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This commit is contained in:
Sergio R. Caprile
2023-12-20 16:40:31 -03:00
parent 24d9fbffae
commit 285dc63c5c
7 changed files with 396 additions and 402 deletions
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src/tls_aes128.c
+1
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@@ -1000,3 +1000,4 @@ int aes_gcm_decrypt(unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *input,
return (ret);
}
#endif
// End of aes128 PD
src/tls_aes128.h
+1
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@@ -261,3 +261,4 @@ int aes_gcm_decrypt(unsigned char *output, const unsigned char *input,
#endif
// End of aes128 PD
src/tls_builtin.c
+53 -60
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
#if MG_TLS == MG_TLS_BUILTIN
/* handshake is re-entrant, so we need to keep track of its state */
// handshake is re-entrant, so we need to keep track of its state
enum mg_tls_hs_state {
MG_TLS_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, // first, wait for ClientHello
MG_TLS_HS_SERVER_HELLO, // then, send all server handshake data at once
@@ -11,27 +11,26 @@ enum mg_tls_hs_state {
MG_TLS_HS_DONE, // finish handshake, start application data flow
};
/* per-connection TLS data */
// per-connection TLS data
struct tls_data {
enum mg_tls_hs_state state; /* keep track of connection handshake progress */
enum mg_tls_hs_state state; // keep track of connection handshake progress
struct mg_iobuf send;
struct mg_iobuf recv;
mg_sha256_ctx sha256; /* incremental SHA-256 hash for TLS handshake */
mg_sha256_ctx sha256; // incremental SHA-256 hash for TLS handshake
uint32_t sseq; /* server sequence number, used in encryption */
uint32_t cseq; /* client sequence number, used in decryption */
uint32_t sseq; // server sequence number, used in encryption
uint32_t cseq; // client sequence number, used in decryption
uint8_t session_id[32]; /* client session ID between the handshake states */
uint8_t x25519_cli[32]; /* client X25519 key between the handshake states */
uint8_t x25519_sec[32]; /* x25519 secret between the handshake
states */
uint8_t session_id[32]; // client session ID between the handshake states
uint8_t x25519_cli[32]; // client X25519 key between the handshake states
uint8_t x25519_sec[32]; // x25519 secret between the handshake states
struct mg_str server_cert_der; /* server certificate in DER format */
uint8_t server_key[32]; /* server EC private key */
struct mg_str server_cert_der; // server certificate in DER format
uint8_t server_key[32]; // server EC private key
/* keys for AES encryption */
// keys for AES encryption
uint8_t handshake_secret[32];
uint8_t server_write_key[16];
uint8_t server_write_iv[12];
@@ -69,7 +68,7 @@ static limb_t umaal(limb_t *carry, limb_t acc, limb_t mand, limb_t mier) {
return (limb_t) tmp;
}
/* These functions are implemented in terms of umaal on ARM */
// These functions are implemented in terms of umaal on ARM
static limb_t adc(limb_t *carry, limb_t acc, limb_t mand) {
dlimb_t total = (dlimb_t) *carry + acc + mand;
*carry = (limb_t) (total >> X25519_WBITS);
@@ -82,11 +81,10 @@ static limb_t adc0(limb_t *carry, limb_t acc) {
return (limb_t) total;
}
/* Precondition: carry is small.
* Invariant: result of propagate is < 2^255 + 1 word
* In particular, always less than 2p.
* Also, output x >= min(x,19)
*/
// - Precondition: carry is small.
// - Invariant: result of propagate is < 2^255 + 1 word
// - In particular, always less than 2p.
// - Also, output x >= min(x,19)
static void propagate(fe x, limb_t over) {
unsigned i;
limb_t carry;
@@ -160,14 +158,11 @@ static void condswap(limb_t a[2 * NLIMBS], limb_t b[2 * NLIMBS],
}
}
// Canonicalize a field element x, reducing it to the least residue which is
// congruent to it mod 2^255-19
// - Precondition: x < 2^255 + 1 word
static limb_t canon(fe x) {
/* Canonicalize a field element x, reducing it to the least residue
* which is congruent to it mod 2^255-19.
*
* Precondition: x < 2^255 + 1 word
*/
/* First, add 19. */
// First, add 19.
unsigned i;
limb_t carry0 = 19;
limb_t res;
@@ -177,18 +172,14 @@ static limb_t canon(fe x) {
}
propagate(x, carry0);
/* Here, 19 <= x2 < 2^255
*
* This is because we added 19, so before propagate it can't be less than 19.
