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mongoose/src/tls_builtin.c
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#include "base64.h"
#include "config.h"
#include "printf.h"
#include "sha256.h"
#include "tls.h"
#include "tls_aes128.h"
#include "tls_chacha20.h"
#include "tls_rsa.h"
#include "tls_uecc.h"
#include "tls_x25519.h"
#include "util.h"
#if MG_TLS == MG_TLS_BUILTIN
#ifndef MG_MAX_TLSOID_DEPTH
#define MG_MAX_TLSOID_DEPTH 15
#endif
// PKCS#8 algorithm OIDs
static const uint8_t mg_rsa_oid[] = {
0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01 // 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 rsaEncryption
};
static const uint8_t mg_ec_public_key_oid[] = {
0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01 // 1.2.840.10045.2.1 ecPublicKey
};
static const uint8_t mg_secp256r1_oid[] = {
0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce,
0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07 // 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 secp256r1
};
/* TLS 1.3 Record Content Type (RFC8446 B.1) */
#define MG_TLS_CHANGE_CIPHER 20
#define MG_TLS_ALERT 21
#define MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE 22
#define MG_TLS_APP_DATA 23
#define MG_TLS_HEARTBEAT 24
/* TLS 1.3 Handshake Message Type (RFC8446 B.3) */
#define MG_TLS_CLIENT_HELLO 1
#define MG_TLS_SERVER_HELLO 2
#define MG_TLS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS 8
#define MG_TLS_CERTIFICATE 11
#define MG_TLS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13
#define MG_TLS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15
#define MG_TLS_FINISHED 20
#define MG_TLS_RSA_USE_CRT 1 // CRT instead of naive RSA
// handshake is re-entrant, so we need to keep track of its state state names
// refer to RFC8446#A.1
enum mg_tls_hs_state {
// Client state machine:
MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_START, // Send ClientHello
MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_WAIT_SH, // Wait for ServerHello
MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_WAIT_EE, // Wait for EncryptedExtensions
MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_WAIT_CERT, // Wait for Certificate
MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_WAIT_CV, // Wait for CertificateVerify
MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_WAIT_FINISH, // Wait for Finish
MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_CONNECTED, // Done
// Server state machine:
MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_START, // Wait for ClientHello
MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_WAIT_CERT, // Wait for Certificate
MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_WAIT_CV, // Wait for CertificateVerify
MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_NEGOTIATED, // Wait for Finish
MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_CONNECTED // Done
};
// encryption keys for a TLS connection
struct tls_enc {
uint32_t sseq; // server sequence number, used in encryption
uint32_t cseq; // client sequence number, used in decryption
// keys for AES encryption or ChaCha20
uint8_t handshake_secret[32];
uint8_t server_write_key[32];
uint8_t server_write_iv[12];
uint8_t server_finished_key[32];
uint8_t client_write_key[32];
uint8_t client_write_iv[12];
uint8_t client_finished_key[32];
};
struct mg_rsa_key {
struct mg_str n; // modulus
struct mg_str e; // public exponent
struct mg_str d; // private exponent
struct mg_str p; // prime1
struct mg_str q; // prime2
struct mg_str dP; // exponent1 (d mod (p-1))
struct mg_str dQ; // exponent2 (d mod (q-1))
struct mg_str qInv; // coefficient ((inverse of q) mod p)
};
// per-connection TLS data
struct tls_data {
enum mg_tls_hs_state state; // keep track of connection handshake progress
struct mg_iobuf send; // For the receive path, we're reusing c->rtls
size_t recv_offset; // While c->rtls contains full records, reuse that
size_t recv_len; // buffer but point at individual decrypted messages
uint8_t content_type; // Last received record content type
mg_sha256_ctx sha256; // incremental SHA-256 hash for TLS handshake
uint8_t random[32]; // client random from ClientHello
uint8_t session_id[32]; // client session ID between the handshake states
uint8_t x25519_cli[32]; // client X25519 key between the handshake states
uint8_t p256_cli[32]; // client P-256 key between the handshake states
uint8_t x25519_sec[32]; // ECDHE secret (X25519 or P-256) between the states
bool skip_verification; // do not perform checks on server certificate
bool cert_requested; // client received a CertificateRequest
bool is_twoway; // server is configured to authenticate clients
bool is_sntp_pending; // TLS handshake is waiting for wall-clock time
struct mg_connection *timec; // SNTP connection for wall-clock time
struct mg_str cert_der; // certificate in DER format
struct mg_str ca_der; // current CA certificate
struct mg_str *ca_bundle_der; // bundle of CA certificates
size_t ca_bundle_len; // number of certificates in bundle
struct mg_str *chain_der; // certificate chain (intermediate certs)
size_t chain_len; // number of certificates in chain
uint8_t ec_key[32]; // EC private key
struct mg_rsa_key rsa;
struct mg_str rsa_key_der; // RSA private key in DER format
char hostname[254]; // matching hostname
bool is_ec_pubkey; // EC or RSA. TODO(): currently unused
uint8_t pubkey[512 + 16]; // server EC (64) or RSA (512+exp) public key to
// verify cert
size_t pubkeysz; // size of the server public key
uint8_t sighash[32]; // calculated signature verification hash
uint8_t sighash384[48]; // same, SHA-384, for ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
struct tls_enc enc; // actual keys in use at this time
struct tls_enc app_keys; // storage during two-way auth handshake
};
#define TLS_RECHDR_SIZE 5 // 1 byte type, 2 bytes version, 2 bytes length
#define TLS_MSGHDR_SIZE 4 // 1 byte type, 3 bytes length
#ifdef MG_TLS_SSLKEYLOGFILE
#include <stdio.h>
static void mg_ssl_key_log(const char *label, uint8_t client_random[32],
uint8_t *secret, size_t secretsz) {
FILE *f;
char *keylogfile = getenv("SSLKEYLOGFILE");
if (keylogfile == NULL) return;
MG_DEBUG(("Dumping key log into %s", keylogfile));
f = fopen(keylogfile, "a");
if (f != NULL) {
size_t i;
fprintf(f, "%s ", label);
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
fprintf(f, "%02x", client_random[i]);
}
fprintf(f, " ");
for (i = 0; i < secretsz; i++) {
fprintf(f, "%02x", secret[i]);
}
fprintf(f, "\n");
fclose(f);
} else {
MG_ERROR(("Cannot open %s", keylogfile));
}
}
#endif
// for derived tls keys we need SHA256([0]*32)
static uint8_t zeros[32] = {0};
static uint8_t zeros_sha256_digest[32] = {
0xe3, 0xb0, 0xc4, 0x42, 0x98, 0xfc, 0x1c, 0x14, 0x9a, 0xfb, 0xf4,
0xc8, 0x99, 0x6f, 0xb9, 0x24, 0x27, 0xae, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x64, 0x9b,
0x93, 0x4c, 0xa4, 0x95, 0x99, 0x1b, 0x78, 0x52, 0xb8, 0x55};
// helper to hexdump buffers inline
static void mg_tls_hexdump(const char *msg, uint8_t *buf, size_t bufsz) {
MG_VERBOSE(("%s: %M", msg, mg_print_hex, bufsz, buf));
}
// helper utilities to parse ASN.1 DER
struct mg_der_tlv {
uint8_t type;
uint32_t len;
uint8_t *value;
};
// parse DER into a TLV record
static int mg_der_to_tlv(uint8_t *der, size_t dersz, struct mg_der_tlv *tlv) {
uint32_t n = 0;
if (dersz < 2) return -1;
tlv->type = der[0];
tlv->len = der[1];
tlv->value = der + 2;
if (tlv->len > 0x7f) { // long-form length
uint32_t i;
n = tlv->len - 0x80;
if (n == 0 || n > 4 || dersz < (2 + n)) return -1;
tlv->len = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
tlv->len = (tlv->len << 8) | der[2 + i];
}
tlv->value += n;
}
if (tlv->len > dersz - (size_t) (tlv->value - der)) return -1;
return (int) n;
}
static int mg_der_parse(uint8_t *der, size_t dersz, struct mg_der_tlv *tlv) {
int n = mg_der_to_tlv(der, dersz, tlv);
if (n < 0) return -1;
if (tlv->len >= (uint32_t)((unsigned) -6)) return -1; // avoid overflow
return 2 + n + (int) tlv->len; // 2: type, len; n = long form len bytes
}
static int mg_der_next(struct mg_der_tlv *parent, struct mg_der_tlv *child) {
int consumed;
if (parent->len == 0) return 0;
consumed = mg_der_parse(parent->value, parent->len, child);
if (consumed < 0) return -1;
parent->value += consumed;
parent->len -= (uint32_t) consumed;
return 1;
}
static int der_find_oid(struct mg_der_tlv *tlv, const uint8_t *oid, size_t oid_len, struct mg_der_tlv *found, int depth) {
struct mg_der_tlv parent, child;
int r;
parent = *tlv;
while ((r = mg_der_next(&parent, &child)) > 0) {
if (child.type == 0x06 && child.len == oid_len &&
memcmp(child.value, oid, oid_len) == 0) {
return mg_der_next(&parent, found);
} else if (child.type & 0x20) {
struct mg_der_tlv sub_parent = child;
if (depth >= MG_MAX_TLSOID_DEPTH) {
MG_ERROR(("too nested der"));
return -1;
}
if ((r = der_find_oid(&sub_parent, oid, oid_len, found, depth + 1)) > 0)
return 1;
if (r < 0) return -1; // exit on error; r = 0 => not found, keep parsing
}
}
if (r < 0) return -1;
return 0;
}
static int mg_der_find_oid(struct mg_der_tlv *tlv, const uint8_t *oid,
size_t oid_len, struct mg_der_tlv *found) {
return der_find_oid(tlv, oid, oid_len, found, 0);
}
#if 0
static void mg_der_debug(struct mg_der_tlv *tlv, int depth) {
MG_DEBUG(("> %.*sd=%d Type: 0x%02X, Length: %u\n", depth * 4, " ", depth,
tlv->type, tlv->len));
if (tlv->type & 0x20) { // Constructed: recurse into children
struct mg_der_tlv child;
struct mg_der_tlv parent = *tlv;
while (mg_der_next(&parent, &child) > 0) {
mg_der_debug(&child, depth + 1);
}
}
}
#endif
// Did we receive a full TLS record in the c->rtls buffer?
static bool mg_tls_got_record(struct mg_connection *c) {
uint16_t rl;
if (c->rtls.len < (size_t) TLS_RECHDR_SIZE) return false;
rl = MG_LOAD_BE16(c->rtls.buf + 3);
if (rl > 16384 + 256) { // TLS 1.3 record max length (RFC-9846 5.1)
mg_error(c, "TLS record too large");
return false;
}
return c->rtls.len >= (size_t) (TLS_RECHDR_SIZE + rl);
}
// Remove a single TLS record from the recv buffer
static void mg_tls_drop_record(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct mg_iobuf *rio = &c->rtls;
uint16_t n = MG_LOAD_BE16(rio->buf + 3) + TLS_RECHDR_SIZE;
mg_iobuf_del(rio, 0, n);
}
// Remove a single TLS message from decrypted buffer, remove the wrapping
// record if it was the last message within a record
static void mg_tls_drop_message(struct mg_connection *c) {
uint32_t len;
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
unsigned char *recv_buf = &c->rtls.buf[tls->recv_offset];
if (tls->recv_len == 0) return;
len = MG_LOAD_BE24(recv_buf + 1) + TLS_MSGHDR_SIZE;
if (tls->recv_len < len) {
mg_error(c, "wrong size");
return;
}
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, recv_buf, len);
tls->recv_offset += len;
tls->recv_len -= len;
if (tls->recv_len == 0) {
mg_tls_drop_record(c);
}
}
// TLS1.3 secret derivation based on the key label
static void mg_tls_derive_secret(const char *label, uint8_t *key, size_t keysz,
uint8_t *data, size_t datasz, uint8_t *hash,
size_t hashsz) {
size_t labelsz = strlen(label);
uint8_t secret[32];
uint8_t packed[256] = {0, (uint8_t) hashsz, (uint8_t) labelsz};
// TODO: assert lengths of label, key, data and hash
if (labelsz > 0) memmove(packed + 3, label, labelsz);
packed[3 + labelsz] = (uint8_t) datasz;
if (datasz > 0) memmove(packed + labelsz + 4, data, datasz);
packed[4 + labelsz + datasz] = 1;
mg_hmac_sha256(secret, key, keysz, packed, 5 + labelsz + datasz);
memmove(hash, secret, hashsz);
}
// at this point we have x25519 shared secret, we can generate a set of derived
// handshake encryption keys
static void mg_tls_generate_handshake_keys(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
mg_sha256_ctx sha256;
uint8_t early_secret[32];
uint8_t pre_extract_secret[32];
uint8_t hello_hash[32];
uint8_t server_hs_secret[32];
uint8_t client_hs_secret[32];
#if MG_ENABLE_CHACHA20
const size_t keysz = 32;
#else
const size_t keysz = 16;
#endif
mg_hmac_sha256(early_secret, NULL, 0, zeros, sizeof(zeros));
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 derived", early_secret, 32, zeros_sha256_digest,
32, pre_extract_secret, 32);
mg_hmac_sha256(tls->enc.handshake_secret, pre_extract_secret,
sizeof(pre_extract_secret), tls->x25519_sec,
sizeof(tls->x25519_sec));
// ECDHE keys and secret are not needed anymore, wipe for forward secrecy
mg_bzero(tls->x25519_cli, sizeof(tls->x25519_cli));
mg_bzero(tls->p256_cli, sizeof(tls->p256_cli));
mg_bzero(tls->x25519_sec, sizeof(tls->x25519_sec));
mg_tls_hexdump("hs secret", tls->enc.handshake_secret, 32);
// mg_sha256_final is not idempotent, need to copy sha256 context to calculate
// the digest
memmove(&sha256, &tls->sha256, sizeof(mg_sha256_ctx));
mg_sha256_final(hello_hash, &sha256);
mg_tls_hexdump("hello hash", hello_hash, 32);
// derive keys needed for the rest of the handshake
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 s hs traffic", tls->enc.handshake_secret, 32,
hello_hash, 32, server_hs_secret, 32);
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 c hs traffic", tls->enc.handshake_secret, 32,
hello_hash, 32, client_hs_secret, 32);
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 key", server_hs_secret, 32, NULL, 0,
tls->enc.server_write_key, keysz);
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 iv", server_hs_secret, 32, NULL, 0,
tls->enc.server_write_iv, 12);
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 finished", server_hs_secret, 32, NULL, 0,
tls->enc.server_finished_key, 32);
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 key", client_hs_secret, 32, NULL, 0,
tls->enc.client_write_key, keysz);
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 iv", client_hs_secret, 32, NULL, 0,
