] & mask) != 0)
-		    return 0;
+		    return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
 		  
 		  break; /* finished checking */
 		}
@@ -1234,24 +1305,24 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
 	      p +=  p[1];
 	    }
 	  
-	  return 1;
+	  return 0;
 	}
       else if (rc == -1)
 	{
 	  /* Normal case, name falls between NSEC name and next domain name,
 	     wrap around case, name falls between NSEC name (rc == -1) and end */
 	  if (hostname_cmp(workspace2, name) >= 0 || hostname_cmp(workspace1, workspace2) >= 0)
-	    return 1;
+	    return 0;
 	}
       else 
 	{
 	  /* wrap around case, name falls between start and next domain name */
 	  if (hostname_cmp(workspace1, workspace2) >= 0 && hostname_cmp(workspace2, name) >=0 )
-	    return 1;
+	    return 0;
 	}
     }
   
-  return 0;
+  return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
 }
 
 /* return digest length, or zero on error */
@@ -1325,13 +1396,16 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
   for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
     if ((p = nsecs[i]))
       {
-       	if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 0) ||
+       	if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10) ||
 	    !(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned char *)workspace2)))
 	  return 0;
 	
 	p += 8; /* class, type, TTL */
 	GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
+
 	psave = p;
+
+	/* packet checked to be as long as implied by rdlen, salt_len and hash_len in prove_non_existence() */
 	p++; /* algo */
 	flags = *p++; /* flags */
 	p += 2; /* iterations */
@@ -1339,9 +1413,6 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
 	p += salt_len; /* salt */
 	hash_len = *p++; /* p now points to next hashed name */
 		
-	if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, hash_len))
-	  return 0;
-	
 	if (digest_len == base32_len && hash_len == base32_len)
 	  {
 	    int rc = memcmp(workspace2, digest, digest_len);
@@ -1349,7 +1420,8 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
 	    if (rc == 0)
 	      {
 		/* We found an NSEC3 whose hashed name exactly matches the query, so
-		   we just need to check the type map. p points to the RR data for the record. */
+		   we just need to check the type map. p points to the RR data for the record.
+		   Note we have packet length up to rdlen bytes checked. */
 		
 		int offset = (type & 0xff) >> 3;
 		int mask = 0x80 >> (type & 0x07);
@@ -1357,9 +1429,6 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
 		p += hash_len; /* skip next-domain hash */
 		rdlen -= p - psave;
 
-		if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
-		  return 0;
-		
 		if (rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0)
 		  {
 		    /* If we can prove that there's no NS record, return that information. */
@@ -1424,8 +1493,9 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
   return 0;
 }
 
-static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count,
+/* returns 0 on success, or DNSSEC_FAIL_* value on failure. */
-				     char *workspace1, char *workspace2, char *name, int type, char *wildname, int *nons)
+static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count, char *workspace1,
+				     char *workspace2, char *name, int type, char *wildname, int *nons, int *validate_counter)
 {
   unsigned char *salt, *p, *digest;
   int digest_len, i, iterations, salt_len, base32_len, algo = 0;
@@ -1445,7 +1515,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
   for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
     {
       if (!(p = skip_name(nsecs[i], header, plen, 15)))
-	return 0; /* bad packet */
+	return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; /* bad packet */
       
       p += 10; /* type, class, TTL, rdlen */
       algo = *p++;
@@ -1456,22 +1526,17 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
 
   /* No usable NSEC3s */
   if (i == nsec_count)
-    return 0;
+    return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
 
   p++; /* flags */
 
   GETSHORT (iterations, p);
-  /* Upper-bound iterations, to avoid DoS.
+  /* Upper-bound iterations, to avoid DoS. RFC 9276 refers. */
-     Strictly, there are lower bounds for small keys, but
+  if (iterations > daemon->limit[LIMIT_NSEC3_ITERS])
-     since we don't have key size info here, at least limit
+    return DNSSEC_FAIL_NSEC3_ITERS;
-     to the largest bound, for 4096-bit keys. RFC 5155 10.3 */
-  if (iterations > 2500)
-    return 0;
   
   salt_len = *p++;
   salt = p;
-  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, salt, plen, salt_len))
-    return 0; /* bad packet */
       
   /* Now prune so we only have NSEC3 records with same iterations, salt and algo */
   for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
@@ -1502,9 +1567,6 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
       if (salt_len != *p++)
 	continue;
       
