diff --git a/mongoose.c b/mongoose.c index aaff20d6..519de7db 100644 --- a/mongoose.c +++ b/mongoose.c @@ -4968,10 +4968,8 @@ static void read_conn(struct mg_connection *c, struct pkt *pkt) { // if not already running, setup a timer to send an ACK later if (s->ttype != MIP_TTYPE_ACK) settmout(c, MIP_TTYPE_ACK); } - if (c->is_tls && c->is_tls_hs) { - mg_tls_handshake(c); - } else if (c->is_tls) { - handle_tls_recv(c); + if (c->is_tls) { + c->is_tls_hs ? mg_tls_handshake(c) : handle_tls_recv(c); } else { // Plain text connection, data is already in c->recv, trigger MG_EV_READ mg_call(c, MG_EV_READ, &pkt->pay.len); @@ -5592,7 +5590,7 @@ void mg_mgr_poll(struct mg_mgr *mgr, int ms) { mg_tls_pending(c), c->rtls.len)); // order is important, TLS conn close with > 1 record in buffer (below) if (is_tls && (c->rtls.len > 0 || mg_tls_pending(c) > 0)) - handle_tls_recv(c); + c->is_tls_hs ? mg_tls_handshake(c) : handle_tls_recv(c); if (can_write(c)) write_conn(c); if (is_tls && c->send.len == 0) mg_tls_flush(c); if (c->is_draining && c->send.len == 0 && s->ttype != MIP_TTYPE_FIN) @@ -11164,7 +11162,8 @@ struct tls_data { size_t pubkeysz; // size of the server public key uint8_t sighash[32]; // calculated signature verification hash - struct tls_enc enc; + struct tls_enc enc; // actual keys in use at this time + struct tls_enc app_keys; // storage during two-way auth handshake }; #define TLS_RECHDR_SIZE 5 // 1 byte type, 2 bytes version, 2 bytes length @@ -11554,8 +11553,7 @@ static int mg_tls_recv_record(struct mg_connection *c) { } if (rio->buf[0] == MG_TLS_APP_DATA) { break; - } else if (rio->buf[0] == - MG_TLS_CHANGE_CIPHER) { // Skip ChangeCipher messages + } else if (rio->buf[0] == MG_TLS_CHANGE_CIPHER) { // skip CCS mg_tls_drop_record(c); } else if (rio->buf[0] == MG_TLS_ALERT) { // Skip Alerts MG_INFO(("TLS ALERT packet received")); @@ -11764,29 +11762,28 @@ static void mg_tls_server_send_ext(struct mg_connection *c) { // signature algorithms we actually support: // rsa_pkcs1_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 and ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 static const uint8_t secp256r1_sig_algs[12] = { - 0x00, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x06, 0x04, 0x03, 0x08, 0x04, 0x04, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x06, 0x04, 0x03, 0x08, 0x04, 0x04, 0x01 }; static void mg_tls_server_send_cert_request(struct mg_connection *c) { struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls; - size_t n = sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs) + 6; - uint8_t *req = (uint8_t *) mg_calloc(1, 13 + n); + uint8_t *req = (uint8_t *) mg_calloc(1, 13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); if (req == NULL) { mg_error(c, "tls cert req oom"); return; } req[0] = MG_TLS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; // handshake header - MG_STORE_BE24(req + 1, n + 9); - req[4] = 0; // context length - MG_STORE_BE16(req + 5, n); // extensions length + MG_STORE_BE24(req + 1, 9 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); + req[4] = 0; // context length + MG_STORE_BE16(req + 5, 6 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); // extensions length MG_STORE_BE16(req + 7, 13); // "signature algorithms" - MG_STORE_BE16(req + 9, sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs) + 2); // length + MG_STORE_BE16(req + 9, 2 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); // length MG_STORE_BE16( req + 11, sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); // signature hash algorithms length memcpy(req + 13, (uint8_t *) secp256r1_sig_algs, sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); - mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, req, 13 + n); - mg_tls_encrypt(c, req, 13 + n, MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE); + mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, req, 