* After propagate, it still can't be less than 19, because if propagate does
* anything it adds 19.
*
* We know that the high bit must be clear, because either the input was
* ~ 2^255 + one word + 19 (in which case it propagates to at most 2 words)
* or it was < 2^255.
*
* So now, if we subtract 19, we will get back to something in [0,2^255-19).
*/
// Here, 19 <= x2 < 2^255
// - This is because we added 19, so before propagate it can't be less
// than 19. After propagate, it still can't be less than 19, because if
// propagate does anything it adds 19.
// - We know that the high bit must be clear, because either the input was ~
// 2^255 + one word + 19 (in which case it propagates to at most 2 words) or
// it was < 2^255. So now, if we subtract 19, we will get back to something in
// [0,2^255-19).
carry = -19;
res = 0;
for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; i++) {
@@ -270,7 +261,7 @@ static int x25519(uint8_t out[X25519_BYTES], const uint8_t scalar[X25519_BYTES],
{3, 1, 2}, {3, 1, 2}, {3, 1, 1}};
x25519_core(xs, scalar, x1, clamp);
/* Precomputed inversion chain */
// Precomputed inversion chain
x2 = xs[0];
z2 = xs[1];
z3 = xs[3];
@@ -286,21 +277,21 @@ static int x25519(uint8_t out[X25519_BYTES], const uint8_t scalar[X25519_BYTES],
mul1(a, xs[steps[i].c]);
}
/* Here prev = z3 */
/* x2 /= z2 */
// Here prev = z3
// x2 /= z2
mul((limb_t *) out, x2, z3, NLIMBS);
ret = (int) canon((limb_t *) out);
if (!clamp) ret = 0;
return ret;
}
/* a help to hexdump buffers inline */
// helper to hexdump buffers inline
static void mg_tls_hexdump(const char *msg, uint8_t *buf, size_t bufsz) {
char p[2048];
MG_INFO(("%s: %s", msg, mg_hex(buf, bufsz, p)));
}
/* TLS1.3 secret derivation based on the key label */
// TLS1.3 secret derivation based on the key label
static void mg_tls_derive_secret(const char *label, uint8_t *key, size_t keysz,
uint8_t *data, size_t datasz, uint8_t *hash,
size_t hashsz) {
@@ -317,7 +308,7 @@ static void mg_tls_derive_secret(const char *label, uint8_t *key, size_t keysz,
memmove(hash, secret, hashsz);
}
/* receive as much data as we can, but at least one full TLS record */
// receive as much data as we can, but at least one full TLS record
static int mg_tls_recv_msg(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = c->tls;
struct mg_iobuf *rio = &tls->recv;
@@ -354,7 +345,7 @@ static void mg_tls_drop_packet(struct mg_iobuf *rio) {
// rio->len = rio->len - n;
}
/* read and parse ClientHello record */
// read and parse ClientHello record
static int mg_tls_client_hello(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = c->tls;
struct mg_iobuf *rio = &tls->recv;
@@ -409,7 +400,7 @@ static int mg_tls_client_hello(struct mg_connection *c) {
return -1;
}
/* put ServerHello record into wio buffer */
// put ServerHello record into wio buffer
static void mg_tls_server_hello(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = c->tls;
struct mg_iobuf *wio = &tls->send;
@@ -460,8 +451,8 @@ static void mg_tls_server_hello(struct mg_connection *c) {
mg_iobuf_add(wio, wio->len, "\x14\x03\x03\x00\x01\x01", 6);
}
/* at this point we have x25519 shared secret, we can generate a
* set of derived handshake encryption keys */
// at this point we have x25519 shared secret, we can generate a set of derived
// handshake encryption keys
static void mg_tls_generate_handshake_keys(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = c->tls;
@@ -506,7 +497,7 @@ static void mg_tls_generate_handshake_keys(struct mg_connection *c) {
tls->client_finished_key, 32);
}
/* AES GCM enctyption of the message + put encoded data into the write buffer */
// AES GCM encryption of the message + put encoded data into the write buffer
static void mg_tls_encrypt(struct mg_connection *c, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msgsz, uint8_t msgtype) {
struct tls_data *tls = c->tls;
@@ -538,7 +529,7 @@ static void mg_tls_encrypt(struct mg_connection *c, const uint8_t *msg,
tls->sseq++;
}
/* read an encrypted message, decrypt it into read buffer (AES GCM) */
// read an encrypted message, decrypt it into read buffer (AES GCM)
static int mg_tls_recv_decrypt(struct mg_connection *c, void *buf,
size_t bufsz) {
struct tls_data *tls = c->tls;
@@ -553,7 +544,7 @@ static int mg_tls_recv_decrypt(struct mg_connection *c, void *buf,
if (rio->buf[0] == 0x17) {
break;
} else if (rio->buf[0] == 0x15) {
MG_INFO(("TLS ALERT packet received")); /* TODO: drop packet? */
MG_INFO(("TLS ALERT packet received")); // TODO: drop packet?