-      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, salt_len))
-	return 0; /* bad packet */
-
       if (memcmp(p, salt, salt_len) != 0)
 	continue;
 
@@ -1512,11 +1574,14 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
       nsecs[i] = nsec3p;
     }
 
+  if (dec_counter(validate_counter, NULL))
+    return DNSSEC_FAIL_WORK;
+
   if ((digest_len = hash_name(name, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
-    return 0;
+    return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
   
   if (check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest, type, workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, nons, count_labels(name)))
-    return 1;
+    return 0;
 
   /* Can't find an NSEC3 which covers the name directly, we need the "closest encloser NSEC3" 
      or an answer inferred from a wildcard record. */
@@ -1531,15 +1596,20 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
       if (wildname && hostname_isequal(closest_encloser, wildname))
 	break;
 
+      if (dec_counter(validate_counter, NULL))
+	return DNSSEC_FAIL_WORK;
+      
       if ((digest_len = hash_name(closest_encloser, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
-	return 0;
+	return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
       
       for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
 	if ((p = nsecs[i]))
 	  {
-	    if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 0) ||
+	    if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 0))
-		!(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned char *)workspace2)))
+	      return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
-	      return 0;
+
+	    if (!(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned char *)workspace2)))
+	      return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
 	  
 	    if (digest_len == base32_len &&
 		memcmp(digest, workspace2, digest_len) == 0)
@@ -1554,14 +1624,17 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
   while ((closest_encloser = strchr(closest_encloser, '.')));
   
   if (!closest_encloser || !next_closest)
-    return 0;
+    return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
   
   /* Look for NSEC3 that proves the non-existence of the next-closest encloser */
+  if (dec_counter(validate_counter, NULL))
+    return DNSSEC_FAIL_WORK;
+  
   if ((digest_len = hash_name(next_closest, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
-    return 0;
+    return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
 
   if (!check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest, type, workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, NULL, 1))
-    return 0;
+    return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
   
   /* Finally, check that there's no seat of wildcard synthesis */
   if (!wildname)
@@ -1572,17 +1645,22 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
       wildcard--;
       *wildcard = '*';
       
+      if (dec_counter(validate_counter, NULL))
+	return DNSSEC_FAIL_WORK;
+      
       if ((digest_len = hash_name(wildcard, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
-	return 0;
+	return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
       
       if (!check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest, type, workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, NULL, 1))
-	return 0;
+	return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
     }
   
-  return 1;
+  return 0;
 }
 
-static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *keyname, char *name, int qtype, int qclass, char *wildname, int *nons, int *nsec_ttl)
+/* returns 0 on success, or DNSSEC_FAIL_* value on failure. */
+static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *keyname, char *name, int qtype, int qclass,
+			       char *wildname, int *nons, int *nsec_ttl, int *validate_counter)
 {
   static unsigned char **nsecset = NULL, **rrsig_labels = NULL;
   static int nsecset_sz = 0, rrsig_labels_sz = 0;
@@ -1594,7 +1672,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
   
   /* Move to NS section */
   if (!p || !(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header, plen)))
-    return 0;
+    return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
 
   auth_start = p;
   
@@ -1603,13 +1681,16 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
       unsigned char *pstart = p;
       
       if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 10))
-	return 0;
+	return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
 	  
       GETSHORT(type, p); 
       GETSHORT(class, p);
       GETLONG(ttl, p);
       GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
  
+      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
+	return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
+      
       if (class == qclass && (type == T_NSEC || type == T_NSEC3))
 	{
 	  if (nsec_ttl)
@@ -1622,12 +1703,12 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
 	  
 	  /* No mixed NSECing 'round here, thankyouverymuch */
 	  if (type_found != 0 && type_found != type)
-	    return 0;
+	    return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
 
 	  type_found = type;
 
 	  if (!expand_workspace(&nsecset, &nsecset_sz, nsecs_found))
-	    return 0; 
+	    return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; 
 	  
 	  if (type == T_NSEC)
 	    {
@@ -1642,30 +1723,33 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
 	      int res, j, rdlen1, type1, class1;
 	      
 	      if (!expand_workspace(&rrsig_labels, &rrsig_labels_sz, nsecs_found))
-		return 0;
+		return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
 	      
 	      rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] = NULL;
 	      
 	      for (j = ntohs(header->nscount); j != 0; j--)
 		{
+		  unsigned char *psav;
+
 		  if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon->workspacename, 0, 10)))
-		    return 0;
+		    return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
 		  
