Compare commits

..
40 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Tijs Van Buggenhout 9af15871e6 Fix crash when no upstream servers defined.
This is a regession introduced in 3b6df06fb8.

When dnsmasq is started without upstreams (yet), but a
DNS query comes in that needs forwarding dnsmasq now potentially crashes as
the value for "first" variable is undetermined.

A segmentation violation occurs when the index
is out of bounds of  serverarray.

Credits go to pedro0311 <pedro@freshtomato.org>
2025-03-14 15:09:35 +00:00
Simon Kelley 5897e79d05 Fix bogus compiler warnings. 2025-03-12 15:44:19 +00:00
Simon Kelley fc9135ca9f Documentation for --do-0x20-encode. 2025-03-09 16:15:16 +00:00
Simon Kelley e427d4b0e6 Default-off 0x20 encoding and provide --do-0x20-encode option.
For now, this causes too many problems to default on.

Hopefully this will change for future releases.
2025-03-04 12:59:17 +00:00
Simon Kelley 9df1bd0cc1 Revert 368ceff6e0 and fix correct problem.
The next() function is broken for any TFTP packet with padding
which doesn't end with a zero.

Rewrite to handle such packets.

Thanks to Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> for persisting in finding the
actual problem and proposing a solution. This patch is modelled on his,
but rewritten for personal preference by Simon Kelley, who is
responsible for all bugs.
2025-03-01 22:43:23 +00:00
Simon Kelley 5990074ab0 Fix stupid error in allocating 0x20-flip bitmaps. 2025-02-21 14:41:34 +00:00
Simon Kelley dbb69bd192 Merge branch 'master' of onyx:dnsmasq/dnsmasq 2025-02-21 13:08:26 +00:00
Simon Kelley d17581c4c6 Use correct packet length when 0x20 flipping truncated packet.
This makes no difference in practice, since only the query is
operated on, but it is more correct.
2025-02-21 13:02:04 +00:00
Simon Kelley 2c9ed7f425 Fix possible problems with case-encode bigmap array allocation. 2025-02-20 22:59:04 +00:00
Simon Kelley 717ff6adc3 Update plen when getting retried query from stash.
They should be equal, but that depends on untrusted data.
2025-02-10 12:26:15 +00:00
Simon Kelley f9f8d19bf5 Yet another 0x20 fix.
To complement the previous one, which fixed the retry path
when the query is retried from a different id/source address, this
fixes retries from the same id/source address.
2025-02-09 11:06:59 +00:00
Simon Kelley 535be2f5d3 Fix possible SIGSEGV in bpf.c 2025-02-08 22:58:42 +00:00
Simon Kelley bceab45dbe Fix 0x20 problem.
A retry to upstream DNS servers triggered by the following conditions

1) A query asking for the same data as a previous query which has not yet been answered.
2) The second query arrives more than two seconds after the first.
3) Either the source of the second query or the id field differs from the first.

fails to set the case of the retry to the same pattern as the first attempt.

However dnsmasq expects the reply from upstream to have the case
pattern of the first attempt.

If the answer to the retry arrives before the answer to the first
query, dnsmasq will notice the case mismatch, log an error, and
ignore the answer.

The worst case scenario would be the first upstream query or reply is
lost and there would follow a short period where all queries for that
particular domain would fail.

This is a 2.91 development issue, it doesn't apply to previous stable releases.
2025-02-07 19:56:33 +00:00
Helge Deller 368ceff6e0 TFTP off-by-2 bugfix
Some of my PA-RISC UNIX machines boot remotely via tftp, but dnsmasq
randomly fails to deliver (the identical file) to some of the machines.

I traced the issue and basically dnsmasq fails with error "unsupported
request from IP.x.y.z" (line 366 in tftp.c).

Here is an example package which is sent (516 hex bytes):
76 6d 6c 69 6e 75 78 00 6f 63 74 65 74 00 12 74 10 3c 00 00 00 00 00 01
a9 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e 38 00 00 00 00 00 00 1c a0 00 00 00 00 00 00
1d 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 1d 28 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
03 d8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 1d 30 00 00 00 02 ff e0
00 00 00 00 03 60 a8 49 55 93 00 00 00 01 f0 d4 21 e4 00 00 00 00 00 00
1d 78 00 00 00 f0 f0 d8 51 38 00 00 00 f0 f0 d4 21 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 aa b8 00 00 00 f0 f0 e9 62 7c 00 00 00 00 00 00
03 01 ff ff ff ff ff ff 03 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 ff ff ff ff ff ff
ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e 38 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 60 00 00 00 00 00 01
a6 68 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 f0 f0 d8 4f 30 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 ae ec 00 00 00 00 00 00 1f 70 00 00 00 00 00 00
1e b8 00 00 03 60 a8 49 55 93 00 00 00 02 18 71 1a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e 38 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 f0 d2 f0 70 00 00 00 00 00 00
1f c0 00 00 00 f0 f0 d4 0b e8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 60 ff ff ff fc 00 60 18 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 f0 d8
8f d0 00 00 00 00 00 00 1f f8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 f0 d8
8d b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e e8 00 00

Please note the last 3 bytes: "e8 00 00".
If the 3rd last byte is "00", then dnsmasq works and it fails it it's "e8".

So, the bug is in line 366 of tftp.c:
   filename = next(&p, end)
Here filename gets the value NULL from next(), because the "end" variable is off-by-2.
The fix is to change line 363 to add an offset of 2:
  end = packet + 2 + len;

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Closes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2293793
2025-02-06 17:04:06 +00:00
Simon Kelley 77c4e95d4a Fix for case-sensitivity problems in DNS.
Fix a case sensitivity problem which has been lurking for a long while.
When we get example.com and Example.com and combine them, we send whichever
query arrives first upstream and then later answer it, and we also
answer the second with the same answer. That means that if example.com
arrives first, it will get the answer example.com - good - but Example.com
will _also_ get the answer example.com - not so good.

In theory, fixing this is simple without having to keep seperate
copies of all the queries: Just use the bit-vector representation
of case flipping that we have for 0x20-encoding to keep the
differences in case. The complication comes from the fact that
the existing bit-vector code only holds data on the first 32 alpha
letters, because we only flip that up to many for 0x20 encoding.

In practise, the delta between combined queries can almost always
be represented with that data, since almost all queries are
all lower case and we only purturb the first 32 letters with
0x20 encoding. It's therefore worth keeping the existing,
efficient data structure for the 99.9% of the time it works.
For the 0.1% it doesn't, however, one needs an arbitrary-length data
structure with the resource implications of that.

Thanks to Peter Tirsek for the well researched bug report which set me
on to these problems.
2025-02-06 17:02:50 +00:00
Simon Kelley e44165c0f7 Fix bug in 0x20 encoding.
We must only compare case when mapping an answer from upstream
to a forwarding record, not when checking a query to see if it's a
duplicate. Since the saved query name is scrambled, that ensures
that almost all such checks will wrongly fail.

Thanks to Peter Tirsek for an exemplary bug report for this.
2025-02-06 10:36:21 +00:00
Simon Kelley a1a214c393 Bump date on manpage. 2025-02-05 21:34:54 +00:00
Simon Kelley 94b7144a1b Fix c99ism added in 0b6144583b 2025-02-05 21:02:54 +00:00
Matthias Andree e72910dec8 Spell check v2.91 CHANGELOG 2025-02-05 20:46:55 +00:00
Simon Kelley 0b6144583b Log failed TCP DNS connections upstream when --log-debug active. 2025-02-05 17:15:52 +00:00
Simon Kelley f31667317d Manpage typo. 2025-02-05 15:20:31 +00:00
Simon Kelley 5226b712a3 Add --no-0x20-encode config option.
The "bit 0x20 encoding" implemented in 995a16ca0c
can interact badly with (hopefully) rare broken upstream servers. Provide
an option to turn it off and a log message to give a clue as to why DNS service
is non-functional.
2025-02-03 21:02:12 +00:00
Simon Kelley 1f84cde024 Tweak to logging.
When a cached answer is too big, log

cached reply is truncated

and not

config reply is truncated
2025-02-03 15:26:55 +00:00
Paul Donald 046bfa2af0 Clean up some of the man page formatting.
Some writing was improved for clarity, especially regarding the use of
tags which can be confusing and difficult to grasp.
2025-02-01 22:40:54 +00:00
Simon Kelley 0762732647 belt-and-braces extra call to check_log_writer() in tcp_request() 2025-02-01 15:24:24 +00:00
Brian Haley efb8f10450 Fix potential memory leak
When a new IPv6 address is being added to a dhcp_config
struct, if there is anything invalid regarding the prefix
it looks like there is a potential memory leak.
ret_err_free() should be used to free it.

Also, the new addrlist struct is being linked into
the existing addr6 list in the dhcp_config before the
validity check, it is best to defer this insertion
until later so an invalid entry is not present, since
the CONFIG_ADDR6 flag might not have been set yet.

Signed-off-by: Brian Haley <haleyb.dev@gmail.com>
2025-01-24 23:01:08 +00:00
Simon Kelley 6dbdf16fd1 Move debian submodule to submodules/dnsmasq-debian. 2025-01-24 21:05:43 +00:00
Simon Kelley 6e6a45a7d9 Bump copyrights to 2025. 2025-01-23 17:08:39 +00:00
Simon Kelley a4569c22cc Correct BNF for --trust-anchor in manpage. 2025-01-20 16:20:13 +00:00
Simon Kelley 199e65c4d9 Remove misleading comment. 2025-01-20 15:55:42 +00:00
Simon Kelley bb8811d472 Convert DNS names in logs to all lower case.
0x20 encoding makes them look odd, otherwise.
2025-01-20 15:25:26 +00:00
Simon Kelley 995a16ca0c Implement "DNS-0x20 encoding".
This provides extra protection against reply-spoof attacks.