13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); + mg_tls_encrypt(c, req, 13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs), MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE); mg_free(req); } @@ -12259,7 +12256,8 @@ static int mg_tls_parse_cert_der(void *buf, size_t dersz, } static int mg_tls_verify_cert_san(const uint8_t *der, size_t dersz, - const char *server_name) { + const char *server_name, + struct mg_addr *server_ip) { struct mg_der_tlv root, field, name; if (mg_der_parse((uint8_t *) der, dersz, &root) < 0) { MG_ERROR(("failed to parse certificate")); @@ -12274,12 +12272,16 @@ static int mg_tls_verify_cert_san(const uint8_t *der, size_t dersz, return -1; } while (mg_der_next(&field, &name) > 0) { - MG_DEBUG(("Found SAN: %.*s", name.len, name.value)); - if (mg_match(mg_str(server_name), mg_str_n((char *) name.value, name.len), - NULL)) { - // Found SAN that matches the host name - return 1; - } + if (name.type == 0x87 && name.len == 4) { // this is an IPv4 address + MG_DEBUG(("Found SAN, IP: %M", mg_print_ip4, name.value)); + if (!server_ip->is_ip6 && *((uint32_t *) name.value) == server_ip->ip4) + return 1; // and matches the one we're connected to + } else { // this is a text SAN + MG_DEBUG(("Found SAN, (%u): %.*s", name.type, name.len, name.value)); + if (mg_match(mg_str(server_name), mg_str_n((char *) name.value, name.len), + NULL)) + return 1; // and matches the host name + } // TODO(): add IPv6 comparison, more items ? } return -1; } @@ -12419,7 +12421,7 @@ static int mg_tls_recv_cert(struct mg_connection *c, bool is_client) { // First certificate in the chain is peer cert, check SAN if requested, // and store public key for further CertVerify step if (tls->hostname[0] != '\0' && - mg_tls_verify_cert_san(cert, certsz, tls->hostname) <= 0 && + mg_tls_verify_cert_san(cert, certsz, tls->hostname, &c->rem) <= 0 && mg_tls_verify_cert_cn(&ci->subj, tls->hostname) <= 0) { mg_error(c, "failed to verify hostname"); return -1; @@ -12627,11 +12629,19 @@ static void mg_tls_client_handshake(struct mg_connection *c) { break; } if (tls->cert_requested && tls->cert_der.len > 0) { // two-way auth + // generate application keys at this point, keep using handshake keys + struct tls_enc hs_keys = tls->enc; + mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c); + tls->app_keys = tls->enc; + tls->enc = hs_keys; mg_tls_send_cert(c, true); mg_tls_send_cert_verify(c, true); + mg_tls_client_send_finish(c); + tls->enc = tls->app_keys; + } else { + mg_tls_client_send_finish(c); + mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c); } - mg_tls_client_send_finish(c); - mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c); tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_CONNECTED; c->is_tls_hs = 0; mg_call(c, MG_EV_TLS_HS, NULL); @@ -12657,6 +12667,11 @@ static void mg_tls_server_handshake(struct mg_connection *c) { mg_tls_send_cert_verify(c, false); mg_tls_server_send_finish(c); if (tls->is_twoway) { + // generate application keys at this point, keep using handshake keys + struct tls_enc hs_keys = tls->enc; + mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c); + tls->app_keys = tls->enc; + tls->enc = hs_keys; tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_WAIT_CERT; break; } @@ -12666,7 +12681,11 @@ static void mg_tls_server_handshake(struct mg_connection *c) { if (mg_tls_server_recv_finish(c) < 0) { return; } - mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c); + if (tls->is_twoway) { // use previously generated keys + tls->enc = tls->app_keys; + } else { // generate keys now + mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c); + } tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_CONNECTED; c->is_tls_hs = 0; return; diff --git a/src/net_builtin.c b/src/net_builtin.c index 37813e06..c62864a7 100644 --- a/src/net_builtin.c +++ b/src/net_builtin.c @@ -804,10 +804,8 @@ static void read_conn(struct mg_connection *c, struct pkt *pkt) { // if not already running, setup a timer to send an ACK later if (s->ttype != MIP_TTYPE_ACK) settmout(c, MIP_TTYPE_ACK); } - if (c->is_tls && c->is_tls_hs) { - mg_tls_handshake(c); - } else if (c->is_tls) { - handle_tls_recv(c); + if (c->is_tls) { + c->is_tls_hs ? mg_tls_handshake(c) : handle_tls_recv(c); } else { // Plain text connection, data is already in c->recv, trigger MG_EV_READ mg_call(c, MG_EV_READ, &pkt->pay.len); @@ -1428,7 +1426,7 @@ void mg_mgr_poll(struct mg_mgr *mgr, int ms) { mg_tls_pending(c), c->rtls.len)); // order is important, TLS conn close with > 1 record in buffer (below) if (is_tls && (c->rtls.len > 0 || mg_tls_pending(c) > 0)) - handle_tls_recv(c); + c->is_tls_hs ? mg_tls_handshake(c) : handle_tls_recv(c); if (can_write(c)) write_conn(c); if (is_tls && c->send.len == 0) mg_tls_flush(c); if (c->is_draining && c->send.len == 0 && s->ttype != MIP_TTYPE_FIN) diff --git a/src/tls_builtin.c b/src/tls_builtin.c index 27c3ca11..3da07e72 100644 --- a/src/tls_builtin.c +++ b/src/tls_builtin.c @@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ struct tls_data { size_t pubkeysz; // size of the server public key uint8_t sighash[32]; // calculated signature verification hash - struct tls_enc enc; + struct tls_enc enc; // actual keys in use at this time + struct tls_enc app_keys; // storage during two-way auth handshake }; #define TLS_RECHDR_SIZE 5 // 1 byte type, 2 bytes version, 2 bytes length @@ -483,8 +484,7 @@ static int mg_tls_recv_record(struct mg_connection *c) { } if (rio->buf[0] == MG_TLS_APP_DATA) { break; - } else if (rio->buf[0] == - MG_TLS_CHANGE_CIPHER) { // Skip ChangeCipher messages + } else if (rio->buf[0] == MG_TLS_CHANGE_CIPHER) { // skip CCS mg_tls_drop_record(c); } else if (rio->buf[0] == MG_TLS_ALERT) { // Skip Alerts MG_INFO(("TLS ALERT packet received")); @@ -693,29 +693,28 @@ static void mg_tls_server_send_ext(struct mg_connection *c) { // signature algorithms we actually support: // rsa_pkcs1_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 and ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 static const uint8_t secp256r1_sig_algs[12] = { - 0x00, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x06, 0x04, 0x03, 0x08, 0x04, 0x04, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x06, 0x04, 0x03, 0x08, 0x04, 0x04, 0x01 }; static void mg_tls_server_send_cert_request(struct mg_connection *c) { struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls; - size_t n = sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs) + 6; - uint8_t *req = (uint8_t *) mg_calloc(1, 13 + n); + uint8_t *req = (uint8_t *) mg_calloc(1, 13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); if (req == NULL) { mg_error(c, "tls cert req oom"); return; } req[0] = MG_TLS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; // handshake header - MG_STORE_BE24(req + 1, n + 9); - req[4] = 0; // context length - MG_STORE_BE16(req + 5, n); // extensions length + MG_STORE_BE24(req + 1, 9 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); + req[4] = 0; // context length + MG_STORE_BE16(req + 5, 6 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); // extensions length MG_STORE_BE16(req + 7, 13); // "signature algorithms" - MG_STORE_BE16(req + 9, sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs) + 2); // length + MG_STORE_BE16(req + 9, 2 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); // length MG_STORE_BE16( req + 11, sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); // signature hash algorithms length memcpy(req + 13, (uint8_t *) secp256r1_sig_algs, sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); - mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, req, 13 + n); - mg_tls_encrypt(c, req, 