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58 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Simon Kelley f9f8d19bf5 Yet another 0x20 fix.
To complement the previous one, which fixed the retry path
when the query is retried from a different id/source address, this
fixes retries from the same id/source address.
2025-02-09 11:06:59 +00:00
Simon Kelley 535be2f5d3 Fix possible SIGSEGV in bpf.c 2025-02-08 22:58:42 +00:00
Simon Kelley bceab45dbe Fix 0x20 problem.
A retry to upstream DNS servers triggered by the following conditions

1) A query asking for the same data as a previous query which has not yet been answered.
2) The second query arrives more than two seconds after the first.
3) Either the source of the second query or the id field differs from the first.

fails to set the case of the retry to the same pattern as the first attempt.

However dnsmasq expects the reply from upstream to have the case
pattern of the first attempt.

If the answer to the retry arrives before the answer to the first
query, dnsmasq will notice the case mismatch, log an error, and
ignore the answer.

The worst case scenario would be the first upstream query or reply is
lost and there would follow a short period where all queries for that
particular domain would fail.

This is a 2.91 development issue, it doesn't apply to previous stable releases.
2025-02-07 19:56:33 +00:00
Helge Deller 368ceff6e0 TFTP off-by-2 bugfix
Some of my PA-RISC UNIX machines boot remotely via tftp, but dnsmasq
randomly fails to deliver (the identical file) to some of the machines.

I traced the issue and basically dnsmasq fails with error "unsupported
request from IP.x.y.z" (line 366 in tftp.c).

Here is an example package which is sent (516 hex bytes):
76 6d 6c 69 6e 75 78 00 6f 63 74 65 74 00 12 74 10 3c 00 00 00 00 00 01
a9 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e 38 00 00 00 00 00 00 1c a0 00 00 00 00 00 00
1d 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 1d 28 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
03 d8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 1d 30 00 00 00 02 ff e0
00 00 00 00 03 60 a8 49 55 93 00 00 00 01 f0 d4 21 e4 00 00 00 00 00 00
1d 78 00 00 00 f0 f0 d8 51 38 00 00 00 f0 f0 d4 21 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 aa b8 00 00 00 f0 f0 e9 62 7c 00 00 00 00 00 00
03 01 ff ff ff ff ff ff 03 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 ff ff ff ff ff ff
ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e 38 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 60 00 00 00 00 00 01
a6 68 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 f0 f0 d8 4f 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 ae ec 00 00 00 00 00 00 1f 70 00 00 00 00 00 00
1e b8 00 00 03 60 a8 49 55 93 00 00 00 02 18 71 1a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e 38 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 f0 d2 f0 70 00 00 00 00 00 00
1f c0 00 00 00 f0 f0 d4 0b e8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 60 ff ff ff fc 00 60 18 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 f0 d8
8f d0 00 00 00 00 00 00 1f f8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 f0 d8
8d b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e e8 00 00

Please note the last 3 bytes: "e8 00 00".
If the 3rd last byte is "00", then dnsmasq works and it fails it it's "e8".

So, the bug is in line 366 of tftp.c:
   filename = next(&p, end)
Here filename gets the value NULL from next(), because the "end" variable is off-by-2.
The fix is to change line 363 to add an offset of 2:
  end = packet + 2 + len;

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Closes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2293793
2025-02-06 17:04:06 +00:00
Simon Kelley 77c4e95d4a Fix for case-sensitivity problems in DNS.
Fix a case sensitivity problem which has been lurking for a long while.
When we get example.com and Example.com and combine them, we send whichever
query arrives first upstream and then later answer it, and we also
answer the second with the same answer. That means that if example.com
arrives first, it will get the answer example.com - good - but Example.com
will _also_ get the answer example.com - not so good.

In theory, fixing this is simple without having to keep seperate
copies of all the queries: Just use the bit-vector representation
of case flipping that we have for 0x20-encoding to keep the
differences in case. The complication comes from the fact that
the existing bit-vector code only holds data on the first 32 alpha
letters, because we only flip that up to many for 0x20 encoding.

In practise, the delta between combined queries can almost always
be represented with that data, since almost all queries are
all lower case and we only purturb the first 32 letters with
0x20 encoding. It's therefore worth keeping the existing,
efficient data structure for the 99.9% of the time it works.
For the 0.1% it doesn't, however, one needs an arbitrary-length data
structure with the resource implications of that.

Thanks to Peter Tirsek for the well researched bug report which set me
on to these problems.
2025-02-06 17:02:50 +00:00
Simon Kelley e44165c0f7 Fix bug in 0x20 encoding.
We must only compare case when mapping an answer from upstream
to a forwarding record, not when checking a query to see if it's a
duplicate. Since the saved query name is scrambled, that ensures
that almost all such checks will wrongly fail.

Thanks to Peter Tirsek for an exemplary bug report for this.
2025-02-06 10:36:21 +00:00
Simon Kelley a1a214c393 Bump date on manpage. 2025-02-05 21:34:54 +00:00
Simon Kelley 94b7144a1b Fix c99ism added in 0b6144583b 2025-02-05 21:02:54 +00:00
Matthias Andree e72910dec8 Spell check v2.91 CHANGELOG 2025-02-05 20:46:55 +00:00
Simon Kelley 0b6144583b Log failed TCP DNS connections upstream when --log-debug active. 2025-02-05 17:15:52 +00:00
Simon Kelley f31667317d Manpage typo. 2025-02-05 15:20:31 +00:00
Simon Kelley 5226b712a3 Add --no-0x20-encode config option.
The "bit 0x20 encoding" implemented in 995a16ca0c
can interact badly with (hopefully) rare broken upstream servers. Provide
an option to turn it off and a log message to give a clue as to why DNS service
is non-functional.
2025-02-03 21:02:12 +00:00
Simon Kelley 1f84cde024 Tweak to logging.
When a cached answer is too big, log

cached reply is truncated

and not

config reply is truncated
2025-02-03 15:26:55 +00:00
Paul Donald 046bfa2af0 Clean up some of the man page formatting.
Some writing was improved for clarity, especially regarding the use of
tags which can be confusing and difficult to grasp.
2025-02-01 22:40:54 +00:00
Simon Kelley 0762732647 belt-and-braces extra call to check_log_writer() in tcp_request() 2025-02-01 15:24:24 +00:00
Brian Haley efb8f10450 Fix potential memory leak
When a new IPv6 address is being added to a dhcp_config
struct, if there is anything invalid regarding the prefix
it looks like there is a potential memory leak.
ret_err_free() should be used to free it.

Also, the new addrlist struct is being linked into
the existing addr6 list in the dhcp_config before the
validity check, it is best to defer this insertion
until later so an invalid entry is not present, since
the CONFIG_ADDR6 flag might not have been set yet.

Signed-off-by: Brian Haley <haleyb.dev@gmail.com>
2025-01-24 23:01:08 +00:00
Simon Kelley 6dbdf16fd1 Move debian submodule to submodules/dnsmasq-debian. 2025-01-24 21:05:43 +00:00
Simon Kelley 6e6a45a7d9 Bump copyrights to 2025. 2025-01-23 17:08:39 +00:00
Simon Kelley a4569c22cc Correct BNF for --trust-anchor in manpage. 2025-01-20 16:20:13 +00:00
Simon Kelley 199e65c4d9 Remove misleading comment. 2025-01-20 15:55:42 +00:00
Simon Kelley bb8811d472 Convert DNS names in logs to all lower case.
0x20 encoding makes them look odd, otherwise.
2025-01-20 15:25:26 +00:00
Simon Kelley 995a16ca0c Implement "DNS-0x20 encoding".
This provides extra protection against reply-spoof attacks.

Since DNS queries are case-insensitive, it's possible to randomly flip
the case of letters in a query and still get the correct answer back.
This adds an extra dimension for a cache-poisoning attacker to guess
when sending replies in-the-blind since it's expected that the
legitimate answer will have the same pattern of upper and lower case
as the query, so any replies which don't can be ignored as
malicious.

The amount of extra entropy clearly depends on the number
of a-z and A-Z characters in the query, and this implementation puts a
hard limit of 32 bits to make rescource allocation easy. This about
doubles entropy over the standard random ID and random port
combination.
2025-01-19 21:54:58 +00:00
Simon Kelley 65f9c1aca1 Case-sensitive matching of questions and answers.
When checking that an answer is the answer to the question that
we asked, compare the name in a case-sensitive manner.

Clients can set the letters in a query to a random pattern of
uppercase and lowercase to add more randomness as protection against
cache-poisoning attacks, and we don't want to nullify that.

This actually restores the status quo before
commit ed6d29a784
since matching questions and answers using a checksum
can't help but be case sensitive.

This patch is a preparation for introducing DNS-0x20
in the dnsmasq query path.
2025-01-19 00:08:36 +00:00
Simon Kelley b72ecb3a59 Fix log message fields in wrong order in some auth replies. 2025-01-18 23:56:23 +00:00
Simon Kelley c221030f89 Rename cache_validated() to cache_not_validated().
Let's give the poor programmers a chance.
2025-01-18 23:26:06 +00:00
Simon Kelley 5bbea085d0 Fix subtle bug in arbitrary-RR caching.
If the client asks for DNSSEC RRs via the do bit, and
we have an answer cached, we can only return the cached
answer if the RR was not validated. This is because
we don't the extra info (RRSIGS, NSECs) for a complete
validated answer. In that case we have to forward again.

This bug was that the "is the cache entry validated" test was
in an outer loop rather than an inner one. A cache hit on
a different RRtype that wasn't validated would satify the
condition to use the cache, even if the cache entry for
the required RRtype didn't. The only time when there can be a mix
of validated and non validated cache entries for the same domain
is when most are not validated, but one is a negative cache for
a DS record.

This bug took a long time to find.
2025-01-18 23:15:53 +00:00
Simon Kelley 622cf03ab9 Fix fubar that could return unsigned NODATA response when do bit set. 2025-01-18 22:16:29 +00:00
Simon Kelley 8ce27433f8 Handle DS queries to auth zones.
When dnsmasq is configured to act as an authoritative server and has
an authoritative zone configured, and recieves a query for
that zone _as_forwarder_ it answers the query directly rather
than forwarding it. This doesn't affect the answer, but it
saves dnsmasq forwarding the query to the recusor upstream,
whch then bounces it back to dnsmasq in auth mode. The
exception should be when the query is for the root of zone, for a DS
RR. The answer to that has to come from the parent, via the
recursor, and will typically be a proof-of-nonexistence since
dnsmasq doesn't support signed zones. This patch suppresses
local answers and forces forwarding to the upstream recursor
for such queries. It stops breakage when a DNSSEC validating
client makes queries to dnsmasq acting as forwarder for a zone
for which it is authoritative.
2025-01-18 08:57:14 +00:00
Simon Kelley 5d894620b4 Extend build fingerprinting to include CFLAGS.
If the value of CFLAGS is changed between builds, the makefile
will rebuid, in the same way as for COPTS.
2025-01-17 16:48:08 +00:00
Simon Kelley 71766c0c35 Tweak handling of duplicate DNS answers via UDP.
If we get a duplicate answer for a query via UDP which we have
either already received and started DNSSEC validation, or was
truncated and we've passed to TCP, then just ignore it.

The code was already in place, but had evolved wonky and
only worked for error replies which would otherwise prompt
a retransmit.
2025-01-13 20:30:37 +00:00
Simon Kelley da58455508 Tweak 7d915a0bb9
A downstream query may have gone to TCP, not just DNSSEC queries.
2025-01-13 11:03:30 +00:00
Simon Kelley b915c9a661 Attempt to keep running if a child process dies.
If a child process dies unexpectedly, log the error and
try and tidy up so the main process continues to run and
doesn't block awaiting the dead child.
2025-01-13 10:56:19 +00:00
Simon Kelley 424aaa0f9d Fix another 509afcd1d2 SNAFU 2025-01-13 10:32:55 +00:00
Andrew Sayers c72c895869 Improve "no upstream servers configured" when D-Bus is enabled
Print a specific INFO message instead of a generic WARNING message,
so users know what to do.

Starting dnsmasq without upstream servers indicates a problem by default,
but is perfectly normal with D-Bus enabled.  For example, NetworkManager
starts dnsmasq with no upstream servers, then immediately populates it
over D-Bus.
2025-01-12 22:32:32 +00:00
Simon Kelley b7156116c2 Fix SNAFU in 509afcd1d2 2025-01-12 22:28:12 +00:00
Simon Kelley 7d915a0bb9 Don't do retries over UDP when we've sent the query by TCP. 2025-01-12 22:02:05 +00:00
Simon Kelley 509afcd1d2 Refactor poll() loop.
Handling events on file descriptors can result in new file
descriptors being created or old ones being deleted. As such
the results of the last call to poll() become invalid in subtle
ways.

After handling each file descriptor in  check_dns_listeners()
return, to go around the poll() loop again and get valid data
for the new situation.

Thanks to Dominik Derigs for his indefatigable sleuthing of this one.
2025-01-12 21:36:09 +00:00
Simon Kelley 51343bd9a2 Treat replies with CD flag set the same for UDP and TCP code paths. 2025-01-12 16:25:07 +00:00
Simon Kelley b58276a73c Return EDE OTHER error when DNSSEC validation abandoned.
This distinguishes the case where we found a message was bogus
from cases where the process failed.
2025-01-12 16:00:09 +00:00
Matthias Andree f162d344c0 cache: Fix potential NULL deref in arcane situations. 2025-01-08 23:34:12 +00:00
Simon Kelley 0003db15cb Fix crash introduced in 6656790f24 2025-01-07 23:08:35 +00:00
Simon Kelley 275f4a4475 Remove arbitrary workspace size limit.
I have no memory for why this was ever there. It breaks DNSSEC
validation of large RRsets.

I can't see any DoS potential that is exposed by removing it.
2025-01-07 21:41:30 +00:00
Andrew Sayers 12e4565fef Improve "chown of PID file failed" message for missing CAP_CHOWN
Print a specific INFO message instead of a generic WARNING message,
so users aren't inconvenienced and maintainers know what to do.

Debian currently runs this service as part of NetworkManager,
in a systemd service without CAP_CHOWN.  Other distributions may
have the same problem, or might add the issue in future.
This fix should communicate the issue clearly to them.
2025-01-07 21:03:25 +00:00
Andrew Sayers 7af26eed32 Fix manpage typo.
s/will we/will be/
2025-01-07 21:01:15 +00:00
Simon Kelley 63dc6eb316 Fix read_write() changes for TCP timeout.
I misread the man page for socket(7) and TCP timeouts.

A timeout generates a -1 return and EAGAIN errno, NOT a short read.

Short reads are legit, and aborting when they are seen creates
hard-to-reproduce errors.
2025-01-07 20:53:03 +00:00
Simon Kelley 6656790f24 Handle queries with EDNS client subnet fields better.
If dnsmasq is configured to add an EDNS client subnet to a query,
it is careful to suppress use of the cache, since a cached answer may
not be valid for a query with a different client subnet.
Extend this behaviour to queries which arrive a dnsmasq
already carrying an EDNS client subnet.

This change is rather more involved than may seem necessary at first sight,
since the existing code relies on all queries being decorated by dnsmasq
and therefore not cached, so there is no chance that an incoming query
might hit the cache and cache lookup don't need to be suppressed, just
cache insertion. When downstream queries may be a mix of client-subnet
bearing and plain vanilla, it can't be assumed that the answers are never
in the cache, and queries with subnets must not do lookups.
2025-01-07 20:46:33 +00:00
Simon Kelley c8de423038 Fix finger-trouble in immediately previous commit. 2025-01-07 17:00:18 +00:00
Simon Kelley c52653f97c Correctly handle failure of pipe() call in swap_to_tcp() 2025-01-06 23:16:40 +00:00
Simon Kelley e24c341068 Fix wrong packet size when dumpong packets to file. 2025-01-01 17:03:50 +00:00
Simon Kelley 5ef6c8c24f Extend fcb40ee73d to cover "Make install-i18n" 2024-12-30 13:29:48 +00:00
Simon Kelley 7c348a0b73 Extend d578da0665 to Linux-only code. 2024-12-24 11:31:34 +00:00
Matthias Andree d578da0665 Fix FTBFS when using -pedantic compiler flag.
I am attaching an incremental git-am ready patch to go on top your Git HEAD,
to fix all sorts of issues and make this conforming C99 with default
options set,
and fix another load of warnings you receive when setting the compiler
to pick the nits,
-pedantic-errors -std=c99 (or c11, c18, c2x).
It changes many void * to uint8_t * to make the "increment by bytes"
explicit.
You can't do:

void *foo;
// ...
foo += 2.
2024-12-24 11:18:42 +00:00
Conrad Kostecki 8949ef44b4 Update DE translation. 2024-12-24 09:47:41 +00:00
DL6ER 3ac11cdd98 Add newly assigned RRTYPE DSYNC
Signed-off-by: DL6ER <dl6er@dl6er.de>
2024-12-23 15:19:00 +00:00
DL6ER 5d49fa112d Add newly assigned RRTYPEs NXNAME, CLA, and IPN
Signed-off-by: DL6ER <dl6er@dl6er.de>
2024-12-23 15:18:56 +00:00
DL6ER d29d19e654 Add newly assigned RRTYPE WALLET (262)
Signed-off-by: DL6ER <dl6er@dl6er.de>
2024-12-23 15:18:47 +00:00
Simon Kelley 49ea7db74e Fix c9bc0156a8d36d56735831cb81e786d628ed73e
Eg.

dhcp-host=AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF,192.168.1.5,server,infinite

is broken.

Thanks to Dominik for the diagnosis.
2024-12-23 15:14:27 +00:00
Olaf Hering fcb40ee73d Fix dependency in make install target
The make target 'install-common' expects results from the target 'all'.
A 'make -j install' may fail because both targets are brought
up-to-todate in parallel. As a result the final binary will not exist at
the time 'install-common' runs, because 'all' is not yet done.

Adjust the dependencies to update 'all' before processing 'install-common'.

Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
2024-12-23 15:02:34 +00:00
56 changed files with 1299 additions and 860 deletions

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+3
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
[submodule "debian"]
path = debian
url = git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq-debian.git
[submodule "submodules/dnsmasq-debian"]
path = submodules/dnsmasq-debian
url = https://thekelleys.org.uk/git/dnsmasq-debian
+54 -5
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ version 2.91
Literal address records are smaller and don't have
this field and don't need to be ordered on it.
To actually provoke this bug seems to need the same server-literal
to be repeated twice, eg --address=/a/1.1.1.1 --address-/a/1.1.1.1
to be repeated twice, e.g., --address=/a/1.1.1.1 --address-/a/1.1.1.1
which is clearly rare in the wild, but if it did exist it could
provoke a SIGSEV. Thanks to Daniel Rhea for fuzzing this one.
provoke a SIGSEGV. Thanks to Daniel Rhea for fuzzing this one.
Fix buffer overflow when configured lease-change script name
is too long.
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ version 2.91
Improve behaviour in the face of non-responsive upstream TCP DNS
servers. Without shorter timeouts, clients are blocked for too long
and fail wuth their own timeouts.
and fail with their own timeouts.
Set --fast-dns-retries by default when doing DNSSEC. A single
downstream query can trigger many upstream queries. On an
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ version 2.91
empty answer.
Fix handling of EDNS0 UDP packet sizes.
When talking upstream we always add a pseudoheader, and set the
When talking upstream we always add a pseudo header, and set the
UDP packet size to --edns-packet-max. Answering queries from
downstream, we get the answer (either from upstream or local
data) If local data won't fit the advertised size (or 512 if
@@ -75,7 +75,56 @@ version 2.91
Fix erroneous "DNSSEC validated" state with non-DNSSEC
upstream servers. Thanks to Dominik Derigs for the bug report.
Handle queries with EDNS client subnet fields better. If dnsmasq
is configured to add an EDNS client subnet to a query, it is careful
to suppress use of the cache, since a cached answer may not be valid
for a query with a different client subnet. Extend this behaviour
to queries which arrive a dnsmasq already carrying an EDNS client
subnet.
Handle DS queries to auth zones. When dnsmasq is configured to
act as an authoritative server and has an authoritative zone
configured, and receives a query for that zone _as_forwarder_
it answers the query directly rather than forwarding it. This
doesn't affect the answer, but it saves dnsmasq forwarding the
query to the recursor upstream, which then bounces it back to dnsmasq
in auth mode. The exception should be when the query is for the root
of zone, for a DS RR. The answer to that has to come from the parent,
via the recursor, and will typically be a proof-of-non-existence
since dnsmasq doesn't support signed zones. This patch suppresses
local answers and forces forwarding to the upstream recursor for such
queries. It stops breakage when a DNSSEC validating client makes
queries to dnsmasq acting as forwarder for a zone for which it is
authoritative.
Implement "DNS-0x20 encoding", for extra protection against
reply-spoof attacks. Since DNS queries are case-insensitive,
it's possible to randomly flip the case of letters in a query
and still get the correct answer back.
This adds an extra dimension for a cache-poisoning attacker
to guess when sending replies in-the-blind since it's expected
that the legitimate answer will have the same pattern of upper
and lower case as the query, so any replies which don't can be
ignored as malicious. The amount of extra entropy clearly depends
on the number of a-z and A-Z characters in the query, and this
implementation puts a hard limit of 32 bits to make resource
allocation easy. This about doubles entropy over the standard
random ID and random port combination. This technique can interact
badly with rare broken DNS servers which don't preserve the case
of the query in their reply. The first time a reply is returned
which matches the query in all respects except case, a warning
will be logged. If this coincides with DNS not functioning, it
is necessary to disable bit 0x20 encoding with --no-0x20-encode.
Fix a long-standing problem when two queries which are identical
in every repect _except_ case, get combined by dnsmasq. If
dnsmasq gets eg, two queries for example.com and Example.com
in quick succession it will get the answer for example.com from
upstream and send that answer to both requestors. This means that
the query for Example.com will get an answer for example.com, and
in the modern DNS, that answer may not be accepted.
version 2.90
Fix reversion in --rev-server introduced in 2.88 which
caused breakage if the prefix length is not exactly divisible
@@ -1944,7 +1993,7 @@ version 2.61
Set the environment variable DNSMASQ_LOG_DHCP when running
the script id --log-dhcp is in effect, so that script can
taylor their logging verbosity. Suggestion from Malte
tailor their logging verbosity. Suggestion from Malte
Forkel.
Arrange that addresses specified with --listen-address
+9 -7
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
# dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
#
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ nft_cflags = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_NFTSET $(PKG_CONFIG
nft_libs = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_NFTSET $(PKG_CONFIG) --libs libnftables`
version = -DVERSION='\"`$(top)/bld/get-version $(top)`\"'
sum?=$(shell $(CC) -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_OPTS $(COPTS) -E $(top)/$(SRC)/dnsmasq.h | ( md5sum 2>/dev/null || md5 ) | cut -f 1 -d ' ')
sum!=$(CC) -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_OPTS $(COPTS) -E $(top)/$(SRC)/dnsmasq.h | ( md5sum 2>/dev/null || md5 ) | cut -f 1 -d ' '
sum?=$(shell echo $(CC) -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_FLAGS="$(CFLAGS)" -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_OPTS $(COPTS) -E $(top)/$(SRC)/dnsmasq.h | ( md5sum 2>/dev/null || md5 ) | cut -f 1 -d ' ')
sum!=echo $(CC) -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_FLAGS="$(CFLAGS)" -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_OPTS $(COPTS) -E $(top)/$(SRC)/dnsmasq.h | ( md5sum 2>/dev/null || md5 ) | cut -f 1 -d ' '
copts_conf = .copts_$(sum)
objs = cache.o rfc1035.o util.o option.o forward.o network.o \
@@ -102,9 +102,7 @@ clean : mostly_clean
rm -f core */core
rm -f *~ contrib/*/*~ */*~
install : all install-common
install-common :
install : all
$(INSTALL) -d $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)
$(INSTALL) -d $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/man8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(MAN)/dnsmasq.8 $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/man8
@@ -121,7 +119,11 @@ all-i18n : $(BUILDDIR)
cd $(top) && cd $(BUILDDIR) && $(MAKE) top="$(top)" -f $(top)/Makefile $${f%.po}.mo; \
done
install-i18n : all-i18n install-common
install-i18n : all-i18n
$(INSTALL) -d $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)
$(INSTALL) -d $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/man8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(MAN)/dnsmasq.8 $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR)/man8
$(INSTALL) -m 755 $(BUILDDIR)/dnsmasq $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)
cd $(BUILDDIR); $(top)/bld/install-mo $(DESTDIR)$(LOCALEDIR) $(INSTALL)
cd $(MAN); ../bld/install-man $(DESTDIR)$(MANDIR) $(INSTALL)
Submodule debian deleted from 83e05da879.
Symlink
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
submodules/dnsmasq-debian/debian
+123 -99
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
.TH DNSMASQ 8 2021-08-16
.TH DNSMASQ 8 2025-02-05
.SH NAME
dnsmasq \- A lightweight DHCP and caching DNS server.
.SH SYNOPSIS
@@ -852,6 +852,14 @@ name on successive queries, for load-balancing. This turns off that
behaviour, so that the records are always returned in the order
that they are received from upstream.
.TP
.B --no-0x20-encode
By default, dnsmasq scrambles the case of letters in DNS queries it sends upstream as a security feature.
This technique can interact badly with rare broken DNS servers which don't preserve the case
of the query in their reply. The first time a reply is returned
which matches the query in all respects except case, a warning
will be logged. If this coincides with DNS not functioning, it
is necessary to disable this scrambling with --no-0x20-encode.
.TP
.B --use-stale-cache[=<max TTL excess in s>]
When set, if a DNS name exists in the cache, but its time-to-live has expired, dnsmasq will return the data anyway. (It attempts to refresh the
data with an upstream query after returning the stale data.) This can improve speed and reliability. It comes at the expense
@@ -882,7 +890,7 @@ ie capable of returning DNSSEC records with data. If they are not,
then dnsmasq will not be able to determine the trusted status of
answers and this means that DNS service will be entirely broken.
.TP
.B --trust-anchor=[<class>],<domain>,<key-tag>,<algorithm>,<digest-type>,<digest>
.B --trust-anchor=<domain>,[<class>,]<key-tag>,<algorithm>,<digest-type>,<digest>
Provide DS records to act a trust anchors for DNSSEC
validation. Typically these will be the DS record(s) for Key Signing
key(s) (KSK) of the root zone,
@@ -1188,7 +1196,7 @@ available, though it normally is for direct-connected clients, or
clients using DHCP relays which support RFC 6939.
For DHCPv4, the special option id:* means "ignore any client-id
For DHCPv4, the special option \fBid:*\fP means "ignore any client-id
and use MAC addresses only." This is useful when a client presents a client-id sometimes
but not others.
@@ -1216,36 +1224,34 @@ the result is undefined. A corollary to this is that the name associated with a
does not appear in the DNS until the host obtains a DHCP lease.
The special keyword "ignore"
tells dnsmasq to never offer a DHCP lease to a machine. The machine
can be specified by hardware address, client ID or hostname, for
instance
.B --dhcp-host=00:20:e0:3b:13:af,ignore
This is
useful when there is another DHCP server on the network which should
The special keyword \fBignore\fP tells dnsmasq never to offer a DHCP lease
to a machine. The machine
can be specified by hardware address, client ID or hostname. For
example: \fB--dhcp-host=00:20:e0:3b:13:af,ignore\fP.
This can be useful when there is another DHCP server on the network which should
be used by some machines.
The set:<tag> construct sets the tag
The \fBset:<tag>\fP construct sets the tag
whenever this \fB--dhcp-host\fP directive is in use. This can be used to
selectively send DHCP options just for this host. More than one tag
can be set in a \fB--dhcp-host\fP directive (but not in other places where
"set:<tag>" is allowed). When a host matches any
\fBset:<tag>\fP is allowed). When a host matches any
\fB--dhcp-host\fP directive (or one implied by /etc/ethers) then the special
tag "known" is set. This allows dnsmasq to be configured to
tag \fBknown\fP is set. This allows dnsmasq to be configured to
ignore requests from unknown machines using
.B --dhcp-ignore=tag:!known
\fB--dhcp-ignore=tag:!known\fP.
If the host matches only a \fB--dhcp-host\fP directive which cannot
be used because it specifies an address on different subnet, the tag "known-othernet" is set.
be used because it specifies an address on a different subnet, the tag \fBknown-othernet\fP is set.
The tag:<tag> construct filters which dhcp-host directives are used; more than
one can be provided, in this case the request must match all of them. Tagged
The \fBtag:<tag>\fP construct filters which dhcp-host directives are used. More than
one tag can be provided. In this case, the request must match all tags. Tagged
directives are used in preference to untagged ones. Note that one of <hwaddr>,
<client_id> or <hostname> still needs to be specified (can be a wildcard).
<client_id> or <hostname> still must be specified (can be a wildcard).
Ethernet addresses (but not client-ids) may have
wildcard bytes, so for example
.B --dhcp-host=00:20:e0:3b:13:*,ignore
will cause dnsmasq to ignore a range of hardware addresses. Note that
will cause dnsmasq to ignore the given range of hardware addresses. Note that
the "*" will need to be escaped or quoted on a command line, but not
in the configuration file.
@@ -1259,11 +1265,11 @@ is 6.
As a special case, in DHCPv4, it is possible to include more than one
hardware address. eg:
.B --dhcp-host=11:22:33:44:55:66,12:34:56:78:90:12,192.168.0.2
\fB--dhcp-host=11:22:33:44:55:66,12:34:56:78:90:12,192.168.0.2\fP.
This allows an IP address to be associated with
multiple hardware addresses, and gives dnsmasq permission to abandon a
DHCP lease to one of the hardware addresses when another one asks for
a lease. Beware that this is a dangerous thing to do, it will only
a lease. Beware that this is a dangerous thing to do: it will only
work reliably if only one of the hardware addresses is active at any
time and there is no way for dnsmasq to enforce this. It is, for instance,
useful to allocate a stable IP address to a laptop which
@@ -1310,27 +1316,25 @@ options containing the same information. /etc/ethers is re-read when
dnsmasq receives SIGHUP. IPv6 addresses are NOT read from /etc/ethers.
.TP
.B \-O, --dhcp-option=[tag:<tag>,[tag:<tag>,]][encap:<opt>,][vi-encap:<enterprise>,][vendor:[<vendor-class>],][<opt>|option:<opt-name>|option6:<opt>|option6:<opt-name>],[<value>[,<value>]]
Specify different or extra options to DHCP clients. By default,
Send various extra options to DHCP clients. By default,
dnsmasq sends some standard options to DHCP clients, the netmask and
broadcast address are set to the same as the host running dnsmasq, and
the DNS server and default route are set to the address of the machine
running dnsmasq. (Equivalent rules apply for IPv6.) If the domain name option has been set, that is sent.
This configuration allows these defaults to be overridden,
or other options specified. The option, to be sent may be given as a
decimal number or as "option:<option-name>" The option numbers are
or other options specified. The option to be sent may be given as a
decimal number or as \fBoption:<option-name>\fP.
Option numbers are
specified in RFC2132 and subsequent RFCs. The set of option-names
known by dnsmasq can be discovered by running "dnsmasq --help dhcp".
For example, to set the default route option to
192.168.4.4, do
.B --dhcp-option=3,192.168.4.4
or
.B --dhcp-option = option:router, 192.168.4.4
and to set the time-server address to 192.168.0.4, do
.B --dhcp-option = 42,192.168.0.4
or
.B --dhcp-option = option:ntp-server, 192.168.0.4
The special address 0.0.0.0 is taken to mean "the address of the
machine running dnsmasq".
known by dnsmasq can be discovered by running \fBdnsmasq --help dhcp\fP.
For example, to set the default route option to 192.168.4.4, use
\fB--dhcp-option=3,192.168.4.4\fP or
\fB--dhcp-option=option:router,192.168.4.4\fP
and to set the time-server address to 192.168.0.4, use
\fB--dhcp-option=42,192.168.0.4\fP or
\fB--dhcp-option=option:ntp-server,192.168.0.4\fP.
The special address 0.0.0.0 means "the address of the system running dnsmasq".
An option without data is valid, and includes just the option without data.
(There is only one option with a zero length data field currently defined for DHCPv4, 80:rapid commit, so this feature is not very useful in practice). Options for which dnsmasq normally
@@ -1351,30 +1355,29 @@ to option 120 are handled as per RFC 3361. Dotted-quad IP addresses
which are followed by a slash and then a netmask size are encoded as
described in RFC 3442.
IPv6 options are specified using the
.B option6:
IPv6 options are specified using the \fBoption6:\fP
keyword, followed by the option number or option name. The IPv6 option
name space is disjoint from the IPv4 option name space. IPv6 addresses
in options must be bracketed with square brackets, eg.
.B --dhcp-option=option6:ntp-server,[1234::56]
\fB --dhcp-option=option6:ntp-server,[1234::56]\fP.
For IPv6, [::] means "the global address of
the machine running dnsmasq", whilst [fd00::] is replaced with the
ULA, if it exists, and [fe80::] with the link-local address.
Be careful: no checking is done that the correct type of data for the
option number is sent, it is quite possible to
persuade dnsmasq to generate illegal DHCP packets with injudicious use
of this flag. When the value is a decimal number, dnsmasq must determine how
Be careful: data-type suitability for the option number sent is not checked.
It is quite possible to persuade dnsmasq to generate illegal DHCP packets with
injudicious use of this flag.
When the value is a decimal number, dnsmasq must determine how
large the data item is. It does this by examining the option number and/or the
value, but can be overridden by appending a single letter flag as follows:
b = one byte, s = two bytes, i = four bytes. This is mainly useful with
encapsulated vendor class options (see below) where dnsmasq cannot
determine data size from the option number. Option data which
determine data size from the option number. Option data which
consists solely of periods and digits will be interpreted by dnsmasq
as an IP address, and inserted into an option as such. To force a
literal string, use quotes. For instance when using option 66 to send
a literal IP address as TFTP server name, it is necessary to do
.B --dhcp-option=66,"1.2.3.4"
a literal IP address as TFTP server name, it is necessary to do
\fB--dhcp-option=66,"1.2.3.4"\fP.
Encapsulated Vendor-class options may also be specified (IPv4 only) using
\fB--dhcp-option\fP: for instance
@@ -1403,7 +1406,7 @@ Vendor Options" as specified by RFC3925. These are denoted like this:
The number in the vi-encap: section is the IANA enterprise number
used to identify this option. This form of encapsulation is supported
in IPv6.
The address 0.0.0.0 is not treated specially in
encapsulated options.
.TP
@@ -1429,7 +1432,7 @@ forces "simple and safe" behaviour to avoid problems in such a case.
.B --dhcp-relay=<local address>[,<server address>[#<server port>]][,<interface]
Configure dnsmasq to do DHCP relay. The local address is an address
allocated to an interface on the host running dnsmasq. All DHCP
requests arriving on that interface will we relayed to a remote DHCP
requests arriving on that interface will be relayed to a remote DHCP
server at the server address. It is possible to relay from a single local
address to multiple remote servers by using multiple \fB--dhcp-relay\fP
configs with the same local address and different server
@@ -1529,45 +1532,47 @@ via relays. If a list of IP addresses is given, only interactions via
relays at those addresses are affected.
.TP
.B --dhcp-match=set:<tag>,<option number>|option:<option name>|vi-encap:<enterprise>[,<value>]
Without a value, set the tag if the client sends a DHCP
option of the given number or name. When a value is given, set the tag only if
the option is sent and matches the value. The value may be of the form
Without \fB<value>\fP, set \fB<tag>\fP if the client sends a DHCP
\fBoption\fP of the given number or name. With \fB<value>\fP, set \fB<tag>\fP only if
the client sends the \fBoption\fP matching or containing \fB<value>\fP.
The value may be of the form
"01:ff:*:02" in which case the value must match (apart from wildcards)
but the option sent may have unmatched data past the end of the
value. The value may also be of the same form as in
.B --dhcp-option
in which case the option sent is treated as an array, and one element
must match, so
must match.
.B --dhcp-match=set:efi-ia32,option:client-arch,6
will set the tag "efi-ia32" if the the number 6 appears in the list of
sets the tag \fBefi-ia32\fP if the number \fB6\fP appears in the list of
architectures sent by the client in option 93. (See RFC 4578 for
details.) If the value is a string, substring matching is used.
details.) If the value is a string, substring matching is used.
The special form with vi-encap:<enterprise number> matches against
vendor-identifying vendor classes for the specified enterprise. Please