Since DNS queries are case-insensitive, it's possible to randomly flip
the case of letters in a query and still get the correct answer back.
This adds an extra dimension for a cache-poisoning attacker to guess
when sending replies in-the-blind since it's expected that the
legitimate answer will have the same pattern of upper and lower case
as the query, so any replies which don't can be ignored as
malicious.

The amount of extra entropy clearly depends on the number
of a-z and A-Z characters in the query, and this implementation puts a
hard limit of 32 bits to make rescource allocation easy. This about
doubles entropy over the standard random ID and random port
combination.
2025-01-19 21:54:58 +00:00
Simon Kelley 65f9c1aca1 Case-sensitive matching of questions and answers.
When checking that an answer is the answer to the question that
we asked, compare the name in a case-sensitive manner.

Clients can set the letters in a query to a random pattern of
uppercase and lowercase to add more randomness as protection against
cache-poisoning attacks, and we don't want to nullify that.

This actually restores the status quo before
commit ed6d29a784
since matching questions and answers using a checksum
can't help but be case sensitive.

This patch is a preparation for introducing DNS-0x20
in the dnsmasq query path.
2025-01-19 00:08:36 +00:00
Simon Kelley b72ecb3a59 Fix log message fields in wrong order in some auth replies. 2025-01-18 23:56:23 +00:00
Simon Kelley c221030f89 Rename cache_validated() to cache_not_validated().
Let's give the poor programmers a chance.
2025-01-18 23:26:06 +00:00
Simon Kelley 5bbea085d0 Fix subtle bug in arbitrary-RR caching.
If the client asks for DNSSEC RRs via the do bit, and
we have an answer cached, we can only return the cached
answer if the RR was not validated. This is because
we don't the extra info (RRSIGS, NSECs) for a complete
validated answer. In that case we have to forward again.

This bug was that the "is the cache entry validated" test was
in an outer loop rather than an inner one. A cache hit on
a different RRtype that wasn't validated would satify the
condition to use the cache, even if the cache entry for
the required RRtype didn't. The only time when there can be a mix
of validated and non validated cache entries for the same domain
is when most are not validated, but one is a negative cache for
a DS record.

This bug took a long time to find.
2025-01-18 23:15:53 +00:00
Simon Kelley 622cf03ab9 Fix fubar that could return unsigned NODATA response when do bit set. 2025-01-18 22:16:29 +00:00
Simon Kelley 8ce27433f8 Handle DS queries to auth zones.
When dnsmasq is configured to act as an authoritative server and has
an authoritative zone configured, and recieves a query for
that zone _as_forwarder_ it answers the query directly rather
than forwarding it. This doesn't affect the answer, but it
saves dnsmasq forwarding the query to the recusor upstream,
whch then bounces it back to dnsmasq in auth mode. The
exception should be when the query is for the root of zone, for a DS
RR. The answer to that has to come from the parent, via the
recursor, and will typically be a proof-of-nonexistence since
dnsmasq doesn't support signed zones. This patch suppresses
local answers and forces forwarding to the upstream recursor
for such queries. It stops breakage when a DNSSEC validating
client makes queries to dnsmasq acting as forwarder for a zone
for which it is authoritative.
2025-01-18 08:57:14 +00:00
Simon Kelley 5d894620b4 Extend build fingerprinting to include CFLAGS.
If the value of CFLAGS is changed between builds, the makefile
will rebuid, in the same way as for COPTS.
2025-01-17 16:48:08 +00:00
Simon Kelley 71766c0c35 Tweak handling of duplicate DNS answers via UDP.
If we get a duplicate answer for a query via UDP which we have
either already received and started DNSSEC validation, or was
truncated and we've passed to TCP, then just ignore it.

The code was already in place, but had evolved wonky and
only worked for error replies which would otherwise prompt
a retransmit.
2025-01-13 20:30:37 +00:00
54 changed files with 777 additions and 405 deletions

