TLS: fix resuming handshake, cert req length, 2-way auth app key generation and handling

This commit is contained in:
Sergio R. Caprile committed 2025-11-04 15:35:28 -03:00
1 parent 340f0dbf89
commit e0304f2b8f
3 files changed
+68 -40

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+3 -5
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@@ -804,10 +804,8 @@ static void read_conn(struct mg_connection *c, struct pkt *pkt) {
// if not already running, setup a timer to send an ACK later
if (s->ttype != MIP_TTYPE_ACK) settmout(c, MIP_TTYPE_ACK);
}
if (c->is_tls && c->is_tls_hs) {
mg_tls_handshake(c);
} else if (c->is_tls) {
handle_tls_recv(c);
if (c->is_tls) {
c->is_tls_hs ? mg_tls_handshake(c) : handle_tls_recv(c);
} else {
// Plain text connection, data is already in c->recv, trigger MG_EV_READ
mg_call(c, MG_EV_READ, &pkt->pay.len);
@@ -1428,7 +1426,7 @@ void mg_mgr_poll(struct mg_mgr *mgr, int ms) {
mg_tls_pending(c), c->rtls.len));
// order is important, TLS conn close with > 1 record in buffer (below)
if (is_tls && (c->rtls.len > 0 || mg_tls_pending(c) > 0))
handle_tls_recv(c);
c->is_tls_hs ? mg_tls_handshake(c) : handle_tls_recv(c);
if (can_write(c)) write_conn(c);
if (is_tls && c->send.len == 0) mg_tls_flush(c);
if (c->is_draining && c->send.len == 0 && s->ttype != MIP_TTYPE_FIN)
+31 -15
View File
@@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ struct tls_data {
size_t pubkeysz; // size of the server public key
uint8_t sighash[32]; // calculated signature verification hash
struct tls_enc enc;
struct tls_enc enc; // actual keys in use at this time
struct tls_enc app_keys; // storage during two-way auth handshake
};
#define TLS_RECHDR_SIZE 5 // 1 byte type, 2 bytes version, 2 bytes length
@@ -483,8 +484,7 @@ static int mg_tls_recv_record(struct mg_connection *c) {
}
if (rio->buf[0] == MG_TLS_APP_DATA) {
break;
} else if (rio->buf[0] ==
MG_TLS_CHANGE_CIPHER) { // Skip ChangeCipher messages
} else if (rio->buf[0] == MG_TLS_CHANGE_CIPHER) { // skip CCS
mg_tls_drop_record(c);
} else if (rio->buf[0] == MG_TLS_ALERT) { // Skip Alerts
MG_INFO(("TLS ALERT packet received"));
@@ -693,29 +693,28 @@ static void mg_tls_server_send_ext(struct mg_connection *c) {
// signature algorithms we actually support:
// rsa_pkcs1_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 and ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
static const uint8_t secp256r1_sig_algs[12] = {
0x00, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x06, 0x04, 0x03, 0x08, 0x04, 0x04, 0x01,
0x00, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x06, 0x04, 0x03, 0x08, 0x04, 0x04, 0x01
};
static void mg_tls_server_send_cert_request(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
size_t n = sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs) + 6;
uint8_t *req = (uint8_t *) mg_calloc(1, 13 + n);
uint8_t *req = (uint8_t *) mg_calloc(1, 13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs));
if (req == NULL) {
mg_error(c, "tls cert req oom");
return;
}
req[0] = MG_TLS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; // handshake header
MG_STORE_BE24(req + 1, n + 9);
req[4] = 0; // context length
MG_STORE_BE16(req + 5, n); // extensions length
MG_STORE_BE24(req + 1, 9 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs));
req[4] = 0; // context length
MG_STORE_BE16(req + 5, 6 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); // extensions length
MG_STORE_BE16(req + 7, 13); // "signature algorithms"
MG_STORE_BE16(req + 9, sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs) + 2); // length
MG_STORE_BE16(req + 9, 2 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); // length
MG_STORE_BE16(
req + 11,
sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); // signature hash algorithms length
memcpy(req + 13, (uint8_t *) secp256r1_sig_algs, sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs));
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, req, 13 + n);
mg_tls_encrypt(c, req, 13 + n, MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE);
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, req, 13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs));
mg_tls_encrypt(c, req, 13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs), MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE);
mg_free(req);
}
@@ -1556,11 +1555,19 @@ static void mg_tls_client_handshake(struct mg_connection *c) {
break;
}
if (tls->cert_requested && tls->cert_der.len > 0) { // two-way auth
// generate application keys at this point, keep using handshake keys
struct tls_enc hs_keys = tls->enc;
mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c);
tls->app_keys = tls->enc;
tls->enc = hs_keys;
mg_tls_send_cert(c, true);
mg_tls_send_cert_verify(c, true);
mg_tls_client_send_finish(c);
tls->enc = tls->app_keys;
} else {
mg_tls_client_send_finish(c);
mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c);
}
mg_tls_client_send_finish(c);
mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c);
tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_CONNECTED;
c->is_tls_hs = 0;
mg_call(c, MG_EV_TLS_HS, NULL);
@@ -1586,6 +1593,11 @@ static void mg_tls_server_handshake(struct mg_connection *c) {
mg_tls_send_cert_verify(c, false);
mg_tls_server_send_finish(c);
if (tls->is_twoway) {
// generate application keys at this point, keep using handshake keys
struct tls_enc hs_keys = tls->enc;
mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c);
tls->app_keys = tls->enc;
tls->enc = hs_keys;
tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_WAIT_CERT;
break;
}
@@ -1595,7 +1607,11 @@ static void mg_tls_server_handshake(struct mg_connection *c) {
if (mg_tls_server_recv_finish(c) < 0) {
return;
}
mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c);
if (tls->is_twoway) { // use previously generated keys
tls->enc = tls->app_keys;
} else { // generate keys now
mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c);
}
tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_CONNECTED;
c->is_tls_hs = 0;
return;