 		   GETSHORT(type1, p1); 
 		   GETSHORT(class1, p1);
 		   p1 += 4; /* TTL */
 		   GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1);
 
+		   psav = p1;
+		   
 		   if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
-		     return 0;
+		     return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
 		   
 		   if (res == 1 && class1 == qclass && type1 == T_RRSIG)
 		     {
 		       int type_covered;
-		       unsigned char *psav = p1;
 		   		       
 		       if (rdlen1 < 18)
-			 return 0; /* bad packet */
+			 return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; /* bad packet */
 
 		       GETSHORT(type_covered, p1);
 
@@ -1677,33 +1761,56 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
 			   if (!rrsig_labels[nsecs_found])
 			     rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] = p1;
 			   else if (*rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] != *p1) /* algo */
-			     return 0;
+			     return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
 			 }
-		       p1 = psav;
 		     }
 		   
-		   if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
+		   p1 = psav + rdlen1;
-		     return 0;
 		}
 
 	      /* Must have found at least one sig. */
 	      if (!rrsig_labels[nsecs_found])
-		return 0;
+		return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
+	    }
+	  else if (type == T_NSEC3)
+	    {
+	      /* Decode the packet structure enough to check that rdlen is big enough
+		 to contain everything other than the type bitmap.
+		 (packet checked to be long enough to contain rdlen above)
+		 We don't need to do any further length checks in check_nes3_coverage()
+		 or prove_non_existence_nsec3() */
+	      
+	      int salt_len, hash_len;
+	      unsigned char *psav = p;
+	      
+	      if (rdlen < 5)
+		return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
+	      
+	      p += 4; /* algo, flags, iterations */
+	      salt_len = *p++; /* salt_len */
+	      if (rdlen < (6 + salt_len)) 
+		return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; /* check up to hash_length */
+
+	      p += salt_len; /* salt */
+	      hash_len = *p++; 
+	      if (rdlen < (6 + salt_len + hash_len))
+		return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET; /* check to end of next hashed name */
+
+	      p = psav;
 	    }
 
 	  nsecset[nsecs_found++] = pstart;   
 	}
       
-      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
+      p += rdlen;
-	return 0;
     }
   
   if (type_found == T_NSEC)
     return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset, rrsig_labels, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
   else if (type_found == T_NSEC3)
-    return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecset, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, wildname, nons);
+    return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecset, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, wildname, nons, validate_counter);
   else
-    return 0;
+    return DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
 }
 
 /* Check signing status of name.
@@ -1798,6 +1905,7 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t now)
    STAT_BOGUS    signature is wrong, bad packet, no validation where there should be.
    STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is returned in keyname, class in *class)
    STAT_NEED_DS  need DS to complete validation (name is returned in keyname)
+   STAT_ABANDONED resource exhaustion.
 
    daemon->rr_status points to a char array which corressponds to the RRs in the 
    answer and auth sections. This is set to >1 for each RR which is validated, and 0 for any which aren't.
@@ -1807,7 +1915,7 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t now)
    if the nons argument is non-NULL.
 */
 int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, 
-			  int *class, int check_unsigned, int *neganswer, int *nons, int *nsec_ttl)
+			  int *class, int check_unsigned, int *neganswer, int *nons, int *nsec_ttl, int *validate_counter)
 {
   static unsigned char **targets = NULL;
   static int target_sz = 0;
@@ -1816,7 +1924,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
   int type1, class1, rdlen1 = 0, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype, targetidx;
   int i, j, rc = STAT_INSECURE;
   int secure = STAT_SECURE;
-   
+  int rc_nsec;
   /* extend rr_status if necessary */
   if (daemon->rr_status_sz < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount))
     {
@@ -1982,9 +2090,9 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
 		{
 		  unsigned long sig_ttl;
 		  rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class1, type1, sigcnt,
-				      rrcnt, name, keyname, &wildname, NULL, 0, 0, 0, &sig_ttl);
+				      rrcnt, name, keyname, &wildname, NULL, 0, 0, 0, &sig_ttl, validate_counter);
 		  