No files matched your search

+3
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
[submodule "debian"]
path = debian
url = git://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq-debian.git
[submodule "submodules/dnsmasq-debian"]
path = submodules/dnsmasq-debian
url = https://thekelleys.org.uk/git/dnsmasq-debian
+49 -5
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ version 2.91
Literal address records are smaller and don't have
this field and don't need to be ordered on it.
To actually provoke this bug seems to need the same server-literal
to be repeated twice, eg --address=/a/1.1.1.1 --address-/a/1.1.1.1
to be repeated twice, e.g., --address=/a/1.1.1.1 --address-/a/1.1.1.1
which is clearly rare in the wild, but if it did exist it could
provoke a SIGSEV. Thanks to Daniel Rhea for fuzzing this one.
provoke a SIGSEGV. Thanks to Daniel Rhea for fuzzing this one.
Fix buffer overflow when configured lease-change script name
is too long.
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ version 2.91
Improve behaviour in the face of non-responsive upstream TCP DNS
servers. Without shorter timeouts, clients are blocked for too long
and fail wuth their own timeouts.
and fail with their own timeouts.
Set --fast-dns-retries by default when doing DNSSEC. A single
downstream query can trigger many upstream queries. On an
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ version 2.91
empty answer.
Fix handling of EDNS0 UDP packet sizes.
When talking upstream we always add a pseudoheader, and set the
When talking upstream we always add a pseudo header, and set the
UDP packet size to --edns-packet-max. Answering queries from
downstream, we get the answer (either from upstream or local
data) If local data won't fit the advertised size (or 512 if
@@ -82,6 +82,50 @@ version 2.91
to queries which arrive a dnsmasq already carrying an EDNS client
subnet.
Handle DS queries to auth zones. When dnsmasq is configured to
act as an authoritative server and has an authoritative zone
configured, and receives a query for that zone _as_forwarder_
it answers the query directly rather than forwarding it. This
doesn't affect the answer, but it saves dnsmasq forwarding the
query to the recursor upstream, which then bounces it back to dnsmasq
in auth mode. The exception should be when the query is for the root
of zone, for a DS RR. The answer to that has to come from the parent,
via the recursor, and will typically be a proof-of-non-existence
since dnsmasq doesn't support signed zones. This patch suppresses
local answers and forces forwarding to the upstream recursor for such
queries. It stops breakage when a DNSSEC validating client makes
queries to dnsmasq acting as forwarder for a zone for which it is
authoritative.
Implement "DNS-0x20 encoding", for extra protection against
reply-spoof attacks. Since DNS queries are case-insensitive,
it's possible to randomly flip the case of letters in a query
and still get the correct answer back.
This adds an extra dimension for a cache-poisoning attacker
to guess when sending replies in-the-blind since it's expected
that the legitimate answer will have the same pattern of upper
and lower case as the query, so any replies which don't can be
ignored as malicious. The amount of extra entropy clearly depends
on the number of a-z and A-Z characters in the query, and this
implementation puts a hard limit of 32 bits to make resource
allocation easy. This about doubles entropy over the standard
random ID and random port combination. This technique can interact
badly with rare broken DNS servers which don't preserve the case
of the query in their reply. The first time a reply is returned
which matches the query in all respects except case, a warning
will be logged. In this release, 0x020-encoding is default-off
and must be explicitly enabled with --do-0x20-encoding. In future
releases it may default on. You can avoid a future release
changing the behaviour of an installation with --no-x20-encode.
Fix a long-standing problem when two queries which are identical
in every repect _except_ case, get combined by dnsmasq. If
dnsmasq gets eg, two queries for example.com and Example.com
in quick succession it will get the answer for example.com from
upstream and send that answer to both requestors. This means that
the query for Example.com will get an answer for example.com, and
in the modern DNS, that answer may not be accepted.
version 2.90
Fix reversion in --rev-server introduced in 2.88 which
@@ -1951,7 +1995,7 @@ version 2.61
Set the environment variable DNSMASQ_LOG_DHCP when running
the script id --log-dhcp is in effect, so that script can
taylor their logging verbosity. Suggestion from Malte
tailor their logging verbosity. Suggestion from Malte
Forkel.
Arrange that addresses specified with --listen-address
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
# dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
#
# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ nft_cflags = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_NFTSET $(PKG_CONFIG
nft_libs = `echo $(COPTS) | $(top)/bld/pkg-wrapper HAVE_NFTSET $(PKG_CONFIG) --libs libnftables`
version = -DVERSION='\"`$(top)/bld/get-version $(top)`\"'
sum?=$(shell $(CC) -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_OPTS $(COPTS) -E $(top)/$(SRC)/dnsmasq.h | ( md5sum 2>/dev/null || md5 ) | cut -f 1 -d ' ')
sum!=$(CC) -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_OPTS $(COPTS) -E $(top)/$(SRC)/dnsmasq.h | ( md5sum 2>/dev/null || md5 ) | cut -f 1 -d ' '
sum?=$(shell echo $(CC) -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_FLAGS="$(CFLAGS)" -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_OPTS $(COPTS) -E $(top)/$(SRC)/dnsmasq.h | ( md5sum 2>/dev/null || md5 ) | cut -f 1 -d ' ')
sum!=echo $(CC) -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_FLAGS="$(CFLAGS)" -DDNSMASQ_COMPILE_OPTS $(COPTS) -E $(top)/$(SRC)/dnsmasq.h | ( md5sum 2>/dev/null || md5 ) | cut -f 1 -d ' '
copts_conf = .copts_$(sum)
objs = cache.o rfc1035.o util.o option.o forward.o network.o \
Submodule debian deleted from 83e05da879.
Symlink
+1
View File
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
submodules/dnsmasq-debian/debian
+126 -98
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
.TH DNSMASQ 8 2021-08-16
.TH DNSMASQ 8 2025-02-05
.SH NAME
dnsmasq \- A lightweight DHCP and caching DNS server.
.SH SYNOPSIS
@@ -852,6 +852,18 @@ name on successive queries, for load-balancing. This turns off that
behaviour, so that the records are always returned in the order
that they are received from upstream.
.TP
.B --do-0x20-encode, --no-0x20-encode
Dnsmasq can scramble the case of letters in DNS queries it sends upstream as a security feature.
This technique can interact badly with rare broken DNS servers which don't preserve the case
of the query in their reply. The first time a reply is returned
which matches the query in all respects except case, a warning
will be logged. If this coincides with DNS not functioning, it
is necessary to disable the feature. As at version 2.91, 0x20 encoding
is disabled by default, and must be enabled with --do-0x20-encode. The default
may change in the future, so to be sure of its status after an upgrade, set --do-0x20-encode
or --no-0x20-encode in your config. --no-0x20-encode overrides --do-x20-encode or a future default
0x20-encode enable.
.TP
.B --use-stale-cache[=<max TTL excess in s>]
When set, if a DNS name exists in the cache, but its time-to-live has expired, dnsmasq will return the data anyway. (It attempts to refresh the
data with an upstream query after returning the stale data.) This can improve speed and reliability. It comes at the expense
@@ -882,7 +894,7 @@ ie capable of returning DNSSEC records with data. If they are not,
then dnsmasq will not be able to determine the trusted status of
answers and this means that DNS service will be entirely broken.
.TP
.B --trust-anchor=[<class>],<domain>,<key-tag>,<algorithm>,<digest-type>,<digest>
.B --trust-anchor=<domain>,[<class>,]<key-tag>,<algorithm>,<digest-type>,<digest>
Provide DS records to act a trust anchors for DNSSEC
validation. Typically these will be the DS record(s) for Key Signing
key(s) (KSK) of the root zone,
@@ -1188,7 +1200,7 @@ available, though it normally is for direct-connected clients, or
clients using DHCP relays which support RFC 6939.
For DHCPv4, the special option id:* means "ignore any client-id
For DHCPv4, the special option \fBid:*\fP means "ignore any client-id
and use MAC addresses only." This is useful when a client presents a client-id sometimes
but not others.
@@ -1216,36 +1228,34 @@ the result is undefined. A corollary to this is that the name associated with a
does not appear in the DNS until the host obtains a DHCP lease.
The special keyword "ignore"
tells dnsmasq to never offer a DHCP lease to a machine. The machine
can be specified by hardware address, client ID or hostname, for
instance
.B --dhcp-host=00:20:e0:3b:13:af,ignore
This is
useful when there is another DHCP server on the network which should
The special keyword \fBignore\fP tells dnsmasq never to offer a DHCP lease
to a machine. The machine
can be specified by hardware address, client ID or hostname. For
example: \fB--dhcp-host=00:20:e0:3b:13:af,ignore\fP.
This can be useful when there is another DHCP server on the network which should
be used by some machines.
The set:<tag> construct sets the tag
The \fBset:<tag>\fP construct sets the tag
whenever this \fB--dhcp-host\fP directive is in use. This can be used to
selectively send DHCP options just for this host. More than one tag
can be set in a \fB--dhcp-host\fP directive (but not in other places where
"set:<tag>" is allowed). When a host matches any
\fBset:<tag>\fP is allowed). When a host matches any
\fB--dhcp-host\fP directive (or one implied by /etc/ethers) then the special
tag "known" is set. This allows dnsmasq to be configured to
tag \fBknown\fP is set. This allows dnsmasq to be configured to
ignore requests from unknown machines using
.B --dhcp-ignore=tag:!known
\fB--dhcp-ignore=tag:!known\fP.
If the host matches only a \fB--dhcp-host\fP directive which cannot
be used because it specifies an address on different subnet, the tag "known-othernet" is set.
be used because it specifies an address on a different subnet, the tag \fBknown-othernet\fP is set.
The tag:<tag> construct filters which dhcp-host directives are used; more than
one can be provided, in this case the request must match all of them. Tagged
The \fBtag:<tag>\fP construct filters which dhcp-host directives are used. More than
one tag can be provided. In this case, the request must match all tags. Tagged
directives are used in preference to untagged ones. Note that one of <hwaddr>,
<client_id> or <hostname> still needs to be specified (can be a wildcard).
<client_id> or <hostname> still must be specified (can be a wildcard).
Ethernet addresses (but not client-ids) may have