13 + n, MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE); + mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, req, 13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); + mg_tls_encrypt(c, req, 13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs), MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE); mg_free(req); } @@ -1188,7 +1187,8 @@ static int mg_tls_parse_cert_der(void *buf, size_t dersz, } static int mg_tls_verify_cert_san(const uint8_t *der, size_t dersz, - const char *server_name) { + const char *server_name, + struct mg_addr *server_ip) { struct mg_der_tlv root, field, name; if (mg_der_parse((uint8_t *) der, dersz, &root) < 0) { MG_ERROR(("failed to parse certificate")); @@ -1203,12 +1203,16 @@ static int mg_tls_verify_cert_san(const uint8_t *der, size_t dersz, return -1; } while (mg_der_next(&field, &name) > 0) { - MG_DEBUG(("Found SAN: %.*s", name.len, name.value)); - if (mg_match(mg_str(server_name), mg_str_n((char *) name.value, name.len), - NULL)) { - // Found SAN that matches the host name - return 1; - } + if (name.type == 0x87 && name.len == 4) { // this is an IPv4 address + MG_DEBUG(("Found SAN, IP: %M", mg_print_ip4, name.value)); + if (!server_ip->is_ip6 && *((uint32_t *) name.value) == server_ip->ip4) + return 1; // and matches the one we're connected to + } else { // this is a text SAN + MG_DEBUG(("Found SAN, (%u): %.*s", name.type, name.len, name.value)); + if (mg_match(mg_str(server_name), mg_str_n((char *) name.value, name.len), + NULL)) + return 1; // and matches the host name + } // TODO(): add IPv6 comparison, more items ? } return -1; } @@ -1348,7 +1352,7 @@ static int mg_tls_recv_cert(struct mg_connection *c, bool is_client) { // First certificate in the chain is peer cert, check SAN if requested, // and store public key for further CertVerify step if (tls->hostname[0] != '\0' && - mg_tls_verify_cert_san(cert, certsz, tls->hostname) <= 0 && + mg_tls_verify_cert_san(cert, certsz, tls->hostname, &c->rem) <= 0 && mg_tls_verify_cert_cn(&ci->subj, tls->hostname) <= 0) { mg_error(c, "failed to verify hostname"); return -1; @@ -1556,11 +1560,19 @@ static void mg_tls_client_handshake(struct mg_connection *c) { break; } if (tls->cert_requested && tls->cert_der.len > 0) { // two-way auth + // generate application keys at this point, keep using handshake keys + struct tls_enc hs_keys = tls->enc; + mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c); + tls->app_keys = tls->enc; + tls->enc = hs_keys; mg_tls_send_cert(c, true); mg_tls_send_cert_verify(c, true); + mg_tls_client_send_finish(c); + tls->enc = tls->app_keys; + } else { + mg_tls_client_send_finish(c); + mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c); } - mg_tls_client_send_finish(c); - mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c); tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_CONNECTED; c->is_tls_hs = 0; mg_call(c, MG_EV_TLS_HS, NULL); @@ -1586,6 +1598,11 @@ static void mg_tls_server_handshake(struct mg_connection *c) { mg_tls_send_cert_verify(c, false); mg_tls_server_send_finish(c); if (tls->is_twoway) { + // generate application keys at this point, keep using handshake keys + struct tls_enc hs_keys = tls->enc; + mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c); + tls->app_keys = tls->enc; + tls->enc = hs_keys; tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_WAIT_CERT; break; } @@ -1595,7 +1612,11 @@ static void mg_tls_server_handshake(struct mg_connection *c) { if (mg_tls_server_recv_finish(c) < 0) { return; } - mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c); + if (tls->is_twoway) { // use previously generated keys + tls->enc = tls->app_keys; + } else { // generate keys now + mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c); + } tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_CONNECTED; c->is_tls_hs = 0; return;