tls->enc.client_write_iv, 12);
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 finished", client_hs_secret, 32, NULL, 0,
tls->enc.client_finished_key, 32);
mg_tls_hexdump("s hs traffic", server_hs_secret, 32);
mg_tls_hexdump("s key", tls->enc.server_write_key, keysz);
mg_tls_hexdump("s iv", tls->enc.server_write_iv, 12);
mg_tls_hexdump("s finished", tls->enc.server_finished_key, 32);
mg_tls_hexdump("c hs traffic", client_hs_secret, 32);
mg_tls_hexdump("c key", tls->enc.client_write_key, keysz);
mg_tls_hexdump("c iv", tls->enc.client_write_iv, 12);
mg_tls_hexdump("c finished", tls->enc.client_finished_key, 32);
#ifdef MG_TLS_SSLKEYLOGFILE
mg_ssl_key_log("SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET", tls->random,
server_hs_secret, 32);
mg_ssl_key_log("CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET", tls->random,
client_hs_secret, 32);
#endif
}
static void mg_tls_generate_application_keys(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
uint8_t hash[32];
uint8_t premaster_secret[32];
uint8_t master_secret[32];
uint8_t server_secret[32];
uint8_t client_secret[32];
#if MG_ENABLE_CHACHA20
const size_t keysz = 32;
#else
const size_t keysz = 16;
#endif
mg_sha256_ctx sha256;
memmove(&sha256, &tls->sha256, sizeof(mg_sha256_ctx));
mg_sha256_final(hash, &sha256);
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 derived", tls->enc.handshake_secret, 32,
zeros_sha256_digest, 32, premaster_secret, 32);
mg_hmac_sha256(master_secret, premaster_secret, 32, zeros, 32);
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 s ap traffic", master_secret, 32, hash, 32,
server_secret, 32);
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 key", server_secret, 32, NULL, 0,
tls->enc.server_write_key, keysz);
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 iv", server_secret, 32, NULL, 0,
tls->enc.server_write_iv, 12);
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 c ap traffic", master_secret, 32, hash, 32,
client_secret, 32);
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 key", client_secret, 32, NULL, 0,
tls->enc.client_write_key, keysz);
mg_tls_derive_secret("tls13 iv", client_secret, 32, NULL, 0,
tls->enc.client_write_iv, 12);
mg_tls_hexdump("s ap traffic", server_secret, 32);
mg_tls_hexdump("s key", tls->enc.server_write_key, keysz);
mg_tls_hexdump("s iv", tls->enc.server_write_iv, 12);
mg_tls_hexdump("s finished", tls->enc.server_finished_key, 32);
mg_tls_hexdump("c ap traffic", client_secret, 32);
mg_tls_hexdump("c key", tls->enc.client_write_key, keysz);
mg_tls_hexdump("c iv", tls->enc.client_write_iv, 12);
mg_tls_hexdump("c finished", tls->enc.client_finished_key, 32);
tls->enc.sseq = tls->enc.cseq = 0;
#ifdef MG_TLS_SSLKEYLOGFILE
mg_ssl_key_log("SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0", tls->random, server_secret, 32);
mg_ssl_key_log("CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0", tls->random, client_secret, 32);
#endif
}
// AES GCM encryption of the message + put encoded data into the write buffer
static bool mg_tls_encrypt(struct mg_connection *c, const uint8_t *msg,
size_t msgsz, uint8_t msgtype) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
struct mg_iobuf *wio = &tls->send;
uint8_t *outmsg;
uint8_t *tag;
size_t encsz = msgsz + 16 + 1;
uint8_t hdr[5] = {MG_TLS_APP_DATA, 0x03, 0x03,
(uint8_t) ((encsz >> 8) & 0xff), (uint8_t) (encsz & 0xff)};
uint8_t associated_data[5] = {MG_TLS_APP_DATA, 0x03, 0x03,
(uint8_t) ((encsz >> 8) & 0xff),
(uint8_t) (encsz & 0xff)};
uint8_t nonce[12];
uint32_t seq = c->is_client ? tls->enc.cseq : tls->enc.sseq;
uint8_t *key =
c->is_client ? tls->enc.client_write_key : tls->enc.server_write_key;
uint8_t *iv =
c->is_client ? tls->enc.client_write_iv : tls->enc.server_write_iv;
if (msgsz > 16384) {
MG_ERROR(("msg longer than recordsz"));
return false;
}
#if MG_ENABLE_CHACHA20
#else
mg_gcm_initialize();
#endif
memmove(nonce, iv, sizeof(nonce));
nonce[8] ^= (uint8_t) ((seq >> 24) & 255U);
nonce[9] ^= (uint8_t) ((seq >> 16) & 255U);
nonce[10] ^= (uint8_t) ((seq >> 8) & 255U);
nonce[11] ^= (uint8_t) ((seq) & 255U);
if (mg_iobuf_add(wio, wio->len, hdr, sizeof(hdr)) == 0 ||
!mg_iobuf_resize(wio, wio->len + encsz))
return false;
outmsg = wio->buf + wio->len;
tag = wio->buf + wio->len + msgsz + 1;
memmove(outmsg, msg, msgsz);
outmsg[msgsz] = msgtype;
#if MG_ENABLE_CHACHA20
(void) tag; // tag is only used in aes gcm
{
size_t n;
uint8_t *enc = (uint8_t *) mg_calloc(1, msgsz + 256 + 1);
if (enc == NULL) return false;
n = mg_chacha20_poly1305_encrypt(enc, key, nonce, associated_data,
sizeof(associated_data), outmsg,
msgsz + 1);
memmove(outmsg, enc, n);
mg_free(enc);
}
#else
mg_aes_gcm_encrypt(outmsg, outmsg, msgsz + 1, key, 16, nonce, sizeof(nonce),
associated_data, sizeof(associated_data), tag, 16);
#endif
c->is_client ? tls->enc.cseq++ : tls->enc.sseq++;
wio->len += encsz;
return true;
}
static void verbose_alert(uint8_t *buf) {
uint8_t level = buf[0], desc = buf[1];
MG_INFO(("TLS ALERT received: level=%d, desc=%d (%s)", level, desc,
desc == 0 ? "close_notify"
: desc == 10 ? "unexpected_message"
: desc == 20 ? "bad_record_mac"
: desc == 21 ? "decryption_failed"
: desc == 40 ? "handshake_failure"
: desc == 42 ? "bad_certificate"
: desc == 43 ? "unsupported_certificate"
: desc == 44 ? "certificate_revoked"
: desc == 45 ? "certificate_expired"
: desc == 46 ? "certificate_unknown"
: desc == 48 ? "unknown_ca"
: "unknown"));
}
// read an encrypted record, decrypt it in place
static int mg_tls_recv_record(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
struct mg_iobuf *rio = &c->rtls;
uint16_t msgsz;
uint8_t *msg;
uint8_t nonce[12];
int r;
uint32_t seq = c->is_client ? tls->enc.sseq : tls->enc.cseq;
uint8_t *key =
c->is_client ? tls->enc.server_write_key : tls->enc.client_write_key;
uint8_t *iv =
c->is_client ? tls->enc.server_write_iv : tls->enc.client_write_iv;
if (tls->recv_len > 0) {
return 0; /* some data from previous record is still present */
}
for (;;) {
if (!mg_tls_got_record(c)) {
return MG_IO_WAIT;
}
if (rio->buf[0] == MG_TLS_APP_DATA) {
break;
} else if (rio->buf[0] == MG_TLS_CHANGE_CIPHER) { // skip CCS
mg_tls_drop_record(c);
} else if (rio->buf[0] == MG_TLS_ALERT) { // Skip Alerts
if (rio->len >= 7) {
verbose_alert(&rio->buf[5]);
} else {
MG_INFO(("TLS ALERT packet received (short)"));
}
mg_tls_drop_record(c);
} else {
mg_error(c, "unexpected packet");
return -1;
}
}
msgsz = MG_LOAD_BE16(rio->buf + 3);
msg = rio->buf + 5;
if (msgsz < 17) {
mg_error(c, "wrong size");
return -1;
}
memmove(nonce, iv, sizeof(nonce));
nonce[8] ^= (uint8_t) ((seq >> 24) & 255U);
nonce[9] ^= (uint8_t) ((seq >> 16) & 255U);
nonce[10] ^= (uint8_t) ((seq >> 8) & 255U);
nonce[11] ^= (uint8_t) ((seq) & 255U);
#if MG_ENABLE_CHACHA20
{
uint8_t associated_data[5] = {MG_TLS_APP_DATA, 0x03, 0x03,
(uint8_t) ((msgsz >> 8) & 0xff),
(uint8_t) (msgsz & 0xff)};
uint8_t *dec = (uint8_t *) mg_calloc(1, msgsz);
size_t n;
if (dec == NULL) {
mg_error(c, "TLS OOM");
return -1;
}
n = mg_chacha20_poly1305_decrypt(dec, key, nonce, associated_data,
sizeof(associated_data), msg, msgsz);
if (n == (size_t) -1) {
mg_free(dec);
mg_error(c, "decryption error");
return -1;
}
memmove(msg, dec, n);
mg_free(dec);
}
#else
{
uint8_t associated_data[5] = {MG_TLS_APP_DATA, 0x03, 0x03,
(uint8_t) ((msgsz >> 8) & 0xff),
(uint8_t) (msgsz & 0xff)};
mg_gcm_initialize();
if (mg_aes_gcm_decrypt(msg, msg, msgsz - 16, key, 16, nonce, sizeof(nonce),
associated_data, sizeof(associated_data),
msg + msgsz - 16, 16) != 0) {
mg_error(c, "GCM tag verify failed");
return -1;
}
}
#endif
r = msgsz - 16 - 1;
tls->content_type = msg[msgsz - 16 - 1];
if (tls->content_type == MG_TLS_ALERT) { // Process Alerts
verbose_alert(msg);
if (msg[0] == 2) {
mg_error(c, "TLS Fatal alert");
return -1;
} else {
mg_tls_drop_record(c);
return MG_IO_WAIT;
}
}
tls->recv_offset = (size_t) msg - (size_t) rio->buf;
tls->recv_len = (size_t) msgsz - 16 - 1;
c->is_client ? tls->enc.sseq++ : tls->enc.cseq++;
return r;
}
// Hash the CertificateVerify content: SHA-256 into hash, and if hash384 is not
// NULL, SHA-384 into hash384 for ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
static void mg_tls_calc_cert_verify_hash(struct mg_connection *c,
uint8_t hash[32], uint8_t *hash384,
bool is_client) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
uint8_t sig_content[130];
mg_sha256_ctx sha256;
memset(sig_content, 0x20, 64);
if (is_client) {
uint8_t client_context[34] = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
memcpy(sig_content + 64, client_context, sizeof(client_context));
} else {
uint8_t server_context[34] = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
memcpy(sig_content + 64, server_context, sizeof(server_context));
}
memmove(&sha256, &tls->sha256, sizeof(mg_sha256_ctx));
mg_sha256_final(sig_content + 98, &sha256);
mg_sha256_init(&sha256);
mg_sha256_update(&sha256, sig_content, sizeof(sig_content));
mg_sha256_final(hash, &sha256);
if (hash384 != NULL) mg_sha384(hash384, sig_content, sizeof(sig_content));
}
// read and parse ClientHello record
static int mg_tls_server_recv_hello(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
struct mg_iobuf *rio = &c->rtls;
uint8_t session_id_len;
uint16_t j;
uint16_t cipher_suites_len;
uint16_t ext_len;
uint8_t *ext;
uint16_t msgsz;
if (!mg_tls_got_record(c)) {
return MG_IO_WAIT;
}
if (rio->buf[0] != MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE || rio->buf[5] != MG_TLS_CLIENT_HELLO) {
mg_error(c, "not a client hello packet");
return -1;
}
if (rio->len < 50) goto fail;
msgsz = MG_LOAD_BE16(rio->buf + 3);
if (((uint32_t) msgsz + 4) > rio->len) goto fail;
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, rio->buf + 5, msgsz);
// store client random
memmove(tls->random, rio->buf + 11, sizeof(tls->random));
// store session_id
session_id_len = rio->buf[43];
if (session_id_len == sizeof(tls->session_id)) {
if (rio->len < (size_t)(46 + session_id_len)) goto fail; // 2: ciphers len
memmove(tls->session_id, rio->buf + 44, session_id_len);
} else if (session_id_len != 0) {
MG_ERROR(("bad session id len"));
goto fail;
} // session_id_len is either sizeof(tls->session_id) or 0
if (((uint32_t) 44 + 2 + session_id_len) > rio->len) goto fail;
cipher_suites_len = MG_LOAD_BE16(rio->buf + 44 + session_id_len);
if (((uint32_t) cipher_suites_len + 46 + 2 + 2 + session_id_len) > rio->len)
goto fail;
ext_len = MG_LOAD_BE16(rio->buf + 48 + session_id_len + cipher_suites_len);
ext = rio->buf + 50 + session_id_len + cipher_suites_len;
if (((unsigned char *) ext + ext_len) > (rio->buf + rio->len)) goto fail;
for (j = 0; j < ext_len;) {
uint16_t k;
uint16_t key_exchange_len;
uint8_t *key_exchange;
uint16_t n = MG_LOAD_BE16(ext + j + 2);
if (((uint32_t) n + j + 4) > ext_len) goto fail;
if (MG_LOAD_BE16(ext + j) != 0x0033) { // not a key share extension, ignore
j += (uint16_t) (n + 4);
continue;
}
key_exchange_len = MG_LOAD_BE16(ext + j + 4);
key_exchange = ext + j + 6;
if ((key_exchange + key_exchange_len) > ((uint8_t *) rio->buf + rio->len))
goto fail;
for (k = 0; k < key_exchange_len;) {
uint16_t m = MG_LOAD_BE16(key_exchange + k + 2);
if (((uint32_t) m + k + 4) > key_exchange_len) goto fail;
if (m == 32 && key_exchange[k] == 0x00 && key_exchange[k + 1] == 0x1d) {
memmove(tls->x25519_cli, key_exchange + k + 4, m);
mg_tls_drop_record(c);
return 0;
}
k += (uint16_t) (m + 4);
}
j += (uint16_t) (n + 4);
}
fail:
mg_error(c, "bad client hello");
return -1;
}
#define PLACEHOLDER_8B 'X', 'X', 'X', 'X', 'X', 'X', 'X', 'X'
#define PLACEHOLDER_16B PLACEHOLDER_8B, PLACEHOLDER_8B
#define PLACEHOLDER_32B PLACEHOLDER_16B, PLACEHOLDER_16B
// put ServerHello record into wio buffer
static bool mg_tls_server_send_hello(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
struct mg_iobuf *wio = &tls->send;
// clang-format off
uint8_t msg_server_hello[122] = {
// server hello, tls 1.2
0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x76, 0x03, 0x03,
// random (32 bytes)
PLACEHOLDER_32B,
// session ID length + session ID (32 bytes)
0x20, PLACEHOLDER_32B,
#if MG_ENABLE_CHACHA20
// TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 + no compression
0x13, 0x03, 0x00,
#else
// TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 + no compression
0x13, 0x01, 0x00,
#endif
// extensions + keyshare
0x00, 0x2e, 0x00, 0x33, 0x00, 0x24, 0x00, 0x1d, 0x00, 0x20,
// x25519 keyshare
PLACEHOLDER_32B,
// supported versions (tls1.3 == 0x304)
0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04};
// clang-format on
// calculate keyshare
uint8_t x25519_pub[X25519_BYTES];
uint8_t x25519_prv[X25519_BYTES];
if (!mg_random(x25519_prv, sizeof(x25519_prv))) mg_error(c, "RNG");
if( mg_tls_x25519(x25519_pub, x25519_prv, X25519_BASE_POINT, 1) < 0 || mg_tls_x25519(tls->x25519_sec, x25519_prv, tls->x25519_cli, 1) < 0) {
mg_error(c, "bad key");
return false;
}
mg_tls_hexdump("s x25519 sec", tls->x25519_sec, sizeof(tls->x25519_sec));
// fill in the gaps: random + session ID + keyshare
memmove(msg_server_hello + 6, tls->random, sizeof(tls->random));
memmove(msg_server_hello + 39, tls->session_id, sizeof(tls->session_id));
memmove(msg_server_hello + 84, x25519_pub, sizeof(x25519_pub));
// server hello message
if (mg_iobuf_add(wio, wio->len, "\x16\x03\x03\x00\x7a", 5) == 0 ||
mg_iobuf_add(wio, wio->len, msg_server_hello, sizeof(msg_server_hello)) ==
0)
return false;
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, msg_server_hello, sizeof(msg_server_hello));
// change cipher message
if (mg_iobuf_add(wio, wio->len, "\x14\x03\x03\x00\x01\x01", 6) == 0)
return false;
return true;
}
static bool mg_tls_server_send_ext(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