wildcard bytes, so for example
.B --dhcp-host=00:20:e0:3b:13:*,ignore
will cause dnsmasq to ignore a range of hardware addresses. Note that
will cause dnsmasq to ignore the given range of hardware addresses. Note that
the "*" will need to be escaped or quoted on a command line, but not
in the configuration file.
@@ -1259,11 +1269,11 @@ is 6.
As a special case, in DHCPv4, it is possible to include more than one
hardware address. eg:
.B --dhcp-host=11:22:33:44:55:66,12:34:56:78:90:12,192.168.0.2
\fB--dhcp-host=11:22:33:44:55:66,12:34:56:78:90:12,192.168.0.2\fP.
This allows an IP address to be associated with
multiple hardware addresses, and gives dnsmasq permission to abandon a
DHCP lease to one of the hardware addresses when another one asks for
a lease. Beware that this is a dangerous thing to do, it will only
a lease. Beware that this is a dangerous thing to do: it will only
work reliably if only one of the hardware addresses is active at any
time and there is no way for dnsmasq to enforce this. It is, for instance,
useful to allocate a stable IP address to a laptop which
@@ -1310,27 +1320,25 @@ options containing the same information. /etc/ethers is re-read when
dnsmasq receives SIGHUP. IPv6 addresses are NOT read from /etc/ethers.
.TP
.B \-O, --dhcp-option=[tag:<tag>,[tag:<tag>,]][encap:<opt>,][vi-encap:<enterprise>,][vendor:[<vendor-class>],][<opt>|option:<opt-name>|option6:<opt>|option6:<opt-name>],[<value>[,<value>]]
Specify different or extra options to DHCP clients. By default,
Send various extra options to DHCP clients. By default,
dnsmasq sends some standard options to DHCP clients, the netmask and
broadcast address are set to the same as the host running dnsmasq, and
the DNS server and default route are set to the address of the machine
running dnsmasq. (Equivalent rules apply for IPv6.) If the domain name option has been set, that is sent.
This configuration allows these defaults to be overridden,
or other options specified. The option, to be sent may be given as a
decimal number or as "option:<option-name>" The option numbers are
or other options specified. The option to be sent may be given as a
decimal number or as \fBoption:<option-name>\fP.
Option numbers are
specified in RFC2132 and subsequent RFCs. The set of option-names
known by dnsmasq can be discovered by running "dnsmasq --help dhcp".
For example, to set the default route option to
192.168.4.4, do
.B --dhcp-option=3,192.168.4.4
or
.B --dhcp-option = option:router, 192.168.4.4
and to set the time-server address to 192.168.0.4, do
.B --dhcp-option = 42,192.168.0.4
or
.B --dhcp-option = option:ntp-server, 192.168.0.4
The special address 0.0.0.0 is taken to mean "the address of the
machine running dnsmasq".
known by dnsmasq can be discovered by running \fBdnsmasq --help dhcp\fP.
For example, to set the default route option to 192.168.4.4, use
\fB--dhcp-option=3,192.168.4.4\fP or
\fB--dhcp-option=option:router,192.168.4.4\fP
and to set the time-server address to 192.168.0.4, use
\fB--dhcp-option=42,192.168.0.4\fP or
\fB--dhcp-option=option:ntp-server,192.168.0.4\fP.
The special address 0.0.0.0 means "the address of the system running dnsmasq".
An option without data is valid, and includes just the option without data.
(There is only one option with a zero length data field currently defined for DHCPv4, 80:rapid commit, so this feature is not very useful in practice). Options for which dnsmasq normally
@@ -1351,30 +1359,29 @@ to option 120 are handled as per RFC 3361. Dotted-quad IP addresses
which are followed by a slash and then a netmask size are encoded as
described in RFC 3442.
IPv6 options are specified using the
.B option6:
IPv6 options are specified using the \fBoption6:\fP
keyword, followed by the option number or option name. The IPv6 option
name space is disjoint from the IPv4 option name space. IPv6 addresses
in options must be bracketed with square brackets, eg.
.B --dhcp-option=option6:ntp-server,[1234::56]
\fB --dhcp-option=option6:ntp-server,[1234::56]\fP.
For IPv6, [::] means "the global address of
the machine running dnsmasq", whilst [fd00::] is replaced with the
ULA, if it exists, and [fe80::] with the link-local address.
Be careful: no checking is done that the correct type of data for the
option number is sent, it is quite possible to
persuade dnsmasq to generate illegal DHCP packets with injudicious use
of this flag. When the value is a decimal number, dnsmasq must determine how
Be careful: data-type suitability for the option number sent is not checked.
It is quite possible to persuade dnsmasq to generate illegal DHCP packets with
injudicious use of this flag.
When the value is a decimal number, dnsmasq must determine how
large the data item is. It does this by examining the option number and/or the
value, but can be overridden by appending a single letter flag as follows:
b = one byte, s = two bytes, i = four bytes. This is mainly useful with
encapsulated vendor class options (see below) where dnsmasq cannot
determine data size from the option number. Option data which
determine data size from the option number. Option data which
consists solely of periods and digits will be interpreted by dnsmasq
as an IP address, and inserted into an option as such. To force a
literal string, use quotes. For instance when using option 66 to send
a literal IP address as TFTP server name, it is necessary to do
.B --dhcp-option=66,"1.2.3.4"
a literal IP address as TFTP server name, it is necessary to do
\fB--dhcp-option=66,"1.2.3.4"\fP.
Encapsulated Vendor-class options may also be specified (IPv4 only) using
\fB--dhcp-option\fP: for instance
@@ -1403,7 +1410,7 @@ Vendor Options" as specified by RFC3925. These are denoted like this:
The number in the vi-encap: section is the IANA enterprise number
used to identify this option. This form of encapsulation is supported
in IPv6.
The address 0.0.0.0 is not treated specially in
encapsulated options.
.TP
@@ -1529,45 +1536,47 @@ via relays. If a list of IP addresses is given, only interactions via
relays at those addresses are affected.
.TP
.B --dhcp-match=set:<tag>,<option number>|option:<option name>|vi-encap:<enterprise>[,<value>]
Without a value, set the tag if the client sends a DHCP
option of the given number or name. When a value is given, set the tag only if
the option is sent and matches the value. The value may be of the form
Without \fB<value>\fP, set \fB<tag>\fP if the client sends a DHCP
\fBoption\fP of the given number or name. With \fB<value>\fP, set \fB<tag>\fP only if
the client sends the \fBoption\fP matching or containing \fB<value>\fP.
The value may be of the form
"01:ff:*:02" in which case the value must match (apart from wildcards)
but the option sent may have unmatched data past the end of the
value. The value may also be of the same form as in
.B --dhcp-option
in which case the option sent is treated as an array, and one element
must match, so
must match.
.B --dhcp-match=set:efi-ia32,option:client-arch,6
will set the tag "efi-ia32" if the the number 6 appears in the list of
sets the tag \fBefi-ia32\fP if the number \fB6\fP appears in the list of
architectures sent by the client in option 93. (See RFC 4578 for
details.) If the value is a string, substring matching is used.
details.) If the value is a string, substring matching is used.
The special form with vi-encap:<enterprise number> matches against
vendor-identifying vendor classes for the specified enterprise. Please
see RFC 3925 for more details of these rare and interesting beasts.
.TP
.B --dhcp-name-match=set:<tag>,<name>[*]
Set the tag if the given name is supplied by a DHCP client. There may be a single trailing wildcard *, which has the usual meaning. Combined with dhcp-ignore or dhcp-ignore-names this gives the ability to ignore certain clients by name, or disallow certain hostnames from being claimed by a client.
Set a \fB<tag>\fP if the given \fB<name>\fP is supplied by a DHCP client. There may be a single trailing wildcard *, with a glob meaning. Combined with \fBdhcp-ignore\fP or \fBdhcp-ignore-names\fP this gives the ability to ignore certain clients by name, or disallow certain hostnames from being claimed by a client.
.TP
.B --tag-if=set:<tag>[,set:<tag>[,tag:<tag>[,tag:<tag>]]]
Perform boolean operations on tags. Any tag appearing as set:<tag> is set if
all the tags which appear as tag:<tag> are set, (or unset when tag:!<tag> is used)
If no tag:<tag> appears set:<tag> tags are set unconditionally.
Any number of set: and tag: forms may appear, in any order.
\fB--tag-if\fP lines are executed in order, so if the tag in tag:<tag> is a
Perform boolean operations on tags. All \fBset:<tag>\fP tags are set if
all \fBtag:<tag>\fP are already set, (or unset when \fBtag:!<tag>\fP is used).
If no \fBtag:<tag>\fP appears, \fBset:<tag>\fP tags are set unconditionally.
Any number of \fBset:\fP and \fBtag:\fP forms may appear, in any order.
\fB--tag-if\fP lines are executed in order, so if the tag in \fBtag:<tag>\fP is a
tag set by another
.B --tag-if,
the line which sets the tag must precede the one which tests it.
the line which sets the tag must precede the line which tests it.
As an extension, the tag:<tag> clauses support limited wildcard matching,
similar to the matching in the \fB--interface\fP directive. This allows, for
example, using \fB--tag-if=set:ppp,tag:ppp*\fP to set the tag 'ppp' for all requests
received on any matching interface (ppp0, ppp1, etc). This can be used in conjunction
with the tag:!<tag> format meaning that no tag matching the wildcard may be set.
As an extension, the \fBtag:<tag>\fP clauses support limited wildcard matching,
similar to the matching in the \fB--interface\fP directive. This allows the
example \fB--tag-if=set:ppp,tag:ppp*\fP to set the tag 'ppp' for all requests
received on any matching interface (ppp0, ppp1, etc). This can be used in conjunction
with the \fBtag:!<tag>\fP format meaning that no tag matching the wildcard may be set.
.TP
.B \-J, --dhcp-ignore=tag:<tag>[,tag:<tag>]
When all the given tags appear in the tag set ignore the host and do
When all the given tags appear in the tag set, ignore the host and do
not allocate it a DHCP lease.
.TP
.B --dhcp-ignore-names[=tag:<tag>[,tag:<tag>]]
@@ -2416,48 +2425,67 @@ the CNAME. To work around this, add the CNAME to /etc/hosts so that
the CNAME is shadowed too.
.PP
The tag system works as follows: For each DHCP request, dnsmasq
collects a set of valid tags from active configuration lines which
include set:<tag>, including one from the
.B --dhcp-range
used to allocate the address, one from any matching
.B --dhcp-host
(and "known" or "known-othernet" if a \fB--dhcp-host\fP matches)
The tag "bootp" is set for BOOTP requests, and a tag whose name is the
name of the interface on which the request arrived is also set.
The tag system works as follows: dnsmasq tags each DHCP request
with tags from applicable configuration lines containing \fBset:<tag>\fP i.e.
Any configuration lines which include one or more tag:<tag> constructs