see RFC 3925 for more details of these rare and interesting beasts.
.TP
.B --dhcp-name-match=set:<tag>,<name>[*]
Set the tag if the given name is supplied by a DHCP client. There may be a single trailing wildcard *, which has the usual meaning. Combined with dhcp-ignore or dhcp-ignore-names this gives the ability to ignore certain clients by name, or disallow certain hostnames from being claimed by a client.
Set a \fB<tag>\fP if the given \fB<name>\fP is supplied by a DHCP client. There may be a single trailing wildcard *, with a glob meaning. Combined with \fBdhcp-ignore\fP or \fBdhcp-ignore-names\fP this gives the ability to ignore certain clients by name, or disallow certain hostnames from being claimed by a client.
.TP
.B --tag-if=set:<tag>[,set:<tag>[,tag:<tag>[,tag:<tag>]]]
Perform boolean operations on tags. Any tag appearing as set:<tag> is set if
all the tags which appear as tag:<tag> are set, (or unset when tag:!<tag> is used)
If no tag:<tag> appears set:<tag> tags are set unconditionally.
Any number of set: and tag: forms may appear, in any order.
\fB--tag-if\fP lines are executed in order, so if the tag in tag:<tag> is a
Perform boolean operations on tags. All \fBset:<tag>\fP tags are set if
all \fBtag:<tag>\fP are already set, (or unset when \fBtag:!<tag>\fP is used).
If no \fBtag:<tag>\fP appears, \fBset:<tag>\fP tags are set unconditionally.
Any number of \fBset:\fP and \fBtag:\fP forms may appear, in any order.
\fB--tag-if\fP lines are executed in order, so if the tag in \fBtag:<tag>\fP is a
tag set by another
.B --tag-if,
the line which sets the tag must precede the one which tests it.
the line which sets the tag must precede the line which tests it.
As an extension, the tag:<tag> clauses support limited wildcard matching,
similar to the matching in the \fB--interface\fP directive. This allows, for
example, using \fB--tag-if=set:ppp,tag:ppp*\fP to set the tag 'ppp' for all requests
received on any matching interface (ppp0, ppp1, etc). This can be used in conjunction
with the tag:!<tag> format meaning that no tag matching the wildcard may be set.
As an extension, the \fBtag:<tag>\fP clauses support limited wildcard matching,
similar to the matching in the \fB--interface\fP directive. This allows the
example \fB--tag-if=set:ppp,tag:ppp*\fP to set the tag 'ppp' for all requests
received on any matching interface (ppp0, ppp1, etc). This can be used in conjunction
with the \fBtag:!<tag>\fP format meaning that no tag matching the wildcard may be set.
.TP
.B \-J, --dhcp-ignore=tag:<tag>[,tag:<tag>]
When all the given tags appear in the tag set ignore the host and do
When all the given tags appear in the tag set, ignore the host and do
not allocate it a DHCP lease.
.TP
.B --dhcp-ignore-names[=tag:<tag>[,tag:<tag>]]
@@ -2416,48 +2421,67 @@ the CNAME. To work around this, add the CNAME to /etc/hosts so that
the CNAME is shadowed too.
.PP
The tag system works as follows: For each DHCP request, dnsmasq
collects a set of valid tags from active configuration lines which
include set:<tag>, including one from the
.B --dhcp-range
used to allocate the address, one from any matching
.B --dhcp-host
(and "known" or "known-othernet" if a \fB--dhcp-host\fP matches)
The tag "bootp" is set for BOOTP requests, and a tag whose name is the
name of the interface on which the request arrived is also set.
The tag system works as follows: dnsmasq tags each DHCP request
with tags from applicable configuration lines containing \fBset:<tag>\fP i.e.
Any configuration lines which include one or more tag:<tag> constructs
will only be valid if all that tags are matched in the set derived
above. Typically this is \fB--dhcp-option\fP.
.B --dhcp-option
which has tags will be used in preference to an untagged
.B --dhcp-option,
provided that _all_ the tags match somewhere in the
set collected as described above. The prefix '!' on a tag means 'not'
so \fB--dhcp-option=tag:!purple,3,1.2.3.4\fP sends the option when the
tag purple is not in the set of valid tags. (If using this in a
command line rather than a configuration file, be sure to escape !,
which is a shell metacharacter)
\fBset:<tag>\fP from the \fB--dhcp-range\fP used to allocate the address;
\fBset:<tag>\fP from any matching \fB--dhcp-host\fP (plus the tag \fBknown\fP or
\fBknown-othernet\fP).
BOOTP requests are tagged \fBbootp\fP. Each request is also tagged with the name of
the interface on which the request arrived.
Each configuration line containing one or more \fBtag:<tag>\fP constructs
applies when all its tags exist on the request. That is:
Configuration tag:A applies to a request set:tagged A.
Configuration tag:B applies to a request set:tagged B.
Configuration tag:A+B doesn't apply to a request set:tagged A.
Configuration tag:A+B doesn't apply to a request set:tagged B.
Configurations tag:A+B, tag:A, tag:B apply to a request set:tagged A+B.
\fBset:<tag>\fP constructs in \fB--dhcp-range\fP and \fB--dhcp-host\fP tag requests.
Use \fBtag:<tag>\fPs in \fB--dhcp-option\fPs to match \fBset:<tag>\fP and apply configurations.
A \fB--dhcp-option\fP with \fBtag:<tag>\fP is preferred over an untagged
\fB--dhcp-option\fP, provided that \fBall\fP its tags match somewhere in the
set gathered above.
The tag prefix '!' means 'not'.
\fB--dhcp-option=tag:!purple,3,1.2.3.4\fP sends the option when the request
is not tagged with purple. (The shell metacharacter '!' must be escaped on the
command line but not in a configuration file).
When selecting \fB--dhcp-option\fPs, a \fB--dhcp-range\fP tag is second class
to other tags, to make it easy to override options for
individual hosts, so:
When selecting \fB--dhcp-options\fP, a tag from \fB--dhcp-range\fP is second class
relative to other tags, to make it easy to override options for
individual hosts, so
.B --dhcp-range=set:interface1,......
.B --dhcp-host=set:myhost,.....
.B --dhcp-option=tag:interface1,option:nis-domain,"domain1"
.B --dhcp-option=tag:myhost,option:nis-domain,"domain2"
will set the NIS-domain to domain1 for hosts in the range, but
override that to domain2 for a particular host.
sets the NIS-domain to domain1 for hosts in the range, but
to domain2 for a particular host that may or may not fall in the range.
.PP
Note that for
.B --dhcp-range
both tag:<tag> and set:<tag> are allowed, to both select the range in
Note that for \fB--dhcp-range\fP both
\fBtag:<tag>\fP and
\fBset:<tag>\fP are possible, in order to both select the range in
use based on (eg) \fB--dhcp-host\fP, and to affect the options sent, based on
the range selected.
This system evolved from an earlier, more limited one and for backward
compatibility "net:" may be used instead of "tag:" and "set:" may be
The tag system evolved from an earlier, more limited system. For backward
compatibility, "net:" may be used instead of "tag:" and "set:" may be
omitted. (Except in
.B --dhcp-host,
where "net:" may be used instead of "set:".) For the same reason, '#'
@@ -2475,7 +2499,7 @@ configuration option is present to activate the DHCP server
on a particular network. (Setting \fB--bootp-dynamic\fP removes the need for
static address mappings.) The filename
parameter in a BOOTP request is used as a tag,
as is the tag "bootp", allowing some control over the options returned to
as is the tag \fBbootp\fP, allowing some control over the options returned to
different classes of hosts.
.SH AUTHORITATIVE CONFIGURATION
+65 -72
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
#
# This revised version is (C) Copyright by
# Matthias Andree <matthias.andree@gmx.de>, 2010 - 2021.
# Conrad Kostecki <conrad@kostecki.com>, 2014 - 2022.
# Conrad Kostecki <conrad@kostecki.com>, 2014 - 2024.
# It is subject to the GNU General Public License v2,
# or at your option, any later version.
#
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@
# Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>, 2005.
msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: dnsmasq 2.88\n"
"Project-Id-Version: dnsmasq 2.91\n"
"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2021-03-20 00:00+0000\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: 2022-11-17 20:08+0100\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: 2024-12-23 22:36+0100\n"
"Last-Translator: Conrad Kostecki <conrad@kostecki.com>\n"
"Language-Team: German <de@li.org>\n"
"Language: de\n"
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ msgstr ""
"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"
"Plural-Forms: nplurals=2; plural=(n != 1);\n"
"X-Generator: Poedit 3.2\n"
"X-Generator: Poedit 3.5\n"
#: cache.c:652
msgid "Internal error in cache."
@@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ msgid "bad name at %s line %d"
msgstr "Fehlerhafter Name in %s Zeile %d"
#: cache.c:1265
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "read %s - %d names"
msgstr "%s gelesen - %d Adressen"
msgstr "%s gelesen - %d Namen"
#: cache.c:1381
msgid "cleared cache"
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ msgstr "weitergeleitete Anfragen %u, lokal beantwortete Anfragen %u"
#: cache.c:1766
#, c-format
msgid "queries answered from stale cache %u"
msgstr ""
msgstr "Anfragen beantwortet vom veralteten Cache %u"
#: cache.c:1768
#, c-format
@@ -92,9 +92,9 @@ msgid "queries for authoritative zones %u"
msgstr "Anfragen nach autoritativen Zonen %u"
#: cache.c:1796
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "server %s#%d: queries sent %u, retried %u, failed %u, nxdomain replies %u, avg. latency %ums"
msgstr "Server %s#%d: Anfragen gesendet %u, erneut versucht oder fehlgeschlagen %u"
msgstr "Server %s#%d: Anfragen gesendet %u, erneut versucht %u, fehlgeschlagen %u, nxdomain-Antworten %u, durchschnittliche Latenz %ums"
#: util.c:51
#, c-format
@@ -120,14 +120,14 @@ msgid "failed to allocate %d bytes"
msgstr "Konnte %d Bytes nicht belegen"
#: util.c:344
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "failed to reallocate %d bytes"
msgstr "Konnte %d Bytes nicht belegen"
msgstr "Konnte %d Bytes nicht allozieren"
#: util.c:465
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "cannot read monotonic clock: %s"
msgstr "kann Netlink-Socket nicht erzeugen: %s"
msgstr "monotone Uhr kann nicht gelesen werden: %s"
# @Simon: not perfect but I cannot get nearer right now.
#: util.c:579
@@ -188,11 +188,11 @@ msgstr "Unberechtigte DNS-Anfragen von Windows-Rechnern nicht weiterleiten."
#: option.c:404
msgid "Don't include IPv4 addresses in DNS answers."
msgstr ""
msgstr "Keine IPv4-Adressen in DNS-Antworten inkludieren."
#: option.c:405
msgid "Don't include IPv6 addresses in DNS answers."
msgstr ""
msgstr "Keine IPv6-Adressen in DNS-Antworten inkludieren."
#: option.c:406
msgid "Enable DHCP in the range given with lease duration."
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ msgstr "Fehlerhafte Suchergebnisse NICHT zwischenspeichern."
#: option.c:434
msgid "Use expired cache data for faster reply."
msgstr ""
msgstr "Verwende abgelaufene Cachedaten für schnellere Antwort."
#: option.c:435
#, c-format
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ msgstr "Ausgehenden Port für DNS-Anfragen an vorgelagerte Server erzwingen."
#: option.c:442
msgid "Set maximum number of random originating ports for a query."
msgstr ""
msgstr "Setze die maximale Anzahl zufälliger Ursprungsports für eine Abfrage."
#: option.c:443
msgid "Do NOT read resolv.conf."
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ msgstr "Spezifiziere untere Gültigkeitsdauergrenze für Zwischenspeicher."
#: option.c:456
msgid "Retry DNS queries after this many milliseconds."
msgstr ""
msgstr "DNS-Abfragen nach so vielen Millisekunden wiederholen."
#: option.c:457
#, c-format
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ msgstr "Konfiguration aus allen Dateien in diesem Verzeichnis lesen."
#: option.c:484
msgid "Execute file and read configuration from stdin."
msgstr ""
msgstr "Führe Datei aus und lese die Konfiguration aus stdin."
#: option.c:485
msgid "Log to this syslog facility or file. (defaults to DAEMON)"
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@ msgstr "Anfragende MAC-Adresse in die weiterleitende DNS-Anfrage einfügen."
#: option.c:523
msgid "Strip MAC information from queries."
msgstr ""
msgstr "Entferne die MAC-Information von Abfragen."
#: option.c:524
msgid "Add specified IP subnet to forwarded DNS queries."
@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ msgstr "Füge spezifiziertes IP-Subnetz an weitergeleiteten DNS-Anfragen hinzu."
#: option.c:525
msgid "Strip ECS information from queries."
msgstr ""
msgstr "Entferne die ECS-Information von Abfragen."
#: option.c:526
msgid "Add client identification to forwarded DNS queries."
@@ -773,9 +773,8 @@ msgid "Specify ipsets to which matching domains should be added"
msgstr "Spezifiziere IPSets, zu denen passende Domains hinzugefügt werden sollen"
#: option.c:546
#, fuzzy
msgid "Specify nftables sets to which matching domains should be added"
msgstr "Spezifiziere IPSets, zu denen passende Domains hinzugefügt werden sollen"
msgstr "Geben Sie nftables sets an, zu denen passende Domänen hinzugefügt werden sollen"
#: option.c:547
msgid "Enable filtering of DNS queries with connection-track marks."
@@ -880,7 +879,7 @@ msgstr "Protokolliere kein Routine-TFTP."
#: option.c:572
msgid "Suppress round-robin ordering of DNS records."
msgstr ""
msgstr "Unterdrückt die Round-Robin-Sortierung von DNS-Einträgen."
#: option.c:802
#, c-format
@@ -915,11 +914,11 @@ msgstr "Schnittstellenbindung nicht unterstützt"
#: option.c:955
msgid "Cannot resolve server name"
msgstr ""
msgstr "Servername kann nicht aufgelöst werden"
#: option.c:991
msgid "cannot use IPv4 server address with IPv6 source address"
msgstr ""
msgstr "IPv4-Serveradresse kann nicht mit IPv6-Quelladresse verwendet werden"
#: option.c:997 option.c:1043
msgid "interface can only be specified once"
@@ -931,21 +930,19 @@ msgstr "Fehlerhafter Schnittestellenname"
#: option.c:1037
msgid "cannot use IPv6 server address with IPv4 source address"
msgstr ""
msgstr "IPv6-Serveradresse kann nicht mit IPv4-Quelladresse verwendet werden"
#: option.c:1124
#, fuzzy
msgid "bad IPv4 prefix length"
msgstr "fehlerhafte Präfixlänge"
msgstr "ungültige IPv4-Präfixlänge"
#: option.c:1155 option.c:1165 option.c:1240 option.c:1250 option.c:5360
msgid "error"
msgstr "Fehler"
#: option.c:1207
#, fuzzy
msgid "bad IPv6 prefix length"
msgstr "fehlerhafte Präfixlänge"
msgstr "ungültige IPv6-Präfixlänge"
#: option.c:1467
msgid "inappropriate vendor:"
@@ -1034,7 +1031,6 @@ msgid "recompile with HAVE_LUASCRIPT defined to enable Lua scripts"
msgstr "Neuübersetzung mit HAVE_LUASCRIPT nötig, um benutzerdefinierte Lua-Skripte auszuführen"
#: option.c:2447
#, fuzzy
msgid "invalid auth-zone"
msgstr "unzulässiger Alias-Bereich"
@@ -1059,9 +1055,8 @@ msgid "recompile with HAVE_IPSET defined to enable ipset directives"
msgstr "Neuübersetzung mit HAVE_IPSET nötig, um IPSet-Direktiven zu aktivieren"
#: option.c:3117
#, fuzzy
msgid "recompile with HAVE_NFTSET defined to enable nftset directives"
msgstr "Neuübersetzung mit HAVE_IPSET nötig, um IPSet-Direktiven zu aktivieren"
msgstr "Neukompilieren mit definiertem HAVE_NFTSET, um NFTSET-Direktiven zu aktivieren"
#: option.c:3192 option.c:3210
msgid "recompile with HAVE_CONNTRACK defined to enable connmark-allowlist directives"
@@ -1259,7 +1254,7 @@ msgstr "unzulässige Option"
#: option.c:5363
#, c-format
msgid " in output from %s"
msgstr ""
msgstr " in der Ausgabe von %s"
#: option.c:5365
#, c-format
@@ -1272,9 +1267,9 @@ msgid "read %s"
msgstr "%s gelesen"
#: option.c:5446
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "cannot execute %s: %s"
msgstr "kann %s nicht erstellen: %s"
msgstr "kann %s nicht ausführen: %s"
#: option.c:5454 option.c:5615 tftp.c:790
#, c-format
@@ -1282,14 +1277,14 @@ msgid "cannot read %s: %s"
msgstr "kann %s nicht lesen: %s"
#: option.c:5473
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "error executing %s: %s"
msgstr "konnte %s nicht ausführen: %s"
msgstr "Fehler bei der Ausführung von %s: %s"
#: option.c:5476
#, c-format
msgid "%s returns non-zero error code"
msgstr ""
msgstr "%s gibt einen Fehlercode ungleich Null zurück"
#: option.c:5775
msgid "junk found in command line"
@@ -1399,14 +1394,14 @@ msgid "reducing DNS packet size for nameserver %s to %d"
msgstr "Reduziere die DNS-Paketgröße für Nameserver %s auf %d"
#: forward.c:1565
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "ignoring query from non-local network %s (logged only once)"
msgstr "Ignoriere Anfrage von auswärtigem Netzwerk"
msgstr "Ignoriere Abfrage von nicht-lokalen Netzwerk %s (Nur einmal protokolliert)"
#: forward.c:2139
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "ignoring query from non-local network %s"
msgstr "Ignoriere Anfrage von auswärtigem Netzwerk"
msgstr "Ignoriere Abfrage von nicht-lokalen Netzwerk %s"
#: forward.c:2501
#, c-format
@@ -1488,7 +1483,7 @@ msgstr "ignoriere Namensserver %s - kann Socket nicht erzeugen/binden: %s"
#: network.c:1643
msgid "more servers are defined but not logged"
msgstr ""
msgstr "mehr Server sind definiert aber nicht protokolliert"
#: network.c:1654
msgid "(no DNSSEC)"
@@ -1605,7 +1600,7 @@ msgstr "max_port darf nicht kleiner als min_port sein"
#: dnsmasq.c:271
msgid "port_limit must not be larger than available port range"
msgstr ""
msgstr "port_limit darf nicht größer als der verfügbare Portbereich sein"
#: dnsmasq.c:278
msgid "--auth-server required when an auth zone is defined."
@@ -1810,9 +1805,9 @@ msgid "restricting maximum simultaneous TFTP transfers to %d"
msgstr "Begrenze gleichzeitige TFTP-Übertragungen auf maximal %d"
#: dnsmasq.c:1095
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "error binding DHCP socket to device %s"
msgstr "Fehler beim Senden des DHCP-Pakets an %s: %s"
msgstr "Fehler beim Binden des DHCP-Sockets an Gerät %s"
#: dnsmasq.c:1229
msgid "connected to system DBus"
@@ -1981,19 +1976,19 @@ msgid "read %s - %d addresses"
msgstr "%s gelesen - %d Adressen"
#: dhcp.c:1136
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "Cannot broadcast DHCP relay via interface %s"
msgstr "Kann nicht zum DHCPv6 Server multicasten ohne korrekte Schnittstelle"
msgstr "DHCP-Relay kann nicht über die Schnittstelle %s gesendet werden"
#: dhcp.c:1160
#, c-format
msgid "broadcast via %s"
msgstr ""
msgstr "broadcast via %s"
#: dhcp.c:1163 rfc3315.c:2219
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "DHCP relay at %s -> %s"
msgstr "DHCP Relais %s -> %s"
msgstr "DHCP-Relay bei %s -> %s"
#: lease.c:64
#, c-format
@@ -2405,14 +2400,14 @@ msgid "release received"
msgstr "Freigabe empfangen"
#: rfc3315.c:2200
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "Cannot multicast DHCP relay via interface %s"
msgstr "Kann nicht zum DHCPv6 Server multicasten ohne korrekte Schnittstelle"
msgstr "Multicast-DHCP-Relay über Schnittstelle %s nicht möglich"
#: rfc3315.c:2216
#, c-format
msgid "multicast via %s"
msgstr ""
msgstr "multicast via %s"
#: dhcp-common.c:187
#, c-format
@@ -2484,9 +2479,9 @@ msgid "router advertisement on %s%s"
msgstr "Router-Advertisment auf %s%s"
#: dhcp-common.c:1043
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "DHCP relay from %s via %s"
msgstr "DHCP Weiterleitung von %s nach %s"
msgstr "DHCP-Relay von %s über %s"
#: dhcp-common.c:1045
#, c-format
@@ -2621,9 +2616,9 @@ msgid "Insecure DS reply received for %s, check domain configuration and upstrea
msgstr "Unsichere DS-Antwort für %s, bitte Domainkonfiguration und Upstream DNS-Server für DNSSEC-Unterstützung überprüfen"
#: blockdata.c:55
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "pool memory in use %zu, max %zu, allocated %zu"
msgstr "Speicherpool in Benutzung %u, Max %u, zugewiesen %u"
msgstr "Speicherpool in Benutzung %zu, Max %zu, zugewiesen %zu"
#: tables.c:61
#, c-format
@@ -2695,24 +2690,23 @@ msgid "bad dynamic directory %s: %s"
msgstr "fehlerhaftes dynamisches Verzeichnis %s: %s"
#: inotify.c:186
#, fuzzy
msgid "not a directory"
msgstr "Kann auf Verzeichnis %s nicht zugreifen: %s"
msgstr "ist kein Verzeichnis"
#: inotify.c:299
#, c-format
msgid "inotify: %s removed"
msgstr ""
msgstr "inotify: %s entfernt"
#: inotify.c:301
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "inotify: %s new or modified"
msgstr "inotify, neue oder geänderte Datei %s"
msgstr "inotify: %s neu oder modifiziert"
#: inotify.c:309
#, c-format