// server extensions
uint8_t ext[6] = {0x08, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0};
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, ext, sizeof(ext));
return mg_tls_encrypt(c, ext, sizeof(ext), MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE);
}
// signature algorithms we actually support: ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
// ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 (if enabled), rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, rsa_pkcs1_sha256
static const uint8_t secp256r1_sig_algs[] = {
#if MG_UECC_SUPPORTS_secp384r1
0x00, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x08, 0x04, 0x03,
0x05, 0x03, 0x08, 0x04, 0x04, 0x01};
#else
0x00, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x06, 0x04, 0x03, 0x08, 0x04, 0x04, 0x01};
#endif
static bool mg_tls_server_send_cert_request(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
uint8_t req[13 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)];
req[0] = MG_TLS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; // handshake header
MG_STORE_BE24(req + 1, 9 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs));
req[4] = 0; // context length
MG_STORE_BE16(req + 5, 6 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); // extensions length
MG_STORE_BE16(req + 7, 13); // "signature algorithms"
MG_STORE_BE16(req + 9, 2 + sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); // length
MG_STORE_BE16(
req + 11,
sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs)); // signature hash algorithms length
memcpy(req + 13, (uint8_t *) secp256r1_sig_algs, sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs));
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, req, sizeof(req));
return mg_tls_encrypt(c, req, sizeof(req), MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE);
}
static bool mg_tls_send_cert(struct mg_connection *c, bool is_client) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
int send_ca = !is_client && tls->ca_der.len > 0;
// DER certificate + CA (server optional)
size_t i, offset, total_size = tls->cert_der.len + 5;
uint8_t *cert;
bool res = false;
for (i = 1; i < tls->chain_len; i++) {
total_size += tls->chain_der[i].len + 5;
}
if (send_ca) {
total_size += tls->ca_der.len + 5;
}
cert = (uint8_t *) mg_calloc(1, 13 + total_size);
if (cert == NULL) return res;
cert[0] = MG_TLS_CERTIFICATE; // handshake header
if (is_client && tls->cert_der.len == 0) total_size = 0; // empty list
MG_STORE_BE24(cert + 1, total_size + 4);
cert[4] = 0; // request context
MG_STORE_BE24(cert + 5, total_size); // 3 bytes: cert (s) length
offset = 8;
if (total_size > 0) { // handle empty list, RFC-8446 4.4.2
MG_STORE_BE24(cert + offset, tls->cert_der.len); // 3 bytes: 1st cert len
offset += 3;
// bytes 11+ are certificate in DER format
memmove(cert + offset, tls->cert_der.buf, tls->cert_der.len);
offset += tls->cert_der.len;
MG_STORE_BE16(cert + offset, 0); // certificate extensions (none)
offset += 2;
for (i = 1; i < tls->chain_len; i++) {
MG_STORE_BE24(cert + offset, tls->chain_der[i].len);
offset += 3;
memmove(cert + offset, tls->chain_der[i].buf, tls->chain_der[i].len);
offset += tls->chain_der[i].len;
MG_STORE_BE16(cert + offset, 0); // certificate extensions (none)
offset += 2;
}
if (send_ca) {
MG_STORE_BE24(cert + offset, tls->ca_der.len); // 3 bytes: CA cert length
offset += 3;
memmove(cert + offset, tls->ca_der.buf,
tls->ca_der.len); // CA cert data
offset += tls->ca_der.len;
MG_STORE_BE16(cert + offset, 0); // certificate extensions (none)
offset += 2;
}
}
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, cert, offset);
res = mg_tls_encrypt(c, cert, offset, MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE);
mg_free(cert);
return res;
}
// type adapter between uECC hash context and our sha256 implementation
typedef struct SHA256_HashContext {
MG_UECC_HashContext uECC;
mg_sha256_ctx ctx;
} SHA256_HashContext;
static void init_SHA256(const MG_UECC_HashContext *base) {
SHA256_HashContext *c = (SHA256_HashContext *) base;
mg_sha256_init(&c->ctx);
}
static void update_SHA256(const MG_UECC_HashContext *base,
const uint8_t *message, unsigned message_size) {
SHA256_HashContext *c = (SHA256_HashContext *) base;
mg_sha256_update(&c->ctx, message, message_size);
}
static void finish_SHA256(const MG_UECC_HashContext *base,
uint8_t *hash_result) {
SHA256_HashContext *c = (SHA256_HashContext *) base;
mg_sha256_final(hash_result, &c->ctx);
}
static void mg_tls_mgf1(uint8_t *mask, size_t mask_len, const uint8_t *seed,
size_t seed_len) {
uint32_t counter = 0;
size_t chunk, chunk_len, generated = 0;
while (generated < mask_len) {
mg_sha256_ctx ctx;
uint8_t digest[32];
uint8_t ctr[4];
ctr[0] = (uint8_t) (counter >> 24);
ctr[1] = (uint8_t) (counter >> 16);
ctr[2] = (uint8_t) (counter >> 8);
ctr[3] = (uint8_t) counter;
mg_sha256_init(&ctx);
mg_sha256_update(&ctx, seed, seed_len);
mg_sha256_update(&ctx, ctr, sizeof(ctr));
mg_sha256_final(digest, &ctx);
chunk_len = mask_len - generated;
chunk = (chunk_len < sizeof(digest) ? chunk_len : sizeof(digest));
memmove(mask + generated, digest, chunk);
generated += chunk;
counter++;
}
}
static unsigned int mg_tls_rsa_bits(const struct mg_str *n) {
size_t i = 0;
unsigned int bits = 0;
while (i < n->len && n->buf[i] == 0) i++;
if (i == n->len) return 0;
bits = (unsigned int) ((n->len - i) * 8);
{
uint8_t byte = (uint8_t) n->buf[i];
while ((byte & 0x80U) == 0) {
bits--;
byte = (uint8_t) (byte << 1);
}
}
return bits;
}
static bool mg_tls_pss_encode(const uint8_t *hash, size_t hashlen,
const struct mg_str *n, uint8_t *em) {
size_t emlen = n->len, saltlen = hashlen, dblen, pslen, i;
uint8_t salt[64]; // Max salt size for any reasonable hash
uint8_t m[136]; // 8 + max hash (64) + max salt (64) = 136
uint8_t H[64]; // Max hash size
uint8_t DB[512]; // Max for 4096-bit RSA
uint8_t mask[512]; // Max for 4096-bit RSA
mg_sha256_ctx ctx;
// Check bounds
if (saltlen > sizeof(salt) || (8 + hashlen + saltlen) > sizeof(m) ||
hashlen > sizeof(H) || emlen > sizeof(DB)) {
MG_ERROR(("RSA key too large for static buffers"));
return false;
}
if (emlen < hashlen + saltlen + 2) {
return false;
}
if (!mg_random(salt, saltlen)) {
return false;
}
MG_VERBOSE(("PSS salt: %M", mg_print_hex, saltlen, salt));
// Build m = 8 zero bytes || hash || salt
memset(m, 0, 8);
memcpy(m + 8, hash, hashlen);
memcpy(m + 8 + hashlen, salt, saltlen);
mg_sha256_init(&ctx);
mg_sha256_update(&ctx, m, 8 + hashlen + saltlen);
mg_sha256_final(H, &ctx);
MG_VERBOSE(("PSS H: %M", mg_print_hex, hashlen, H));
dblen = emlen - hashlen - 1;
pslen = emlen - hashlen - saltlen - 2;
// Build DB = PS || 0x01 || salt
memset(DB, 0, pslen);
DB[pslen] = 0x01;
memcpy(DB + pslen + 1, salt, saltlen);
// Generate mask and apply to DB
mg_tls_mgf1(mask, dblen, H, hashlen);
for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++) DB[i] ^= mask[i];
{
// PSS standard: emBits = modulus_bit_length - 1
unsigned rsa_bits = mg_tls_rsa_bits(n);
unsigned embits = rsa_bits - 1;
unsigned unused = (unsigned) (8 * emlen - embits);
MG_VERBOSE(("RSA modulus bits: %u, emBits: %u, emlen: %zu, unused: %u",
rsa_bits, embits, emlen, unused));
if (unused > 0 && unused < 8) {
uint8_t mask_byte = (uint8_t) (0xff >> unused);
MG_VERBOSE(("Applying mask 0x%02x to first byte (was 0x%02x)", mask_byte,
DB[0]));
DB[0] &= mask_byte;
MG_VERBOSE(("First byte after mask: 0x%02x", DB[0]));
}
}
// Build final em = maskedDB || H || 0xbc
memcpy(em, DB, dblen);
memcpy(em + dblen, H, hashlen);
em[emlen - 1] = 0xbc;
return true;
}
static bool mg_tls_rsa_sign(struct tls_data *tls, const uint8_t *em,
size_t emlen, uint8_t *sig) {
const uint8_t *n = (const uint8_t *) tls->rsa.n.buf;
size_t nlen = tls->rsa.n.len;
int crt_result;
while (nlen > 0 && *n == 0) n++, nlen--;
if (emlen != nlen) return false;
#if MG_TLS_RSA_USE_CRT
// RSA CRT (Chinese Remainder Theorem) optimization:
// s1 = em^dP mod p
// s2 = em^dQ mod q
// h = qInv * (s1 - s2) mod p
// s = s2 + h * q
if (tls->rsa.p.len == 0 || tls->rsa.q.len == 0 || tls->rsa.dP.len == 0 ||
tls->rsa.dQ.len == 0 || tls->rsa.qInv.len == 0) {
MG_ERROR(("CRT parameters missing, cannot use CRT optimization"));
return false;
}
MG_VERBOSE(("Using RSA-CRT optimization"));
crt_result = mg_rsa_crt_sign(
em, emlen, (const uint8_t *) tls->rsa.dP.buf, tls->rsa.dP.len,
(const uint8_t *) tls->rsa.dQ.buf, tls->rsa.dQ.len,
(const uint8_t *) tls->rsa.p.buf, tls->rsa.p.len,
(const uint8_t *) tls->rsa.q.buf, tls->rsa.q.len,
(const uint8_t *) tls->rsa.qInv.buf, tls->rsa.qInv.len, sig, nlen);
if (crt_result == 0) {
uint8_t check[512];
bool verified;
if (nlen > sizeof(check) ||
mg_rsa_mod_pow(n, nlen, (const uint8_t *) tls->rsa.e.buf,
tls->rsa.e.len, sig, nlen, check, nlen) != 0) {
MG_ERROR(("CRT signature verification failed"));
return false;
}
verified = memcmp(check, em, emlen) == 0;
mg_bzero(check, sizeof(check));
if (!verified) {
MG_ERROR(("CRT signature verification failed"));
return false;
}
MG_VERBOSE(("CRT signature successful (first 4 bytes): %02x %02x %02x %02x",
sig[0], sig[1], sig[2], sig[3]));
MG_VERBOSE(("CRT signature successful (last 4 bytes): %02x %02x %02x %02x",
sig[nlen - 4], sig[nlen - 3], sig[nlen - 2], sig[nlen - 1]));
return true;
} else {
MG_ERROR(("CRT signing failed"));
return false;
}
#else
int ret;
// Standard RSA: s = em^d mod n
memset(sig, 0, nlen);
ret = mg_rsa_mod_pow(n, nlen, (const uint8_t *) tls->rsa.d.buf,
tls->rsa.d.len, em, emlen, sig, nlen);
if (ret == 0) {
MG_VERBOSE(("RSA signature first 4 bytes: %02x %02x %02x %02x", sig[0],
sig[1], sig[2], sig[3]));
MG_VERBOSE(("RSA signature last 4 bytes: %02x %02x %02x %02x",
sig[nlen - 4], sig[nlen - 3], sig[nlen - 2], sig[nlen - 1]));
}
return ret == 0;
#endif
}
static size_t mg_rsa_trim_len(const uint8_t **p, size_t n) {
while (n > 0 && **p == 0) (*p)++, n--;
return n;
}
static bool mg_tls_send_cert_verify(struct mg_connection *c, bool is_client) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
uint8_t hash[32] = {0};
mg_tls_calc_cert_verify_hash(c, (uint8_t *) hash, NULL, is_client);
if (tls->rsa.n.len > 0 && tls->rsa.d.len > 0) {
// RSA certificate verify packet
const uint8_t *n = (const uint8_t *) tls->rsa.n.buf;
size_t nlen = tls->rsa.n.len;
struct mg_str rn;
size_t emlen, verifysz;
uint8_t em[512]; // Max for 4096-bit RSA
uint8_t verify[520]; // 8 + 512 max
nlen = mg_rsa_trim_len(&n, nlen);
rn = mg_str_n((char *) n, nlen);
emlen = nlen;
verifysz = 8U + emlen;
// Check bounds
if (emlen > sizeof(em) || verifysz > sizeof(verify)) {
MG_ERROR(("RSA key too large for static buffers"));
return false;
}
if (!mg_tls_pss_encode(hash, sizeof(hash), &rn, em)) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed PSS encode"));
return false;
}
// Validate PSS encoded message format
if (em[emlen - 1] != 0xbc) {
MG_ERROR(("Invalid PSS encoding: last byte is 0x%02x, expected 0xbc",
em[emlen - 1]));
return false;
}
// Build verify packet header, then sign directly into the packet
verify[0] = 0x0f;
MG_STORE_BE24(verify + 1, emlen + 4);
MG_STORE_BE16(verify + 4, 0x0804);
MG_STORE_BE16(verify + 6, emlen);
// Sign directly into the verify buffer (verify + 8 = signature location)
memset(verify + 8, 0, emlen); // Initialize signature area
if (!mg_tls_rsa_sign(tls, em, emlen, verify + 8)) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed RSA sign"));
return false;
}
MG_VERBOSE(
("PSS EM first 4: %02x %02x %02x %02x", em[0], em[1], em[2], em[3]));
MG_VERBOSE(("PSS EM last 4: %02x %02x %02x %02x", em[emlen - 4],
em[emlen - 3], em[emlen - 2], em[emlen - 1]));
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, verify, verifysz);
return mg_tls_encrypt(c, verify, verifysz, MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE);
} else {
// EC certificate verify packet
uint8_t verify[82] = {0x0f, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00};
uint8_t tmp[2 * 32 + 64] = {0};
struct SHA256_HashContext ctx = {
{&init_SHA256, &update_SHA256, &finish_SHA256, 64, 32, tmp},
{{0}, 0, 0, {0}}};
size_t sigsz, verifysz = 0;
int neg1, neg2;
uint8_t sig[64] = {0};
mg_uecc_sign_deterministic(tls->ec_key, hash, sizeof(hash), &ctx.uECC, sig,
mg_uecc_secp256r1());
neg1 = !!(sig[0] & 0x80);
neg2 = !!(sig[32] & 0x80);
verify[8] = 0x30; // ASN.1 SEQUENCE
verify[9] = (uint8_t) (68 + neg1 + neg2);
verify[10] = 0x02; // ASN.1 INTEGER
verify[11] = (uint8_t) (32 + neg1);
memmove(verify + 12 + neg1, sig, 32);
verify[12 + 32 + neg1] = 0x02; // ASN.1 INTEGER
verify[13 + 32 + neg1] = (uint8_t) (32 + neg2);
memmove(verify + 14 + 32 + neg1 + neg2, sig + 32, 32);
sigsz = (size_t) (70 + neg1 + neg2);
verifysz = 8U + sigsz;
verify[3] = (uint8_t) (sigsz + 4);
verify[7] = (uint8_t) sigsz;
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, verify, verifysz);
return mg_tls_encrypt(c, verify, verifysz, MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE);
}
}
static bool mg_tls_server_send_finish(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
mg_sha256_ctx sha256;
uint8_t hash[32];
uint8_t finish[36] = {0x14, 0, 0, 32};
memmove(&sha256, &tls->sha256, sizeof(mg_sha256_ctx));
mg_sha256_final(hash, &sha256);
mg_hmac_sha256(finish + 4, tls->enc.server_finished_key, 32, hash, 32);
if (!mg_tls_encrypt(c, finish, sizeof(finish), MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE))
return false;
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, finish, sizeof(finish));
return true;
}
static int mg_tls_server_recv_finish(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
unsigned char *recv_buf;
// we have to backup sha256 value to restore it later, since Finished record
// is exceptional and is not supposed to be added to the rolling hash
// calculation.