will only be valid if all that tags are matched in the set derived
above. Typically this is \fB--dhcp-option\fP.
.B --dhcp-option
which has tags will be used in preference to an untagged
.B --dhcp-option,
provided that _all_ the tags match somewhere in the
set collected as described above. The prefix '!' on a tag means 'not'
so \fB--dhcp-option=tag:!purple,3,1.2.3.4\fP sends the option when the
tag purple is not in the set of valid tags. (If using this in a
command line rather than a configuration file, be sure to escape !,
which is a shell metacharacter)
\fBset:<tag>\fP from the \fB--dhcp-range\fP used to allocate the address;
\fBset:<tag>\fP from any matching \fB--dhcp-host\fP (plus the tag \fBknown\fP or
\fBknown-othernet\fP).
BOOTP requests are tagged \fBbootp\fP. Each request is also tagged with the name of
the interface on which the request arrived.
Each configuration line containing one or more \fBtag:<tag>\fP constructs
applies when all its tags exist on the request. That is:
Configuration tag:A applies to a request set:tagged A.
Configuration tag:B applies to a request set:tagged B.
Configuration tag:A+B doesn't apply to a request set:tagged A.
Configuration tag:A+B doesn't apply to a request set:tagged B.
Configurations tag:A+B, tag:A, tag:B apply to a request set:tagged A+B.
\fBset:<tag>\fP constructs in \fB--dhcp-range\fP and \fB--dhcp-host\fP tag requests.
Use \fBtag:<tag>\fPs in \fB--dhcp-option\fPs to match \fBset:<tag>\fP and apply configurations.
A \fB--dhcp-option\fP with \fBtag:<tag>\fP is preferred over an untagged
\fB--dhcp-option\fP, provided that \fBall\fP its tags match somewhere in the
set gathered above.
The tag prefix '!' means 'not'.
\fB--dhcp-option=tag:!purple,3,1.2.3.4\fP sends the option when the request
is not tagged with purple. (The shell metacharacter '!' must be escaped on the
command line but not in a configuration file).
When selecting \fB--dhcp-option\fPs, a \fB--dhcp-range\fP tag is second class
to other tags, to make it easy to override options for
individual hosts, so:
When selecting \fB--dhcp-options\fP, a tag from \fB--dhcp-range\fP is second class
relative to other tags, to make it easy to override options for
individual hosts, so
.B --dhcp-range=set:interface1,......
.B --dhcp-host=set:myhost,.....
.B --dhcp-option=tag:interface1,option:nis-domain,"domain1"
.B --dhcp-option=tag:myhost,option:nis-domain,"domain2"
will set the NIS-domain to domain1 for hosts in the range, but
override that to domain2 for a particular host.
sets the NIS-domain to domain1 for hosts in the range, but
to domain2 for a particular host that may or may not fall in the range.
.PP
Note that for
.B --dhcp-range
both tag:<tag> and set:<tag> are allowed, to both select the range in
Note that for \fB--dhcp-range\fP both
\fBtag:<tag>\fP and
\fBset:<tag>\fP are possible, in order to both select the range in
use based on (eg) \fB--dhcp-host\fP, and to affect the options sent, based on
the range selected.
This system evolved from an earlier, more limited one and for backward
compatibility "net:" may be used instead of "tag:" and "set:" may be
The tag system evolved from an earlier, more limited system. For backward
compatibility, "net:" may be used instead of "tag:" and "set:" may be
omitted. (Except in
.B --dhcp-host,
where "net:" may be used instead of "set:".) For the same reason, '#'
@@ -2475,7 +2503,7 @@ configuration option is present to activate the DHCP server
on a particular network. (Setting \fB--bootp-dynamic\fP removes the need for
static address mappings.) The filename
parameter in a BOOTP request is used as a tag,
as is the tag "bootp", allowing some control over the options returned to
as is the tag \fBbootp\fP, allowing some control over the options returned to
different classes of hosts.
.SH AUTHORITATIVE CONFIGURATION
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen, time_t n
nameoffset = p - (unsigned char *)header;
/* now extract name as .-concatenated string into name */
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, 1, 4))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return 0; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen, time_t n
nxdomain = 0;
if ((crecp->flags & flag) && (local_query || filter_zone(zone, flag, &(crecp->addr))))
{
log_query(crecp->flags, name, &crecp->addr, record_source(crecp->uid), 0);
log_query(crecp->flags & ~F_REVERSE, name, &crecp->addr, record_source(crecp->uid), 0);
if (add_resource_record(header, limit, &trunc, nameoffset, &ansp,
daemon->auth_ttl, NULL, qtype, C_IN,
qtype == T_A ? "4" : "6", &crecp->addr))
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+89 -91
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -126,112 +126,110 @@ int iface_enumerate(int family, void *parm, callback_t callback)
for (addrs = head; addrs; addrs = addrs->ifa_next)
{
if (addrs->ifa_addr->sa_family == family)
int iface_index = if_nametoindex(addrs->ifa_name);
if (iface_index == 0 || !addrs->ifa_addr ||
addrs->ifa_addr->sa_family != family ||
(!addrs->ifa_netmask && family != AF_LINK))
continue;
if (family == AF_INET)
{
int iface_index = if_nametoindex(addrs->ifa_name);
if (iface_index == 0 || !addrs->ifa_addr ||
(!addrs->ifa_netmask && family != AF_LINK))
struct in_addr addr, netmask, broadcast;
addr = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin_addr;
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_NETWORK
if (del_family == AF_INET && del_addr.addr4.s_addr == addr.s_addr)
continue;
if (family == AF_INET)
{
struct in_addr addr, netmask, broadcast;
addr = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin_addr;
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_NETWORK
if (del_family == AF_INET && del_addr.addr4.s_addr == addr.s_addr)
continue;
#endif
netmask = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_netmask)->sin_addr;
if (addrs->ifa_broadaddr)
broadcast = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_broadaddr)->sin_addr;
else
broadcast.s_addr = 0;
if (!callback.af_inet(addr, iface_index, NULL, netmask, broadcast, parm))
goto err;
}
else if (family == AF_INET6)
{
struct in6_addr *addr = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin6_addr;
unsigned char *netmask = (unsigned char *) &((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_netmask)->sin6_addr;
int scope_id = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin6_scope_id;
int i, j, prefix = 0;
u32 valid = 0xffffffff, preferred = 0xffffffff;
int flags = 0;
netmask = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_netmask)->sin_addr;
if (addrs->ifa_broadaddr)
broadcast = ((struct sockaddr_in *) addrs->ifa_broadaddr)->sin_addr;
else
broadcast.s_addr = 0;
if (!callback.af_inet(addr, iface_index, NULL, netmask, broadcast, parm))
goto err;
}
else if (family == AF_INET6)
{
struct in6_addr *addr = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin6_addr;
unsigned char *netmask = (unsigned char *) &((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_netmask)->sin6_addr;
int scope_id = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr)->sin6_scope_id;
int i, j, prefix = 0;
u32 valid = 0xffffffff, preferred = 0xffffffff;
int flags = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_BSD_NETWORK
if (del_family == AF_INET6 && IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&del_addr.addr6, addr))
continue;
if (del_family == AF_INET6 && IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&del_addr.addr6, addr))
continue;
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_BSD_NETWORK) && !defined(__APPLE__)
struct in6_ifreq ifr6;
memset(&ifr6, 0, sizeof(ifr6));
safe_strncpy(ifr6.ifr_name, addrs->ifa_name, sizeof(ifr6.ifr_name));
struct in6_ifreq ifr6;
memset(&ifr6, 0, sizeof(ifr6));
safe_strncpy(ifr6.ifr_name, addrs->ifa_name, sizeof(ifr6.ifr_name));
ifr6.ifr_addr = *((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr);
if (fd != -1 && ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFAFLAG_IN6, &ifr6) != -1)
{
if (ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & IN6_IFF_TENTATIVE)
flags |= IFACE_TENTATIVE;
if (ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & IN6_IFF_DEPRECATED)
flags |= IFACE_DEPRECATED;
ifr6.ifr_addr = *((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr);
if (fd != -1 && ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFAFLAG_IN6, &ifr6) != -1)
{
if (ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & IN6_IFF_TENTATIVE)
flags |= IFACE_TENTATIVE;
if (ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & IN6_IFF_DEPRECATED)
flags |= IFACE_DEPRECATED;
#ifdef IN6_IFF_TEMPORARY
if (!(ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & (IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF | IN6_IFF_TEMPORARY)))
flags |= IFACE_PERMANENT;
if (!(ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & (IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF | IN6_IFF_TEMPORARY)))
flags |= IFACE_PERMANENT;
#endif
#ifdef IN6_IFF_PRIVACY
if (!(ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & (IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF | IN6_IFF_PRIVACY)))
flags |= IFACE_PERMANENT;
if (!(ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_flags6 & (IN6_IFF_AUTOCONF | IN6_IFF_PRIVACY)))
flags |= IFACE_PERMANENT;
#endif
}
ifr6.ifr_addr = *((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr);
if (fd != -1 && ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFALIFETIME_IN6, &ifr6) != -1)
{
valid = ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_lifetime.ia6t_vltime;
preferred = ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_lifetime.ia6t_pltime;
}
}
ifr6.ifr_addr = *((struct sockaddr_in6 *) addrs->ifa_addr);
if (fd != -1 && ioctl(fd, SIOCGIFALIFETIME_IN6, &ifr6) != -1)
{
valid = ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_lifetime.ia6t_vltime;
preferred = ifr6.ifr_ifru.ifru_lifetime.ia6t_pltime;
}
#endif
for (i = 0; i < IN6ADDRSZ; i++, prefix += 8)
if (netmask[i] != 0xff)
break;
if (i != IN6ADDRSZ && netmask[i])
for (j = 7; j > 0; j--, prefix++)
if ((netmask[i] & (1 << j)) == 0)
break;
/* voodoo to clear interface field in address */
if (!option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) && IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(addr))
{
addr->s6_addr[2] = 0;
addr->s6_addr[3] = 0;
}
if (!callback.af_inet6(addr, prefix, scope_id, iface_index, flags,
(unsigned int) preferred, (unsigned int)valid, parm))
goto err;
}
#ifdef HAVE_DHCP6
else if (family == AF_LINK)
{
/* Assume ethernet again here */
struct sockaddr_dl *sdl = (struct sockaddr_dl *) addrs->ifa_addr;
if (sdl->sdl_alen != 0 &&
!callback.af_local(iface_index, ARPHRD_ETHER, LLADDR(sdl), sdl->sdl_alen, parm))
goto err;
}
#endif
for (i = 0; i < IN6ADDRSZ; i++, prefix += 8)
if (netmask[i] != 0xff)
break;
if (i != IN6ADDRSZ && netmask[i])
for (j = 7; j > 0; j--, prefix++)
if ((netmask[i] & (1 << j)) == 0)
break;
/* voodoo to clear interface field in address */