-		  if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_BOGUS) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_KEY) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_DS))
+		  if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_BOGUS) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_KEY) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_NEED_DS) || STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_ABANDONED))
 		    {
 		      if (class)
 			*class = class1; /* Class for DS or DNSKEY */
@@ -2018,8 +2126,8 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
 		     That's not a problem since if the RRsets later fail
 		     we'll return BOGUS then. */
 		  if (STAT_ISEQUAL(rc, STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD) &&
-		      !prove_non_existence(header, plen, keyname, name, type1, class1, wildname, NULL, NULL))
+		      ((rc_nsec = prove_non_existence(header, plen, keyname, name, type1, class1, wildname, NULL, NULL, validate_counter))) != 0)
-		    return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
+		    return  (rc_nsec & DNSSEC_FAIL_WORK) ? STAT_ABANDONED : (STAT_BOGUS | rc_nsec);
 
 		  rc = STAT_SECURE;
 		}
@@ -2044,20 +2152,24 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
 	
 	/* For anything other than a DS record, this situation is OK if either
 	   the answer is in an unsigned zone, or there's a NSEC records. */
-	if (!prove_non_existence(header, plen, keyname, name, qtype, qclass, NULL, nons, nsec_ttl))
+	if ((rc_nsec = prove_non_existence(header, plen, keyname, name, qtype, qclass, NULL, nons, nsec_ttl, validate_counter)) != 0)
 	  {
+	    if (rc_nsec & DNSSEC_FAIL_WORK)
+	      return STAT_ABANDONED;
+
 	    /* Empty DS without NSECS */
 	    if (qtype == T_DS)
-	      return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC;
+	      return STAT_BOGUS | rc_nsec;
 	    
-	    if (!STAT_ISEQUAL((rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now)), STAT_SECURE))
+	    if ((rc_nsec & (DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC | DNSSEC_FAIL_NSEC3_ITERS)) &&
+		!STAT_ISEQUAL((rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now)), STAT_SECURE))
 	      {
 		if (class)
 		  *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or NEED_KEY */
 		return rc;
 	      } 
 	    
-	    return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC; /* signed zone, no NSECs */
+	    return STAT_BOGUS | rc_nsec; /* signed zone, no NSECs */
 	  }
       }
   
@@ -2139,6 +2251,8 @@ int errflags_to_ede(int status)
     return EDE_NO_DNSKEY;
   else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NODSSUP)
     return EDE_USUPDS;
+  else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NSEC3_ITERS)
+    return EDE_UNS_NS3_ITER;
   else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_NONSEC)
     return EDE_NO_NSEC;
   else if (status & DNSSEC_FAIL_INDET)

src/forward.c

@@ -338,7 +338,8 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
       if (ad_reqd)
 	forward->flags |= FREC_AD_QUESTION;
 #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
-      forward->work_counter = DNSSEC_WORK;
+      forward->work_counter = daemon->limit[LIMIT_WORK];
+      forward->validate_counter = daemon->limit[LIMIT_CRYPTO]; 
       if (do_bit)
 	forward->flags |= FREC_DO_QUESTION;
 #endif
@@ -892,6 +893,9 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_header *header, time_t now, struct server
 static void dnssec_validate(struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header,
 			    ssize_t plen, int status, time_t now)
 {
+  struct frec *orig;
+  int log_resource = 0;
+
   daemon->log_display_id = forward->frec_src.log_id;
   
   /* We've had a reply already, which we're validating. Ignore this duplicate */
@@ -917,26 +921,27 @@ static void dnssec_validate(struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header,
 	}
     }
 
+  /* Find the original query that started it all.... */
+  for (orig = forward; orig->dependent; orig = orig->dependent);
+  
   /* As soon as anything returns BOGUS, we stop and unwind, to do otherwise
      would invite infinite loops, since the answers to DNSKEY and DS queries
      will not be cached, so they'll be repeated. */
   if (!STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_BOGUS) && !STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_TRUNCATED) && !STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_ABANDONED))
     {
       if (forward->flags & FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY)
-	status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, plen, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
+	status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, plen, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class, &orig->validate_counter);
       else if (forward->flags & FREC_DS_QUERY)
-	status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, plen, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
+	status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, plen, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class, &orig->validate_counter);
       else
 	status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, &forward->class, 
 				       !option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_IGN_NS) && (forward->sentto->flags & SERV_DO_DNSSEC),
-				       NULL, NULL, NULL);
+				       NULL, NULL, NULL, &orig->validate_counter);
-#ifdef HAVE_DUMPFILE
-      if (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_BOGUS))
-	dump_packet_udp((forward->flags & (FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY)) ? DUMP_SEC_BOGUS : DUMP_BOGUS,
-			header, (size_t)plen, &forward->sentto->addr, NULL, -daemon->port);
-#endif
     }
 