mg_sha256_ctx sha256 = tls->sha256;
if (mg_tls_recv_record(c) < 0) {
return -1;
}
recv_buf = &c->rtls.buf[tls->recv_offset];
if (recv_buf[0] != MG_TLS_FINISHED) {
mg_error(c, "expected Finish but got msg 0x%02x", recv_buf[0]);
return -1;
}
mg_tls_drop_message(c);
// restore hash
tls->sha256 = sha256;
return 0;
}
static bool mg_tls_client_send_hello(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
struct mg_iobuf *wio = &tls->send;
uint8_t x25519_pub[X25519_BYTES];
uint8_t p256_pub[64]; // X || Y, sent as an uncompressed point 0x04 || X || Y
// - "signature algorithms we actually support", see above
// uint8_t secp256r1_sig_algs[]
// - all popular signature algorithms (if we don't care about verification)
uint8_t all_sig_algs[34] = {
0x00, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x1c, 0x04, 0x03, 0x05, 0x03, 0x06, 0x03,
0x08, 0x07, 0x08, 0x08, 0x08, 0x09, 0x08, 0x0a, 0x08, 0x0b, 0x08, 0x04,
0x08, 0x05, 0x08, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x05, 0x01, 0x06, 0x01};
uint8_t server_name_ext[9] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe, 0x00,
0xfe, 0x00, 0x00, 0xfe};
// clang-format off
uint8_t msg_client_hello[216] = {
// TLS Client Hello header reported as TLS1.2 (5)
0x16, 0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0xfe,
// client hello, tls 1.2 (6)
0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x8c, 0x03, 0x03,
// random (32 bytes)
PLACEHOLDER_32B,
// session ID length + session ID (32 bytes)
0x20, PLACEHOLDER_32B, 0x00,
0x02, // size = 2 bytes
#if MG_ENABLE_CHACHA20
// TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
0x13, 0x03,
#else
// TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
0x13, 0x01,
#endif
// no compression
0x01, 0x00,
// extensions + keyshare
0x00, 0xfe,
// keyshare: x25519
0x00, 0x33, 0x00, 0x6b, 0x00, 0x69, 0x00, 0x1d, 0x00, 0x20,
PLACEHOLDER_32B,
// keyshare: secp256r1, uncompressed point
0x00, 0x17, 0x00, 0x41, 0x04, PLACEHOLDER_32B, PLACEHOLDER_32B,
// supported groups (x25519, secp256r1)
0x00, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x1d, 0x00, 0x17,
// supported versions (tls1.3 == 0x304)
0x00, 0x2b, 0x00, 0x03, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04,
// session ticket (none)
0x00, 0x23, 0x00, 0x00, // 215 bytes till here
};
// clang-format on
const char *hostname = tls->hostname;
size_t hostnamesz = strlen(tls->hostname);
size_t hostname_extsz = hostnamesz ? hostnamesz + 9 : 0;
uint8_t *sig_alg =
tls->skip_verification ? all_sig_algs : (uint8_t *) secp256r1_sig_algs;
size_t sig_alg_sz = tls->skip_verification ? sizeof(all_sig_algs)
: sizeof(secp256r1_sig_algs);
// patch ClientHello with correct hostname ext length (if any)
MG_STORE_BE16(msg_client_hello + 3,
hostname_extsz + 254 - 9 - 34 + sig_alg_sz);
MG_STORE_BE16(msg_client_hello + 7,
hostname_extsz + 250 - 9 - 34 + sig_alg_sz);
MG_STORE_BE16(msg_client_hello + 82,
hostname_extsz + 175 - 9 - 34 + sig_alg_sz);
if (hostnamesz > 0) {
MG_STORE_BE16(server_name_ext + 2, hostnamesz + 5);
MG_STORE_BE16(server_name_ext + 4, hostnamesz + 3);
MG_STORE_BE16(server_name_ext + 7, hostnamesz);
}
// calculate keyshares
if (!mg_random(tls->x25519_cli, sizeof(tls->x25519_cli))) mg_error(c, "RNG");
mg_tls_x25519(x25519_pub, tls->x25519_cli, X25519_BASE_POINT, 1);
if (!mg_uecc_make_key(p256_pub, tls->p256_cli, mg_uecc_secp256r1())) {
mg_error(c, "P-256 key");
return false; // Do not send uninitialised p256_pub
}
// fill in the gaps: random + session ID + keyshares
if (!mg_random(tls->session_id, sizeof(tls->session_id))) mg_error(c, "RNG");
if (!mg_random(tls->random, sizeof(tls->random))) mg_error(c, "RNG");
memmove(msg_client_hello + 11, tls->random, sizeof(tls->random));
memmove(msg_client_hello + 44, tls->session_id, sizeof(tls->session_id));
memmove(msg_client_hello + 94, x25519_pub, sizeof(x25519_pub));
memmove(msg_client_hello + 131, p256_pub, sizeof(p256_pub));
// client hello message
if (mg_iobuf_add(wio, wio->len, msg_client_hello, sizeof(msg_client_hello)) ==
0)
return false;
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, msg_client_hello + 5,
sizeof(msg_client_hello) - 5);
if (mg_iobuf_add(wio, wio->len, sig_alg, sig_alg_sz) == 0) return false;
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, sig_alg, sig_alg_sz);
if (hostnamesz > 0) {
if (mg_iobuf_add(wio, wio->len, server_name_ext, sizeof(server_name_ext)) ==
0 ||
mg_iobuf_add(wio, wio->len, hostname, hostnamesz) == 0)
return false;
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, server_name_ext, sizeof(server_name_ext));
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, (uint8_t *) hostname, hostnamesz);
}
// change cipher message
if (mg_iobuf_add(wio, wio->len, (const char *) "\x14\x03\x03\x00\x01\x01",
6) == 0)
return false;
return true;
}
static int mg_tls_client_recv_hello(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
struct mg_iobuf *rio = &c->rtls;
uint16_t msgsz;
uint8_t *ext;
uint16_t ext_len;
int j;
if (!mg_tls_got_record(c)) {
return MG_IO_WAIT;
}
if (rio->buf[0] != MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE || rio->len < 6 || rio->buf[5] != MG_TLS_SERVER_HELLO) {
if (rio->buf[0] == MG_TLS_ALERT && rio->len >= 7) {
verbose_alert(&rio->buf[5]);
mg_error(c, "TLS error alert");
return -1;
}
if (rio->len >= 6) MG_ERROR(("got packet type 0x%02x/0x%02x", rio->buf[0], rio->buf[5]));
mg_error(c, "not a server hello packet");
return -1;
}
if (rio->len < 5 + 39 + 32 + 3 + 2) goto fail;
msgsz = MG_LOAD_BE16(rio->buf + 3);
if (msgsz > rio->len - 5) goto fail;
mg_sha256_update(&tls->sha256, rio->buf + 5, msgsz);
ext_len = MG_LOAD_BE16(rio->buf + 5 + 39 + 32 + 3);
ext = rio->buf + 5 + 39 + 32 + 3 + 2;
if (ext_len > (rio->len - (5 + 39 + 32 + 3 + 2))) goto fail;
for (j = 0; j < ext_len;) {
uint16_t ext_type, ext_len2, group, key_exchange_len;
uint8_t *key_exchange;
if ((ext_len - j) < 4) goto fail;
ext_type = MG_LOAD_BE16(ext + j);
ext_len2 = MG_LOAD_BE16(ext + j + 2);
if (ext_len2 > (ext_len - j - 4)) goto fail;
if (ext_type != 0x0033) { // not a key share extension, ignore
j += (uint16_t) (ext_len2 + 4);
continue;
}
if (ext_len2 < (2 + 2 + 32)) goto fail;
group = MG_LOAD_BE16(ext + j + 4);
key_exchange_len = MG_LOAD_BE16(ext + j + 6);
key_exchange = ext + j + 8;
if (key_exchange_len > ext_len2 - 4) goto fail;
if (group == 0x001d) { // x25519
if (key_exchange_len != 32 ||
mg_tls_x25519(tls->x25519_sec, tls->x25519_cli, key_exchange, 1) <
0) {
mg_error(c, "bad key");
return -1;
}
} else if (group == 0x0017) { // secp256r1, uncompressed point 0x04 || X || Y
if (key_exchange_len != 65 || key_exchange[0] != 0x04 ||
!mg_uecc_valid_public_key(key_exchange + 1, mg_uecc_secp256r1()) ||
!mg_uecc_shared_secret(key_exchange + 1, tls->p256_cli,
tls->x25519_sec, mg_uecc_secp256r1())) {
mg_error(c, "bad key");
return -1;
}
} else {
mg_error(c, "bad key exchange group");
return -1;
}
// mg_tls_hexdump("c ecdhe sec", tls->x25519_sec, 32);
mg_tls_drop_record(c);
/* generate handshake keys */
mg_tls_generate_handshake_keys(c);
return 0;
}
fail:
mg_error(c, "bad server hello");
return -1;
}
static int mg_tls_client_recv_ext(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
unsigned char *recv_buf;
if (mg_tls_recv_record(c) < 0) {
return -1;
}
recv_buf = &c->rtls.buf[tls->recv_offset];
if (recv_buf[0] != MG_TLS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
mg_error(c, "expected server extensions but got msg 0x%02x", recv_buf[0]);
return -1;
}
mg_tls_drop_message(c);
return 0;
}
struct mg_tls_cert {
bool is_ec_pubkey;
bool is_ca;
struct mg_str sn;
struct mg_str pubkey;
struct mg_der_tlv issuer;
struct mg_der_tlv subj;
struct mg_str sig; // signature
uint8_t tbshash[48]; // 32B for sha256/secp256, 48B for sha384/secp384
size_t tbshashsz; // actual TBS hash size
};
static void mg_der_debug_cert_name(const char *name, struct mg_der_tlv *tlv) {
struct mg_der_tlv v;
struct mg_str cn, c, o, ou;
if (mg_log_level < MG_LL_VERBOSE) return; // skip recursive computations
cn = c = o = ou = mg_str("");
if (mg_der_find_oid(tlv, (uint8_t *) "\x55\x04\x03", 3, &v) > 0)
cn = mg_str_n((const char *) v.value, v.len);
if (mg_der_find_oid(tlv, (uint8_t *) "\x55\x04\x06", 3, &v) > 0)
c = mg_str_n((const char *) v.value, v.len);
if (mg_der_find_oid(tlv, (uint8_t *) "\x55\x04\x0a", 3, &v) > 0)
o = mg_str_n((const char *) v.value, v.len);
if (mg_der_find_oid(tlv, (uint8_t *) "\x55\x04\x0b", 3, &v) > 0)
ou = mg_str_n((const char *) v.value, v.len);
MG_VERBOSE(("%s: CN=%.*s, C=%.*s, O=%.*s, OU=%.*s", name, cn.len, cn.buf,
c.len, c.buf, o.len, o.buf, ou.len, ou.buf));
}
static uint64_t asnt2t(uint8_t *v, uint8_t type) {
unsigned int y, mo, d, h, mi, ss;
y = 10U * (*v++ - '0'), y += (*v++ - '0');
if (type == 0x17) { // UTCTime, RFC-5280 4.1.2.5.1 YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
if (y >= 50) return (uint64_t) 0; // 19YY is in the past
y += 2000;
} else { // GeneralizedTime, RFC-5280 4.1.2.5.2 YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
y *= 100U, y += 10U * (*v++ - '0'), y += (*v++ - '0');
}
mo = 10U * (*v++ - '0'), mo += (*v++ - '0');
d = 10U * (*v++ - '0'), d += (*v++ - '0');
h = 10U * (*v++ - '0'), h += (*v++ - '0');
mi = 10U * (*v++ - '0'), mi += (*v++ - '0');
ss = 10U * (*v++ - '0'), ss += (*v++ - '0');
if (*v != 'Z') return 0; // invalid
return mg_timegm(y, mo, d, h, mi, ss);
}
static int mg_tls_parse_cert_der(void *buf, size_t dersz,
struct mg_tls_cert *cert) {
uint8_t *tbs, *der = (uint8_t *) buf;
size_t tbssz;
struct mg_der_tlv root, tbs_cert, field, algo; // pubkey, signature;
struct mg_der_tlv pki, pki_algo, pki_key, pki_curve, raw_sig;
// Parse outermost SEQUENCE
if (mg_der_parse(der, dersz, &root) <= 0 || root.type != 0x30) return -1;
// Parse TBSCertificate SEQUENCE
tbs = root.value;
if (mg_der_next(&root, &tbs_cert) <= 0 || tbs_cert.type != 0x30) return -1;
tbssz = (size_t) (tbs_cert.value + tbs_cert.len - tbs);
// Parse Version (optional field)
if (mg_der_next(&tbs_cert, &field) <= 0) return -1;
if (field.type == 0xa0) { // v3
if (mg_der_parse(field.value, field.len, &field) <= 0 || field.len != 1 ||
field.value[0] != 2)
return -1;
if (mg_der_next(&tbs_cert, &field) <= 0) return -1;
}
// Parse Serial Number
if (field.type != 2) return -1;
cert->sn = mg_str_n((char *) field.value, field.len);
MG_VERBOSE(("cert s/n: %M", mg_print_hex, cert->sn.len, cert->sn.buf));
// Parse signature algorithm (first occurrence)
if (mg_der_next(&tbs_cert, &field) <= 0 || field.type != 0x30) return -1;
if (mg_der_next(&field, &algo) <= 0 || algo.type != 0x06) return -1;
MG_VERBOSE(("sig algo (oid): %M", mg_print_hex, algo.len, algo.value));
// Signature algorithm OID mapping
if (algo.len == 8 &&
memcmp(algo.value, "\x2A\x86\x48\xCE\x3D\x04\x03\x02", 8) == 0) {
MG_VERBOSE(("sig algo: ECDSA with SHA256"));
mg_sha256(cert->tbshash, tbs, tbssz);
cert->tbshashsz = 32;
} else if (algo.len == 9 &&
memcmp(algo.value, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x01\x0B", 9) ==
0) {
MG_VERBOSE(("sig algo: RSA with SHA256"));
mg_sha256(cert->tbshash, tbs, tbssz);
cert->tbshashsz = 32;
} else if (algo.len == 8 &&
memcmp(algo.value, "\x2A\x86\x48\xCE\x3D\x04\x03\x03", 8) == 0) {
MG_VERBOSE(("sig algo: ECDSA with SHA384"));
mg_sha384(cert->tbshash, tbs, tbssz);
cert->tbshashsz = 48;
} else if (algo.len == 9 &&
memcmp(algo.value, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x01\x0C", 9) ==
0) {
MG_VERBOSE(("sig algo: RSA with SHA384"));
mg_sha384(cert->tbshash, tbs, tbssz);