if (!option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) && IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(addr))
{
addr->s6_addr[2] = 0;
addr->s6_addr[3] = 0;
}
if (!callback.af_inet6(addr, prefix, scope_id, iface_index, flags,
(unsigned int) preferred, (unsigned int)valid, parm))
goto err;
}
#ifdef HAVE_DHCP6
else if (family == AF_LINK)
{
/* Assume ethernet again here */
struct sockaddr_dl *sdl = (struct sockaddr_dl *) addrs->ifa_addr;
if (sdl->sdl_alen != 0 &&
!callback.af_local(iface_index, ARPHRD_ETHER, LLADDR(sdl), sdl->sdl_alen, parm))
goto err;
}
#endif
}
ret = 1;
err:
errsave = errno;
freeifaddrs(head);
+23 -7
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -1852,15 +1852,31 @@ int cache_make_stat(struct txt_record *t)
#endif
/* There can be names in the cache containing control chars, don't
mess up logging or open security holes. */
mess up logging or open security holes. Also convert to all-LC
so that 0x20-encoding doesn't make logs look like ransom notes
made out of letters cut from a newspaper.
Overwrites daemon->workspacename */
static char *sanitise(char *name)
{
unsigned char *r;
unsigned char *r = (unsigned char *)name;
if (name)
for (r = (unsigned char *)name; *r; r++)
if (!isprint((int)*r))
return "<name unprintable>";
{
char *d = name = daemon->workspacename;
for (; *r; r++, d++)
if (!isprint((int)*r))
return "<name unprintable>";
else
{
unsigned char c = *r;
*d = (char)((c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') ? c + 'a' - 'A' : c);
}
*d = 0;
}
return name;
}
+6 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -362,6 +362,11 @@ HAVE_SOCKADDR_SA_LEN
#define HAVE_INOTIFY
#endif
/* This never compiles code, it's only used by the makefile to fingerprint builds. */
#ifdef DNSMASQ_COMPILE_FLAGS
static char *compile_flags = DNSMASQ_COMPILE_FLAGS;
#endif
/* Define a string indicating which options are in use.
DNSMASQ_COMPILE_OPTS is only defined in dnsmasq.c */
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+13 -5
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#define COPYRIGHT "Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley"
#define COPYRIGHT "Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley"
/* We do defines that influence behavior of stdio.h, so complain
if included too early. */
@@ -279,7 +279,9 @@ struct event_desc {
#define OPT_CACHE_RR 71
#define OPT_LOCALHOST_SERVICE 72
#define OPT_LOG_PROTO 73
#define OPT_LAST 74
#define OPT_NO_0x20 74
#define OPT_DO_0x20 75
#define OPT_LAST 76
#define OPTION_BITS (sizeof(unsigned int)*8)
#define OPTION_SIZE ( (OPT_LAST/OPTION_BITS)+((OPT_LAST%OPTION_BITS)!=0) )
@@ -774,12 +776,13 @@ struct dyndir {
#define FREC_DO_QUESTION 64
#define FREC_HAS_PHEADER 128
#define FREC_GONE_TO_TCP 256
#define FREC_ANSWER 512
struct frec {
struct frec_src {
union mysockaddr source;
union all_addr dest;
unsigned int iface, log_id;
unsigned int iface, log_id, encode_bitmap, *encode_bigmap;
int fd;
unsigned short orig_id, udp_pkt_size;
struct frec_src *next;
@@ -1386,7 +1389,7 @@ int is_rev_synth(int flag, union all_addr *addr, char *name);
/* rfc1035.c */
int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *namebuff);
int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
char *name, int isExtract, int extrabytes);
char *name, int func, unsigned int parm);
unsigned char *skip_name(unsigned char *ansp, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int extrabytes);
unsigned char *skip_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen);
unsigned char *skip_section(unsigned char *ansp, int count, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen);
@@ -1413,6 +1416,11 @@ int add_resource_record(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, int *truncp,
int *offset, unsigned short type, unsigned short class, char *format, ...);
int in_arpa_name_2_addr(char *namein, union all_addr *addrp);
int private_net(struct in_addr addr, int ban_localhost);
/* extract_name ops */
#define EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT 1
#define EXTR_NAME_COMPARE 2
#define EXTR_NAME_NOCASE 3
#define EXTR_NAME_FLIP 4
/* auth.c */
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH
+24 -24
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* dnssec.c is Copyright (c) 2012 Giovanni Bajo <rasky@develer.com>
and Copyright (c) 2012-2023 Simon Kelley
and Copyright (c) 2012-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ static int get_rdata(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, struct rdata_state
/* domain-name, canonicalise */
int len;
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &state->ip, state->buff, 1, 0) ||
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &state->ip, state->buff, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0) ||
(len = to_wire(state->buff)) == 0)
continue;
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, int
pstart = p;
if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return 0; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(stype, p);
@@ -374,14 +374,14 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, int
if (gotkey)
{
/* If there's more than one SIG, ensure they all have same keyname */
if (extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 0, 0) != 1)
if (extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 0) != 1)
return 0;
}
else
{
gotkey = 1;
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return 0;
/* RFC 4035 5.3.1 says that the Signer's Name field MUST equal
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
GETSHORT(key_tag, p);
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return STAT_BOGUS;
if (!time_check)
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
p = rrset[i];
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 10))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return STAT_BOGUS;
name_start = name;
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
/* namebuff used for workspace above, restore to leave unchanged on exit */
p = (unsigned char*)(rrset[0]);
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return STAT_BOGUS;
if (key)
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
static unsigned char **cached_digest;
static size_t cached_digest_size = 0;
if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 || RCODE(header) != NOERROR || !extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 || RCODE(header) != NOERROR || !extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return STAT_BOGUS | DNSSEC_FAIL_NOKEY;
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--)
{
/* Ensure we have type, class TTL and length */
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -904,7 +904,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--)
{
/* Ensure we have type, class TTL and length */
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
}
p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return STAT_BOGUS;
p += 4; /* qtype, qclass */
@@ -1050,7 +1050,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
{
unsigned char *psave;
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(atype, p);
@@ -1231,12 +1231,12 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
int sig_labels, name_labels;
p = nsecs[i];
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
p += 8; /* class, type, TTL */
GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
psave = p;
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
/* If NSEC comes from wildcard expansion, use original wildcard
@@ -1400,7 +1400,7 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
if ((p = nsecs[i]))
{
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10) ||
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10) ||
!(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned char *)workspace2)))
return 0;
@@ -1609,7 +1609,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
if ((p = nsecs[i]))
{
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
if (!(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned char *)workspace2)))
@@ -1684,7 +1684,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
{
unsigned char *pstart = p;
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 10))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
GETSHORT(type, p);
@@ -1735,7 +1735,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
{
unsigned char *psav;
if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon->workspacename, 0, 10)))
if (!(res = extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return DNSSEC_FAIL_BADPACKET;
GETSHORT(type1, p1);
@@ -1965,7 +1965,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
targets[0] = p1;
targetidx = 1;
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 1, 4))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return STAT_BOGUS;
GETSHORT(qtype, p1);
@@ -2003,7 +2003,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
if (i != 0 && !ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1))
return STAT_BOGUS;
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 1, 10))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(type1, p1);
@@ -2018,7 +2018,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
/* Check if we've done this RRset already */
for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < i; j++)
{
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(type2, p2);
@@ -2115,7 +2115,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
if ((p2 = targets[j]))
{
int rc1;
if (!(rc1 = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(rc1 = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
if (class1 == qclass && rc1 == 1 && (type1 == T_CNAME || type1 == qtype || qtype == T_ANY ))
@@ -2149,7 +2149,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
if (neganswer)
*neganswer = 1;
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, 1, 10))
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
/* NXDOMAIN or NODATA reply, unanswered question is (name, qclass, qtype) */
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+284 -76
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -197,9 +197,18 @@ static void forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
FREC_HAS_PHEADER | FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY | FREC_NO_CACHE)))
{
struct frec_src *src;
unsigned int casediff = 0;
unsigned int *bitvector = NULL;
unsigned short id = ntohs(header->id); /* Retrieve the id from the new query before we overwrite it. */
/* Get the case-scambled version of the query to resend. This is important because we
may fall through below and forward the query in the packet buffer again and we
want to use the same case scrambling as the first time. */
blockdata_retrieve(forward->stash, forward->stash_len, (void *)header);
plen = forward->stash_len;
for (src = &forward->frec_src; src; src = src->next)
if (src->orig_id == ntohs(header->id) &&
if (src->orig_id == id &&
sockaddr_isequal(&src->source, udpaddr))
break;