msgid "inotify: flushed %u names read from %s"
msgstr ""
msgstr "inotify: %u Namen gelöscht, aus %s gelesen"
#: dump.c:68
#, c-format
@@ -2729,14 +2723,14 @@ msgid "failed to write packet dump"
msgstr "schreiben des Paketmitschnitts fehlgeschlagen"
#: dump.c:289
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "%u dumping packet %u mask 0x%04x"
msgstr "Lade UDP Paket %u Maske 0x%04x ab"
msgstr "%u dumpe Paket %u Maske 0x%04x"
#: dump.c:291
#, fuzzy, c-format
#, c-format
msgid "dumping packet %u mask 0x%04x"
msgstr "Lade UDP Paket %u Maske 0x%04x ab"
msgstr "Dumpe Packet %u Make 0x%04x"
#: ubus.c:79
#, c-format
@@ -2770,9 +2764,8 @@ msgid "Failed to create SHA-256 hash object"
msgstr "Kann SHA-256-Hash-Objekt nicht erstellen"
#: nftset.c:35
#, fuzzy
msgid "failed to create nftset context"
msgstr "konnte IPset-Kontroll-Socket nicht erzeugen: %s"
msgstr "Fehler beim Erstellen des NFTSET-Kontexts"
#~ msgid "bad IPv4 prefix"
#~ msgstr "fehlerhaftes IPv4-Präfix"
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ struct arp_record {
static struct arp_record *arps = NULL, *old = NULL, *freelist = NULL;
static time_t last = 0;
static int filter_mac(int family, char *addrp, char *mac, size_t maclen, void *parmv)
static int filter_mac(int family, void *addrp, char *mac, size_t maclen, void *parmv)
{
struct arp_record *arp;
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen, time_t n
nameoffset = p - (unsigned char *)header;
/* now extract name as .-concatenated string into name */
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, 1, 4))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return 0; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen, time_t n
nxdomain = 0;
if ((crecp->flags & flag) && (local_query || filter_zone(zone, flag, &(crecp->addr))))
{
log_query(crecp->flags, name, &crecp->addr, record_source(crecp->uid), 0);
log_query(crecp->flags & ~F_REVERSE, name, &crecp->addr, record_source(crecp->uid), 0);
if (add_resource_record(header, limit, &trunc, nameoffset, &ansp,
daemon->auth_ttl, NULL, qtype, C_IN,
qtype == T_A ? "4" : "6", &crecp->addr))
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ void *blockdata_retrieve(struct blockdata *block, size_t len, void *data)
{
size_t blen;
struct blockdata *b;
void *new, *d;
uint8_t *new, *d;
static unsigned int buff_len = 0;
static unsigned char *buff = NULL;
+89 -91
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -126,112 +126,110 @@ int iface_enumerate(int family, void *parm, callback_t callback)
for (addrs = head; addrs; addrs = addrs->ifa_next)
{
if (addrs->ifa_addr->sa_family == family)
int iface_index = if_nametoindex(addrs->ifa_name);
if (iface_index == 0 || !addrs->ifa_addr ||
addrs->ifa_addr->sa_family != family ||
(!addrs->ifa_netmask && family != AF_LINK))
continue;
if (family == AF_INET)
{
int iface_index = if_nametoindex(addrs->ifa_name);
if (iface_index == 0 || !addrs->ifa_addr ||
(!addrs->ifa_netmask && family != AF_LINK))
struct in_addr addr, netmask, broadcast;
addr = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin_addr;
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_NETWORK
if (del_family == AF_INET && del_addr.addr4.s_addr == addr.s_addr)
continue;
if (family == AF_INET)
{
struct in_addr addr, netmask, broadcast;
addr = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin_addr;
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_NETWORK
if (del_family == AF_INET && del_addr.addr4.s_addr == addr.s_addr)
continue;
#endif
netmask = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_netmask)->sin_addr;
if (addrs->ifa_broadaddr)
broadcast = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_broadaddr)->sin_addr;
else
broadcast.s_addr = 0;
if (!callback.af_inet(addr, iface_index, NULL, netmask, broadcast, parm))
goto err;
}
else if (family == AF_INET6)
{
struct in6_addr *addr = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin6_addr;
unsigned char *netmask = (unsigned char *) &((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_netmask)->sin6_addr;
int scope_id = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin6_scope_id;
int i, j, prefix = 0;
u32 valid = 0xffffffff, preferred = 0xffffffff;
int flags = 0;
netmask = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_netmask)->sin_addr;
if (addrs->ifa_broadaddr)
broadcast = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_broadaddr)->sin_addr;
else
broadcast.s_addr = 0;
if (!callback.af_inet(addr, iface_index, NULL, netmask, broadcast, parm))
goto err;
}
else if (family == AF_INET6)
{
struct in6_addr *addr = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin6_addr;
unsigned char *netmask = (unsigned char *) &((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_netmask)->sin6_addr;
int scope_id = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin6_scope_id;
int i, j, prefix = 0;
u32 valid = 0xffffffff, preferred = 0xffffffff;
int flags = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_NETWORK
if (del_family == AF_INET6 && IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&del_addr.addr6, addr))
continue;
if (del_family == AF_INET6 && IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&del_addr.addr6, addr))
continue;
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_BSD_NETWORK) && !defined(__APPLE__)
struct in6_ifreq ifr6;
memset(&ifr6, 0, sizeof(ifr6));
safe_strncpy(ifr6.ifr_name, addrs->ifa_name, sizeof(ifr6.ifr_name));
struct in6_ifreq ifr6;
memset(&ifr6, 0, sizeof(ifr6));
safe_strncpy(ifr6.ifr_name, addrs->ifa_name, sizeof(ifr6.ifr_name));
ifr6.ifr_addr = *((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr);
if (fd != -1 && ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFAFLAG_IN6, &ifr6) != -1)
{
if (ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & IN6_IFF_TENTATIVE)
flags |= IFACE_TENTATIVE;
if (ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & IN6_IFF_DEPRECATED)
flags |= IFACE_DEPRECATED;
ifr6.ifr_addr = *((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr);
if (fd != -1 && ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFAFLAG_IN6, &ifr6) != -1)
{
if (ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & IN6_IFF_TENTATIVE)
flags |= IFACE_TENTATIVE;
if (ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & IN6_IFF_DEPRECATED)
flags |= IFACE_DEPRECATED;
#ifdef IN6_IFF_TEMPORARY
if (!(ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & (IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF | IN6_IFF_TEMPORARY)))
flags |= IFACE_PERMANENT;
if (!(ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & (IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF | IN6_IFF_TEMPORARY)))
flags |= IFACE_PERMANENT;
#endif
#ifdef IN6_IFF_PRIVACY
if (!(ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & (IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF | IN6_IFF_PRIVACY)))
flags |= IFACE_PERMANENT;
if (!(ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & (IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF | IN6_IFF_PRIVACY)))
flags |= IFACE_PERMANENT;
#endif
}
ifr6.ifr_addr = *((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr);
if (fd != -1 && ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFALIFETIME_IN6, &ifr6) != -1)
{
valid = ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_lifetime.ia6t_vltime;
preferred = ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_lifetime.ia6t_pltime;
}
}
ifr6.ifr_addr = *((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr);
if (fd != -1 && ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFALIFETIME_IN6, &ifr6) != -1)
{
valid = ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_lifetime.ia6t_vltime;
preferred = ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_lifetime.ia6t_pltime;
}
#endif
for (i = 0; i < IN6ADDRSZ; i++, prefix += 8)
if (netmask[i] != 0xff)
break;
if (i != IN6ADDRSZ && netmask[i])
for (j = 7; j > 0; j--, prefix++)
if ((netmask[i] & (1 << j)) == 0)
break;
/* voodoo to clear interface field in address */
if (!option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) && IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(addr))
{
addr->s6_addr[2] = 0;
addr->s6_addr[3] = 0;
}
if (!callback.af_inet6(addr, prefix, scope_id, iface_index, flags,
(unsigned int) preferred, (unsigned int)valid, parm))
goto err;
}
#ifdef HAVE_DHCP6
else if (family == AF_LINK)
{
/* Assume ethernet again here */
struct sockaddr_dl *sdl = (struct sockaddr_dl *) addrs->ifa_addr;
if (sdl->sdl_alen != 0 &&
!callback.af_local(iface_index, ARPHRD_ETHER, LLADDR(sdl), sdl->sdl_alen, parm))
goto err;
}
#endif
for (i = 0; i < IN6ADDRSZ; i++, prefix += 8)
if (netmask[i] != 0xff)
break;
if (i != IN6ADDRSZ && netmask[i])
for (j = 7; j > 0; j--, prefix++)
if ((netmask[i] & (1 << j)) == 0)
break;
/* voodoo to clear interface field in address */
if (!option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) && IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(addr))
{
addr->s6_addr[2] = 0;
addr->s6_addr[3] = 0;
}
if (!callback.af_inet6(addr, prefix, scope_id, iface_index, flags,
(unsigned int) preferred, (unsigned int)valid, parm))
goto err;
}
#ifdef HAVE_DHCP6
else if (family == AF_LINK)
{
/* Assume ethernet again here */
struct sockaddr_dl *sdl = (struct sockaddr_dl *) addrs->ifa_addr;
if (sdl->sdl_alen != 0 &&
!callback.af_local(iface_index, ARPHRD_ETHER, LLADDR(sdl), sdl->sdl_alen, parm))
goto err;
}
#endif
}
ret = 1;
err:
errsave = errno;
freeifaddrs(head);
+29 -8
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ static const struct {
{ 63, "ZONEMD" }, /* Message Digest Over Zone Data [RFC8976] ZONEMD/zonemd-completed-template 2018-12-12*/
{ 64, "SVCB" }, /* Service Binding [draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https-00] SVCB/svcb-completed-template 2020-06-30*/
{ 65, "HTTPS" }, /* HTTPS Binding [draft-ietf-dnsop-svcb-https-00] HTTPS/https-completed-template 2020-06-30*/
{ 66, "DSYNC" }, /* Endpoint discovery for delegation synchronization [draft-ietf-dnsop-generalized-notify-03] DSYNC/dsync-completed-template 2024-12-10 */
{ 99, "SPF" }, /* [RFC7208] */
{ 100, "UINFO" }, /* [IANA-Reserved] */
{ 101, "UID" }, /* [IANA-Reserved] */
@@ -112,6 +113,7 @@ static const struct {
{ 107, "LP" }, /* [RFC6742] ILNP/lp-completed-template */
{ 108, "EUI48" }, /* an EUI-48 address [RFC7043] EUI48/eui48-completed-template 2013-03-27*/
{ 109, "EUI64" }, /* an EUI-64 address [RFC7043] EUI64/eui64-completed-template 2013-03-27*/
{ 128, "NXNAME" }, /* NXDOMAIN indicator for Compact Denial of Existence https://www.iana.org/go/draft-ietf-dnsop-compact-denial-of-existence-04 */
{ 249, "TKEY" }, /* Transaction Key [RFC2930] */
{ 250, "TSIG" }, /* Transaction Signature [RFC8945] */
{ 251, "IXFR" }, /* incremental transfer [RFC1995] */
@@ -125,6 +127,9 @@ static const struct {
{ 259, "DOA" }, /* Digital Object Architecture [draft-durand-doa-over-dns] DOA/doa-completed-template 2017-08-30*/
{ 260, "AMTRELAY" }, /* Automatic Multicast Tunneling Relay [RFC8777] AMTRELAY/amtrelay-completed-template 2019-02-06*/
{ 261, "RESINFO" }, /* Resolver Information as Key/Value Pairs https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-add-resolver-info/06/ */
{ 262, "WALLET" }, /* Public wallet address https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters/WALLET/wallet-completed-template */
{ 263, "CLA" }, /* BP Convergence Layer Adapter https://www.iana.org/go/draft-johnson-dns-ipn-cla-07 */
{ 264, "IPN" }, /* BP Node Number https://www.iana.org/go/draft-johnson-dns-ipn-cla-07 */
{ 32768, "TA" }, /* DNSSEC Trust Authorities [Sam_Weiler][http://cameo.library.cmu.edu/][ Deploying DNSSEC Without a Signed Root. Technical Report 1999-19, Information Networking Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, April 2004.] 2005-12-13*/
{ 32769, "DLV" }, /* DNSSEC Lookaside Validation (OBSOLETE) [RFC8749][RFC4431] */
};
@@ -474,7 +479,7 @@ static struct crec *cache_scan_free(char *name, union all_addr *addr, unsigned s
if ((crecp->flags & F_FORWARD) && hostname_isequal(cache_get_name(crecp), name))
{
int rrmatch = 0;
if (crecp->flags & flags & F_RR)
if (addr && (crecp->flags & flags & F_RR))
{
unsigned short rrc = (crecp->flags & F_KEYTAG) ? crecp->addr.rrblock.rrtype : crecp->addr.rrdata.rrtype;
unsigned short rra = (flags & F_KEYTAG) ? addr->rrblock.rrtype : addr->rrdata.rrtype;
@@ -1847,15 +1852,31 @@ int cache_make_stat(struct txt_record *t)
#endif
/* There can be names in the cache containing control chars, don't
mess up logging or open security holes. */
mess up logging or open security holes. Also convert to all-LC
so that 0x20-encoding doesn't make logs look like ransom notes
made out of letters cut from a newspaper.
Overwrites daemon->workspacename */
static char *sanitise(char *name)
{
unsigned char *r;
unsigned char *r = (unsigned char *)name;
if (name)
for (r = (unsigned char *)name; *r; r++)
if (!isprint((int)*r))
return "<name unprintable>";
{
char *d = name = daemon->workspacename;
for (; *r; r++, d++)
if (!isprint((int)*r))
return "<name unprintable>";
else
{
unsigned char c = *r;
*d = (char)((c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') ? c + 'a' - 'A' : c);
}
*d = 0;
}
return name;
}
+6 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -362,6 +362,11 @@ HAVE_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN
#define HAVE_INOTIFY
#endif
/* This never compiles code, it's only used by the makefile to fingerprint builds. */
#ifdef DNSMASQ_COMPILE_FLAGS
static char *compile_flags = DNSMASQ_COMPILE_FLAGS;
#endif
/* Define a string indicating which options are in use.
DNSMASQ_COMPILE_OPTS is only defined in dnsmasq.c */
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+294 -228
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static volatile int pipewrite;
static void set_dns_listeners(void);
static void set_tftp_listeners(void);
static void check_dns_listeners(time_t now);
static void do_tcp_connection(struct listener *listener, time_t now, int slot);
static void sig_handler(int sig);
static void async_event(int pipe, time_t now);
static void fatal_event(struct event_desc *ev, char *msg);
@@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
int need_cap_net_admin = 0;
int need_cap_net_raw = 0;
int need_cap_net_bind_service = 0;
int have_cap_chown = 0;
char *bound_device = NULL;
int did_bind = 0;
struct server *serv;
@@ -556,6 +558,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
data = safe_malloc(sizeof(*data) * capsize);
capget(hdr, data); /* Get current values, for verification */
have_cap_chown = data->permitted & (1 << CAP_CHOWN);
if (need_cap_net_admin && !(data->permitted & (1 << CAP_NET_ADMIN)))
fail = "NET_ADMIN";
else if (need_cap_net_raw && !(data->permitted & (1 << CAP_NET_RAW)))
@@ -869,7 +873,14 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("compile time options: %s"), compile_opts);
if (chown_warn != 0)
my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, "chown of PID file %s failed: %s", daemon->runfile, strerror(chown_warn));
{
#if defined(HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK)
if (chown_warn == EPERM && !have_cap_chown)
my_syslog(LOG_INFO, "chown of PID file %s failed: please add capability CAP_CHOWN", daemon->runfile);
else
#endif
my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, "chown of PID file %s failed: %s", daemon->runfile, strerror(chown_warn));
}
#ifdef HAVE_DBUS
if (option_bool(OPT_DBUS))
@@ -951,7 +962,14 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("warning: ignoring resolv-file flag because no-resolv is set"));
daemon->resolv_files = NULL;
if (!daemon->servers)
my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("warning: no upstream servers configured"));
{
#ifdef HAVE_DBUS
if (option_bool(OPT_DBUS))
my_syslog(LOG_INFO, _("no upstream servers configured - please set them from DBus"));
else
#endif
my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("warning: no upstream servers configured"));
}
}
if (daemon->max_logs != 0)
@@ -1466,7 +1484,7 @@ static void async_event(int pipe, time_t now)
{
pid_t p;
struct event_desc ev;
int i, check = 0;
int wstatus, i, check = 0;
char *msg;
/* NOTE: the memory used to return msg is leaked: use msgs in events only
@@ -1529,7 +1547,7 @@ static void async_event(int pipe, time_t now)
case EVENT_CHILD:
/* See Stevens 5.10 */
while ((p = waitpid(-1, NULL, WNOHANG)) != 0)
while ((p = waitpid(-1, &wstatus, WNOHANG)) != 0)
if (p == -1)
{
if (errno != EINTR)
@@ -1540,6 +1558,20 @@ static void async_event(int pipe, time_t now)
if (daemon->tcp_pids[i] == p)
{
daemon->tcp_pids[i] = 0;
if (!WIFEXITED(wstatus))
{
/* If a helper process dies, (eg with SIGSEV)
log that and attempt to patch things up so that the
parent can continue to function. */
my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("TCP helper process %u died unexpectedly"), (unsigned int)p);
if (daemon->tcp_pipes[i] != -1)
{
close(daemon->tcp_pipes[i]);
daemon->tcp_pipes[i] = -1;
}
}
/* tcp_pipes == -1 && tcp_pids == 0 required to free slot */
if (daemon->tcp_pipes[i] == -1)
daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS]--;
@@ -1822,247 +1854,281 @@ static void check_dns_listeners(time_t now)
struct listener *listener;
struct randfd_list *rfl;
int i;
int pipefd[2];
/* Note that handling events here can create or destroy fds and
render the result of the last poll() call invalid. Once
we find an fd that needs service, do it, then return to go around the
poll() loop again. This avoid really, really, wierd bugs. */
if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG))
for (i = 0; i < daemon->max_procs; i++)
if (daemon->tcp_pipes[i] != -1 &&
poll_check(daemon->tcp_pipes[i], POLLIN | POLLHUP))
{
/* Races. The child process can die before we read all of the data from the
pipe, or vice versa. Therefore send tcp_pids to zero when we wait() the
process, and tcp_pipes to -1 and close the FD when we read the last
of the data - indicated by cache_recv_insert returning zero.
The order of these events is indeterminate, and both are needed
to free the process slot. Once the child process has gone, poll()
returns POLLHUP, not POLLIN, so have to check for both here. */
if (!cache_recv_insert(now, daemon->tcp_pipes[i]))
{
close(daemon->tcp_pipes[i]);
daemon->tcp_pipes[i] = -1;
/* tcp_pipes == -1 && tcp_pids == 0 required to free slot */
if (daemon->tcp_pids[i] == 0)
daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS]--;
}
return;
}
for (serverfdp = daemon->sfds; serverfdp; serverfdp = serverfdp->next)
if (poll_check(serverfdp->fd, POLLIN))
reply_query(serverfdp->fd, now);
{
reply_query(serverfdp->fd, now);
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < daemon->numrrand; i++)
if (daemon->randomsocks[i].refcount != 0 &&
poll_check(daemon->randomsocks[i].fd, POLLIN))
reply_query(daemon->randomsocks[i].fd, now);
{
reply_query(daemon->randomsocks[i].fd, now);
return;
}
/* Check overflow random sockets too. */
for (rfl = daemon->rfl_poll; rfl; rfl = rfl->next)
if (poll_check(rfl->rfd->fd, POLLIN))
reply_query(rfl->rfd->fd, now);
/* Races. The child process can die before we read all of the data from the
pipe, or vice versa. Therefore send tcp_pids to zero when we wait() the
process, and tcp_pipes to -1 and close the FD when we read the last
of the data - indicated by cache_recv_insert returning zero.
The order of these events is indeterminate, and both are needed
to free the process slot. Once the child process has gone, poll()
returns POLLHUP, not POLLIN, so have to check for both here. */
if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG))
for (i = 0; i < daemon->max_procs; i++)
if (daemon->tcp_pipes[i] != -1 &&
poll_check(daemon->tcp_pipes[i], POLLIN | POLLHUP) &&
!cache_recv_insert(now, daemon->tcp_pipes[i]))
{
close(daemon->tcp_pipes[i]);
daemon->tcp_pipes[i] = -1;
/* tcp_pipes == -1 && tcp_pids == 0 required to free slot */
if (daemon->tcp_pids[i] == 0)
daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS]--;
}
{
reply_query(rfl->rfd->fd, now);
return;
}
for (listener = daemon->listeners; listener; listener = listener->next)
{
if (listener->fd != -1 && poll_check(listener->fd, POLLIN))
if (listener->fd != -1 && poll_check(listener->fd, POLLIN))
{
receive_query(listener, now);
/* check to see if we have a free tcp process slot.
Note that we can't assume that because we had
at least one a poll() time, that we still do.
There may be more waiting connections after