cert->tbshashsz = 48;
} else {
MG_ERROR(
("sig algo: unsupported OID: %M", mg_print_hex, algo.len, algo.value));
return -1;
}
MG_VERBOSE(("tbs hash: %M", mg_print_hex, cert->tbshashsz, cert->tbshash));
// issuer
if (mg_der_next(&tbs_cert, &field) <= 0 || field.type != 0x30) return -1;
cert->issuer = field;
mg_der_debug_cert_name("issuer", &field);
// validity dates (before/after)
if (mg_der_next(&tbs_cert, &field) <= 0 || field.type != 0x30) return -1;
{
struct mg_der_tlv before, after;
uint64_t now = mg_now() / 1000U, t;
if (mg_der_next(&field, &before) <= 0 || ((before.type != 0x17 || before.len != 13) && (before.type != 0x18 || before.len != 15))) return -1;
if (now < (t = asnt2t(before.value, before.type))) {
MG_ERROR(("cert is not yet valid: before=%.*s (%lu), now=%lu", before.len, before.value, t, now));
return -1;
}
if (mg_der_next(&field, &after) <= 0 || ((after.type != 0x17 || after.len != 13) && (after.type != 0x18 || after.len != 15))) return -1;
if (memcmp(after.value, "99991231235959Z", 15) == 0) { // RFC-5280 4.1.2.5
MG_ERROR(("No well-defined expiration date"));
return -1;
}
if (now > (t = asnt2t(after.value, after.type))) {
MG_ERROR(("cert is no longer valid: after=%.*s (%lu), now=%lu", after.len, after.value, t, now));
return -1;
}
}
// subject
if (mg_der_next(&tbs_cert, &field) <= 0 || field.type != 0x30) return -1;
cert->subj = field;
mg_der_debug_cert_name("subject", &field);
// subject public key info
if (mg_der_next(&tbs_cert, &field) <= 0 || field.type != 0x30) return -1;
if (mg_der_next(&field, &pki) <= 0 || pki.type != 0x30) return -1;
if (mg_der_next(&pki, &pki_algo) <= 0 || pki_algo.type != 0x06) return -1;
// public key algorithm
MG_VERBOSE(("pk algo (oid): %M", mg_print_hex, pki_algo.len, pki_algo.value));
if (pki_algo.len == 8 &&
memcmp(pki_algo.value, "\x2A\x86\x48\xCE\x3D\x03\x01\x07", 8) == 0) {
cert->is_ec_pubkey = true;
MG_VERBOSE(("pk algo: ECDSA secp256r1"));
} else if (pki_algo.len == 8 &&
memcmp(pki_algo.value, "\x2A\x86\x48\xCE\x3D\x03\x01\x08", 8) ==
0) {
cert->is_ec_pubkey = true;
MG_VERBOSE(("pk algo: ECDSA secp384r1"));
} else if (pki_algo.len == 7 &&
memcmp(pki_algo.value, "\x2A\x86\x48\xCE\x3D\x02\x01", 7) == 0) {
cert->is_ec_pubkey = true;
MG_VERBOSE(("pk algo: EC public key"));
} else if (pki_algo.len == 9 &&
memcmp(pki_algo.value, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D\x01\x01\x01",
9) == 0) {
cert->is_ec_pubkey = false;
MG_VERBOSE(("pk algo: RSA"));
} else {
MG_ERROR(("unsupported pk algo: %M", mg_print_hex, pki_algo.len,
pki_algo.value));
return -1;
}
// Parse public key
if (cert->is_ec_pubkey) {
if (mg_der_next(&pki, &pki_curve) <= 0 || pki_curve.type != 0x06) return -1;
}
if (mg_der_next(&field, &pki_key) <= 0 || pki_key.type != 0x03) return -1;
if (cert->is_ec_pubkey) { // Skip leading 0x00 and 0x04 (=uncompressed)
if (pki_key.len < 2) return -1;
cert->pubkey = mg_str_n((char *) pki_key.value + 2, pki_key.len - 2);
} else { // Skip leading 0x00 byte
if (pki_key.len < 1) return -1;
cert->pubkey = mg_str_n((char *) pki_key.value + 1, pki_key.len - 1);
}
{ // parse optional fields
int r; // unique ids
while ((r = mg_der_next(&tbs_cert, &field)) > 0 && field.type == 0xa1);
if (r > 0 && field.type == 0xa3) { // extensions
bool ca = false, certsign = true;
struct mg_der_tlv ext, e, i; // ext[e(i, ...), ...]
if (mg_der_next(&field, &ext) <= 0 || ext.type != 0x30) return -1;
while (mg_der_next(&ext, &e) > 0) {
if (mg_der_next(&e, &i) <= 0 || i.type != 0x06) return -1;
if (i.len == 3 && memcmp(i.value, (uint8_t *) "\x55\x1d\x13", 3) == 0) {
struct mg_der_tlv s, v; // basicConstraints
MG_VERBOSE(("basicConstraints"));
if (mg_der_next(&e, &i) <= 0 || i.type != 0x01 || i.len != 1 || *i.value != 0xff) return -1;
if (mg_der_next(&e, &i) <= 0 || i.type != 0x04) return -1;
if (mg_der_next(&i, &s) <= 0 || s.type != 0x30) return -1;
if (s.len == 0) break;
if (mg_der_next(&s, &v) <= 0) return -1;
if (v.type == 0x01 && v.len == 1 && *v.value == 0xff) ca = true;
} else if (i.len == 3 && memcmp(i.value, (uint8_t *) "\x55\x1d\x0f", 3) == 0) {
struct mg_der_tlv b; // keyUsage, enforce when present
MG_VERBOSE(("keyUsage"));
if (mg_der_next(&e, &i) <= 0) return -1;
if (i.type == 0x01) { // SHOULD, defaults to false
if (i.len != 1) return -1;
if (mg_der_next(&e, &i) <= 0) return -1;
}
if (i.type != 0x04) return -1;
if (mg_der_next(&i, &b) <= 0 || b.type != 0x03) return -1;
if (!(b.value[1] & MG_BIT(2))) certsign = false;
}
}
if (ca && certsign) cert->is_ca = true;
}
}
// Parse signature
if (mg_der_next(&root, &field) <= 0 || field.type != 0x30) return -1;
if (mg_der_next(&root, &raw_sig) <= 0 || raw_sig.type != 0x03) return -1;
if (raw_sig.len < 1 || raw_sig.value[0] != 0x00) return -1;
cert->sig = mg_str_n((char *) raw_sig.value + 1, raw_sig.len - 1);
MG_VERBOSE(("sig: %M", mg_print_hex, cert->sig.len, cert->sig.buf));
return 0;
}
static int countdots(struct mg_str s) {
int count = 0;
size_t len = s.len;
char *p = s.buf;
while (len--) {
if (*(p++) == '.') ++count;
}
return count;
}
static int mg_tls_verify_cert_san(const uint8_t *der, size_t dersz,
const char *server_name,
struct mg_addr *ref_ip) {
struct mg_der_tlv root, field, name;
bool is_addr = ref_ip != NULL;
if (mg_der_parse((uint8_t *) der, dersz, &root) < 0) {
MG_ERROR(("failed to parse certificate"));
return -1;
}
if (mg_der_find_oid(&root, (uint8_t *) "\x55\x1d\x11", 3, &field) <= 0) {
MG_ERROR(("failed to extract SAN"));
return -1;
}
if (mg_der_parse(field.value, field.len, &field) < 0) {
MG_ERROR(("SAN is not a constructed object"));
return -1;
}
while (mg_der_next(&field, &name) > 0) {
if (is_addr) { // match ref IP to IP and name to DNS name (RFC-9525 6.2)
if (name.type == 0x87 && name.len == 4) { // this is an IPv4 address
uint32_t cert_ip;
MG_VERBOSE(("Found SAN, IP: %M", mg_print_ip4, name.value));
memcpy(&cert_ip, name.value, 4);
if (!ref_ip->is_ip6 && cert_ip == ref_ip->addr.ip4) // RFC-9525 6.4
return 1; // and byte-matches the one we wanted to connected to
}
#if MG_ENABLE_IPV6
else if (name.type == 0x87 && name.len == 16) { // is an IPv6 address
MG_VERBOSE(("Found SAN, IPv6: %M", mg_print_ip6, name.value));
if (ref_ip->is_ip6 && memcmp(name.value, ref_ip->addr.ip6, 16) == 0)
return 1; // and byte-matches the one we wanted to connected to
}
#endif
} else if (name.type == 0x82) { // this is a DNS name
struct mg_str sn, tn;
MG_VERBOSE(("Found SAN, DNS: %.*s", name.len, name.value));
sn = mg_str(server_name), tn = mg_str_n((char *) name.value, name.len);
if (countdots(sn) == countdots(tn) && mg_match(sn, tn, NULL))
return 1; // and matches the host name
}
}
return -1;
}
static int mg_tls_verify_cert_signature(const struct mg_tls_cert *cert,
const struct mg_tls_cert *issuer) {
if (issuer->is_ec_pubkey) {
uint8_t sig[128];
struct mg_der_tlv seq = {0, 0, 0}, a = {0, 0, 0}, b = {0, 0, 0};
mg_der_parse((uint8_t *) cert->sig.buf, cert->sig.len, &seq);
mg_der_next(&seq, &a);
mg_der_next(&seq, &b);
if (a.len == 0 || b.len == 0) {
MG_ERROR(("cert verification error"));
return 0;
}
#if MG_UECC_SUPPORTS_secp256r1
if (issuer->pubkey.len == 64) {
const uint32_t N = 32;
if (a.len > N) a.value += (a.len - N), a.len = N; // padding
if (b.len > N) b.value += (b.len - N), b.len = N;
memset(sig, 0, N - a.len); // short encoding
memmove(sig + (N - a.len), a.value, a.len);
memset(sig + N, 0, N - b.len);
memmove(sig + N + (N - b.len), b.value, b.len);
return mg_uecc_verify((uint8_t *) issuer->pubkey.buf, cert->tbshash,
(unsigned) cert->tbshashsz, sig,
mg_uecc_secp256r1());
} else
#endif
#if MG_UECC_SUPPORTS_secp384r1
if (issuer->pubkey.len == 96) {
const uint32_t N = 48;
if (a.len > N) a.value += (a.len - N), a.len = N; // padding
if (b.len > N) b.value += (b.len - N), b.len = N;
memset(sig, 0, N - a.len); // short encoding
memmove(sig + (N - a.len), a.value, a.len);
memset(sig + N, 0, N - b.len);
memmove(sig + N + (N - b.len), b.value, b.len);
return mg_uecc_verify((uint8_t *) issuer->pubkey.buf, cert->tbshash,
(unsigned) cert->tbshashsz, sig,
mg_uecc_secp384r1());
} else
#endif
{
MG_ERROR(("unsupported public key length: %d", issuer->pubkey.len));
return 0;
}
} else {
const uint8_t *n;
size_t nlen;
uint8_t sig2[512]; // 4096 bits
struct mg_der_tlv seq, modulus, exponent;
if (mg_der_parse((uint8_t *) issuer->pubkey.buf, issuer->pubkey.len,
&seq) <= 0 ||
mg_der_next(&seq, &modulus) <= 0 || modulus.type != 2 ||
modulus.len == 0 || mg_der_next(&seq, &exponent) <= 0 ||
exponent.type != 2 || exponent.len == 0) {
return -1;
}
n = modulus.value, nlen = mg_rsa_trim_len(&n, modulus.len);
if (nlen > sizeof(sig2) || cert->tbshashsz > nlen ||
mg_rsa_mod_pow(modulus.value, modulus.len, exponent.value,
exponent.len, (uint8_t *) cert->sig.buf, cert->sig.len,
sig2, nlen) != 0) {
return 0;
}
return mg_rsa_pkcs_verify(sig2, nlen, cert->tbshash, cert->tbshashsz);
}
}
static int mg_tls_verify_cert_cn(struct mg_der_tlv *subj, const char *host) {
struct mg_der_tlv v;
int matched = 0;
if (mg_der_find_oid(subj, (uint8_t *) "\x55\x04\x03", 3, &v) > 0) {
struct mg_str hn, cn;
MG_VERBOSE(("using CN: %.*s <-> %s", v.len, v.value, host));
hn = mg_str(host), cn = mg_str_n((char *) v.value, v.len);
matched = (int) (countdots(hn) == countdots(cn) && mg_match(hn, cn, NULL));
}
return matched;
}
// 1: found, 0: not found, < 0: parse error: -1: bundle (unused), -2: name
static int tls_bundle_find(struct tls_data *tls, struct mg_der_tlv *name,
struct mg_tls_cert *cert) {
size_t i;
struct mg_der_tlv v;
struct mg_str *p = tls->ca_bundle_der, tgt;
if (mg_der_find_oid(name, (uint8_t *) "\x55\x04\x03", 3, &v) <= 0) return -2;
tgt = mg_str_n((const char *) v.value, v.len);
for (i = 0; i < tls->ca_bundle_len; i++, p++) {
struct mg_str subj;
if (mg_tls_parse_cert_der(p->buf, p->len, cert) < 0 ||
mg_der_find_oid(&cert->subj, (uint8_t *) "\x55\x04\x03", 3, &v) <= 0) {
MG_ERROR(("failed to parse certificate #%u in bundle", i + 1));
continue; // skip this certificate but don't halt the process
}
subj = mg_str_n((const char *) v.value, v.len);
MG_VERBOSE(("#%u: %.*s (%.*s)", i + 1, subj.len, subj.buf, tgt.len, tgt.buf));
if (mg_strcasecmp(subj, tgt) == 0) return 1;
}
return 0;
}
bool mg_aton_(struct mg_str str, struct mg_addr *addr);
static int mg_tls_recv_cert(struct mg_connection *c, bool is_client) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
unsigned char *recv_buf;
if (mg_tls_recv_record(c) < 0) {
return -1;
}
recv_buf = &c->rtls.buf[tls->recv_offset];
if (recv_buf[0] == MG_TLS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
MG_VERBOSE(("got certificate request"));
mg_tls_drop_message(c);
tls->cert_requested = 1;
return -1;
}
if (recv_buf[0] != MG_TLS_CERTIFICATE) {
mg_error(c, "expected %s certificate but got msg 0x%02x",
is_client ? "server" : "client", recv_buf[0]);
return -1;
}
if (tls->recv_len < 13) { // 8 + 3 + 2, chain len + cert len + ext len
mg_error(c, "certificate list too short");
return -1;
}
{
// Normally, there are 2-3 certs in a chain (when is_client)
struct mg_tls_cert certs[8];
int certnum = 0;
uint32_t full_cert_chain_len = MG_LOAD_BE24(recv_buf + 1);
uint32_t cert_chain_len = MG_LOAD_BE24(recv_buf + 5);
uint8_t *p = recv_buf + 8;
uint8_t *endp = recv_buf + cert_chain_len + 8;
bool found_ca = false;
struct mg_tls_cert ca;
if (cert_chain_len != full_cert_chain_len - 4 || cert_chain_len > (tls->recv_len - 8)) {
MG_ERROR(("full chain length: %d, chain length: %d, msg length: %d", full_cert_chain_len, cert_chain_len, tls->recv_len));