@@ -221,6 +230,7 @@ static void forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
{
daemon->frec_src_count++;
daemon->free_frec_src->next = NULL;
daemon->free_frec_src->encode_bigmap = NULL;
}
/* If we've been spammed with many duplicates, return REFUSED. */
@@ -237,17 +247,72 @@ static void forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
free_frec(forward);
goto reply;
}
/* Find a bitmap of case differences between the query sent upstream and this one,
so we can reply to each query with the correct case pattern.
Since we need this to get back the exact case pattern of each query when doing
query combining, we have to handle the (rare) case that there are case differences
beyond the first 32 letters.
If that happens we have to allocate memory to save it, and the casediff variable
holds the length of that array.
Mismatches beyond 32 letters are rare because most queries are all lowercase and
we only scramble the first 32 letters for security reasons.
Note the two names are guaranteed to be the same length and differ only in the case
of letters at this point.
The original query we sent is now in packet buffer and the query name in the
new instance is on daemon->namebuff. */
if (extract_request(header, forward->stash_len, daemon->workspacename, NULL))
{
unsigned int i, gobig = 0;
char *s1, *s2;
#define BITS_IN_INT (sizeof(unsigned int) * 8)
big_redo:
for (s1 = daemon->namebuff, s2 = daemon->workspacename, i = 0; *s1; s1++, s2++)
{
char c1 = *s1, c2 = *s2;
if ((c1 >= 'a' && c1 <= 'z') || (c1 >= 'A' && c1 <= 'Z'))
{
if ((c1 & 0x20) ^ (c2 & 0x20))
{
if (bitvector)
bitvector[i/BITS_IN_INT] |= 1<<(i%BITS_IN_INT);
else if (i >= BITS_IN_INT)
gobig = 1; /* More than 32 */
else
casediff |= 1<<i;
}
i++;
}
}
if (gobig && !bitvector)
{
casediff = ((i - 1)/BITS_IN_INT) + 1; /* length of array */
/* whine_malloc() zeros memory */
if ((bitvector = whine_malloc(casediff * sizeof(unsigned int))))
goto big_redo;
}
}
src = daemon->free_frec_src;
daemon->free_frec_src = src->next;
src->next = forward->frec_src.next;
forward->frec_src.next = src;
src->orig_id = ntohs(header->id);
src->orig_id = id;
src->source = *udpaddr;
src->dest = *dst_addr;
src->log_id = daemon->log_id;
src->iface = dst_iface;
src->fd = udpfd;
src->encode_bitmap = casediff;
src->encode_bigmap = bitvector;
src->udp_pkt_size = (unsigned short)replylimit;
/* closely spaced identical queries cannot be a try and a retry, so
@@ -264,6 +329,8 @@ static void forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
/* new query */
if (!forward)
{
unsigned char *p;
if (OPCODE(header) != QUERY)
{
flags = F_RCODE;
@@ -287,8 +354,6 @@ static void forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
flags = 0;
}
master = daemon->serverarray[first];
/* don't forward A or AAAA queries for simple names, except the empty name */
if (!flags &&
option_bool(OPT_NODOTS_LOCAL) &&
@@ -300,7 +365,9 @@ static void forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
/* Configured answer. */
if (flags || ede == EDE_NOT_READY)
goto reply;
master = daemon->serverarray[first];
if (!(forward = get_new_frec(now, master, 0)))
goto reply;
/* table full - flags == 0, return REFUSED */
@@ -323,7 +390,13 @@ static void forward_query(int udpfd, union mysockaddr *udpaddr,
forward->frec_src.orig_id = ntohs(header->id);
forward->new_id = get_id();
header->id = ntohs(forward->new_id);
forward->frec_src.encode_bitmap = (!option_bool(OPT_NO_0x20) && option_bool(OPT_DO_0x20)) ? rand32() : 0;
forward->frec_src.encode_bigmap = NULL;
p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, (char *)&forward->frec_src.encode_bitmap, EXTR_NAME_FLIP, 1))
goto reply;
/* Keep copy of query for retries and move to TCP */
if (!(forward->stash = blockdata_alloc((char *)header, plen)))
{
@@ -822,10 +895,6 @@ static void dnssec_validate(struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header,
daemon->log_display_id = forward->frec_src.log_id;
/* We've had a reply already, which we're validating. Ignore this duplicate */
if (forward->blocking_query || (forward->flags & FREC_GONE_TO_TCP))
return;
/* Find the original query that started it all.... */
for (orig = forward; orig->dependent; orig = orig->dependent);
@@ -972,7 +1041,9 @@ static void dnssec_validate(struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header,
new->flags &= ~(FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY);
new->flags |= flags;
new->forwardall = 0;
new->frec_src.encode_bitmap = 0;
new->frec_src.encode_bigmap = NULL;
forward->next_dependent = NULL;
new->dependent = forward; /* to find query awaiting new one. */
@@ -1089,12 +1160,12 @@ void reply_query(int fd, time_t now)
return;
p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (!extract_name(header, n, &p, daemon->namebuff, 1, 4))
if (!extract_name(header, n, &p, daemon->namebuff, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(rrtype, p);
GETSHORT(class, p);
if (!(forward = lookup_frec(daemon->namebuff, class, rrtype, ntohs(header->id), 0, 0)))
if (!(forward = lookup_frec(daemon->namebuff, class, rrtype, ntohs(header->id), FREC_ANSWER, 0)))
return;
filter_servers(forward->sentto->arrayposn, F_SERVER, &first, &last);
@@ -1152,18 +1223,20 @@ void reply_query(int fd, time_t now)
if (daemon->ignore_addr && RCODE(header) == NOERROR &&
check_for_ignored_address(header, n))
return;
if ((RCODE(header) == REFUSED || RCODE(header) == SERVFAIL) && forward->forwardall == 0)
/* for broken servers, attempt to send to another one. */
{
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
/* The query MAY have got a good answer, and be awaiting
the results of further queries, in which case
The Stash contains something else and we don't need to retry anyway. */
the stash contains something else and we don't need to retry anyway.
We may also have already got a truncated reply, and be in the process
of doing the query by TCP so can ignore further, probably truncated, UDP answers. */
if (forward->blocking_query || (forward->flags & FREC_GONE_TO_TCP))
return;
#endif
if ((RCODE(header) == REFUSED || RCODE(header) == SERVFAIL) && forward->forwardall == 0)
/* for broken servers, attempt to send to another one. */
{
/* Get the saved query back. */
blockdata_retrieve(forward->stash, forward->stash_len, (void *)header);
@@ -1197,7 +1270,11 @@ void reply_query(int fd, time_t now)
/* denominator controls how many queries we average over. */
server->query_latency = server->mma_latency/128;
/* Flip the bits back in the query name. */
p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (!extract_name(header, n, &p, (char *)&forward->frec_src.encode_bitmap, EXTR_NAME_FLIP, 1))
return;
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
{
@@ -1217,6 +1294,51 @@ void reply_query(int fd, time_t now)
return_reply(now, forward, header, n, STAT_OK);
}
static void xor_array(unsigned int *arg1, unsigned int *arg2, unsigned int len)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
arg1[i] ^= arg2[i];
}
/* Call extract_name() to flip case of query in packet according to the XOR of the bit maps help in arg1 and arg2 */
static void flip_queryname(struct dns_header *header, ssize_t len, struct frec_src *arg1, struct frec_src *arg2)
{
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
unsigned int *arg1p, *arg2p, arg1len, arg2len, *swapp, swap;
/* Two cases: bitmap is single 32 bit int, or it's arbitrary-length array of 32bit ints.
The two args may be different and of different lengths.
The shorter gets notionally extended with zeros. */
if (arg1->encode_bigmap)
arg1p = arg1->encode_bigmap, arg1len = arg1->encode_bitmap;
else
arg1p = &arg1->encode_bitmap, arg1len = 1;
if (arg2->encode_bigmap)
arg2p = arg2->encode_bigmap, arg2len = arg2->encode_bitmap;
else
arg2p = &arg2->encode_bitmap, arg2len = 1;
/* make arg1 the longer, if they differ. */
if (arg2len > arg1len)
{
swap = arg1len;
swapp = arg1p;
arg1len = arg2len;
arg1p = arg2p;
arg2len = swap;
arg2p = swapp;
}
/* XOR on shorter length, flip on longer, operate on longer */
xor_array(arg1p, arg2p, arg2len);
extract_name(header, len, &p, (char *)arg1p, EXTR_NAME_FLIP, arg1len);
xor_array(arg1p, arg2p, arg2len); /* restore */
}
void return_reply(time_t now, struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header, ssize_t n, int status)
{
int check_rebind = 0, no_cache_dnssec = 0, cache_secure = 0, bogusanswer = 0;
@@ -1306,10 +1428,10 @@ void return_reply(time_t now, struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header, s
!(forward->flags & FREC_HAS_PHEADER), &forward->frec_src.source,
((unsigned char *)header) + daemon->edns_pktsz, ede)))
{
struct frec_src *src;
struct frec_src *src, *prev;
int do_trunc;
for (do_trunc = 0, src = &forward->frec_src; src; src = src->next)
for (do_trunc = 0, prev = NULL, src = &forward->frec_src; src; prev = src, src = src->next)
{
header->id = htons(src->orig_id);
@@ -1323,6 +1445,13 @@ void return_reply(time_t now, struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header, s
}
#endif
/* You will have to draw diagrams and scratch your head to convince yourself
that this works. Bear in mind that the flip to upstream state has already been undone,
for the original query so nothing needs to be done, but subsequent queries' flips
were recorded relative to the flipped name sent upstream. */
if (prev)
flip_queryname(header, nn, prev, src);
if (src->fd != -1)
{
/* Only send packets that fit what the requestor allows.
@@ -1346,7 +1475,7 @@ void return_reply(time_t now, struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header, s
}
}
}
/* The packet is too big for one or more requestors, send them a truncated answer. */
if (do_trunc)
{
@@ -1358,22 +1487,31 @@ void return_reply(time_t now, struct frec *forward, struct dns_header *header, s
header->arcount = htons(0);
header->hb3 |= HB3_TC;
new = resize_packet(header, nn, pheader, hlen);
daemon->log_display_id = forward->frec_src.log_id;
daemon->log_source_addr = &forward->frec_src.source;
log_query(F_UPSTREAM, NULL, NULL, "truncated", 0);
for (src = &forward->frec_src; src; src = src->next)
if (src->fd != -1 && nn > src->udp_pkt_size)
{
header->id = htons(src->orig_id);
send_from(src->fd, option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) || option_bool (OPT_CLEVERBIND), daemon->packet, new,
&src->source, &src->dest, src->iface);
/* This gets the name back to the state it was in when we started. */
flip_queryname(header, new, prev, &forward->frec_src);
for (src = &forward->frec_src, prev = NULL; src; prev = src, src = src->next)
{
/* If you didn't undertand this above, you won't understand it here either. */
if (prev)
flip_queryname(header, new, prev, src);
if (src->fd != -1 && nn > src->udp_pkt_size)
{
header->id = htons(src->orig_id);
send_from(src->fd, option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) || option_bool (OPT_CLEVERBIND), daemon->packet, new,
&src->source, &src->dest, src->iface);
#ifdef HAVE_DUMPFILE
dump_packet_udp(DUMP_REPLY, daemon->packet, (size_t)new, NULL, &src->source, src->fd);