poll() returns then free process slots. */
for (i = daemon->max_procs - 1; i >= 0; i--)
if (daemon->tcp_pids[i] == 0 && daemon->tcp_pipes[i] == -1)
break;
return;
}
/* check to see if we have a free tcp process slot.
Note that we can't assume that because we had
at least one a poll() time, that we still do.
There may be more waiting connections after
poll() returns then free process slots. */
for (i = daemon->max_procs - 1; i >= 0; i--)
if (daemon->tcp_pids[i] == 0 && daemon->tcp_pipes[i] == -1)
break;
if (listener->tcpfd != -1 && i >= 0 && poll_check(listener->tcpfd, POLLIN))
if (i >= 0)
for (listener = daemon->listeners; listener; listener = listener->next)
if (listener->tcpfd != -1 && poll_check(listener->tcpfd, POLLIN))
{
int confd, client_ok = 1;
struct irec *iface = NULL;
pid_t p;
union mysockaddr tcp_addr;
socklen_t tcp_len = sizeof(union mysockaddr);
do_tcp_connection(listener, now, i);
return;
}
}
while ((confd = accept(listener->tcpfd, NULL, NULL)) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
if (confd == -1)
continue;
if (getsockname(confd, (struct sockaddr *)&tcp_addr, &tcp_len) == -1)
{
close(confd);
continue;
}
/* Make sure that the interface list is up-to-date.
We do this here as we may need the results below, and
the DNS code needs them for --interface-name stuff.
static void do_tcp_connection(struct listener *listener, time_t now, int slot)
{
int confd, client_ok = 1;
struct irec *iface = NULL;
pid_t p;
union mysockaddr tcp_addr;
socklen_t tcp_len = sizeof(union mysockaddr);
unsigned char a = 0, *buff;
struct server *s;
int flags, auth_dns;
struct in_addr netmask;
int pipefd[2];
Multiple calls to enumerate_interfaces() per select loop are
inhibited, so calls to it in the child process (which doesn't select())
have no effect. This avoids two processes reading from the same
netlink fd and screwing the pooch entirely.
*/
enumerate_interfaces(0);
while ((confd = accept(listener->tcpfd, NULL, NULL)) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
if (confd == -1)
return;
if (getsockname(confd, (struct sockaddr *)&tcp_addr, &tcp_len) == -1)
{
closeconandreturn:
shutdown(confd, SHUT_RDWR);
close(confd);
return;
}
/* Make sure that the interface list is up-to-date.
We do this here as we may need the results below, and
the DNS code needs them for --interface-name stuff.
Multiple calls to enumerate_interfaces() per select loop are
inhibited, so calls to it in the child process (which doesn't select())
have no effect. This avoids two processes reading from the same
netlink fd and screwing the pooch entirely.
*/
enumerate_interfaces(0);
if (option_bool(OPT_NOWILD))
iface = listener->iface; /* May be NULL */
else
{
int if_index;
char intr_name[IF_NAMESIZE];
/* if we can find the arrival interface, check it's one that's allowed */
if ((if_index = tcp_interface(confd, tcp_addr.sa.sa_family)) != 0 &&
indextoname(listener->tcpfd, if_index, intr_name))
{
union all_addr addr;
if (option_bool(OPT_NOWILD))
iface = listener->iface; /* May be NULL */
else
{
int if_index;
char intr_name[IF_NAMESIZE];
/* if we can find the arrival interface, check it's one that's allowed */
if ((if_index = tcp_interface(confd, tcp_addr.sa.sa_family)) != 0 &&
indextoname(listener->tcpfd, if_index, intr_name))
{
union all_addr addr;
if (tcp_addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
addr.addr6 = tcp_addr.in6.sin6_addr;
else
addr.addr4 = tcp_addr.in.sin_addr;
for (iface = daemon->interfaces; iface; iface = iface->next)
if (iface->index == if_index &&
iface->addr.sa.sa_family == tcp_addr.sa.sa_family)
break;
if (!iface && !loopback_exception(listener->tcpfd, tcp_addr.sa.sa_family, &addr, intr_name))
client_ok = 0;
}
if (option_bool(OPT_CLEVERBIND))
iface = listener->iface; /* May be NULL */
else
{
/* Check for allowed interfaces when binding the wildcard address:
we do this by looking for an interface with the same address as
the local address of the TCP connection, then looking to see if that's
an allowed interface. As a side effect, we get the netmask of the
interface too, for localisation. */
for (iface = daemon->interfaces; iface; iface = iface->next)
if (sockaddr_isequal(&iface->addr, &tcp_addr))
break;
if (!iface)
client_ok = 0;
}
}
if (!client_ok)
{
shutdown(confd, SHUT_RDWR);
close(confd);
}
else if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG) && pipe(pipefd) == 0 && (p = fork()) != 0)
{
close(pipefd[1]); /* parent needs read pipe end. */
if (p == -1)
close(pipefd[0]);
else
{
#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK
/* The child process inherits the netlink socket,
which it never uses, but when the parent (us)
uses it in the future, the answer may go to the
child, resulting in the parent blocking
forever awaiting the result. To avoid this
the child closes the netlink socket, but there's
a nasty race, since the parent may use netlink
before the child has done the close.
To avoid this, the parent blocks here until a
single byte comes back up the pipe, which
is sent by the child after it has closed the
netlink socket. */
unsigned char a;
read_write(pipefd[0], &a, 1, RW_READ);
#endif
/* i holds index of free slot */
daemon->tcp_pids[i] = p;
daemon->tcp_pipes[i] = pipefd[0];
daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS]++;
if (daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS] > daemon->max_procs_used)
daemon->max_procs_used = daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS];
}
close(confd);
/* The child can use up to TCP_MAX_QUERIES ids, so skip that many. */
daemon->log_id += TCP_MAX_QUERIES;
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
/* It can do more if making DNSSEC queries too. */
if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
daemon->log_id += daemon->limit[LIMIT_WORK];
#endif
}
if (tcp_addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
addr.addr6 = tcp_addr.in6.sin6_addr;
else
{
unsigned char *buff;
struct server *s;
int flags;
struct in_addr netmask;
int auth_dns;
if (iface)
{
netmask = iface->netmask;
auth_dns = iface->dns_auth;
}
else
{
netmask.s_addr = 0;
auth_dns = 0;
}
/* Arrange for SIGALRM after CHILD_LIFETIME seconds to
terminate the process. */
if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG))
{
#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK
/* See comment above re: netlink socket. */
unsigned char a = 0;
close(daemon->netlinkfd);
read_write(pipefd[1], &a, 1, RW_WRITE);
#endif
alarm(CHILD_LIFETIME);
close(pipefd[0]); /* close read end in child. */
daemon->pipe_to_parent = pipefd[1];
}
/* The connected socket inherits non-blocking
attribute from the listening socket.
Reset that here. */
if ((flags = fcntl(confd, F_GETFL, 0)) != -1)
while(retry_send(fcntl(confd, F_SETFL, flags & ~O_NONBLOCK)));
buff = tcp_request(confd, now, &tcp_addr, netmask, auth_dns);
if (buff)
free(buff);
for (s = daemon->servers; s; s = s->next)
if (s->tcpfd != -1)
{
shutdown(s->tcpfd, SHUT_RDWR);
close(s->tcpfd);
s->tcpfd = -1;
}
if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG))
{
close(daemon->pipe_to_parent);
flush_log();
_exit(0);
}
}
addr.addr4 = tcp_addr.in.sin_addr;
for (iface = daemon->interfaces; iface; iface = iface->next)
if (iface->index == if_index &&
iface->addr.sa.sa_family == tcp_addr.sa.sa_family)
break;
if (!iface && !loopback_exception(listener->tcpfd, tcp_addr.sa.sa_family, &addr, intr_name))
client_ok = 0;
}
if (option_bool(OPT_CLEVERBIND))
iface = listener->iface; /* May be NULL */
else
{
/* Check for allowed interfaces when binding the wildcard address:
we do this by looking for an interface with the same address as
the local address of the TCP connection, then looking to see if that's
an allowed interface. As a side effect, we get the netmask of the
interface too, for localisation. */
for (iface = daemon->interfaces; iface; iface = iface->next)
if (sockaddr_isequal(&iface->addr, &tcp_addr))
break;
if (!iface)
client_ok = 0;
}
}
if (!client_ok)
goto closeconandreturn;
if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG))
{
if (pipe(pipefd) == -1)
goto closeconandreturn; /* pipe failed */
if ((p = fork()) == -1)
{
/* fork failed */
close(pipefd[0]);
close(pipefd[1]);
goto closeconandreturn;
}
if (p != 0)
{
/* fork() done: parent side */
close(pipefd[1]); /* parent needs read pipe end. */
#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK
/* The child process inherits the netlink socket,
which it never uses, but when the parent (us)
uses it in the future, the answer may go to the
child, resulting in the parent blocking
forever awaiting the result. To avoid this
the child closes the netlink socket, but there's
a nasty race, since the parent may use netlink
before the child has done the close.
To avoid this, the parent blocks here until a
single byte comes back up the pipe, which
is sent by the child after it has closed the
netlink socket. */
read_write(pipefd[0], &a, 1, RW_READ);
#endif
daemon->tcp_pids[slot] = p;
daemon->tcp_pipes[slot] = pipefd[0];
daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS]++;
if (daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS] > daemon->max_procs_used)
daemon->max_procs_used = daemon->metrics[METRIC_TCP_CONNECTIONS];
close(confd);
/* The child can use up to TCP_MAX_QUERIES ids, so skip that many. */
daemon->log_id += TCP_MAX_QUERIES;
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
/* It can do more if making DNSSEC queries too. */
if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
daemon->log_id += daemon->limit[LIMIT_WORK];
#endif
return;
}
}
if (iface)
{
netmask = iface->netmask;
auth_dns = iface->dns_auth;
}
else
{
netmask.s_addr = 0;
auth_dns = 0;
}
/* Arrange for SIGALRM after CHILD_LIFETIME seconds to
terminate the process. */
if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG))
{
#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK
/* See comment above re: netlink socket. */
close(daemon->netlinkfd);
read_write(pipefd[1], &a, 1, RW_WRITE);
#endif
alarm(CHILD_LIFETIME);
close(pipefd[0]); /* close read end in child. */
daemon->pipe_to_parent = pipefd[1];
}
/* The connected socket inherits non-blocking
attribute from the listening socket.
Reset that here. */
if ((flags = fcntl(confd, F_GETFL, 0)) != -1)
while(retry_send(fcntl(confd, F_SETFL, flags & ~O_NONBLOCK)));
buff = tcp_request(confd, now, &tcp_addr, netmask, auth_dns);
if (buff)
free(buff);
for (s = daemon->servers; s; s = s->next)
if (s->tcpfd != -1)
{
shutdown(s->tcpfd, SHUT_RDWR);
close(s->tcpfd);
s->tcpfd = -1;
}
if (!option_bool(OPT_DEBUG))
{
close(daemon->pipe_to_parent);
flush_log();
_exit(0);
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
/* If a DNSSEC query over UDP returns a truncated answer,
we swap to the TCP path. This routine is responsible for forking
@@ -2091,11 +2157,11 @@ int swap_to_tcp(struct frec *forward, time_t now, int status, struct dns_header
if (daemon->tcp_pids[i] == 0 && daemon->tcp_pipes[i] == -1)
break;
/* No slots */
if (i < 0)
/* No slots or no pipe */
if (i < 0 || pipe(pipefd) != 0)
return STAT_ABANDONED;
if (pipe(pipefd) == 0 && (p = fork()) != 0)
if ((p = fork()) != 0)
{
close(pipefd[1]); /* parent needs read pipe end. */
if (p == -1)
+17 -11
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#define COPYRIGHT "Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley"
#define COPYRIGHT "Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley"
/* We do defines that influence behavior of stdio.h, so complain
if included too early. */
@@ -279,7 +279,8 @@ struct event_desc {
#define OPT_CACHE_RR 71
#define OPT_LOCALHOST_SERVICE 72
#define OPT_LOG_PROTO 73
#define OPT_LAST 74
#define OPT_NO_0x20 74
#define OPT_LAST 75
#define OPTION_BITS (sizeof(unsigned int)*8)
#define OPTION_SIZE ( (OPT_LAST/OPTION_BITS)+((OPT_LAST%OPTION_BITS)!=0) )
@@ -339,7 +340,7 @@ union all_addr {
struct datablock {
unsigned short rrtype;
unsigned char datalen; /* also length of SOA in negative records. */
char data[];
char data[1];
} rrdata;
};
@@ -772,15 +773,15 @@ struct dyndir {
#define FREC_DS_QUERY 16
#define FREC_AD_QUESTION 32
#define FREC_DO_QUESTION 64
#define FREC_ADDED_PHEADER 128
#define FREC_HAS_PHEADER 256
#define FREC_GONE_TO_TCP 512
#define FREC_HAS_PHEADER 128
#define FREC_GONE_TO_TCP 256
#define FREC_ANSWER 512
struct frec {
struct frec_src {
union mysockaddr source;
union all_addr dest;
unsigned int iface, log_id;
unsigned int iface, log_id, encode_bitmap, *encode_bigmap;
int fd;
unsigned short orig_id, udp_pkt_size;
struct frec_src *next;
@@ -1387,7 +1388,7 @@ int is_rev_synth(int flag, union all_addr *addr, char *name);
/* rfc1035.c */
int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *namebuff);
int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
char *name, int isExtract, int extrabytes);
char *name, int func, unsigned int parm);
unsigned char *skip_name(unsigned char *ansp, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int extrabytes);
unsigned char *skip_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen);
unsigned char *skip_section(unsigned char *ansp, int count, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen);
@@ -1402,7 +1403,7 @@ void report_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t len, u32 mark);
#endif
size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
struct in_addr local_addr, struct in_addr local_netmask,
time_t now, int ad_reqd, int do_bit, int *stale, int *filtered);
time_t now, int ad_reqd, int do_bit, int no_cache, int *stale, int *filtered);
int check_for_bogus_wildcard(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name,
time_t now);
int check_for_ignored_address(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen);
@@ -1414,6 +1415,11 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp,
int *offset, unsigned short type, unsigned short class, char *format, ...);
int in_arpa_name_2_addr(char *namein, union all_addr *addrp);
int private_net(struct in_addr addr, int ban_localhost);
/* extract_name ops */
#define EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT 1
#define EXTR_NAME_COMPARE 2
#define EXTR_NAME_NOCASE 3
#define EXTR_NAME_FLIP 4
/* auth.c */
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH
@@ -1667,7 +1673,7 @@ void route_sock(void);
/* bpf.c or netlink.c */
typedef union {
int (*af_unspec)(int family, char *addrp, char *mac, size_t maclen, void *parmv);
int (*af_unspec)(int family, void *addrp, char *mac, size_t maclen, void *parmv);
int (*af_inet)(struct in_addr local, int if_index, char *label, struct in_addr netmask, struct in_addr broadcast, void *vparam);
int (*af_inet6)(struct in6_addr *local, int prefix, int scope, int if_index, int flags, unsigned int preferred, unsigned int valid, void *vparam);
int (*af_local)(int index, unsigned int type, char *mac, size_t maclen, void *parm);
+24 -24
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* dnssec.c is Copyright (c) 2012 Giovanni Bajo <rasky@develer.com>
and Copyright (c) 2012-2023 Simon Kelley
and Copyright (c) 2012-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ static int get_rdata(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, struct rdata_state
/* domain-name, canonicalise */
int len;
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &state->ip, state->buff, 1, 0) ||
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &state->ip, state->buff, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0) ||
(len = to_wire(state->buff)) == 0)
continue;
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, int
pstart = p;
if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return 0; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(stype, p);
@@ -374,14 +374,14 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, int
if (gotkey)
{
/* If there's more than one SIG, ensure they all have same keyname */
if (extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 0, 0) != 1)
if (extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 0) != 1)
return 0;
}
else
{
gotkey = 1;
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return 0;
/* RFC 4035 5.3.1 says that the Signer's Name field MUST equal
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
GETSHORT(key_tag, p);
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return STAT_BOGUS;
if (!time_check)
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
p = rrset[i];
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 10))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return STAT_BOGUS;
name_start = name;
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
/* namebuff used for workspace above, restore to leave unchanged on exit */
p = (unsigned char*)(rrset[0]);
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return STAT_BOGUS;
if (key)
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
static unsigned char **cached_digest;
static size_t cached_digest_size = 0;
if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 || RCODE(header) != NOERROR || !extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 || RCODE(header) != NOERROR || !extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY;
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--)
{
/* Ensure we have type, class TTL and length */
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -904,7 +904,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--)
{
/* Ensure we have type, class TTL and length */
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
}
p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return STAT_BOGUS;
p += 4; /* qtype, qclass */
@@ -1050,7 +1050,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
{
unsigned char *psave;
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(atype, p);
@@ -1231,12 +1231,12 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
int sig_labels, name_labels;
p = nsecs[i];
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
p += 8; /* class, type, TTL */
GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
psave = p;
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
/* If NSEC comes from wildcard expansion, use original wildcard
@@ -1400,7 +1400,7 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
if ((p = nsecs[i]))
{
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10) ||
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10) ||
!(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned char *)workspace2)))
return 0;
@@ -1609,7 +1609,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
if ((p = nsecs[i]))
{
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
if (!(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned char *)workspace2)))
@@ -1684,7 +1684,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
{
unsigned char *pstart = p;
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 10))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
GETSHORT(type, p);
@@ -1735,7 +1735,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
{
unsigned char *psav;
if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon->workspacename, 0, 10)))
if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
GETSHORT(type1, p1);
@@ -1965,7 +1965,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
targets[0] = p1;
targetidx = 1;
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 1, 4))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return STAT_BOGUS;
GETSHORT(qtype, p1);
@@ -2003,7 +2003,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
if (i != 0 && !ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
return STAT_BOGUS;
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 1, 10))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(type1, p1);
@@ -2018,7 +2018,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
/* Check if we've done this RRset already */
for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < i; j++)
{
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(type2, p2);
@@ -2115,7 +2115,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
if ((p2 = targets[j]))
{
int rc1;
if (!(rc1 = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(rc1 = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
if (class1 == qclass && rc1 == 1 && (type1 == T_CNAME || type1 == qtype || qtype == T_ANY ))
@@ -2149,7 +2149,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
if (neganswer)
*neganswer = 1;
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, 1, 10))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
