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https://github.com/yhirose/cpp-httplib.git
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Use detail::from_chars for out-of-range Content-Length check
Replace the strtoull + errno + cast-back dance in get_header_value_u64 with the existing hand-written detail::from_chars, which reports result_out_of_range at size_t width. This detects the 32-bit truncation case directly (instead of via a separate cast-back comparison), drops the reliance on the global errno, and keeps the parsing locale- independent and consistent with the rest of the codebase.
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@@ -2957,18 +2957,18 @@ inline size_t get_header_value_u64(const Headers &headers,
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std::advance(it, static_cast<ssize_t>(id));
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if (it != rng.second) {
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if (is_numeric(it->second)) {
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errno = 0;
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auto val = std::strtoull(it->second.data(), nullptr, 10);
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auto result = static_cast<size_t>(val);
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// strtoull saturates to ULLONG_MAX on overflow, and the size_t cast
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// truncates a value that doesn't fit (a Content-Length above 2^32 wraps
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// to a small length on 32-bit builds). Either way the framing length
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// would be wrong, so flag it rather than return a bogus size.
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if (errno == ERANGE || static_cast<unsigned long long>(result) != val) {
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// Parse at size_t width so an out-of-range Content-Length is reported
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// rather than silently saturated/truncated (a value above 2^32 would
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// otherwise wrap to a small framing length on 32-bit builds). Flag it
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// and return SIZE_MAX so the existing oversized-value guards reject it.
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size_t val = 0;
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const auto &s = it->second;
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auto r = from_chars(s.data(), s.data() + s.size(), val);
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if (r.ec == std::errc::result_out_of_range) {
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is_invalid_value = true;
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return (std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max)();
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}
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return result;
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return val;
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} else {
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is_invalid_value = true;
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}
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+7
-7
@@ -1302,9 +1302,9 @@ TEST(GetHeaderValueTest, RegularInvalidValueInt) {
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TEST(GetHeaderValueTest, OutOfRangeValueInt) {
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// An all-digit value that overflows size_t must be reported as invalid, not
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// silently saturated/truncated: strtoull would otherwise return ULLONG_MAX
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// (or, on 32-bit builds, the cast would wrap a large length to a small one),
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// leaving the framing length wrong while is_invalid_value stayed false.
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// silently saturated/truncated: parsing at size_t width would otherwise wrap
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// a large length to a small one on 32-bit builds, leaving the framing length
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// wrong while is_invalid_value stayed false.
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Headers headers = {{"Content-Length", "99999999999999999999999999"}};
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auto is_invalid_value = false;
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detail::get_header_value_u64(headers, "Content-Length", 0, 0,
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@@ -16094,10 +16094,10 @@ TEST(OpenStreamMalformedContentLength, OutOfRange) {
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ASSERT_GT(port, 0);
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// Historically std::stoull would throw std::out_of_range here and crash
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// the process, then strtoull silently clamped to ULLONG_MAX and the
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// stream opened with a bogus framing length. Now the out-of-range value
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// is flagged invalid, so the stream fails to open, matching the
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// not-a-number case above. The process still must NOT terminate.
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// the process, then parsing silently clamped to a bogus framing length and
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// the stream opened anyway. Now the out-of-range value is flagged invalid,
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// so the stream fails to open, matching the not-a-number case above. The
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// process still must NOT terminate.
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Client cli("127.0.0.1", port);
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auto handle = cli.open_stream("GET", "/");
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EXPECT_FALSE(handle.is_valid());
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