mg_error(c, "invalid certificate chain length");
return -1;
}
memset(certs, 0, sizeof(certs));
memset(&ca, 0, sizeof(ca));
if (tls->ca_der.len > 0) { // single cert or server
if (mg_tls_parse_cert_der(tls->ca_der.buf, tls->ca_der.len, &ca) < 0) {
mg_error(c, "failed to parse CA certificate");
return -1;
}
MG_VERBOSE(("CA serial: %M", mg_print_hex, ca.sn.len, ca.sn.buf));
}
while (p < endp) {
struct mg_tls_cert *ci = &certs[certnum++];
uint32_t certsz;
uint16_t certext;
uint8_t *cert = p + 3;
if ((endp - p) < 5) { // 3 + 2, cert len + ext len fields
mg_error(c, "truncated certificate in chain");
return -1;
}
certsz = MG_LOAD_BE24(p);
p = cert + certsz + 2; // skip cert extensions (size only, not supported)
if (p > endp) {
mg_error(c, "invalid certificate length");
return -1;
}
certext = MG_LOAD_BE16(cert + certsz);
if (certext != 0) {
mg_error(c, "certificate extensions are not supported");
return -1;
}
if (mg_tls_parse_cert_der(cert, certsz, ci) < 0) {
mg_error(c, "failed to parse certificate");
return -1;
}
if (ci == certs) {
// First certificate in the chain is peer cert, check SAN if requested,
// and store public key for further CertVerify step
if (tls->hostname[0] != '\0') {
struct mg_addr addr; // use aton_ so localhost evals as a name
bool is_addr = mg_aton_(mg_str_s(tls->hostname), &addr);
if (mg_tls_verify_cert_san(cert, certsz, tls->hostname,
is_addr ? &addr : NULL) <= 0 &&
(!is_addr || // DNS CN fallback
mg_tls_verify_cert_cn(&ci->subj, tls->hostname) <= 0)) {
mg_error(c, "failed to verify hostname");
return -1;
}
}
if (ci->pubkey.len > sizeof(tls->pubkey)) {
mg_error(c, "peer public key too large");
return -1;
}
memmove(tls->pubkey, ci->pubkey.buf, ci->pubkey.len);
tls->pubkeysz = ci->pubkey.len;
} else {
if (!ci->is_ca || !mg_tls_verify_cert_signature(ci - 1, ci)) {
mg_error(c, "failed to verify certificate chain %s", ci->is_ca ? "" : "(not a true CA)");
return -1;
}
}
if (tls->ca_bundle_len > 0) { // bundle, find subject and compare keys
int r;
MG_VERBOSE(("Search current cert in bundle"));
r = tls_bundle_find(tls, &ci->subj, &ca); // find current cert ci
if (r == -1) {
mg_error(c, "failed to parse CA bundle");
return -1;
} else if (r > 0 && ca.pubkey.len == ci->pubkey.len &&
memcmp(ca.pubkey.buf, ci->pubkey.buf, ca.pubkey.len) == 0) {
found_ca = true;
MG_VERBOSE(("CA serial: %M", mg_print_hex, ca.sn.len, ca.sn.buf));
break;
} // else r = 0 or -2 => subj not found or pubkey not matching
}
// Single CA: accept the chain if the CA itself is in it, e.g. a
// cross-signed copy of the root. Same subject and same public key
// means the same trusted key, and the links below ci are verified
if (tls->ca_der.len > 0 && ca.subj.len == ci->subj.len &&
memcmp(ca.subj.value, ci->subj.value, ca.subj.len) == 0 &&
ca.pubkey.len == ci->pubkey.len &&
memcmp(ca.pubkey.buf, ci->pubkey.buf, ca.pubkey.len) == 0) {
found_ca = true;
MG_VERBOSE(("CA found in chain at depth %d", certnum - 1));
break;
}
if (certnum == sizeof(certs) / sizeof(certs[0]) - 1) {
mg_error(c, "too many certificates in the chain");
return -1;
}
}
if (!found_ca && certnum > 0 && tls->ca_bundle_len > 0) { // bundle
int r;
MG_VERBOSE(("Search bundle for issuer of last cert in chain"));
r = tls_bundle_find(tls, &certs[certnum - 1].issuer, &ca);
if (r <= 0) {
mg_error(c, "failed to %s",
r == 0 ? "find issuing CA in bundle"
: r == -1 ? "parse CA bundle"
: "parse name OID");
return -1;
} else if (!ca.is_ca || // candidate issuer found
!mg_tls_verify_cert_signature(&certs[certnum - 1], &ca)) {
mg_error(c, "failed to verify CA");
return -1;
} // issuer verified. NOTE(): may fail if two diff CAs share a CN
MG_VERBOSE(("CA serial: %M", mg_print_hex, ca.sn.len, ca.sn.buf));
}
if (!found_ca && tls->ca_der.len > 0) { // single cert or server
if (certnum < 1 ||
!mg_tls_verify_cert_signature(&certs[certnum - 1], &ca)) {
mg_error(c, "failed to verify CA");
return -1;
} else if (is_client) {
MG_VERBOSE(("no CA in chain; verification with builtin CA passed"));
}
}
}
mg_tls_drop_message(c);
mg_tls_calc_cert_verify_hash(c, tls->sighash, tls->sighash384, !is_client);
return 0;
}
static int mg_tls_recv_cert_verify(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
unsigned char *recv_buf;
if (mg_tls_recv_record(c) < 0) {
return -1;
}
recv_buf = &c->rtls.buf[tls->recv_offset];
if (recv_buf[0] != MG_TLS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
mg_error(c, "expected %s certificate verify but got msg 0x%02x",
c->is_client ? "server" : "client", recv_buf[0]);
return -1;
}
if (tls->recv_len < 8) {
mg_error(c, "server certificate verify is too short: %d bytes",
tls->recv_len);
return -1;
}
// Ignore CertificateVerify if strict checks are not required
if (tls->skip_verification) {
mg_tls_drop_message(c);
return 0;
}
{
uint16_t sigalg = MG_LOAD_BE16(recv_buf + 4);
uint16_t siglen = MG_LOAD_BE16(recv_buf + 6);
uint8_t *sigbuf = recv_buf + 8;
if (siglen > tls->recv_len - 8) {
mg_error(c, "invalid certverify signature length: %d, expected %d",
siglen, tls->recv_len - 8);
return -1;
}
MG_VERBOSE(
("certificate verification, algo=%04x, siglen=%d", sigalg, siglen));
if (sigalg == 0x0804) { // rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
uint8_t sig2[512]; // 2048 or 4096 bits
const uint8_t *n;
size_t nlen;
struct mg_der_tlv seq, modulus, exponent;
if (mg_der_parse(tls->pubkey, tls->pubkeysz, &seq) <= 0 ||
mg_der_next(&seq, &modulus) <= 0 || modulus.type != 2 ||
modulus.len == 0 || mg_der_next(&seq, &exponent) <= 0 ||
exponent.type != 2 || exponent.len == 0) {
mg_error(c, "invalid public key");
return -1;
}
n = modulus.value, nlen = mg_rsa_trim_len(&n, modulus.len);
if (nlen > sizeof(sig2) ||
mg_rsa_mod_pow(modulus.value, modulus.len, exponent.value,
exponent.len, sigbuf, siglen, sig2, nlen) != 0 ||
!mg_rsa_verify(sig2, nlen, tls->sighash)) {
mg_error(c, "failed to verify RSA certificate (certverify)");
return -1;
}
MG_VERBOSE(("certificate verification successful (RSA)"));
} else if (sigalg == 0x0403 ||
(sigalg == 0x0503 && MG_UECC_SUPPORTS_secp384r1)) {
// ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 or ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384. Extract certificate
// signature and verify it using pubkey and sighash
bool is384 = sigalg == 0x0503;
uint32_t N = is384 ? 48 : 32; // curve size: r and s are N bytes each
int ok;
uint8_t sig[96];
struct mg_der_tlv seq, r, s;
memset(sig, 0, sizeof(sig));
if (tls->pubkeysz != 2 * N) {
mg_error(c, "certverify scheme %04x does not match the key", sigalg);
return -1;
}
if (mg_der_to_tlv(sigbuf, siglen, &seq) < 0) {
mg_error(c, "verification message is not an ASN.1 DER sequence");
return -1;
}
if (mg_der_to_tlv(seq.value, seq.len, &r) < 0) {
mg_error(c, "missing first part of the signature");
return -1;
}
if (mg_der_to_tlv(r.value + r.len, seq.len - r.len, &s) < 0) {
mg_error(c, "missing second part of the signature");
return -1;
}
// Integers may be padded with zeroes
if (r.len > N) r.value = r.value + (r.len - N), r.len = N;
if (s.len > N) s.value = s.value + (s.len - N), s.len = N;
// r or s may be shorter than N bytes, "right-justify" (network order)
memmove(sig + (N - r.len), r.value, r.len);
memmove(sig + N + (N - s.len), s.value, s.len);
#if MG_UECC_SUPPORTS_secp384r1
if (is384) {
ok = mg_uecc_verify(tls->pubkey, tls->sighash384,
sizeof(tls->sighash384), sig, mg_uecc_secp384r1());
} else
#endif
{
ok = mg_uecc_verify(tls->pubkey, tls->sighash, sizeof(tls->sighash),
sig, mg_uecc_secp256r1());
}
if (ok != 1) {
mg_error(c, "failed to verify EC certificate (certverify)");
return -1;
}
MG_VERBOSE(("certificate verification successful (EC)"));
} else {
// From
// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml:
// 0805 = rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
// 0806 = rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
// 0807 = ed25519
// 0808 = ed448
// 0809 = rsa_pss_pss_sha256
// 080A = rsa_pss_pss_sha384
// 080B = rsa_pss_pss_sha512
MG_ERROR(("unsupported certverify signature scheme: %x of %d bytes",
sigalg, siglen));
return -1;
}
}
mg_tls_drop_message(c);
return 0;
}
static int mg_tls_client_recv_finish(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
unsigned char *recv_buf;
if (mg_tls_recv_record(c) < 0) {
return -1;
}
recv_buf = &c->rtls.buf[tls->recv_offset];
if (recv_buf[0] != MG_TLS_FINISHED) {
mg_error(c, "expected server finished but got msg 0x%02x", recv_buf[0]);
return -1;
}
mg_tls_drop_message(c);
return 0;
}
static bool mg_tls_client_send_finish(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
mg_sha256_ctx sha256;
uint8_t hash[32];
uint8_t finish[36] = {0x14, 0, 0, 32};
memmove(&sha256, &tls->sha256, sizeof(mg_sha256_ctx));
mg_sha256_final(hash, &sha256);
mg_hmac_sha256(finish + 4, tls->enc.client_finished_key, 32, hash, 32);
return mg_tls_encrypt(c, finish, sizeof(finish), MG_TLS_HANDSHAKE);
}
static bool mg_tls_client_handshake(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
switch (tls->state) {
case MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_START:
if (!mg_tls_client_send_hello(c)) return false;
tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_WAIT_SH;
// Fallthrough
case MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_WAIT_SH:
if (mg_tls_client_recv_hello(c) < 0) break;
tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_WAIT_EE;
// Fallthrough
case MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_WAIT_EE:
if (mg_tls_client_recv_ext(c) < 0) break;
tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_WAIT_CERT;
// Fallthrough
case MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_WAIT_CERT:
if (mg_tls_recv_cert(c, true) < 0) break;
tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_WAIT_CV;
// Fallthrough
case MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_WAIT_CV:
if (mg_tls_recv_cert_verify(c) < 0) break;
tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_WAIT_FINISH;
// Fallthrough
case MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_WAIT_FINISH:
if (mg_tls_client_recv_finish(c) < 0) break;
if (tls->cert_requested && tls->cert_der.len > 0) { // two-way auth
// generate application keys at this point, keep using handshake keys
struct tls_enc hs_keys = tls->enc;
mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c);
tls->app_keys = tls->enc;
tls->enc = hs_keys;
if (!mg_tls_send_cert(c, true) || !mg_tls_send_cert_verify(c, true) ||
!mg_tls_client_send_finish(c))
return false;
tls->enc = tls->app_keys;
} else {
if (!mg_tls_client_send_finish(c)) return false;
mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c);
}
tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_CONNECTED;
c->is_tls_hs = 0;
mg_call(c, MG_EV_TLS_HS, NULL);
break;
default:
mg_error(c, "unexpected client state: %d", tls->state);
break;
}
return true;
}
static bool mg_tls_server_handshake(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
switch (tls->state) {
case MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_START:
if (mg_tls_server_recv_hello(c) < 0) break;
if (!mg_tls_server_send_hello(c)) return false;
mg_tls_generate_handshake_keys(c);
if (!mg_tls_server_send_ext(c)) return false;
if (tls->is_twoway && !mg_tls_server_send_cert_request(c)) return false;
if (!mg_tls_send_cert(c, false) || !mg_tls_send_cert_verify(c, false) ||
!mg_tls_server_send_finish(c))
return false;
if (tls->is_twoway) {
// generate application keys at this point, keep using handshake keys