/* NXDOMAIN or NODATA reply, unanswered question is (name, qclass, qtype) */
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+31 -13
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -417,21 +417,34 @@ static size_t add_source_addr(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned c
else if (option_bool(OPT_STRIP_ECS))
replace = 2;
else
return plen;
{
unsigned char *pheader;
/* If we still think the data is cacheable, and we're not
messing with EDNS client subnet ourselves, see if the client
sent a client subnet. If so, mark the data as uncacheable */
if (*cacheable &&
(pheader = find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) &&
!check_source(header, plen, pheader, NULL))
*cacheable = 0;
return plen;
}
return add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)limit, EDNS0_OPTION_CLIENT_SUBNET, (unsigned char *)&opt, len, 0, replace);
}
int check_source(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *pseudoheader, union mysockaddr *peer)
{
/* Section 9.2, Check that subnet option in reply matches. */
/* Section 9.2, Check that subnet option (if any) in reply matches.
if peer == NULL, this degrades to a check for the existence of and EDNS0 client-subnet option. */
int len, calc_len;
struct subnet_opt opt;
unsigned char *p;
int code, i, rdlen;
calc_len = calc_subnet_opt(&opt, peer, NULL);
if (peer)
calc_len = calc_subnet_opt(&opt, peer, NULL);
if (!(p = skip_name(pseudoheader, header, plen, 10)))
return 1;
@@ -443,21 +456,26 @@ int check_source(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *pseudohe
return 1; /* bad packet */
/* check if option there */
for (i = 0; i + 4 < rdlen; i += len + 4)
for (i = 0; i + 4 < rdlen; i += len + 4)
{
GETSHORT(code, p);
GETSHORT(len, p);
if (code == EDNS0_OPTION_CLIENT_SUBNET)
{
/* make sure this doesn't mismatch. */
opt.scope_netmask = p[3];
if (len != calc_len || memcmp(p, &opt, len) != 0)
if (peer)
{
/* make sure this doesn't mismatch. */
opt.scope_netmask = p[3];
if (len != calc_len || memcmp(p, &opt, len) != 0)
return 0;
}
else if (((struct subnet_opt *)p)->source_netmask != 0)
return 0;
}
p += len;
}
return 1;
return 1;
}
/* See https://docs.umbrella.com/umbrella-api/docs/identifying-dns-traffic for
@@ -491,7 +509,7 @@ static size_t add_umbrella_opt(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned
{
*cacheable = 0;
struct umbrella_opt opt = {{"ODNS"}, UMBRELLA_VERSION, 0, {}};
struct umbrella_opt opt = {{"ODNS"}, UMBRELLA_VERSION, 0, {0}};
u8 *u = &opt.fields[0];
int family = source->sa.sa_family;
int size = family == AF_INET ? INADDRSZ : IN6ADDRSZ;
@@ -541,6 +559,6 @@ size_t add_edns0_config(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
plen = add_umbrella_opt(header, plen, limit, source, cacheable);
plen = add_source_addr(header, plen, limit, source, cacheable);
return plen;
}
+347 -159
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -163,37 +163,22 @@ static int domain_no_rebind(char *domain)
return 0;
}
static int forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
union all_addr *dst_addr, unsigned int dst_iface,
struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, size_t replylimit, time_t now,
struct frec *forward, int ad_reqd, int do_bit, int fast_retry)
static void forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
union all_addr *dst_addr, unsigned int dst_iface,
struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, size_t replylimit, time_t now,
struct frec *forward, unsigned int fwd_flags, int fast_retry)
{
unsigned int flags = 0;
unsigned int fwd_flags = 0;
int is_dnssec = forward && (forward->flags & (FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY));
struct server *master;
unsigned int gotname;
int old_src = 0, old_reply = 0;
int first, last, start = 0;
int cacheable, forwarded = 0;
unsigned char *oph;
int forwarded = 0;
int ede = EDE_UNSET;
(void)do_bit;
unsigned short rrtype;
gotname = extract_request(header, plen, daemon->namebuff, &rrtype);
oph = find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (header->hb4 & HB4_CD)
fwd_flags |= FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED;
if (ad_reqd)
fwd_flags |= FREC_AD_QUESTION;
if (oph)
fwd_flags |= FREC_HAS_PHEADER;
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
if (do_bit)
fwd_flags |= FREC_DO_QUESTION;
#endif
/* Check for retry on existing query.
FREC_DNSKEY and FREC_DS_QUERY are never set in flags, so the test below
@@ -205,15 +190,24 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
{
old_src = 1;
old_reply = 1;
fwd_flags = forward->flags;
}
else if (gotname && (forward = lookup_frec(daemon->namebuff, C_IN, (int)rrtype, -1, fwd_flags,
FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED | FREC_AD_QUESTION | FREC_DO_QUESTION |
FREC_HAS_PHEADER | FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY | FREC_NO_CACHE)))
{
struct frec_src *src;
unsigned int casediff = 0;
unsigned int *bitvector = NULL;
unsigned short id = ntohs(header->id); /* Retrieve the id from the new query before we overwrite it. */
/* Get the case-scambled version of the query to resend. This is important because we
may fall through below and forward the query in the packet buffer again and we
want to use the same case scrambling as the first time. */
blockdata_retrieve(forward->stash, forward->stash_len, (void *)header);
for (src = &forward->frec_src; src; src = src->next)
if (src->orig_id == ntohs(header->id) &&
if (src->orig_id == id &&
sockaddr_isequal(&src->source, udpaddr))
break;
@@ -235,6 +229,7 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
{
daemon->frec_src_count++;
daemon->free_frec_src->next = NULL;
daemon->free_frec_src->encode_bigmap = NULL;
}
/* If we've been spammed with many duplicates, return REFUSED. */
@@ -251,24 +246,78 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
free_frec(forward);
goto reply;
}
/* Find a bitmap of case differences between the query sent upstream and this one,
so we can reply to each query with the correct case pattern.
Since we need this to get back the exact case pattern of each query when doing
query combining, we have to handle the (rare) case that there are case differences
beyond the first 32 letters.
If that happens we have to allocate memory to save it, and the casediff variable
holds the length of that array.
Mismatches beyond 32 letters are rare because most queries are all lowercase and
we only scramble the first 32 letters for security reasons.
Note the two names are guaranteed to be the same length and differ only in the case
of letters at this point.
The original query we sent is now in packet buffer and the query name in the
new instance is on daemon->namebuff. */
if (extract_request(header, forward->stash_len, daemon->workspacename, NULL))
{
unsigned int i, gobig = 0;
char *s1, *s2;
#define BITS_IN_INT (sizeof(unsigned int) * 8)
big_redo:
for (s1 = daemon->namebuff, s2 = daemon->workspacename, i = 0; *s1; s1++, s2++)
{
char c1 = *s1, c2 = *s2;
if ((c1 >= 'a' && c1 <= 'z') || (c1 >= 'A' && c1 <= 'Z'))
{
if ((c1 & 0x20) ^ (c2 & 0x20))
{
if (bitvector)
bitvector[i/BITS_IN_INT] |= 1<<(i%BITS_IN_INT);
else if (i >= BITS_IN_INT)
gobig = 1; /* More than 32 */
else
casediff |= 1<<i;
}
i++;
}
}
if (gobig && !bitvector)
{
casediff = (i/BITS_IN_INT) + 1; /* length of array */
if ((bitvector = whine_malloc(casediff)))
goto big_redo;
}
}
src = daemon->free_frec_src;
daemon->free_frec_src = src->next;
src->next = forward->frec_src.next;
forward->frec_src.next = src;
src->orig_id = ntohs(header->id);
src->orig_id = id;
src->source = *udpaddr;
src->dest = *dst_addr;
src->log_id = daemon->log_id;
src->iface = dst_iface;
src->fd = udpfd;
src->encode_bitmap = casediff;
src->encode_bigmap = bitvector;
src->udp_pkt_size = (unsigned short)replylimit;
/* closely spaced identical queries cannot be a try and a retry, so
it's safe to wait for the reply from the first without
forwarding the second. */
if (difftime(now, forward->time) < 2)
return 0;
return;
}
/* use our id when resending */
@@ -278,6 +327,8 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
/* new query */
if (!forward)
{
unsigned char *p;
if (OPCODE(header) != QUERY)
{
flags = F_RCODE;
@@ -321,11 +372,6 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
forward->flags = fwd_flags;
plen = add_edns0_config(header, plen, ((unsigned char *)header) + daemon->edns_pktsz, &forward->frec_src.source, now, &cacheable);
if (!cacheable)
forward->flags |= FREC_NO_CACHE;
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && (master->flags & SERV_DO_DNSSEC))
{
@@ -338,15 +384,16 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
}
#endif
/* If there wasn't a PH before, and there is now, we added it. */
if (!oph && find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL))
forward->flags |= FREC_ADDED_PHEADER;
/* Do these before saving query. */
forward->frec_src.orig_id = ntohs(header->id);
forward->new_id = get_id();
header->id = ntohs(forward->new_id);
forward->frec_src.encode_bitmap = option_bool(OPT_NO_0x20) ? 0 : rand32();
p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, (char *)&forward->frec_src.encode_bitmap, EXTR_NAME_FLIP, 1))
goto reply;
/* Keep copy of query for retries and move to TCP */
if (!(forward->stash = blockdata_alloc((char *)header, plen)))
{
@@ -365,15 +412,9 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
forward->forwardall = 0;
if (domain_no_rebind(daemon->namebuff))
forward->flags |= FREC_NOREBIND;
if (header->hb4 & HB4_CD)
forward->flags |= FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED;
if (ad_reqd)
forward->flags |= FREC_AD_QUESTION;
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
forward->work_counter = daemon->limit[LIMIT_WORK];
forward->validate_counter = daemon->limit[LIMIT_CRYPTO];
if (do_bit)
forward->flags |= FREC_DO_QUESTION;
#endif
start = first;
@@ -403,6 +444,10 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
while (forward->blocking_query)
forward = forward->blocking_query;
/* Don't retry if we've already sent it via TCP. */
if (forward->flags & FREC_GONE_TO_TCP)
return;
if (forward->flags & (FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY))
{
/* log_id should match previous DNSSEC query. */
@@ -415,8 +460,8 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
/* Find suitable servers: should never fail. */
if (!filter_servers(forward->sentto->arrayposn, F_DNSSECOK, &first, &last))
return 0;
return;
is_dnssec = 1;
forward->forwardall = 1;
}
@@ -531,8 +576,9 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
if (forwarded || is_dnssec)
{
daemon->metrics[METRIC_DNS_QUERIES_FORWARDED]++;
forward->forward_timestamp = dnsmasq_milliseconds();
return 1;
return;
}
/* could not send on, prepare to return */
@@ -544,16 +590,16 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
if (udpfd != -1)
{
if (!(plen = make_local_answer(flags, gotname, plen, header, daemon->namebuff, (char *)(header + replylimit), first, last, ede)))
return 0;
return;
if (oph)
if (fwd_flags & FREC_HAS_PHEADER)
{
u16 swap = htons((u16)ede);
if (ede != EDE_UNSET)
plen = add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)(header + replylimit), EDNS0_OPTION_EDE, (unsigned char *)&swap, 2, do_bit, 0);
plen = add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)(header + replylimit), EDNS0_OPTION_EDE, (unsigned char *)&swap, 2, 0, 0);
else
plen = add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)(header + replylimit), 0, NULL, 0, do_bit, 0);
plen = add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)(header + replylimit), 0, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
}
#if defined(HAVE_CONNTRACK) && defined(HAVE_UBUS)
@@ -572,7 +618,8 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
send_from(udpfd, option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) || option_bool(OPT_CLEVERBIND), (char *)header, plen, udpaddr, dst_addr, dst_iface);
}
return 0;
daemon->metrics[METRIC_DNS_LOCAL_ANSWERED]++;
return;
}
/* Check if any frecs need to do a retry, and action that if so.
@@ -611,8 +658,7 @@ int fast_retry(time_t now)
daemon->log_display_id = f->frec_src.log_id;
daemon->log_source_addr = NULL;
forward_query(-1, NULL, NULL, 0, header, f->stash_len, 0, now, f,
f->flags & FREC_AD_QUESTION, f->flags & FREC_DO_QUESTION, 1);
forward_query(-1, NULL, NULL, 0, header, f->stash_len, 0, now, f, 0, 1);
to_run = f->forward_delay = 2 * f->forward_delay;
}
@@ -810,10 +856,9 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_header *header, time_t now, struct server
header->ancount = htons(0);
header->nscount = htons(0);
header->arcount = htons(0);
ede = EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
}
}
else if (!(header->hb4 & HB4_CD) && ad_reqd && cache_secure)
else if (ad_reqd && cache_secure)
header->hb4 |= HB4_AD;
/* If the requestor didn't set the DO bit, don't return DNSSEC info. */
@@ -847,10 +892,6 @@ static void dnssec_validate(struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header,
daemon->log_display_id = forward->frec_src.log_id;
/* We've had a reply already, which we're validating. Ignore this duplicate */
if (forward->blocking_query || (forward->flags & FREC_GONE_TO_TCP))
return;
/* Find the original query that started it all.... */
for (orig = forward; orig->dependent; orig = orig->dependent);
@@ -997,7 +1038,8 @@ static void dnssec_validate(struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header,
new->flags &= ~(FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY);
new->flags |= flags;
new->forwardall = 0;
new->frec_src.encode_bitmap = 0;
forward->next_dependent = NULL;
new->dependent = forward; /* to find query awaiting new one. */
@@ -1114,12 +1156,12 @@ void reply_query(int fd, time_t now)
return;
p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (!extract_name(header, n, &p, daemon->namebuff, 1, 4))
if (!extract_name(header, n, &p, daemon->namebuff, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(rrtype, p);
GETSHORT(class, p);
if (!(forward = lookup_frec(daemon->namebuff, class, rrtype, ntohs(header->id), 0, 0)))
if (!(forward = lookup_frec(daemon->namebuff, class, rrtype, ntohs(header->id), FREC_ANSWER, 0)))
return;
filter_servers(forward->sentto->arrayposn, F_SERVER, &first, &last);
@@ -1177,23 +1219,24 @@ void reply_query(int fd, time_t now)
if (daemon->ignore_addr && RCODE(header) == NOERROR &&
check_for_ignored_address(header, n))
return;
if ((RCODE(header) == REFUSED || RCODE(header) == SERVFAIL) && forward->forwardall == 0)
/* for broken servers, attempt to send to another one. */
{
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
/* The query MAY have got a good answer, and be awaiting
the results of further queries, in which case
The Stash contains something else and we don't need to retry anyway. */
the stash contains something else and we don't need to retry anyway.
We may also have already got a truncated reply, and be in the process
of doing the query by TCP so can ignore further, probably truncated, UDP answers. */
if (forward->blocking_query || (forward->flags & FREC_GONE_TO_TCP))
return;
#endif
if ((RCODE(header) == REFUSED || RCODE(header) == SERVFAIL) && forward->forwardall == 0)
/* for broken servers, attempt to send to another one. */
{
/* Get the saved query back. */
blockdata_retrieve(forward->stash, forward->stash_len, (void *)header);
forward_query(-1, NULL, NULL, 0, header, forward->stash_len, 0, now, forward,
forward->flags & FREC_AD_QUESTION, forward->flags & FREC_DO_QUESTION, 0);
forward_query(-1, NULL, NULL, 0, header, forward->stash_len, 0, now, forward, 0, 0);
return;
}
@@ -1223,7 +1266,11 @@ void reply_query(int fd, time_t now)
/* denominator controls how many queries we average over. */
server->query_latency = server->mma_latency/128;
/* Flip the bits back in the query name. */
p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (!extract_name(header, n, &p, (char *)&forward->frec_src.encode_bitmap, EXTR_NAME_FLIP, 1))
return;
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
{
@@ -1243,6 +1290,51 @@ void reply_query(int fd, time_t now)
return_reply(now, forward, header, n, STAT_OK);
}
static void xor_array(unsigned int *arg1, unsigned int *arg2, unsigned int len)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
arg1[i] ^= arg2[i];
}
/* Call extract_name() to flip case of query in packet according to the XOR of the bit maps help in arg1 and arg2 */
static void flip_queryname(struct dns_header *header, ssize_t len, struct frec_src *arg1, struct frec_src *arg2)
{
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
unsigned int *arg1p, *arg2p, arg1len, arg2len, *swapp, swap;
/* Two cases: bitmap is single 32 bit int, or it's arbitrary-length array of 32bit ints.
The two args may be different and of different lengths.
The shorter gets notionally extended with zeros. */
if (arg1->encode_bigmap)
arg1p = arg1->encode_bigmap, arg1len = arg1->encode_bitmap;
else
arg1p = &arg1->encode_bitmap, arg1len = 1;
if (arg2->encode_bigmap)
arg2p = arg2->encode_bigmap, arg2len = arg2->encode_bitmap;
else
arg2p = &arg2->encode_bitmap, arg2len = 1;
/* make arg1 the longer, if they differ. */
if (arg2len > arg1len)
{
swap = arg1len;
swapp = arg1p;
arg1len = arg2len;
arg1p = arg2p;
arg2len = swap;
arg2p = swapp;
}
/* XOR on shorter length, flip on longer, operate on longer */
xor_array(arg1p, arg2p, arg2len);
extract_name(header, len, &p, (char *)arg1p, EXTR_NAME_FLIP, arg1len);
xor_array(arg1p, arg2p, arg2len); /* restore */
}
void return_reply(time_t now, struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header, ssize_t n, int status)
{
int check_rebind = 0, no_cache_dnssec = 0, cache_secure = 0, bogusanswer = 0;
@@ -1275,20 +1367,25 @@ void return_reply(time_t now, struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header, s
char *result, *domain = "result";
union all_addr a;
a.log.ede = ede = errflags_to_ede(status);
ede = errflags_to_ede(status);
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_ABANDONED))
{
result = "ABANDONED";
status = STAT_BOGUS;
if (ede == EDE_UNSET)
ede = EDE_OTHER;
}
else
result = (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_SECURE) ? "SECURE" : (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_INSECURE) ? "INSECURE" : "BOGUS"));
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_SECURE))
cache_secure = 1;
else if (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_BOGUS))
{
if (ede == EDE_UNSET)
ede = EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
no_cache_dnssec = 1;
bogusanswer = 1;
@@ -1296,6 +1393,7 @@ void return_reply(time_t now, struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header, s
domain = daemon->namebuff;
}
a.log.ede = ede;
log_query(F_SECSTAT, domain, &a, result, 0);
}
}
@@ -1315,7 +1413,7 @@ void return_reply(time_t now, struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header, s
header->hb4 |= HB4_CD;
else
header->hb4 &= ~HB4_CD;
/* Never cache answers which are contingent on the source or MAC address EDSN0 option,
since the cache is ignorant of such things. */
if (forward->flags & FREC_NO_CACHE)
@@ -1323,13 +1421,13 @@ void return_reply(time_t now, struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header, s
if ((nn = process_reply(header, now, forward->sentto, (size_t)n, check_rebind, no_cache_dnssec, cache_secure, bogusanswer,
forward->flags & FREC_AD_QUESTION, forward->flags & FREC_DO_QUESTION,
forward->flags & FREC_ADDED_PHEADER, &forward->frec_src.source,
!(forward->flags & FREC_HAS_PHEADER), &forward->frec_src.source,
((unsigned char *)header) + daemon->edns_pktsz, ede)))
{
struct frec_src *src;
struct frec_src *src, *prev;
int do_trunc;
for (do_trunc = 0, src = &forward->frec_src; src; src = src->next)
for (do_trunc = 0, prev = NULL, src = &forward->frec_src; src; prev = src, src = src->next)
{
header->id = htons(src->orig_id);
@@ -1343,6 +1441,13 @@ void return_reply(time_t now, struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header, s
}
#endif
/* You will have to draw diagrams and scratch your head to convince yourself
that this works. Bear in mind that the flip to upstream state has already been undone,
for the original query so nothing needs to be done, but subsequent queries' flips
were recorded relative to the flipped name sent upstream. */
if (prev)
flip_queryname(header, nn, prev, src);
if (src->fd != -1)
{
/* Only send packets that fit what the requestor allows.