+  if (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_ABANDONED))
+    log_resource = 1;
+  
   /* Can't validate, as we're missing key data. Put this
      answer aside, whilst we get that. */     
   if (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_NEED_DS) || STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_NEED_KEY))
@@ -979,18 +984,19 @@ static void dnssec_validate(struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header,
 		  return;
 		}
 	    }
+	  else if (orig->work_counter-- == 0)
+	    {
+	      my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("limit exceeded: per-query subqueries"));
+	      log_resource = 1;
+	    }
 	  else
 	    {
 	      struct server *server;
-	      struct frec *orig;
 	      void *hash;
 	      size_t nn;
 	      int serverind, fd;
 	      struct randfd_list *rfds = NULL;
 	      
-	      /* Find the original query that started it all.... */
-	      for (orig = forward; orig->dependent; orig = orig->dependent);
-	      
 	      /* Make sure we don't expire and free the orig frec during the
 		 allocation of a new one: third arg of get_new_frec() does that. */
 	      if ((serverind = dnssec_server(forward->sentto, daemon->keyname, NULL, NULL)) != -1 &&
@@ -999,7 +1005,6 @@ static void dnssec_validate(struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header,
 					      daemon->keyname, forward->class,
 					      STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_NEED_KEY) ? T_DNSKEY : T_DS, server->edns_pktsz)) && 
 		  (hash = hash_questions(header, nn, daemon->namebuff)) &&
-		  --orig->work_counter != 0 &&
 		  (fd = allocate_rfd(&rfds, server)) != -1 &&
 		  (new = get_new_frec(now, server, 1)))
 		{
@@ -1065,6 +1070,21 @@ static void dnssec_validate(struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header,
       status = STAT_ABANDONED;
     }
 
+  if (log_resource)
+    {
+      /* Log the actual validation that made us barf. */
+      unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
+      if  (extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->namebuff, 0, 4) == 1)
+	my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("validation of %s failed: resource limit exceeded."),
+		  daemon->namebuff[0] ? daemon->namebuff : ".");
+    }
+  
+#ifdef HAVE_DUMPFILE
+  if (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_BOGUS) || STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_ABANDONED))
+    dump_packet_udp((forward->flags & (FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY)) ? DUMP_SEC_BOGUS : DUMP_BOGUS,
+		    header, (size_t)plen, &forward->sentto->addr, NULL, -daemon->port);
+#endif
+  
   /* Validated original answer, all done. */
   if (!forward->dependent)
     return_reply(now, forward, header, plen, status);
@@ -1337,6 +1357,12 @@ static void return_reply(time_t now, struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *he
 	  log_query(F_SECSTAT, domain, &a, result, 0);
 	}
     }
+
+  if ((daemon->limit[LIMIT_CRYPTO] - forward->validate_counter) > (int)daemon->metrics[METRIC_CRYPTO_HWM])
+    daemon->metrics[METRIC_CRYPTO_HWM] = daemon->limit[LIMIT_CRYPTO] - forward->validate_counter;
+
+  if ((daemon->limit[LIMIT_WORK] - forward->work_counter) > (int)daemon->metrics[METRIC_WORK_HWM])
+    daemon->metrics[METRIC_WORK_HWM] = daemon->limit[LIMIT_WORK] - forward->work_counter;
 #endif
   
   if (option_bool(OPT_NO_REBIND))
@@ -2018,7 +2044,7 @@ static ssize_t tcp_talk(int first, int last, int start, unsigned char *packet,
 /* Recurse down the key hierarchy */
 static int tcp_key_recurse(time_t now, int status, struct dns_header *header, size_t n, 
 			   int class, char *name, char *keyname, struct server *server, 
-			   int have_mark, unsigned int mark, int *keycount)
+			   int have_mark, unsigned int mark, int *keycount, int *validatecount)
 {
   int first, last, start, new_status;
   unsigned char *packet = NULL;
@@ -2030,20 +2056,34 @@ static int tcp_key_recurse(time_t now, int status, struct dns_header *header, si
       int log_save;
             