struct tls_enc hs_keys = tls->enc;
mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c);
tls->app_keys = tls->enc;
tls->enc = hs_keys;
tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_WAIT_CERT;
break;
}
tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_NEGOTIATED;
// fallthrough
case MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_NEGOTIATED:
if (mg_tls_server_recv_finish(c) < 0) break;
if (tls->is_twoway) { // use previously generated keys
tls->enc = tls->app_keys;
} else { // generate keys now
mg_tls_generate_application_keys(c);
}
tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_CONNECTED;
c->is_tls_hs = 0;
break;
case MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_WAIT_CERT:
if (mg_tls_recv_cert(c, false) < 0) break;
tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_WAIT_CV;
// Fallthrough
case MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_WAIT_CV:
if (mg_tls_recv_cert_verify(c) < 0) break;
tls->state = MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_NEGOTIATED;
break;
default:
mg_error(c, "unexpected server state: %d", tls->state);
break;
}
return true;
}
void mg_tls_handshake(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
long n;
bool res;
if (c->is_closing) return; // we don't clear rx buf, so ignore what's left
if (tls->is_sntp_pending) return;
if (c->is_client) {
// will clear is_hs when sending last chunk
res = mg_tls_client_handshake(c);
} else {
res = mg_tls_server_handshake(c);
}
if (!res) {
mg_error(c, "TLS OOM");
return;
}
while (tls->send.len > 0 &&
(n = mg_io_send(c, tls->send.buf, tls->send.len)) > 0) {
mg_iobuf_del(&tls->send, 0, (size_t) n);
} // if last chunk fails to be sent, it will be sent with first app data,
// otherwise, it needs to be flushed
}
static int mg_rsa_parse_der_int(const uint8_t **p, const uint8_t *end,
struct mg_str *out) {
const uint8_t *start = *p, *value_start, *value_end;
uint8_t i;
uint32_t len;
if (end - start < 2) {
MG_VERBOSE(("DER INT: not enough bytes (%d < 2)", (int) (end - start)));
return -1;
}
if (start[0] != 0x02) {
MG_VERBOSE(("DER INT: expected 0x02, got 0x%02x", start[0]));
return -1;
}
len = start[1];
*p = start + 2;
if (len > 0x7F) {
// Long form length
uint8_t len_bytes = len & 0x7F;
MG_VERBOSE(("DER INT: long form, %d length bytes", len_bytes));
if (len_bytes == 0 || len_bytes > 4 || (size_t) (end - *p) < len_bytes) {
MG_VERBOSE(("DER INT: not enough bytes for length"));
return -1;
}
len = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len_bytes; i++) {
len = (len << 8) | (*p)[i];
}
*p += len_bytes;
}
MG_VERBOSE(("DER INT: length=%u, remaining=%d", len, (int) (end - *p)));
if ((size_t) (end - *p) < len) {
MG_VERBOSE(("DER INT: length exceeds remaining bytes"));
return -1;
}
// The encoded length tells us how many bytes to consume from the stream
value_start = *p;
value_end = *p + len;
// Skip leading zero byte if present (for positive numbers)
// This doesn't change how many bytes we consume, just what we expose
if (len > 0 && (*p)[0] == 0x00) {
(*p)++;
len--;
}
out->buf = (char *) *p;
out->len = len;
// Advance pointer by the ORIGINAL encoded length, not the adjusted length
*p = value_end;
MG_VERBOSE(("DER INT: parsed %u bytes (skipped zero=%d)", len,
(size_t) (value_end - value_start) != (size_t) len ? 1 : 0));
return 0;
}
// RFC 5915 ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
// version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) },
// privateKey OCTET STRING,
// parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL,
// publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL
// }
static int mg_parse_ec_private_key(const uint8_t *der, size_t dersz,
uint8_t *ec_key) {
struct mg_der_tlv root, version, private_key_octets;
if (mg_der_parse((uint8_t *) der, dersz, &root) < 0 || root.type != 0x30) {
MG_ERROR(("EC private key: invalid SEQUENCE"));
return -1;
}
if (mg_der_next(&root, &version) <= 0 || version.type != 0x02) {
MG_ERROR(("EC private key: invalid version"));
return -1;
}
if (mg_der_next(&root, &private_key_octets) <= 0 ||
private_key_octets.type != 0x04) {
MG_ERROR(("EC private key: invalid privateKey OCTET STRING"));
return -1;
}
if (private_key_octets.len != 32) {
MG_ERROR(
("EC private key: expected 32 bytes, got %u", private_key_octets.len));
return -1;
}
memcpy(ec_key, private_key_octets.value, 32);
return 0;
}
// Parse RSA private key from DER format
// RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
// version INTEGER (0),
// modulus INTEGER, -- n
// publicExponent INTEGER, -- e
// privateExponent INTEGER, -- d
// prime1 INTEGER, -- p
// prime2 INTEGER, -- q
// exponent1 INTEGER, -- dP = d mod (p-1)
// exponent2 INTEGER, -- dQ = d mod (q-1)
// coefficient INTEGER, -- qInv = (inverse of q) mod p
// }
static int mg_rsa_parse_key(const uint8_t *der, size_t dersz,
struct mg_rsa_key *key) {
const uint8_t *p = der;
const uint8_t *end = der + dersz;
uint32_t seq_len;
struct mg_str version;
memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
// Parse outer SEQUENCE
if (end - p < 2) {
MG_ERROR(("RSA key too short for SEQUENCE header"));
return -1;
}
if (p[0] != 0x30) {
MG_ERROR(("RSA key: expected SEQUENCE (0x30), got 0x%02x", p[0]));
return -1;
}
seq_len = p[1];
p += 2;
if (seq_len > 0x7F) {
// Long form length
uint8_t i, len_bytes = seq_len & 0x7F;
MG_VERBOSE(("Long form length: %d bytes", len_bytes));
if (len_bytes == 0 || len_bytes > 4 || (size_t) (end - p) < len_bytes) {
MG_ERROR(("Not enough bytes for long form length"));
return -1;
}
seq_len = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len_bytes; i++) {
seq_len = (seq_len << 8) | p[i];
}
p += len_bytes;
}
MG_VERBOSE(
("SEQUENCE length: %u, total DER size: %u", seq_len, (unsigned) dersz));
if ((size_t) (end - p) < seq_len) {
MG_ERROR(("SEQUENCE length exceeds buffer"));
return -1;
}
end = p + seq_len; // Adjust end to sequence boundary
// Parse version (should be 0)
MG_VERBOSE(("Before version: offset=%d, bytes: %02x %02x %02x %02x",
(int) (p - der), p < end ? p[0] : 0xFF,
p + 1 < end ? p[1] : 0xFF, p + 2 < end ? p[2] : 0xFF,
p + 3 < end ? p[3] : 0xFF));
if (mg_rsa_parse_der_int(&p, end, &version) < 0) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed to parse version"));
return -1;
}
MG_DEBUG(("Version: %d byte(s), value=%d, offset now=%d", (int) version.len,
version.len > 0 ? (int) (unsigned char) version.buf[0] : -1,
(int) (p - der)));
// Parse the 8 components: n, e, d, p, q, dP, dQ, qInv
MG_VERBOSE(("Before n: offset=%d, bytes: %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x",
(int) (p - der), p < end ? p[0] : 0xFF,
p + 1 < end ? p[1] : 0xFF, p + 2 < end ? p[2] : 0xFF,
p + 3 < end ? p[3] : 0xFF, p + 4 < end ? p[4] : 0xFF,
p + 5 < end ? p[5] : 0xFF));
if (mg_rsa_parse_der_int(&p, end, &key->n) < 0) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed to parse n (modulus)"));
return -1;
}
MG_VERBOSE(("Parsed n: %d bytes, offset now=%d, consumed=%d bytes total",
(int) key->n.len, (int) (p - der), (int) (p - der)));
MG_VERBOSE((" First 8 bytes of n: %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x",
key->n.len > 0 ? (unsigned char) key->n.buf[0] : 0xFF,
key->n.len > 1 ? (unsigned char) key->n.buf[1] : 0xFF,
key->n.len > 2 ? (unsigned char) key->n.buf[2] : 0xFF,
key->n.len > 3 ? (unsigned char) key->n.buf[3] : 0xFF,
key->n.len > 4 ? (unsigned char) key->n.buf[4] : 0xFF,
key->n.len > 5 ? (unsigned char) key->n.buf[5] : 0xFF,
key->n.len > 6 ? (unsigned char) key->n.buf[6] : 0xFF,
key->n.len > 7 ? (unsigned char) key->n.buf[7] : 0xFF));
MG_VERBOSE((" Next bytes after n: %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x %02x",
p < end ? p[0] : 0xFF, p + 1 < end ? p[1] : 0xFF,
p + 2 < end ? p[2] : 0xFF, p + 3 < end ? p[3] : 0xFF,
p + 4 < end ? p[4] : 0xFF, p + 5 < end ? p[5] : 0xFF));
if (mg_rsa_parse_der_int(&p, end, &key->e) < 0) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed to parse e (public exponent), bytes remaining: %d",
(int) (end - p)));
if (end - p >= 4) {
MG_ERROR((" Next 4 bytes: %02x %02x %02x %02x", p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3]));
}
return -1;
}
if (mg_rsa_parse_der_int(&p, end, &key->d) < 0) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed to parse d (private exponent)"));
return -1;
}
if (mg_rsa_parse_der_int(&p, end, &key->p) < 0) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed to parse p (prime1)"));
return -1;
}
if (mg_rsa_parse_der_int(&p, end, &key->q) < 0) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed to parse q (prime2)"));
return -1;
}
if (mg_rsa_parse_der_int(&p, end, &key->dP) < 0) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed to parse dP (exponent1)"));
return -1;
}
if (mg_rsa_parse_der_int(&p, end, &key->dQ) < 0) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed to parse dQ (exponent2)"));
return -1;
}
if (mg_rsa_parse_der_int(&p, end, &key->qInv) < 0) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed to parse qInv (coefficient)"));
return -1;
}
MG_VERBOSE(("Successfully parsed RSA key"));
return 0;
}
// PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
// version INTEGER,
// privateKeyAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
// privateKey OCTET STRING,
// attributes [0] Attributes OPTIONAL
// }
// AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
// algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
// parameters ANY OPTIONAL
// }
static int mg_parse_pkcs8_key(const uint8_t *der, size_t dersz,
struct mg_rsa_key *rsa, uint8_t *ec_key) {
struct mg_der_tlv root, version, alg_id, private_key_octets;
struct mg_der_tlv alg_oid, alg_params;
if (mg_der_parse((uint8_t *) der, dersz, &root) < 0 || root.type != 0x30) {
MG_ERROR(("PKCS#8: invalid PrivateKeyInfo SEQUENCE"));
return -1;
}
if (mg_der_next(&root, &version) <= 0 || version.type != 0x02) {
MG_ERROR(("PKCS#8: invalid version"));
return -1;
}
if (mg_der_next(&root, &alg_id) <= 0 || alg_id.type != 0x30) {
MG_ERROR(("PKCS#8: invalid AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE"));
return -1;
}
if (mg_der_next(&alg_id, &alg_oid) <= 0 || alg_oid.type != 0x06) {
MG_ERROR(("PKCS#8: invalid algorithm OID"));
return -1;
}
if (mg_der_next(&root, &private_key_octets) <= 0 ||
private_key_octets.type != 0x04) {
MG_ERROR(("PKCS#8: invalid privateKey OCTET STRING"));
return -1;
}
if (alg_oid.len == sizeof(mg_rsa_oid) &&
memcmp(alg_oid.value, mg_rsa_oid, sizeof(mg_rsa_oid)) == 0) {
struct mg_rsa_key rsa_key;
if (rsa == NULL) return -1;
if (mg_rsa_parse_key(private_key_octets.value, private_key_octets.len,
&rsa_key) < 0) {
MG_ERROR(("PKCS#8: failed to parse inner RSA key"));
return -1;
}
*rsa = rsa_key;
return 0;
} else if (alg_oid.len == sizeof(mg_ec_public_key_oid) &&
memcmp(alg_oid.value, mg_ec_public_key_oid,
sizeof(mg_ec_public_key_oid)) == 0) {
if (ec_key == NULL) return -1;
if (mg_der_next(&alg_id, &alg_params) <= 0 || alg_params.type != 0x06) {
MG_ERROR(("PKCS#8: invalid EC parameters OID"));
return -1;
}
if (alg_params.len != sizeof(mg_secp256r1_oid) ||
memcmp(alg_params.value, mg_secp256r1_oid, sizeof(mg_secp256r1_oid)) !=
0) {
MG_ERROR(("PKCS#8: unsupported EC curve (only secp256r1 supported)"));
return -1;
}
return mg_parse_ec_private_key(private_key_octets.value,
private_key_octets.len, ec_key);
} else {
MG_ERROR(("PKCS#8: unsupported algorithm"));
return -1;
}
}
static int mg_parse_pem(const struct mg_str pem, const struct mg_str label,
struct mg_str *der) {
size_t n = 0, m = 0;