} else {
mg_error(c, "unexpected packet");
return -1;
@@ -613,7 +604,7 @@ static void mg_tls_server_cert(struct mg_connection *c) {
mg_tls_encrypt(c, cert, 13 + n, 0x16);
}
/* type adapter between uECC hash context and our sha256 implementation */
// type adapter between uECC hash context and our sha256 implementation
typedef struct SHA256_HashContext {
uECC_HashContext uECC;
mg_sha256_ctx ctx;
@@ -661,12 +652,12 @@ static void mg_tls_server_verify_ecdsa(struct mg_connection *c) {
neg1 = !!(sig[0] & 0x80);
neg2 = !!(sig[32] & 0x80);
verify[8] = 0x30; /* ASN.1 SEQUENCE */
verify[8] = 0x30; // ASN.1 SEQUENCE
verify[9] = (uint8_t) (68 + neg1 + neg2);
verify[10] = 0x02; /* ASN.1 INTEGER */
verify[10] = 0x02; // ASN.1 INTEGER
verify[11] = (uint8_t) (32 + neg1);
memmove(verify + 12 + neg1, sig, 32);
verify[12 + 32 + neg1] = 0x02; /* ASN.1 INTEGER */
verify[12 + 32 + neg1] = 0x02; // ASN.1 INTEGER
verify[13 + 32 + neg1] = (uint8_t) (32 + neg2);
memmove(verify + 14 + 32 + neg1 + neg2, sig + 32, 32);
@@ -794,7 +785,9 @@ void mg_tls_handshake(struct mg_connection *c) {
mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c);
tls->state = MG_TLS_HS_DONE;
// fallthrough
case MG_TLS_HS_DONE: c->is_tls_hs = 0; return;
case MG_TLS_HS_DONE:
c->is_tls_hs = 0;
return;
}
}
@@ -838,7 +831,7 @@ void mg_tls_init(struct mg_connection *c, const struct mg_tls_opts *opts) {
mg_error(c, "tls oom");
return;
}
/* parse PEM or DER EC key */
// parse PEM or DER EC key
if (opts->key.ptr == NULL ||
mg_parse_pem(opts->key, mg_str_s("EC PRIVATE KEY"), &key) < 0) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed to load EC private key"));
@@ -848,8 +841,8 @@ void mg_tls_init(struct mg_connection *c, const struct mg_tls_opts *opts) {
MG_ERROR(("EC private key too short"));
return;
}
/* expect ASN.1 SEQUENCE=[INTEGER=1, BITSTRING of 32 bytes, ...] */
/* 30 nn 02 01 01 04 20 [key] ... */
// expect ASN.1 SEQUENCE=[INTEGER=1, BITSTRING of 32 bytes, ...]
// 30 nn 02 01 01 04 20 [key] ...
if (key.ptr[0] != 0x30 || (key.ptr[1] & 0x80) != 0) {
MG_ERROR(("EC private key: ASN.1 bad sequence"));
return;
@@ -860,7 +853,7 @@ void mg_tls_init(struct mg_connection *c, const struct mg_tls_opts *opts) {
memmove(tls->server_key, key.ptr + 7, 32);
free((void *) key.ptr);
/* parse PEM or DER certificate */
// parse PEM or DER certificate
if (mg_parse_pem(opts->cert, mg_str_s("CERTIFICATE"), &tls->server_cert_der) <
0) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed to load certificate"));
src/tls_uecc.c
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@@ -3171,3 +3171,4 @@ void uECC_point_mult(uECC_word_t *result, const uECC_word_t *point,
#endif /* uECC_ENABLE_VLI_API */
#endif // MG_TLS_BUILTIN
// End of uecc BSD-2
src/tls_uecc.h
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@@ -636,3 +636,4 @@ typedef uint64_t uECC_word_t;
#endif /* uECC_WORD_SIZE */
#endif /* _UECC_TYPES_H_ */
// End of uecc BSD-2