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On the local bus SO_PEERCRED says who is calling and the kernel is the one saying it. Behind a broker one connection carries every caller, so that credential describes dbus-daemon and nothing else, and every privileged method was refused there, root included. Ask the bus driver instead. libink parks the call and hands us the sender; we ask GetConnectionUnixUser and answer when the reply lands, through the same event loop as everything else. Nothing blocks: blocking in PID 1 is why libuEv exists. That needs calls libink can make on a connection it already has, so it gained those too. Answers are cached, since a bus never reuses a unique name while it runs. Not across a restart though: a new dbus-daemon numbers from scratch and :1.7 becomes somebody else, so the cache goes when the broker does. A sender name too long to key on is refused rather than truncated, two callers sharing a truncated key would share an identity. Privilege is no longer uid 0 alone. The socket is already owned by the --with-group group, so refusing its members every method that changes anything left a wheel user able to open the bus and unable to reboot. Both gates now say the same thing. Group membership needs NSS, which the C library loads with dlopen(), so the lookup is compiled out where Finit is built to link statically. That leaves such a build root-only, which is worth saying out loud rather than leaving to be discovered. Signed-off-by: Joachim Wiberg <troglobit@gmail.com>
226 lines
4.6 KiB
C
226 lines
4.6 KiB
C
/* libink — listening socket, accept, peer-credential capture
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2026 Joachim Wiberg <troglobit@gmail.com>
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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*/
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/un.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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static void close_save_errno(int fd)
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{
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int saved = errno;
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close(fd);
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errno = saved;
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}
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int link_server_new(link_server_t **out, const char *path, mode_t mode)
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{
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struct sockaddr_un sun = { .sun_family = AF_UNIX };
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link_server_t *srv;
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size_t plen;
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int fd;
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if (!out || !path || !*path) {
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errno = EINVAL;
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return -1;
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}
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plen = strlen(path);
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if (plen >= sizeof(sun.sun_path) || plen >= LINK_PATH_MAX) {
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errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
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return -1;
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}
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srv = calloc(1, sizeof(*srv));
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if (!srv)
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return -1;
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TAILQ_INIT(&srv->objects);
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fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_NONBLOCK | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
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if (fd < 0)
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goto err_free;
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memcpy(sun.sun_path, path, plen + 1);
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(void)unlink(path);
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/* fchmod() on a Unix-domain socket fd is a silent no-op on Linux:
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* the file mode is fixed at bind() time as (0777 & ~umask). Set
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* umask around the bind() so the socket appears with the mode the
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* caller asked for atomically, with no window where it is more
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* permissive. Who may connect is the caller's policy to set;
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* per-method authorization happens later in dispatch via
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* SO_PEERCRED. */
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{
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mode_t oldmask = umask(0777 & ~mode);
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int rc = bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sun, sizeof(sun));
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int saved = errno;
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umask(oldmask);
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if (rc < 0) {
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errno = saved;
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goto err_close;
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}
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}
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if (listen(fd, 16) < 0)
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goto err_unlink;
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srv->fd = fd;
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memcpy(srv->path, path, plen + 1);
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*out = srv;
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return 0;
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err_unlink:
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(void)unlink(path);
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err_close:
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close_save_errno(fd);
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err_free:
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free(srv);
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return -1;
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}
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void link_server_free(link_server_t *srv)
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{
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struct link_object *o;
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if (!srv)
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return;
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o = TAILQ_FIRST(&srv->objects);
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while (o) {
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struct link_object *next_o = TAILQ_NEXT(o, link);
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struct link_vtable_entry *e = TAILQ_FIRST(&o->vtables);
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while (e) {
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struct link_vtable_entry *next_e = TAILQ_NEXT(e, link);
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free(e);
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e = next_e;
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}
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free(o);
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o = next_o;
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}
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if (srv->fd >= 0)
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close(srv->fd);
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if (srv->path[0])
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(void)unlink(srv->path);
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free(srv);
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}
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int link_server_get_fd(const link_server_t *srv)
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{
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if (!srv)
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return -1;
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return srv->fd;
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}
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int link_server_accept(link_server_t *srv, link_connection_t **out)
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{
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struct ucred cred = { 0 };
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socklen_t credlen = sizeof(cred);
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link_connection_t *conn;
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int cfd;
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if (!srv || !out) {
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errno = EINVAL;
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return -1;
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}
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cfd = accept4(srv->fd, NULL, NULL, SOCK_NONBLOCK | SOCK_CLOEXEC);
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if (cfd < 0)
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return -1;
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conn = calloc(1, sizeof(*conn));
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if (!conn) {
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close_save_errno(cfd);
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return -1;
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}
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conn->fd = cfd;
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conn->auth = LINK_AUTH_NUL;
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conn->server = srv;
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if (getsockopt(cfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cred, &credlen) == 0)
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conn->peer_uid = cred.uid;
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else
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conn->peer_uid = (uid_t)-1;
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__auth_generate_guid(conn->guid);
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*out = conn;
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return 0;
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}
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void link_server_set_uid_resolver(link_server_t *srv, link_uid_resolver_t cb, void *userdata)
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{
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if (!srv)
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return;
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srv->uid_resolver = cb;
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srv->uid_userdata = userdata;
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}
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void link_server_set_authorizer(link_server_t *srv, link_authorizer_t cb, void *userdata)
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{
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if (!srv)
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return;
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srv->authorizer = cb;
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srv->authz_userdata = userdata;
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}
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link_connection_t *link_server_attach(link_server_t *srv, int fd, uid_t peer_uid,
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unsigned int attach_flags)
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{
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link_connection_t *conn;
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int flags;
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/* On entry we always own `fd` -- close it on every failure path
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* so callers don't have to track whether we touched fcntl state. */
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if (!srv || fd < 0) {
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if (fd >= 0)
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close_save_errno(fd);
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errno = EINVAL;
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return NULL;
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}
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/* Match server_accept's fd setup: CLOEXEC first (so a fork-and-
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* exec between the two calls cannot leak the fd), then NONBLOCK
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* so process_binary's read loop can drain without hanging. */
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flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD, 0);
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if (flags < 0 || fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags | FD_CLOEXEC) < 0)
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goto err_close;
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flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
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if (flags < 0 || fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) < 0)
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goto err_close;
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conn = calloc(1, sizeof(*conn));
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if (!conn)
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goto err_close;
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conn->fd = fd;
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conn->auth = LINK_AUTH_DONE; /* caller already handshook */
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conn->server = srv;
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conn->peer_uid = peer_uid;
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conn->broker = !!(attach_flags & LINK_ATTACH_BROKER);
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__auth_generate_guid(conn->guid);
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return conn;
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err_close:
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close_save_errno(fd);
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return NULL;
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}
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