UBJSON/BJData/MessagePack reader: reject a container count equal to SIZE_MAX (#6002)

* UBJSON/BJData reader: reject a container count equal to SIZE_MAX

The reader marks a container whose count is not known by npos, which
is SIZE_MAX. A count of exactly that value was stored unchanged and
then read as "no count", so the BJData input

    [ # M ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff i 01 ]

parsed as [1] instead of throwing out_of_range.408 as a count of
2^64-2 does. Where size_t is 32 bits, the same holds for 'm' and 'L'
counts of 2^32-1, in UBJSON too.

The counts of 'm', 'M' and the signed types now go through
store_ubjson_count(), which rejects npos with "integer value overflow"
(the message a count beyond size_t already gets), as the CBOR reader
does in get_cbor_container_size(). An ND-array dimension of 2^64-1 gets
the same message now, where it was "excessive ndarray size caused
overflow" (the product check) on 64-bit platforms.

Signed-off-by: Niels Lohmann <mail@nlohmann.me>

* MessagePack reader: reject an array/map 32 length equal to SIZE_MAX

On a platform with a 32-bit std::size_t, an array 32 or map 32 length of
0xFFFFFFFF equals unknown_size(), so start_array()/start_object() were
told the size was unknown and skipped the max_size() check. Route both
through the CBOR length check, renamed get_container_size(), which
already rejects that value.

Signed-off-by: Niels Lohmann <mail@nlohmann.me>

---------

Signed-off-by: Niels Lohmann <mail@nlohmann.me>

tests/src/unit-ubjson.cpp

@@ -2385,6 +2385,18 @@ TEST_CASE("UBJSON optimized arrays of a valueless type are bounded")
         }
     }
 
+    SECTION("a count equal to SIZE_MAX is rejected")
+    {
+        // the reader marks a container without a count by SIZE_MAX, so a
+        // count of that value must not be read as "no count"; UBJSON's
+        // largest count type (int64) can only reach it where size_t is 32 bits
+#if SIZE_MAX == 0xffffffff
+        const std::vector<uint8_t> input = {'[', '#', 'L', 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 'i', 0x01, ']'};
+        CHECK_THROWS_WITH_AS(_ = json::from_ubjson(input), "[json.exception.out_of_range.408] syntax error while parsing UBJSON size: integer value overflow", json::out_of_range&);
+        CHECK(json::from_ubjson(input, true, false).is_discarded());
+#endif
+    }
+
     SECTION("ordinary counts are unaffected")
     {
         CHECK(json::from_ubjson(std::vector<uint8_t>({'[', '$', 'Z', '#', 'i', 3})) == json({nullptr, nullptr, nullptr}));