       /* limit the amount of work we do, to avoid cycling forever on loops in the DNS */
-      if (--(*keycount) == 0)
+      if (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_NEED_KEY))
-	new_status = STAT_ABANDONED;
+	new_status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n, name, keyname, class, validatecount);
-      else if (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_NEED_KEY))
-	new_status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n, name, keyname, class);
       else if (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_NEED_DS))
-	new_status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n, name, keyname, class);
+	new_status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n, name, keyname, class, validatecount);
       else 
 	new_status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, n, name, keyname, &class,
 					   !option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_IGN_NS) && (server->flags & SERV_DO_DNSSEC),
-					   NULL, NULL, NULL);
+					   NULL, NULL, NULL, validatecount);
       
-      if (!STAT_ISEQUAL(new_status, STAT_NEED_DS) && !STAT_ISEQUAL(new_status, STAT_NEED_KEY))
+      if (!STAT_ISEQUAL(new_status, STAT_NEED_DS) && !STAT_ISEQUAL(new_status, STAT_NEED_KEY) && !STAT_ISEQUAL(new_status, STAT_ABANDONED))
 	break;
       
+      if ((*keycount)-- == 0)
+	{
+	  my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("limit exceeded: per-query subqueries"));
+	  new_status = STAT_ABANDONED;
+	}
+      
+      if (STAT_ISEQUAL(new_status, STAT_ABANDONED))
+	{
+	  /* Log the actual validation that made us barf. */
+	  unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
+	  if  (extract_name(header, n, &p, daemon->namebuff, 0, 4) == 1)
+	    my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("validation of %s failed: resource limit exceeded."),
+		      daemon->namebuff[0] ? daemon->namebuff : ".");
+	  break;
+	}
+      
       /* Can't validate because we need a key/DS whose name now in keyname.
 	 Make query for same, and recurse to validate */
       if (!packet)
@@ -2074,7 +2114,8 @@ static int tcp_key_recurse(time_t now, int status, struct dns_header *header, si
       log_query_mysockaddr(F_NOEXTRA | F_DNSSEC | F_SERVER, keyname, &server->addr,
 			   STAT_ISEQUAL(new_status, STAT_NEED_KEY) ? "dnssec-query[DNSKEY]" : "dnssec-query[DS]", 0);
       
-      new_status = tcp_key_recurse(now, new_status, new_header, m, class, name, keyname, server, have_mark, mark, keycount);
+      new_status = tcp_key_recurse(now, new_status, new_header, m, class, name, keyname, server,
+				   have_mark, mark, keycount, validatecount);
       
       daemon->log_display_id = log_save;
       
@@ -2379,9 +2420,10 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
 #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
 		  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !checking_disabled && (master->flags & SERV_DO_DNSSEC))
 		    {
-		      int keycount = DNSSEC_WORK; /* Limit to number of DNSSEC questions, to catch loops and avoid filling cache. */
+		      int keycount = daemon->limit[LIMIT_WORK]; /* Limit to number of DNSSEC questions, to catch loops and avoid filling cache. */
+		      int validatecount = daemon->limit[LIMIT_CRYPTO]; 
 		      int status = tcp_key_recurse(now, STAT_OK, header, m, 0, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, 
-						   serv, have_mark, mark, &keycount);
+						   serv, have_mark, mark, &keycount, &validatecount);
 		      char *result, *domain = "result";
 		      
 		      union all_addr a;
@@ -2407,6 +2449,12 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
 			}
 		      
 		      log_query(F_SECSTAT, domain, &a, result, 0);
+		    
+		      if ((daemon->limit[LIMIT_CRYPTO] - validatecount) > (int)daemon->metrics[METRIC_CRYPTO_HWM])
+			daemon->metrics[METRIC_CRYPTO_HWM] = daemon->limit[LIMIT_CRYPTO] - validatecount;
+
+		      if ((daemon->limit[LIMIT_WORK] - keycount) > (int)daemon->metrics[METRIC_WORK_HWM])
+			daemon->metrics[METRIC_WORK_HWM] = daemon->limit[LIMIT_WORK] - keycount;
 		    }
 #endif
 		  

src/metrics.c

@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ const char * metric_names[] = {
     "dns_local_answered",
     "dns_stale_answered",
     "dns_unanswered",
+    "dnssec_max_crypto_use",
+    "dnssec_max_sig_fail",
+    "dnssec_max_work",
     "bootp",
     "pxe",
     "dhcp_ack",

src/metrics.h

@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ enum {
   METRIC_DNS_LOCAL_ANSWERED,
   METRIC_DNS_STALE_ANSWERED,
   METRIC_DNS_UNANSWERED_QUERY,
+  METRIC_CRYPTO_HWM,
+  METRIC_SIG_FAIL_HWM,
+  METRIC_WORK_HWM,
   METRIC_BOOTP,
   METRIC_PXE,
   METRIC_DHCPACK,

src/option.c

@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ struct myoption {
 #define LOPT_NO_DHCP6      382
 #define LOPT_NO_DHCP4      383
 #define LOPT_MAX_PROCS     384
+#define LOPT_DNSSEC_LIMITS 385
 
