Files
finit/libink/server.c
T
Joachim Wiberg 63aabaa6df libink/dbus: identify the caller behind a broker
On the local bus SO_PEERCRED says who is calling and the kernel is the
one saying it.  Behind a broker one connection carries every caller,
so that credential describes dbus-daemon and nothing else, and every
privileged method was refused there, root included.

Ask the bus driver instead.  libink parks the call and hands us the
sender; we ask GetConnectionUnixUser and answer when the reply lands,
through the same event loop as everything else.  Nothing blocks:
blocking in PID 1 is why libuEv exists.  That needs calls libink can
make on a connection it already has, so it gained those too.

Answers are cached, since a bus never reuses a unique name while it
runs.  Not across a restart though: a new dbus-daemon numbers from
scratch and :1.7 becomes somebody else, so the cache goes when the
broker does.  A sender name too long to key on is refused rather than
truncated, two callers sharing a truncated key would share an
identity.

Privilege is no longer uid 0 alone.  The socket is already owned by
the --with-group group, so refusing its members every method that
changes anything left a wheel user able to open the bus and unable to
reboot.  Both gates now say the same thing.

Group membership needs NSS, which the C library loads with dlopen(),
so the lookup is compiled out where Finit is built to link statically.
That leaves such a build root-only, which is worth saying out loud
rather than leaving to be discovered.

Signed-off-by: Joachim Wiberg <troglobit@gmail.com>
2026-08-13 10:15:06 +02:00

226 lines
4.6 KiB
C

/* libink — listening socket, accept, peer-credential capture
*
* Copyright (c) 2026 Joachim Wiberg <troglobit@gmail.com>
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "internal.h"
static void close_save_errno(int fd)
{
int saved = errno;
close(fd);
errno = saved;
}
int link_server_new(link_server_t **out, const char *path, mode_t mode)
{
struct sockaddr_un sun = { .sun_family = AF_UNIX };
link_server_t *srv;
size_t plen;
int fd;
if (!out || !path || !*path) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
plen = strlen(path);
if (plen >= sizeof(sun.sun_path) || plen >= LINK_PATH_MAX) {
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
return -1;
}
srv = calloc(1, sizeof(*srv));
if (!srv)
return -1;
TAILQ_INIT(&srv->objects);
fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_NONBLOCK | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
if (fd < 0)
goto err_free;
memcpy(sun.sun_path, path, plen + 1);
(void)unlink(path);
/* fchmod() on a Unix-domain socket fd is a silent no-op on Linux:
* the file mode is fixed at bind() time as (0777 & ~umask). Set
* umask around the bind() so the socket appears with the mode the
* caller asked for atomically, with no window where it is more
* permissive. Who may connect is the caller's policy to set;
* per-method authorization happens later in dispatch via
* SO_PEERCRED. */
{
mode_t oldmask = umask(0777 & ~mode);
int rc = bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sun, sizeof(sun));
int saved = errno;
umask(oldmask);
if (rc < 0) {
errno = saved;
goto err_close;
}
}
if (listen(fd, 16) < 0)
goto err_unlink;
srv->fd = fd;
memcpy(srv->path, path, plen + 1);
*out = srv;
return 0;
err_unlink:
(void)unlink(path);
err_close:
close_save_errno(fd);
err_free:
free(srv);
return -1;
}
void link_server_free(link_server_t *srv)
{
struct link_object *o;
if (!srv)
return;
o = TAILQ_FIRST(&srv->objects);
while (o) {
struct link_object *next_o = TAILQ_NEXT(o, link);
struct link_vtable_entry *e = TAILQ_FIRST(&o->vtables);
while (e) {
struct link_vtable_entry *next_e = TAILQ_NEXT(e, link);
free(e);
e = next_e;
}
free(o);
o = next_o;
}
if (srv->fd >= 0)
close(srv->fd);
if (srv->path[0])
(void)unlink(srv->path);
free(srv);
}
int link_server_get_fd(const link_server_t *srv)
{
if (!srv)
return -1;
return srv->fd;
}
int link_server_accept(link_server_t *srv, link_connection_t **out)
{
struct ucred cred = { 0 };
socklen_t credlen = sizeof(cred);
link_connection_t *conn;
int cfd;
if (!srv || !out) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
cfd = accept4(srv->fd, NULL, NULL, SOCK_NONBLOCK | SOCK_CLOEXEC);
if (cfd < 0)
return -1;
conn = calloc(1, sizeof(*conn));
if (!conn) {
close_save_errno(cfd);
return -1;
}
conn->fd = cfd;
conn->auth = LINK_AUTH_NUL;
conn->server = srv;
if (getsockopt(cfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cred, &credlen) == 0)
conn->peer_uid = cred.uid;
else
conn->peer_uid = (uid_t)-1;
__auth_generate_guid(conn->guid);
*out = conn;
return 0;
}
void link_server_set_uid_resolver(link_server_t *srv, link_uid_resolver_t cb, void *userdata)
{
if (!srv)
return;
srv->uid_resolver = cb;
srv->uid_userdata = userdata;
}
void link_server_set_authorizer(link_server_t *srv, link_authorizer_t cb, void *userdata)
{
if (!srv)
return;
srv->authorizer = cb;
srv->authz_userdata = userdata;
}
link_connection_t *link_server_attach(link_server_t *srv, int fd, uid_t peer_uid,
unsigned int attach_flags)
{
link_connection_t *conn;
int flags;
/* On entry we always own `fd` -- close it on every failure path
* so callers don't have to track whether we touched fcntl state. */
if (!srv || fd < 0) {
if (fd >= 0)
close_save_errno(fd);
errno = EINVAL;
return NULL;
}
/* Match server_accept's fd setup: CLOEXEC first (so a fork-and-
* exec between the two calls cannot leak the fd), then NONBLOCK
* so process_binary's read loop can drain without hanging. */
flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD, 0);
if (flags < 0 || fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags | FD_CLOEXEC) < 0)
goto err_close;
flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
if (flags < 0 || fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) < 0)
goto err_close;
conn = calloc(1, sizeof(*conn));
if (!conn)
goto err_close;
conn->fd = fd;
conn->auth = LINK_AUTH_DONE; /* caller already handshook */
conn->server = srv;
conn->peer_uid = peer_uid;
conn->broker = !!(attach_flags & LINK_ATTACH_BROKER);
__auth_generate_guid(conn->guid);
return conn;
err_close:
close_save_errno(fd);
return NULL;
}