@@ -1366,7 +1471,7 @@ void return_reply(time_t now, struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header, s
}
}
}
/* The packet is too big for one or more requestors, send them a truncated answer. */
if (do_trunc)
{
@@ -1378,22 +1483,31 @@ void return_reply(time_t now, struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header, s
header->arcount = htons(0);
header->hb3 |= HB3_TC;
new = resize_packet(header, nn, pheader, hlen);
daemon->log_display_id = forward->frec_src.log_id;
daemon->log_source_addr = &forward->frec_src.source;
log_query(F_UPSTREAM, NULL, NULL, "truncated", 0);
for (src = &forward->frec_src; src; src = src->next)
if (src->fd != -1 && nn > src->udp_pkt_size)
{
header->id = htons(src->orig_id);
send_from(src->fd, option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) || option_bool (OPT_CLEVERBIND), daemon->packet, new,
&src->source, &src->dest, src->iface);
/* This gets the name back to the state it was in when we started. */
flip_queryname(header, nn, prev, &forward->frec_src);
for (src = &forward->frec_src, prev = NULL; src; prev = src, src = src->next)
{
/* If you didn't undertand this above, you won't understand it here either. */
if (prev)
flip_queryname(header, nn, prev, src);
if (src->fd != -1 && nn > src->udp_pkt_size)
{
header->id = htons(src->orig_id);
send_from(src->fd, option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) || option_bool (OPT_CLEVERBIND), daemon->packet, new,
&src->source, &src->dest, src->iface);
#ifdef HAVE_DUMPFILE
dump_packet_udp(DUMP_REPLY, daemon->packet, (size_t)nn, NULL, &src->source, src->fd);
dump_packet_udp(DUMP_REPLY, daemon->packet, (size_t)new, NULL, &src->source, src->fd);
#endif
}
}
}
}
}
@@ -1454,9 +1568,10 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
struct in_addr netmask, dst_addr_4;
size_t m;
ssize_t n;
int if_index = 0, auth_dns = 0, do_bit = 0, have_pseudoheader = 0;
int if_index = 0, auth_dns = 0, do_bit = 0;
unsigned int fwd_flags = 0;
int stale = 0, filtered = 0, ede = EDE_UNSET, do_forward = 0;
int metric, ad_reqd, fd;
int metric, fd;
struct blockdata *saved_question = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_CONNTRACK
unsigned int mark = 0;
@@ -1712,15 +1827,27 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
&source_addr, auth_dns ? "auth" : "query", type);
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH
/* find queries for zones we're authoritative for, and answer them directly */
/* Find queries for zones we're authoritative for, and answer them directly.
The exception to this is DS queries for the zone route. They
have to come from the parent zone. Since dnsmasq's auth server
can't do DNSSEC, the zone will be unsigned, and anything using
dnsmasq as a forwarder and doing validation will be expecting to
see the proof of non-existence from the parent. */
if (!auth_dns && !option_bool(OPT_LOCALISE))
for (zone = daemon->auth_zones; zone; zone = zone->next)
if (in_zone(zone, daemon->namebuff, NULL))
{
auth_dns = 1;
local_auth = 1;
break;
}
{
char *cut;
if (in_zone(zone, daemon->namebuff, &cut))
{
if (type != T_DS || cut)
{
auth_dns = 1;
local_auth = 1;
}
break;
}
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOOP
@@ -1734,7 +1861,8 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
{
unsigned short flags;
have_pseudoheader = 1;
fwd_flags |= FREC_HAS_PHEADER;
GETSHORT(udp_size, pheader);
pheader += 2; /* ext_rcode */
GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
@@ -1752,10 +1880,15 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
udp_size = PACKETSZ; /* Sanity check - can't reduce below default. RFC 6891 6.2.3 */
}
ad_reqd = do_bit;
/* RFC 6840 5.7 */
if (header->hb4 & HB4_AD)
ad_reqd = 1;
if (do_bit || (header->hb4 & HB4_AD))
fwd_flags |= FREC_AD_QUESTION;
if (do_bit)
fwd_flags |= FREC_DO_QUESTION;
if (header->hb4 & HB4_CD)
fwd_flags |= FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED;
fd = listen->fd;
@@ -1790,10 +1923,16 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
#endif
else
{
int cacheable;
n = add_edns0_config(header, n, ((unsigned char *)header) + daemon->edns_pktsz, &source_addr, now, &cacheable);
saved_question = blockdata_alloc((char *) header, (size_t)n);
if (!cacheable)
fwd_flags |= FREC_NO_CACHE;
m = answer_request(header, ((char *) header) + udp_size, (size_t)n,
dst_addr_4, netmask, now, ad_reqd, do_bit, &stale, &filtered);
dst_addr_4, netmask, now, fwd_flags & FREC_AD_QUESTION, do_bit, !cacheable, &stale, &filtered);
metric = stale ? METRIC_DNS_STALE_ANSWERED : METRIC_DNS_LOCAL_ANSWERED;
@@ -1814,7 +1953,7 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
if (m != 0)
{
if (have_pseudoheader)
if (fwd_flags & FREC_HAS_PHEADER)
{
if (ede != EDE_UNSET)
{
@@ -1863,12 +2002,9 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
blockdata_retrieve(saved_question, (size_t)n, (void *)header);
blockdata_free(saved_question);
saved_question = NULL;
if (forward_query(fd, &source_addr, &dst_addr, if_index, header, (size_t)n,
udp_size, now, NULL, ad_reqd, do_bit, 0))
daemon->metrics[METRIC_DNS_QUERIES_FORWARDED]++;
else
daemon->metrics[METRIC_DNS_LOCAL_ANSWERED]++;
forward_query(fd, &source_addr, &dst_addr, if_index, header, (size_t)n,
udp_size, now, NULL, fwd_flags, 0);
}
blockdata_free(saved_question);
@@ -1895,7 +2031,7 @@ static ssize_t tcp_talk(int first, int last, int start, unsigned char *packet,
/* Save the query to make sure we get the answer we expect. */
p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (!extract_name(header, qsize, &p, daemon->namebuff, 1, 4))
if (!extract_name(header, qsize, &p, daemon->namebuff, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return 0;
GETSHORT(type, p);
GETSHORT(class, p);
@@ -1922,7 +2058,7 @@ static ssize_t tcp_talk(int first, int last, int start, unsigned char *packet,
break;
}
serv = daemon->serverarray[start];
*servp = serv = daemon->serverarray[start];
retry:
blockdata_retrieve(saved_question, qsize, header);
@@ -1973,6 +2109,12 @@ static ssize_t tcp_talk(int first, int last, int start, unsigned char *packet,
trying again in non-FASTOPEN mode. */
if (fatal || (!data_sent && connect(serv->tcpfd, &serv->addr.sa, sa_len(&serv->addr)) == -1))
{
int port;
failed:
port = prettyprint_addr(&serv->addr, daemon->addrbuff);
my_syslog(LOG_DEBUG|MS_DEBUG, _("TCP connection failed to %s#%d"), daemon->addrbuff, port);
close(serv->tcpfd);
serv->tcpfd = -1;
continue;
@@ -1988,23 +2130,25 @@ static ssize_t tcp_talk(int first, int last, int start, unsigned char *packet,
!read_write(serv->tcpfd, (unsigned char *)length, sizeof (*length), RW_READ_ONCE) ||
!read_write(serv->tcpfd, payload, (rsize = ntohs(*length)), RW_READ_ONCE))
{
close(serv->tcpfd);
serv->tcpfd = -1;
/* We get data then EOF, reopen connection to same server,
else try next. This avoids DoS from a server which accepts
connections and then closes them. */
if (serv->flags & SERV_GOT_TCP)
goto retry;
{
close(serv->tcpfd);
serv->tcpfd = -1;
goto retry;
}
else
continue;
goto failed;
}
/* If the question section of the reply doesn't match the crc we sent, then
/* If the question section of the reply doesn't match the question we sent, then
someone might be attempting to insert bogus values into the cache by
sending replies containing questions and bogus answers.
sending replies containing questions and bogus answers.
Try another server, or give up */
p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (extract_name(header, rsize, &p, daemon->namebuff, 0, 4) != 1)
if (extract_name(header, rsize, &p, daemon->namebuff, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 4) != 1)
continue;
GETSHORT(rtype, p);
GETSHORT(rclass, p);
@@ -2212,7 +2356,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH
int local_auth = 0;
#endif
int checking_disabled, do_bit = 0, ad_reqd = 0, added_pheader = 0, have_pseudoheader = 0;
int checking_disabled, do_bit = 0, ad_reqd = 0, have_pseudoheader = 0;
struct blockdata *saved_question = NULL;
unsigned short qtype;
unsigned int gotname = 0;
@@ -2284,7 +2428,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
while (1)
{
int stale = 0, ede = EDE_UNSET;
int cacheable = 1, stale = 0, ede = EDE_UNSET;
size_t m = 0;
unsigned int flags = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH
@@ -2329,6 +2473,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
if (saved_question)
blockdata_free(saved_question);
size = add_edns0_config(header, size, ((unsigned char *) header) + 65536, &peer_addr, now, &cacheable);
saved_question = blockdata_alloc((char *)header, (size_t)size);
saved_size = size;
@@ -2336,15 +2481,27 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
&peer_addr, auth_dns ? "auth" : "query", qtype);
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH
/* find queries for zones we're authoritative for, and answer them directly */
/* Find queries for zones we're authoritative for, and answer them directly.
The exception to this is DS queries for the zone route. They
have to come from the parent zone. Since dnsmasq's auth server
can't do DNSSEC, the zone will be unsigned, and anything using
dnsmasq as a forwarder and doing validation will be expecting to
see the proof of non-existence from the parent. */
if (!auth_dns && !option_bool(OPT_LOCALISE))
for (zone = daemon->auth_zones; zone; zone = zone->next)
if (in_zone(zone, daemon->namebuff, NULL))
{
auth_dns = 1;
local_auth = 1;
break;
}
{
char *cut;
if (in_zone(zone, daemon->namebuff, &cut))
{
if (qtype != T_DS || cut)
{
auth_dns = 1;
local_auth = 1;
}
break;
}
}
#endif
norebind = domain_no_rebind(daemon->namebuff);
@@ -2395,7 +2552,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
#endif
else
m = answer_request(header, ((char *) header) + 65536, (size_t)size,
dst_addr_4, netmask, now, ad_reqd, do_bit, &stale, &filtered);
dst_addr_4, netmask, now, ad_reqd, do_bit, !cacheable, &stale, &filtered);
}
}
@@ -2406,15 +2563,14 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
{
struct server *master;
int start;
int cacheable, no_cache_dnssec = 0, cache_secure = 0, bogusanswer = 0;
int no_cache_dnssec = 0, cache_secure = 0, bogusanswer = 0;
blockdata_retrieve(saved_question, (size_t)saved_size, header);
size = saved_size;
/* save state of "cd" flag in query */
if ((checking_disabled = header->hb4 & HB4_CD))
no_cache_dnssec = 1;
checking_disabled = header->hb4 & HB4_CD;
if (lookup_domain(daemon->namebuff, gotname, &first, &last))
flags = is_local_answer(now, first, daemon->namebuff);
else
@@ -2437,8 +2593,6 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
else
start = master->last_server;
size = add_edns0_config(header, size, ((unsigned char *) header) + 65536, &peer_addr, now, &cacheable);
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && (master->flags & SERV_DO_DNSSEC))
{
@@ -2451,11 +2605,6 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
}
#endif
/* Check if we added a pheader on forwarding - may need to
strip it from the reply. */
if (!have_pseudoheader && find_pseudoheader(header, size, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL))
added_pheader = 1;
/* Loop round available servers until we succeed in connecting to one. */
if ((m = tcp_talk(first, last, start, packet, size, have_mark, mark, &serv)) == 0)
ede = EDE_NETERR;
@@ -2472,7 +2621,9 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
/* Clear this in case we don't call tcp_key_recurse() below */
memset(daemon->rr_status, 0, sizeof(*daemon->rr_status) * daemon->rr_status_sz);
if (!checking_disabled && (master->flags & SERV_DO_DNSSEC))
if (checking_disabled || (header->hb4 & HB4_CD))
no_cache_dnssec = 1;
else if (master->flags & SERV_DO_DNSSEC)
{
int keycount = daemon->limit[LIMIT_WORK]; /* Limit to number of DNSSEC questions, to catch loops and avoid filling cache. */
int validatecount = daemon->limit[LIMIT_CRYPTO];
@@ -2481,12 +2632,14 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
char *result, *domain = "result";
union all_addr a;
a.log.ede = ede = errflags_to_ede(status);
ede = errflags_to_ede(status);
if (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_ABANDONED))
{
result = "ABANDONED";
status = STAT_BOGUS;
if (ede == EDE_UNSET)
ede = EDE_OTHER;
}
else
result = (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_SECURE) ? "SECURE" : (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_INSECURE) ? "INSECURE" : "BOGUS"));
@@ -2495,6 +2648,8 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
cache_secure = 1;
else if (STAT_ISEQUAL(status, STAT_BOGUS))
{
if (ede == EDE_UNSET)
ede = EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
no_cache_dnssec = 1;
bogusanswer = 1;
@@ -2502,6 +2657,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
domain = daemon->namebuff;
}
a.log.ede = ede;
log_query(F_SECSTAT, domain, &a, result, 0);
if ((daemon->limit[LIMIT_CRYPTO] - validatecount) > (int)daemon->metrics[METRIC_CRYPTO_HWM])
@@ -2530,7 +2686,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
m = process_reply(header, now, serv, (unsigned int)m,
option_bool(OPT_NO_REBIND) && !norebind, no_cache_dnssec, cache_secure, bogusanswer,
ad_reqd, do_bit, added_pheader, &peer_addr, ((unsigned char *)header) + 65536, ede);
ad_reqd, do_bit, !have_pseudoheader, &peer_addr, ((unsigned char *)header) + 65536, ede);
/* process_reply() adds pheader itself */
have_pseudoheader = 0;
@@ -2604,7 +2760,8 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
}
blockdata_free(saved_question);
check_log_writer(1);
return packet;
}
@@ -2883,8 +3040,15 @@ static void free_frec(struct frec *f)
{
struct frec_src *last;
/* add back to freelist if not the record builtin to every frec. */
for (last = f->frec_src.next; last && last->next; last = last->next) ;
/* add back to freelist if not the record builtin to every frec,
also free any bigmaps they's been decorated with. */
for (last = f->frec_src.next; last && last->next; last = last->next)
if (last->encode_bigmap)
{
free(last->encode_bigmap);
last->encode_bigmap = NULL;
}
if (last)
{
last->next = daemon->free_frec_src;
@@ -2901,7 +3065,7 @@ static void free_frec(struct frec *f)
blockdata_free(f->stash);
f->stash = NULL;
}
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
/* Anything we're waiting on is pointless now, too */
if (f->blocking_query)
@@ -3024,6 +3188,16 @@ static struct frec *lookup_frec(char *target, int class, int rrtype, int id, int
{
struct frec *f;
struct dns_header *header;
int compare_mode = EXTR_NAME_COMPARE;
/* Only compare case-sensitive when matching frec to a recieved answer,
NOT when looking for a duplicated question. */
if (flags & FREC_ANSWER)
{
flags &= ~FREC_ANSWER;
if (!option_bool(OPT_NO_0x20))
compare_mode = EXTR_NAME_NOCASE;
}
for (f = daemon->frec_list; f; f = f->next)
if (f->sentto &&
@@ -3032,21 +3206,35 @@ static struct frec *lookup_frec(char *target, int class, int rrtype, int id, int
(header = blockdata_retrieve(f->stash, f->stash_len, NULL)))
{
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
int hclass, hrrtype;
if (extract_name(header, f->stash_len, &p, target, 0, 4) != 1)
continue;
GETSHORT(hrrtype, p);
GETSHORT(hclass, p);
/* type checked by flags for DNSSEC queries. */
if (rrtype != -1 && rrtype != hrrtype)
continue;
if (class != hclass)
continue;
int hclass, hrrtype, rc;
/* Case sensitive compare for DNS-0x20 encoding. */
if ((rc = extract_name(header, f->stash_len, &p, target, compare_mode, 4)))
{
GETSHORT(hrrtype, p);
GETSHORT(hclass, p);
/* type checked by flags for DNSSEC queries. */
if (rrtype != -1 && rrtype != hrrtype)
continue;
if (class != hclass)
continue;
}
if (rc != 1)
{
static int warned = 0;
if (rc == 3 && !warned)
{
my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("Case mismatch in DNS reply - check bit 0x20 encoding."));
warned = 1;
}
continue;
}
return f;
}
@@ -3054,7 +3242,7 @@ static struct frec *lookup_frec(char *target, int class, int rrtype, int id, int
}
/* Send query packet again, if we can. */
void resend_query()
void resend_query(void)
{
if (daemon->srv_save)
server_send(daemon->srv_save, daemon->fd_save,
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+4 -4
View File
@@ -75,11 +75,11 @@ static char *buffer;
static inline void add_attr(struct nlmsghdr *nlh, uint16_t type, size_t len, const void *data)
{
struct my_nlattr *attr = (void *)nlh + NL_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
struct my_nlattr *attr = (struct my_nlattr *)((u8 *)nlh + NL_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len));
uint16_t payload_len = NL_ALIGN(sizeof(struct my_nlattr)) + len;
attr->nla_type = type;
attr->nla_len = payload_len;
memcpy((void *)attr + NL_ALIGN(sizeof(struct my_nlattr)), data, len);
memcpy((u8 *)attr + NL_ALIGN(sizeof(struct my_nlattr)), data, len);
nlh->nlmsg_len += NL_ALIGN(payload_len);
}
@@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ static int new_add_to_ipset(const char *setname, const union all_addr *ipaddr, i
add_attr(nlh,
(af == AF_INET ? IPSET_ATTR_IPADDR_IPV4 : IPSET_ATTR_IPADDR_IPV6) | NLA_F_NET_BYTEORDER,
addrsz, ipaddr);
nested[1]->nla_len = (void *)buffer + NL_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len) - (void *)nested[1];
nested[0]->nla_len = (void *)buffer + NL_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len) - (void *)nested[0];
nested[1]->nla_len = (u8 *)buffer + NL_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len) - (u8 *)nested[1];
nested[0]->nla_len = (u8 *)buffer + NL_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len) - (u8 *)nested[0];
while (retry_send(sendto(ipset_sock, buffer, nlh->nlmsg_len, 0,
(struct sockaddr *)&snl, sizeof(snl))));
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
#ifdef HAVE_LOOP
static ssize_t loop_make_probe(u32 uid);
void loop_send_probes()
void loop_send_probes(void)
{
struct server *serv;
struct randfd_list *rfds = NULL;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ static int iface_allowed_v4(struct in_addr local, int if_index, char *label,
/*
* Clean old interfaces no longer found.
*/
static void clean_interfaces()
static void clean_interfaces(void)
{
struct irec *iface;
struct irec **up = &daemon->interfaces;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+9 -6
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ struct myoption {
#define LOPT_MAX_PROCS 384
#define LOPT_DNSSEC_LIMITS 385
#define LOPT_PXE_OPT 386
#define LOPT_NO_ENCODE 387
#ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_LONG
static const struct option opts[] =
@@ -247,6 +248,7 @@ static const struct myoption opts[] =
{ "local-ttl", 1, 0, 'T' },
{ "no-negcache", 0, 0, 'N' },
{ "no-round-robin", 0, 0, LOPT_NORR },
{ "no-0x20-encode", 0, 0, LOPT_NO_ENCODE },
{ "cache-rr", 1, 0, LOPT_CACHE_RR },
{ "addn-hosts", 1, 0, 'H' },
{ "hostsdir", 1, 0, LOPT_HOST_INOTIFY },
@@ -568,7 +570,7 @@ static struct {
{ LOPT_CMARK_ALST, ARG_DUP, "<connmark>[/<mask>][,<pattern>[/<pattern>...]]", gettext_noop("Set allowed DNS patterns for a connection-track mark."), NULL },
{ LOPT_SYNTH, ARG_DUP, "<domain>,<range>,[<prefix>]", gettext_noop("Specify a domain and address range for synthesised names"), NULL },
{ LOPT_SEC_VALID, OPT_DNSSEC_VALID, NULL, gettext_noop("Activate DNSSEC validation"), NULL },
{ LOPT_TRUST_ANCHOR, ARG_DUP, "<domain>,[<class>],...", gettext_noop("Specify trust anchor key digest."), NULL },
{ LOPT_TRUST_ANCHOR, ARG_DUP, "<domain>,[<class>,]...", gettext_noop("Specify trust anchor key digest."), NULL },
{ LOPT_DNSSEC_DEBUG, OPT_DNSSEC_DEBUG, NULL, gettext_noop("Disable upstream checking for DNSSEC debugging."), NULL },
{ LOPT_DNSSEC_CHECK, ARG_DUP, NULL, gettext_noop("Ensure answers without DNSSEC are in unsigned zones."), NULL },
{ LOPT_DNSSEC_TIME, OPT_DNSSEC_TIME, NULL, gettext_noop("Don't check DNSSEC signature timestamps until first cache-reload"), NULL },
@@ -591,6 +593,7 @@ static struct {
{ LOPT_UMBRELLA, ARG_ONE, "[=<optspec>]", gettext_noop("Send Cisco Umbrella identifiers including remote IP."), NULL },
{ LOPT_QUIET_TFTP, OPT_QUIET_TFTP, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not log routine TFTP."), NULL },
{ LOPT_NORR, OPT_NORR, NULL, gettext_noop("Suppress round-robin ordering of DNS records."), NULL },
{ LOPT_NO_ENCODE, OPT_NO_0x20, NULL, gettext_noop("Suppress DNS bit 0x20 encoding."), NULL },
{ LOPT_NO_IDENT, OPT_NO_IDENT, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not add CHAOS TXT records."), NULL },
{ LOPT_CACHE_RR, ARG_DUP, "<RR-type>", gettext_noop("Cache this DNS resource record type."), NULL },