char *s;
const char *c;
struct mg_str caps[6]; // number of wildcards + 1
if (!mg_match(pem, mg_str("#-----BEGIN #-----#-----END #-----#"), caps)) {
*der = mg_strdup(pem);
return 0;
}
if (mg_strcmp(caps[1], label) != 0 || mg_strcmp(caps[3], label) != 0) {
return -1; // bad label
}
if ((s = (char *) mg_calloc(1, caps[2].len)) == NULL) {
return -1;
}
for (c = caps[2].buf; c < caps[2].buf + caps[2].len; c++) {
if (*c == ' ' || *c == '\n' || *c == '\r' || *c == '\t') {
continue;
}
s[n++] = *c;
}
m = mg_base64_decode(s, n, s, n);
if (m == 0) {
mg_free(s);
return -1;
}
der->buf = s;
der->len = m;
return 0;
}
static int mg_parse_pem_certs(const struct mg_str pem, struct mg_str **ders) {
int count = 0;
struct mg_str *certs = NULL;
const char *p = pem.buf;
const char *end = pem.buf + pem.len;
const char *begin_marker = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----";
const char *end_marker = "-----END CERTIFICATE-----";
size_t begin_len = strlen(begin_marker);
size_t end_len = strlen(end_marker);
while (p < end) {
const char *s, *begin = NULL, *finish = NULL;
struct mg_str cert_pem, cert_der, *new_certs;
int i;
for (s = p; s <= end - (int) begin_len; s++) {
if (memcmp(s, begin_marker, begin_len) == 0) {
begin = s;
break;
}
}
if (begin == NULL) break;
for (s = begin + begin_len; s <= end - (int) end_len; s++) {
if (memcmp(s, end_marker, end_len) == 0) {
finish = s + end_len;
break;
}
}
if (finish == NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) mg_free((void *) certs[i].buf);
mg_free(certs);
return -1;
}
cert_pem = mg_str_n(begin, (size_t) (finish - begin));
if (mg_parse_pem(cert_pem, mg_str_s("CERTIFICATE"), &cert_der) < 0) {
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) mg_free((void *) certs[i].buf);
mg_free(certs);
return -1;
}
new_certs =
(struct mg_str *) mg_calloc((size_t) count + 1, sizeof(*new_certs));
if (new_certs == NULL) {
mg_free((void *) cert_der.buf);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) mg_free((void *) certs[i].buf);
mg_free(certs);
return -1;
}
if (count > 0) {
memmove(new_certs, certs, (size_t) count * sizeof(struct mg_str));
mg_free(certs);
}
certs = new_certs;
certs[count++] = cert_der;
p = finish;
}
*ders = certs;
return count;
}
size_t mg_uecc_parse_private_key(struct mg_str key, uint8_t *buf, size_t len) {
struct mg_str der = mg_str_n(NULL, 0);
size_t n = 0;
if (buf == NULL || len < 32) return 0;
// current mg_parse_ec_private_key() only handles 32-byte keys
if (mg_parse_pem(key, mg_str_s("EC PRIVATE KEY"), &der) == 0) {
if (mg_parse_ec_private_key((uint8_t *) der.buf, der.len, buf) == 0) n = 32;
} else if (mg_parse_pem(key, mg_str_s("PRIVATE KEY"), &der) == 0) {
if (mg_parse_pkcs8_key((uint8_t *) der.buf, der.len, NULL, buf) == 0) n = 32;
}
mg_free((void *) der.buf);
return n;
}
static void sync_time_cancel(struct mg_connection *c) {
c->fn = NULL;
c->is_closing = 1;
}
static void sync_time_cb(struct mg_connection *c, int ev, void *ev_data) {
if (ev == MG_EV_SNTP_TIME || (ev == MG_EV_CLOSE)) {
struct mg_connection *tlsc = (struct mg_connection *) c->fn_data;
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) tlsc->tls;
sync_time_cancel(c); // c = tls->timec
tls->timec = NULL;
tls->is_sntp_pending = false;
if (ev == MG_EV_SNTP_TIME) mg_tls_handshake(tlsc);
if (ev == MG_EV_CLOSE) mg_error(tlsc, "time sync failed");
}
(void) ev_data;
}
void mg_tls_init(struct mg_connection *c, const struct mg_tls_opts *opts) {
struct mg_str key;
struct tls_data *tls =
(struct tls_data *) mg_calloc(1, sizeof(struct tls_data));
if (tls == NULL) {
mg_error(c, "tls oom");
return;
}
tls->state =
c->is_client ? MG_TLS_STATE_CLIENT_START : MG_TLS_STATE_SERVER_START;
tls->skip_verification = opts->skip_verification;
// tls->send.align = MG_IO_SIZE;
c->tls = tls;
c->is_tls = c->is_tls_hs = 1;
mg_sha256_init(&tls->sha256);
// save hostname (client extension)
if (opts->name.len > 0) {
if (opts->name.len >= sizeof(tls->hostname) - 1) {
mg_error(c, "hostname too long");
return;
}
strncpy((char *) tls->hostname, opts->name.buf, sizeof(tls->hostname) - 1);
tls->hostname[opts->name.len] = 0;
}
// server CA certificate; parse PEM [bundle] or DER
if (opts->ca.len > 0) {
struct mg_str *all_certs = NULL;
int cert_count = mg_parse_pem_certs(opts->ca, &all_certs);
if (cert_count > 1 && c->is_client) { // use bundle for clients only
tls->ca_bundle_len = (size_t) cert_count;
tls->ca_bundle_der = all_certs;
MG_VERBOSE(("%d-cert bundle", cert_count));
} else if (cert_count > 0) {
tls->ca_der.buf = all_certs[0].buf;
tls->ca_der.len = all_certs[0].len;
mg_free(all_certs);
} else { // parse again for a possible DER (or a truncated begin string)
if (mg_parse_pem(opts->ca, mg_str_s("CERTIFICATE"), &tls->ca_der) < 0) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed to load CA certificate"));
goto xit;
}
} // ca_bundle_len != 0 && ca_der.len = 0 => bundle
if (!c->is_client) tls->is_twoway = true; // server + CA: two-way auth
}
if (opts->cert.buf == NULL || opts->cert.len == 0) {
MG_VERBOSE(("No certificate provided"));
goto xit;
}
// parse PEM or DER certificate
{
struct mg_str *all_certs = NULL;
int cert_count = mg_parse_pem_certs(opts->cert, &all_certs);
if (cert_count > 0) {
tls->cert_der.buf = all_certs[0].buf;
tls->cert_der.len = all_certs[0].len;
if (cert_count > 1) {
tls->chain_len = (size_t) cert_count;
tls->chain_der = all_certs;
} else {
mg_free(all_certs);
}
} else { // parse again for a possible DER (or a truncated begin string)
if (mg_parse_pem(opts->cert, mg_str_s("CERTIFICATE"), &tls->cert_der) <
0) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed to load certificate"));
return;
}
}
}
// parse PEM or DER EC key
if (opts->key.buf == NULL || opts->key.len == 0) {
mg_error(c, "Certificate provided without a private key");
return;
}
if (mg_parse_pem(opts->key, mg_str_s("EC PRIVATE KEY"), &key) == 0) {
// expect ASN.1 SEQUENCE=[INTEGER=1, BITSTRING of 32 bytes, ...]
// 30 nn 02 01 01 04 20 [key] ...
if (key.len < (2 + 5 + 32) || key.buf[0] != 0x30 ||
(key.buf[1] & 0x80) != 0 ||
memcmp(key.buf + 2, "\x02\x01\x01\x04\x20", 5) != 0) {
mg_error(c, "EC private key: invalid ASN.1");
} else {
memmove(tls->ec_key, key.buf + 7, 32);
}
mg_free((void *) key.buf);
} else if (mg_parse_pem(opts->key, mg_str_s("RSA PRIVATE KEY"), &key) == 0) {
struct mg_rsa_key rsa_key;
// RSA private key found, store it for later use
tls->rsa_key_der = key;
// parse and validate the key structure
// we keep the DER buffer, rsa_key just points into it
if (mg_rsa_parse_key((const uint8_t *) key.buf, key.len, &rsa_key) < 0) {
MG_ERROR(("Failed to parse RSA private key structure"));
mg_free((void *) key.buf);
tls->rsa_key_der = mg_str_n(NULL, 0);
mg_error(c, "Invalid RSA private key format");
return;
}
MG_VERBOSE(("RSA key components:"));
MG_VERBOSE((" n (modulus): %d bytes", (int) rsa_key.n.len));
MG_VERBOSE((" e (pubexp): %d bytes", (int) rsa_key.e.len));
MG_VERBOSE((" d (privexp): %d bytes", (int) rsa_key.d.len));
MG_VERBOSE((" p (prime1): %d bytes", (int) rsa_key.p.len));
MG_VERBOSE((" q (prime2): %d bytes", (int) rsa_key.q.len));
MG_VERBOSE((" dP: %d bytes", (int) rsa_key.dP.len));
MG_VERBOSE((" dQ: %d bytes", (int) rsa_key.dQ.len));
MG_VERBOSE((" qInv: %d bytes", (int) rsa_key.qInv.len));
// Copy parsed RSA key components to tls->rsa for signing operations
tls->rsa = rsa_key;
} else if (mg_parse_pem(opts->key, mg_str_s("PRIVATE KEY"), &key) == 0) {
if (mg_parse_pkcs8_key((const uint8_t *) key.buf, key.len, &tls->rsa,
tls->ec_key) == 0) {
if (tls->rsa.n.len > 0) {
tls->rsa_key_der = key;
MG_INFO(("Parsed PKCS#8 RSA private key: %d bytes", (int) key.len));
} else {
mg_free((void *) key.buf);
MG_VERBOSE(("Parsed PKCS#8 EC private key"));
}
} else {
mg_free((void *) key.buf);
mg_error(c, "Unsupported PKCS#8 private key format, algorithm, or curve");
return;
}
} else {
mg_error(
c, "Expected EC PRIVATE KEY, RSA PRIVATE KEY, or PRIVATE KEY (PKCS#8)");
return;
}
xit:
if (mg_boot_timestamp_ms == 0 && !tls->skip_verification &&
(tls->ca_bundle_len > 0 || tls->ca_der.len > 0)) {
struct mg_connection *timec;
timec = mg_sntp_connect(c->mgr, NULL, sync_time_cb, c);
if (timec == NULL) {
mg_error(c, "time sync failed");
return;
}
tls->is_sntp_pending = true;
tls->timec = timec;
}
}
void mg_tls_free(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
size_t i;
if (tls != NULL) {
if (tls->timec != NULL) {
sync_time_cancel(tls->timec);
tls->timec = NULL;
}
mg_iobuf_free(&tls->send);
if (tls->chain_der != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < tls->chain_len; i++) {
mg_free((void *) tls->chain_der[i].buf);
}
mg_free(tls->chain_der);
} else {
mg_free((void *) tls->cert_der.buf);
}
if (tls->ca_bundle_der != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < tls->ca_bundle_len; i++) {
mg_free((void *) tls->ca_bundle_der[i].buf);
}
mg_free(tls->ca_bundle_der);
}
mg_free((void *) tls->ca_der.buf);
mg_free((void *) tls->rsa_key_der.buf);
mg_bzero((unsigned char *) tls, sizeof(*tls)); // Wipe keys and secrets
}
mg_free(c->tls);
c->tls = NULL;
}
long mg_tls_send(struct mg_connection *c, const void *buf, size_t len) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
long n = MG_IO_WAIT;
bool was_throttled = c->is_tls_throttled; // see #3074
if (!was_throttled) { // encrypt new data
if (len > MG_IO_SIZE) len = MG_IO_SIZE;
if (len > 16384) len = 16384;
if (!mg_tls_encrypt(c, (const uint8_t *) buf, len, MG_TLS_APP_DATA))
return 0; // returning 0 means an OOM condition (iobuf couldn't resize),
// yet this is so far recoverable, let the caller decide
} // else, resend outstanding encrypted data in tls->send
while (tls->send.len > 0 &&
(n = mg_io_send(c, tls->send.buf, tls->send.len)) > 0) {
mg_iobuf_del(&tls->send, 0, (size_t) n);
} // if last chunk fails to be sent, it needs to be flushed
c->is_tls_throttled = (tls->send.len > 0 && n == MG_IO_WAIT);
MG_VERBOSE(("%lu %ld %ld %ld %c %c", c->id, (long) len, (long) tls->send.len,
n, was_throttled ? 'T' : 't', c->is_tls_throttled ? 'T' : 't'));
if (n == MG_IO_ERR) return MG_IO_ERR;
if (was_throttled) return MG_IO_WAIT; // sent throttled data instead
return (long) len; // return len even when throttled, already encripted that
}
long mg_tls_recv(struct mg_connection *c, void *buf, size_t len) {
int r = 0;
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
unsigned char *recv_buf;
size_t minlen;
for (;;) {
r = mg_tls_recv_record(c);
if (r < 0) return r;
if (tls->content_type == MG_TLS_APP_DATA) break;
tls->recv_len = 0;
mg_tls_drop_record(c);
}
if (buf == NULL || len == 0) return 0L;
recv_buf = &c->rtls.buf[tls->recv_offset];
minlen = len < tls->recv_len ? len : tls->recv_len;
memmove(buf, recv_buf, minlen);
tls->recv_offset += minlen;
tls->recv_len -= minlen;
if (tls->recv_len == 0) mg_tls_drop_record(c);
return (long) minlen;
}
size_t mg_tls_pending(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
return tls != NULL ? tls->recv_len : 0;
}
long mg_tls_flush(struct mg_connection *c) {
struct tls_data *tls = (struct tls_data *) c->tls;
long n = 0;
while (tls->send.len > 0 &&
(n = mg_io_send(c, tls->send.buf, tls->send.len)) > 0) {
mg_iobuf_del(&tls->send, 0, (size_t) n);
}
if (n == MG_IO_ERR) return n;
c->is_tls_throttled = tls->send.len > 0;
return c->is_tls_throttled ? MG_IO_WAIT : 0;
}
void mg_tls_ctx_init(struct mg_mgr *mgr) {
(void) mgr;
}
void mg_tls_ctx_free(struct mg_mgr *mgr) {
(void) mgr;
}
#endif
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