 #ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_LONG
 static const struct option opts[] =  
@@ -364,6 +365,7 @@ static const struct myoption opts[] =
     { "dnssec-check-unsigned", 2, 0, LOPT_DNSSEC_CHECK },
     { "dnssec-no-timecheck", 0, 0, LOPT_DNSSEC_TIME },
     { "dnssec-timestamp", 1, 0, LOPT_DNSSEC_STAMP },
+    { "dnssec-limits", 1, 0, LOPT_DNSSEC_LIMITS },
     { "dhcp-relay", 1, 0, LOPT_RELAY },
     { "ra-param", 1, 0, LOPT_RA_PARAM },
     { "quiet-dhcp", 0, 0, LOPT_QUIET_DHCP },
@@ -568,6 +570,7 @@ static struct {
   { LOPT_DNSSEC_CHECK, ARG_DUP, NULL, gettext_noop("Ensure answers without DNSSEC are in unsigned zones."), NULL },
   { LOPT_DNSSEC_TIME, OPT_DNSSEC_TIME, NULL, gettext_noop("Don't check DNSSEC signature timestamps until first cache-reload"), NULL },
   { LOPT_DNSSEC_STAMP, ARG_ONE, "<path>", gettext_noop("Timestamp file to verify system clock for DNSSEC"), NULL },
+  { LOPT_DNSSEC_LIMITS, ARG_ONE, "<limit>,..", gettext_noop("Set resource limits for DNSSEC validation"), NULL },
   { LOPT_RA_PARAM, ARG_DUP, "<iface>,[mtu:<value>|<interface>|off,][<prio>,]<intval>[,<lifetime>]", gettext_noop("Set MTU, priority, resend-interval and router-lifetime"), NULL },
   { LOPT_QUIET_DHCP, OPT_QUIET_DHCP, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not log routine DHCP."), NULL },
   { LOPT_QUIET_DHCP6, OPT_QUIET_DHCP6, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not log routine DHCPv6."), NULL },
@@ -5258,6 +5261,24 @@ err:
       }
 
 #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
+    case LOPT_DNSSEC_LIMITS:
+      {
+	int lim, val;
+
+	for (lim = LIMIT_SIG_FAIL; arg && lim < LIMIT_MAX ;  lim++, arg = comma)
+	  {
+	    comma = split(arg);
+
+	    if (!atoi_check(arg, &val))
+	      ret_err(gen_err);
+
+	    if (val != 0)
+	      daemon->limit[lim] = val;
+	  }
+	
+	break;
+      }
+      
     case LOPT_DNSSEC_STAMP: /* --dnssec-timestamp */
       daemon->timestamp_file = opt_string_alloc(arg); 
       break;
@@ -5869,7 +5890,12 @@ void read_opts(int argc, char **argv, char *compile_opts)
   daemon->randport_limit = 1;
   daemon->host_index = SRC_AH;
   daemon->max_procs = MAX_PROCS;
-  daemon->max_procs_used = 0;
+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
+  daemon->limit[LIMIT_SIG_FAIL] = DNSSEC_LIMIT_SIG_FAIL;
+  daemon->limit[LIMIT_CRYPTO] = DNSSEC_LIMIT_CRYPTO;
+  daemon->limit[LIMIT_WORK] = DNSSEC_LIMIT_WORK;
+  daemon->limit[LIMIT_NSEC3_ITERS] = DNSSEC_LIMIT_NSEC3_ITERS;
+#endif
   
   /* See comment above make_servers(). Optimises server-read code. */
   mark_servers(0);

src/rfc1035.c

@@ -875,7 +875,6 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
 #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
 	      if (!option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) || aqtype != T_RRSIG)
 #endif
-		if (qtype != T_ANY)
 		log_query(secflag | F_FORWARD | F_UPSTREAM | F_RRNAME, name, NULL, NULL, aqtype);
 	    }
 	  else if (!(flags & F_NXDOMAIN))