{ LOPT_MAX_PROCS, ARG_ONE, "<integer>", gettext_noop("Maximum number of concurrent tcp connections."), NULL },
@@ -4043,10 +4046,8 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
}
new_addr = opt_malloc(sizeof(struct addrlist));
new_addr->next = new->addr6;
new_addr->flags = 0;
new_addr->addr.addr6 = in6;
new->addr6 = new_addr;
if (pref)
{
@@ -4057,7 +4058,7 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
((((u64)1<<(128-new_addr->prefixlen))-1) & addrpart) != 0)
{
dhcp_config_free(new);
ret_err(_("bad IPv6 prefix"));
ret_err_free(_("bad IPv6 prefix"), new_addr);
}
new_addr->flags |= ADDRLIST_PREFIX;
@@ -4071,6 +4072,8 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
if (i == 8)
new_addr->flags |= ADDRLIST_WILDCARD;
new_addr->next = new->addr6;
new->addr6 = new_addr;
new->flags |= CONFIG_ADDR6;
}
#endif
@@ -4161,7 +4164,7 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
}
else if (strcmp(arg, "ignore") == 0)
new->flags |= CONFIG_DISABLE;
if (new->hostname)
else if (new->hostname)
{
dhcp_config_free(new);
ret_err(_("DHCP host has multiple names"));
+7 -7
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ static size_t outpacket_counter;
void end_opt6(int container)
{
void *p = daemon->outpacket.iov_base + container + 2;
uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *)daemon->outpacket.iov_base + container + 2;
u16 len = outpacket_counter - container - 4 ;
PUTSHORT(len, p);
@@ -50,11 +50,11 @@ int save_counter(int newval)
void *expand(size_t headroom)
{
void *ret;
uint8_t *ret;
if (expand_buf(&daemon->outpacket, outpacket_counter + headroom))
{
ret = daemon->outpacket.iov_base + outpacket_counter;
ret = (uint8_t *)daemon->outpacket.iov_base + outpacket_counter;
outpacket_counter += headroom;
return ret;
}
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ void *expand(size_t headroom)
int new_opt6(int opt)
{
int ret = outpacket_counter;
void *p;
unsigned char *p;
if ((p = expand(4)))
{
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ void *put_opt6(void *data, size_t len)
void put_opt6_long(unsigned int val)
{
void *p;
unsigned char *p;
if ((p = expand(4)))
PUTLONG(val, p);
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ void put_opt6_long(unsigned int val)
void put_opt6_short(unsigned int val)
{
void *p;
uint8_t *p;
if ((p = expand(2)))
PUTSHORT(val, p);
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+101 -41
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -16,16 +16,41 @@
#include "dnsmasq.h"
/* EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT -> extract name
EXTR_NAME_COMPARE -> compare name, case insensitive
EXTR_NAME_NOCASE -> compare name, case sensitive
EXTR_NAME_FLIP -> flip 0x20 bits in packet.
For flip, name is an array of ints, whose size
is given in parm, which forms the bitmap. Bits beyond the size
are assumed to be zero.
return = 0 -> error
return = 1 -> extract OK, compare OK, flip OK
return = 2 -> extract OK, compare failed.
return = 3 -> extract OK, compare failed but only on case.
*/
int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
char *name, int isExtract, int extrabytes)
char *name, int func, unsigned int parm)
{
unsigned char *cp = (unsigned char *)name, *p = *pp, *p1 = NULL;
unsigned int j, l, namelen = 0, hops = 0;
int retvalue = 1;
if (isExtract)
*cp = 0;
unsigned int bigmap_counter = 0, bigmap_posn = 0, bigmap_size, bitmap;
int retvalue = 1, case_insens = 1, isExtract = 0, flip = 0, extrabytes = (int)parm;
unsigned int *bigmap;
if (func == EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT)
isExtract = 1, *cp = 0;
else if (func == EXTR_NAME_NOCASE)
case_insens = 0;
else if (func == EXTR_NAME_FLIP)
{
flip = 1, extrabytes = 0;
bigmap = (unsigned int *)name;
name = NULL;
bigmap_size = parm;
}
while (1)
{
unsigned int label_type;
@@ -46,7 +71,7 @@ int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
cp--;
*cp = 0; /* terminate: lose final period */
}
else if (*cp != 0)
else if (!flip && *cp != 0)
retvalue = 2;
if (p1) /* we jumped via compression */
@@ -85,7 +110,7 @@ int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, l))
return 0;
for(j=0; j<l; j++, p++)
for (j=0; j<l; j++, p++)
if (isExtract)
{
unsigned char c = *p;
@@ -98,6 +123,24 @@ int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
else
*cp++ = c;
}
else if (flip)
{
unsigned char c = *p;
if ((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z'))
{
/* Get the next int of the bitmap */
if (bigmap_posn < bigmap_size && bigmap_counter-- == 0)
{
bitmap = bigmap[bigmap_posn++];
bigmap_counter = (sizeof(unsigned int) * 8) - 1;
}
if (bitmap & 1)
*p ^= 0x20;
bitmap >>= 1;
}
}
else
{
unsigned char c1 = *cp, c2 = *p;
@@ -107,23 +150,35 @@ int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
else
{
cp++;
if (c1 >= 'A' && c1 <= 'Z')
c1 += 'a' - 'A';
if (c1 == NAME_ESCAPE)
c1 = (*cp++)-1;
else if (case_insens && c1 >= 'A' && c1 <= 'Z')
c1 += 'a' - 'A';
if (c2 >= 'A' && c2 <= 'Z')
if (case_insens && c2 >= 'A' && c2 <= 'Z')
c2 += 'a' - 'A';
if (!case_insens && retvalue != 2 && c1 != c2)
{
if (c1 >= 'A' && c1 <= 'Z')
c1 += 'a' - 'A';
if (c2 >= 'A' && c2 <= 'Z')
c2 += 'a' - 'A';
if (c1 == c2)
retvalue = 3;
}
if (c1 != c2)
retvalue = 2;
retvalue = 2;
}
}
if (isExtract)
*cp++ = '.';
else if (*cp != 0 && *cp++ != '.')
else if (!flip && *cp != 0 && *cp++ != '.')
retvalue = 2;
}
else
@@ -399,7 +454,7 @@ int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *namebuff)
if (i == ntohs(header->ancount) && !(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->nscount), header, qlen)))
return done;
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, namebuff, 1, 10))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, namebuff, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return done; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -480,7 +535,7 @@ static int find_soa(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, int *sub
for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->nscount); i++)
{
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return 0; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -509,7 +564,7 @@ static int find_soa(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, int *sub
for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) /* MNAME, RNAME */
{
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
{
if (!no_cache)
blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
@@ -660,7 +715,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
namep = p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 || !extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, 1, 4))
if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 || !extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return 2; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -684,7 +739,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
for (j = 0; j < ntohs(header->ancount); j++)
{
int secflag = 0;
if (!(res = extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(res = extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return 2; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(aqtype, p1);
@@ -722,7 +777,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
if (aqtype == T_CNAME)
log_query(secflag | F_CNAME | F_FORWARD | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return 2;
if (aqtype == T_CNAME)
@@ -800,7 +855,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
{
int secflag = 0;
if (!(res = extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(res = extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return 2; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(aqtype, p1);
@@ -862,7 +917,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
}
namep = p1;
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return 2;
if (qtype != T_CNAME)
@@ -932,7 +987,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
/* Name, extract it then re-encode. */
int len;
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
{
blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
return 2;
@@ -965,7 +1020,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
} while (desc != -1);
/* we overwrote the original name, so get it back here. */
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &tmp, name, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &tmp, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
{
blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
return 2;
@@ -1127,7 +1182,7 @@ void report_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t len, u32 mark)
{
int aqtype, aqclass, ardlen;
if (!extract_name(header, len, &p, daemon->namebuff, 1, 10))
if (!extract_name(header, len, &p, daemon->namebuff, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return;
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, len, 10))
@@ -1145,7 +1200,7 @@ void report_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t len, u32 mark)
{
if (aqtype == T_CNAME)
{
if (!extract_name(header, len, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, len, &p, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return;
if (safe_name(daemon->namebuff) && safe_name(daemon->workspacename))
ubus_event_bcast_connmark_allowlist_resolved(mark, daemon->namebuff, daemon->workspacename, attl);
@@ -1195,7 +1250,7 @@ unsigned int extract_request(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name,
if (!(header->hb3 & HB3_QR) && (ntohs(header->ancount) != 0 || ntohs(header->nscount) != 0))
return 0; /* non-standard query. */
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, 1, 4))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return 0; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -1309,7 +1364,7 @@ static int check_bad_address(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, struct bogu
for (i = ntohs(header->ancount); i != 0; i--)
{
if (name && !extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, 1, 10))
if (name && !extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return 0; /* bad packet */
if (!name && !(p = skip_name(p, header, qlen, 10)))
@@ -1559,7 +1614,7 @@ static unsigned long crec_ttl(struct crec *crecp, time_t now)
return daemon->max_ttl;
}
static int cache_validated(const struct crec *crecp)
static int cache_not_validated(const struct crec *crecp)
{
return (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK));
}
@@ -1567,7 +1622,7 @@ static int cache_validated(const struct crec *crecp)
/* return zero if we can't answer from cache, or packet size if we can */
size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
struct in_addr local_addr, struct in_addr local_netmask,
time_t now, int ad_reqd, int do_bit, int *stale, int *filtered)
time_t now, int ad_reqd, int do_bit, int no_cache, int *stale, int *filtered)
{
char *name = daemon->namebuff;
unsigned char *p, *ansp;
@@ -1582,6 +1637,10 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
size_t len;
int rd_bit = (header->hb3 & HB3_RD);
int count = 255; /* catch loops */
/* Suppress cached answers of no_cache set. */
if (no_cache)
rd_bit = 0;
if (stale)
*stale = 0;
@@ -1615,7 +1674,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
nameoffset = p - (unsigned char *)header;
/* now extract name as .-concatenated string into name */
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, 1, 4))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return 0; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -1656,7 +1715,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
/* If the client asked for DNSSEC don't use cached data. */
if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP | F_CONFIG)) ||
(rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_validated(crecp))))
(rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_not_validated(crecp))))
{
if (crecp->flags & F_CONFIG || qtype == T_CNAME)
ans = 1;
@@ -1815,7 +1874,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
the zone is unsigned, which implies that we're doing
validation. */
if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP | F_CONFIG)) ||
(rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_validated(crecp)) ))
(rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_not_validated(crecp)) ))
{
do
{
@@ -1971,7 +2030,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
/* If the client asked for DNSSEC don't use cached data. */
if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP | F_CONFIG)) ||
(rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_validated(crecp)) ))
(rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_not_validated(crecp)) ))
do
{
int stale_flag = 0;
@@ -2153,19 +2212,19 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
if (!ans)
{
if ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_RR | F_NXDOMAIN)) &&
rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_validated(crecp)))
if ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_RR | F_NXDOMAIN)) && rd_bit)
do
{
int flags = crecp->flags;
unsigned short rrtype;
if (flags & F_KEYTAG)
rrtype = crecp->addr.rrblock.rrtype;
else
rrtype = crecp->addr.rrdata.rrtype;
if ((flags & F_NXDOMAIN) || rrtype == qtype)
if (((flags & F_NXDOMAIN) || rrtype == qtype) &&
(!do_bit || cache_not_validated(crecp)))
{
char *rrdata = NULL;
unsigned short rrlen = 0;
@@ -2228,14 +2287,15 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
}
if (qtype != T_ANY && !ans && rr_on_list(daemon->filter_rr, qtype))
if (qtype != T_ANY && !ans && rr_on_list(daemon->filter_rr, qtype) && !do_bit)
{
/* We don't have a cached answer and when we get an answer from upstream we're going to
filter it anyway. If we have a cached answer for the domain for another RRtype then
that may be enough to tell us if the answer should be NODATA and save the round trip.
Cached NXDOMAIN has already been handled, so here we look for any record for the domain,
since its existence allows us to return a NODATA answer. Note that we never set the AD flag,
since we didn't authenticate the record. */
since we didn't authenticate the record; this doesn't work if we want auth data, so
don't use this shortcut in that case. */
if (cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_IPV4 | F_IPV6 | F_RR | F_CNAME))
{
@@ -2334,7 +2394,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
if (!(ansp = skip_questions(header, qlen)))
return 0; /* bad packet */
anscount = nscount = addncount = 0;
log_query(F_CONFIG, "reply", NULL, "truncated", 0);
log_query(0, "reply", NULL, "truncated", 0);
}
if (nxdomain)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+13 -13
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ static int dhcp6_no_relay(struct state *state, int msg_type, unsigned char *inbu
static void log6_opts(int nest, unsigned int xid, void *start_opts, void *end_opts);
static void log6_packet(struct state *state, char *type, struct in6_addr *addr, char *string);
static void log6_quiet(struct state *state, char *type, struct in6_addr *addr, char *string);
static void *opt6_find (void *opts, void *end, unsigned int search, unsigned int minsize);
static void *opt6_next(void *opts, void *end);
static void *opt6_find (uint8_t *opts, uint8_t *end, unsigned int search, unsigned int minsize);
static void *opt6_next(uint8_t *opts, uint8_t *end);
static unsigned int opt6_uint(unsigned char *opt, int offset, int size);
static void get_context_tag(struct state *state, struct dhcp_context *context);
static int check_ia(struct state *state, void *opt, void **endp, void **ia_option);
@@ -61,11 +61,11 @@ static void calculate_times(struct dhcp_context *context, unsigned int *min_time
#define opt6_len(opt) ((int)(opt6_uint(opt, -2, 2)))
#define opt6_type(opt) (opt6_uint(opt, -4, 2))
#define opt6_ptr(opt, i) ((void *)&(((unsigned char *)(opt))[4+(i)]))
#define opt6_ptr(opt, i) ((void *)&(((uint8_t *)(opt))[4+(i)]))
#define opt6_user_vendor_ptr(opt, i) ((void *)&(((unsigned char *)(opt))[2+(i)]))
#define opt6_user_vendor_ptr(opt, i) ((void *)&(((uint8_t *)(opt))[2+(i)]))
#define opt6_user_vendor_len(opt) ((int)(opt6_uint(opt, -4, 2)))
#define opt6_user_vendor_next(opt, end) (opt6_next(((void *) opt) - 2, end))
#define opt6_user_vendor_next(opt, end) (opt6_next(((uint8_t *) opt) - 2, end))
unsigned short dhcp6_reply(struct dhcp_context *context, int interface, char *iface_name,
@@ -107,11 +107,11 @@ unsigned short dhcp6_reply(struct dhcp_context *context, int interface, char *if
static int dhcp6_maybe_relay(struct state *state, unsigned char *inbuff, size_t sz,
struct in6_addr *client_addr, int is_unicast, time_t now)
{
void *end = inbuff + sz;
void *opts = inbuff + 34;
uint8_t *end = inbuff + sz;
uint8_t *opts = inbuff + 34;
int msg_type = *inbuff;
unsigned char *outmsgtypep;
void *opt;
uint8_t *opt;
struct dhcp_vendor *vendor;
/* if not an encapsulated relayed message, just do the stuff */
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static int dhcp6_maybe_relay(struct state *state, unsigned char *inbuff, size_t
for (opt = opts; opt; opt = opt6_next(opt, end))
{
if (opt6_ptr(opt, 0) + opt6_len(opt) > end)
if ((uint8_t *)opt6_ptr(opt, 0) + opt6_len(opt) > end)
return 0;
/* Don't copy MAC address into reply. */
@@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ static int dhcp6_no_relay(struct state *state, int msg_type, unsigned char *inbu
reallocated. */
((unsigned char *)(daemon->outpacket.iov_base))[start_msg] = outmsgtype;
log6_opts(0, state->xid, daemon->outpacket.iov_base + start_opts, daemon->outpacket.iov_base + save_counter(-1));
log6_opts(0, state->xid, (uint8_t *)daemon->outpacket.iov_base + start_opts, (uint8_t *)daemon->outpacket.iov_base + save_counter(-1));
return 1;
@@ -2093,7 +2093,7 @@ static void log6_packet(struct state *state, char *type, struct in6_addr *addr,
string ? string : "");
}
static void *opt6_find (void *opts, void *end, unsigned int search, unsigned int minsize)
static void *opt6_find (uint8_t *opts, uint8_t *end, unsigned int search, unsigned int minsize)
{
u16 opt, opt_len;
void *start;
@@ -2120,7 +2120,7 @@ static void *opt6_find (void *opts, void *end, unsigned int search, unsigned int
}
}
static void *opt6_next(void *opts, void *end)
static void *opt6_next(uint8_t *opts, uint8_t *end)
{
u16 opt_len;
+1 -4
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -345,9 +345,6 @@ int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *szp, int new)
if (old >= new+1)
return 1;
if (new >= 100)
return 0;
new += 5;
if (!(p = whine_realloc(*wkspc, new * sizeof(unsigned char *))))
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ void tftp_request(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
}
p = packet + 2;
end = packet + len;
end = packet + 2 + len;
if (ntohs(*((unsigned short *)packet)) != OP_RRQ ||
!(filename = next(&p, end)) ||
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+30 -25
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static u32 in[12];
static u32 out[8];
static int outleft = 0;
void rand_init()
void rand_init(void)
{
int fd = open(RANDFILE, O_RDONLY);
@@ -767,10 +767,10 @@ int retry_send(ssize_t rc)
/* rw = 0 -> write
rw = 1 -> read
rw = 2 -> read once
rw = 3 -> write once
rw = 2 -> write once
rw = 3 -> read once
"once" fail if all the data doesn't arrive/go in a single read/write.
"once" fails on EAGAIN, as this a timeout.
This indicates a timeout of a TCP socket.
*/
int read_write(int fd, unsigned char *packet, int size, int rw)
@@ -779,29 +779,34 @@ int read_write(int fd, unsigned char *packet, int size, int rw)
for (done = 0; done < size; done += n)
{
do {
if (rw & 1)
n = read(fd, &packet[done], (size_t)(size - done));
else
n = write(fd, &packet[done], (size_t)(size - done));
if (n == 0)
return 0;
if (n == -1 && errno == EINTR)
continue;
/* "once" variant */
if ((rw & 2) && n != size)
return 0;
} while (n == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == ENOMEM || errno == ENOBUFS ||
errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK));
if (rw & 1)
n = read(fd, &packet[done], (size_t)(size - done));
else
n = write(fd, &packet[done], (size_t)(size - done));
if (n == -1)
if (n == 0)
return 0;
if (n == -1)
{
n = 0; /* don't mess with counter when we loop. */
if (errno == EINTR || errno == ENOMEM || errno == ENOBUFS)
continue;
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
{
/* "once" variant */
if (rw & 2)
return 0;
continue;
}
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}