dump_packet_udp(DUMP_REPLY, daemon->packet, (size_t)new, NULL, &src->source, src->fd);
#endif
}
}
}
}
}
@@ -1693,15 +1831,27 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
&source_addr, auth_dns ? "auth" : "query", type);
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH
/* find queries for zones we're authoritative for, and answer them directly */
/* Find queries for zones we're authoritative for, and answer them directly.
The exception to this is DS queries for the zone route. They
have to come from the parent zone. Since dnsmasq's auth server
can't do DNSSEC, the zone will be unsigned, and anything using
dnsmasq as a forwarder and doing validation will be expecting to
see the proof of non-existence from the parent. */
if (!auth_dns && !option_bool(OPT_LOCALISE))
for (zone = daemon->auth_zones; zone; zone = zone->next)
if (in_zone(zone, daemon->namebuff, NULL))
{
auth_dns = 1;
local_auth = 1;
break;
}
{
char *cut;
if (in_zone(zone, daemon->namebuff, &cut))
{
if (type != T_DS || cut)
{
auth_dns = 1;
local_auth = 1;
}
break;
}
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOOP
@@ -1885,7 +2035,7 @@ static ssize_t tcp_talk(int first, int last, int start, unsigned char *packet,
/* Save the query to make sure we get the answer we expect. */
p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (!extract_name(header, qsize, &p, daemon->namebuff, 1, 4))
if (!extract_name(header, qsize, &p, daemon->namebuff, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return 0;
GETSHORT(type, p);
GETSHORT(class, p);
@@ -1912,7 +2062,7 @@ static ssize_t tcp_talk(int first, int last, int start, unsigned char *packet,
break;
}
serv = daemon->serverarray[start];
*servp = serv = daemon->serverarray[start];
retry:
blockdata_retrieve(saved_question, qsize, header);
@@ -1963,6 +2113,12 @@ static ssize_t tcp_talk(int first, int last, int start, unsigned char *packet,
trying again in non-FASTOPEN mode. */
if (fatal || (!data_sent && connect(serv->tcpfd, &serv->addr.sa, sa_len(&serv->addr)) == -1))
{
int port;
failed:
port = prettyprint_addr(&serv->addr, daemon->addrbuff);
my_syslog(LOG_DEBUG|MS_DEBUG, _("TCP connection failed to %s#%d"), daemon->addrbuff, port);
close(serv->tcpfd);
serv->tcpfd = -1;
continue;
@@ -1978,23 +2134,25 @@ static ssize_t tcp_talk(int first, int last, int start, unsigned char *packet,
!read_write(serv->tcpfd, (unsigned char *)length, sizeof (*length), RW_READ_ONCE) ||
!read_write(serv->tcpfd, payload, (rsize = ntohs(*length)), RW_READ_ONCE))
{
close(serv->tcpfd);
serv->tcpfd = -1;
/* We get data then EOF, reopen connection to same server,
else try next. This avoids DoS from a server which accepts
connections and then closes them. */
if (serv->flags & SERV_GOT_TCP)
goto retry;
{
close(serv->tcpfd);
serv->tcpfd = -1;
goto retry;
}
else
continue;
goto failed;
}
/* If the question section of the reply doesn't match the crc we sent, then
/* If the question section of the reply doesn't match the question we sent, then
someone might be attempting to insert bogus values into the cache by
sending replies containing questions and bogus answers.
sending replies containing questions and bogus answers.
Try another server, or give up */
p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (extract_name(header, rsize, &p, daemon->namebuff, 0, 4) != 1)
if (extract_name(header, rsize, &p, daemon->namebuff, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 4) != 1)
continue;
GETSHORT(rtype, p);
GETSHORT(rclass, p);
@@ -2327,15 +2485,27 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
&peer_addr, auth_dns ? "auth" : "query", qtype);
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH
/* find queries for zones we're authoritative for, and answer them directly */
/* Find queries for zones we're authoritative for, and answer them directly.
The exception to this is DS queries for the zone route. They
have to come from the parent zone. Since dnsmasq's auth server
can't do DNSSEC, the zone will be unsigned, and anything using
dnsmasq as a forwarder and doing validation will be expecting to
see the proof of non-existence from the parent. */
if (!auth_dns && !option_bool(OPT_LOCALISE))
for (zone = daemon->auth_zones; zone; zone = zone->next)
if (in_zone(zone, daemon->namebuff, NULL))
{
auth_dns = 1;
local_auth = 1;
break;
}
{
char *cut;
if (in_zone(zone, daemon->namebuff, &cut))
{
if (qtype != T_DS || cut)
{
auth_dns = 1;
local_auth = 1;
}
break;
}
}
#endif
norebind = domain_no_rebind(daemon->namebuff);
@@ -2594,7 +2764,8 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t now,
}
blockdata_free(saved_question);
check_log_writer(1);
return packet;
}
@@ -2873,10 +3044,23 @@ static void free_frec(struct frec *f)
{
struct frec_src *last;
/* add back to freelist if not the record builtin to every frec. */
for (last = f->frec_src.next; last && last->next; last = last->next) ;
/* add back to freelist if not the record builtin to every frec,
also free any bigmaps they've been decorated with. */
for (last = f->frec_src.next; last && last->next; last = last->next)
if (last->encode_bigmap)
{
free(last->encode_bigmap);
last->encode_bigmap = NULL;
}
if (last)
{
/* final link in the chain loses bigmap too. */
if (last->encode_bigmap)
{
free(last->encode_bigmap);
last->encode_bigmap = NULL;
}
last->next = daemon->free_frec_src;
daemon->free_frec_src = f->frec_src.next;
}
@@ -2891,7 +3075,7 @@ static void free_frec(struct frec *f)
blockdata_free(f->stash);
f->stash = NULL;
}
#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
/* Anything we're waiting on is pointless now, too */
if (f->blocking_query)
@@ -3014,6 +3198,16 @@ static struct frec *lookup_frec(char *target, int class, int rrtype, int id, int
{
struct frec *f;
struct dns_header *header;
int compare_mode = EXTR_NAME_COMPARE;
/* Only compare case-sensitive when matching frec to a received answer,
NOT when looking for a duplicated question. */
if (flags & FREC_ANSWER)
{
flags &= ~FREC_ANSWER;
if (!option_bool(OPT_NO_0x20) && option_bool(OPT_DO_0x20))
compare_mode = EXTR_NAME_NOCASE;
}
for (f = daemon->frec_list; f; f = f->next)
if (f->sentto &&
@@ -3022,21 +3216,35 @@ static struct frec *lookup_frec(char *target, int class, int rrtype, int id, int
(header = blockdata_retrieve(f->stash, f->stash_len, NULL)))
{
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
int hclass, hrrtype;
if (extract_name(header, f->stash_len, &p, target, 0, 4) != 1)
continue;
GETSHORT(hrrtype, p);
GETSHORT(hclass, p);
/* type checked by flags for DNSSEC queries. */
if (rrtype != -1 && rrtype != hrrtype)
continue;
if (class != hclass)
continue;
int hclass, hrrtype, rc;
/* Case sensitive compare for DNS-0x20 encoding. */
if ((rc = extract_name(header, f->stash_len, &p, target, compare_mode, 4)))
{
GETSHORT(hrrtype, p);
GETSHORT(hclass, p);
/* type checked by flags for DNSSEC queries. */
if (rrtype != -1 && rrtype != hrrtype)
continue;
if (class != hclass)
continue;
}
if (rc != 1)
{
static int warned = 0;
if (rc == 3 && !warned)
{
my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("Case mismatch in DNS reply - check bit 0x20 encoding."));
warned = 1;
}
continue;
}
return f;
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+11 -5
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ struct myoption {
#define LOPT_MAX_PROCS 384
#define LOPT_DNSSEC_LIMITS 385
#define LOPT_PXE_OPT 386
#define LOPT_NO_ENCODE 387
#define LOPT_DO_ENCODE 388
#ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_LONG
static const struct option opts[] =
@@ -247,6 +249,8 @@ static const struct myoption opts[] =
{ "local-ttl", 1, 0, 'T' },
{ "no-negcache", 0, 0, 'N' },
{ "no-round-robin", 0, 0, LOPT_NORR },
{ "no-0x20-encode", 0, 0, LOPT_NO_ENCODE },
{ "do-0x20-encode", 0, 0, LOPT_DO_ENCODE },
{ "cache-rr", 1, 0, LOPT_CACHE_RR },
{ "addn-hosts", 1, 0, 'H' },
{ "hostsdir", 1, 0, LOPT_HOST_INOTIFY },
@@ -568,7 +572,7 @@ static struct {
{ LOPT_CMARK_ALST, ARG_DUP, "<connmark>[/<mask>][,<pattern>[/<pattern>...]]", gettext_noop("Set allowed DNS patterns for a connection-track mark."), NULL },
{ LOPT_SYNTH, ARG_DUP, "<domain>,<range>,[<prefix>]", gettext_noop("Specify a domain and address range for synthesised names"), NULL },
{ LOPT_SEC_VALID, OPT_DNSSEC_VALID, NULL, gettext_noop("Activate DNSSEC validation"), NULL },
{ LOPT_TRUST_ANCHOR, ARG_DUP, "<domain>,[<class>],...", gettext_noop("Specify trust anchor key digest."), NULL },
{ LOPT_TRUST_ANCHOR, ARG_DUP, "<domain>,[<class>,]...", gettext_noop("Specify trust anchor key digest."), NULL },
{ LOPT_DNSSEC_DEBUG, OPT_DNSSEC_DEBUG, NULL, gettext_noop("Disable upstream checking for DNSSEC debugging."), NULL },
{ LOPT_DNSSEC_CHECK, ARG_DUP, NULL, gettext_noop("Ensure answers without DNSSEC are in unsigned zones."), NULL },
{ LOPT_DNSSEC_TIME, OPT_DNSSEC_TIME, NULL, gettext_noop("Don't check DNSSEC signature timestamps until first cache-reload"), NULL },
@@ -591,6 +595,8 @@ static struct {
{ LOPT_UMBRELLA, ARG_ONE, "[=<optspec>]", gettext_noop("Send Cisco Umbrella identifiers including remote IP."), NULL },
{ LOPT_QUIET_TFTP, OPT_QUIET_TFTP, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not log routine TFTP."), NULL },
{ LOPT_NORR, OPT_NORR, NULL, gettext_noop("Suppress round-robin ordering of DNS records."), NULL },
{ LOPT_NO_ENCODE, OPT_NO_0x20, NULL, gettext_noop("Suppress DNS bit 0x20 encoding."), NULL },
{ LOPT_DO_ENCODE, OPT_DO_0x20, NULL, gettext_noop("Enable DNS bit 0x20 encoding."), NULL },
{ LOPT_NO_IDENT, OPT_NO_IDENT, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not add CHAOS TXT records."), NULL },
{ LOPT_CACHE_RR, ARG_DUP, "<RR-type>", gettext_noop("Cache this DNS resource record type."), NULL },
{ LOPT_MAX_PROCS, ARG_ONE, "<integer>", gettext_noop("Maximum number of concurrent tcp connections."), NULL },
@@ -4043,10 +4049,8 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
}
new_addr = opt_malloc(sizeof(struct addrlist));
new_addr->next = new->addr6;
new_addr->flags = 0;
new_addr->addr.addr6 = in6;
new->addr6 = new_addr;
if (pref)
{
@@ -4057,7 +4061,7 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
((((u64)1<<(128-new_addr->prefixlen))-1) & addrpart) != 0)
{
dhcp_config_free(new);
ret_err(_("bad IPv6 prefix"));
ret_err_free(_("bad IPv6 prefix"), new_addr);
}
new_addr->flags |= ADDRLIST_PREFIX;
@@ -4071,6 +4075,8 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
if (i == 8)
new_addr->flags |= ADDRLIST_WILDCARD;
new_addr->next = new->addr6;
new->addr6 = new_addr;
new->flags |= CONFIG_ADDR6;
}
#endif
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+94 -40
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -16,16 +16,39 @@
#include "dnsmasq.h"
/* EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT -> extract name
EXTR_NAME_COMPARE -> compare name, case insensitive
EXTR_NAME_NOCASE -> compare name, case sensitive
EXTR_NAME_FLIP -> flip 0x20 bits in packet.
For flip, name is an array of ints, whose size
is given in parm, which forms the bitmap. Bits beyond the size
are assumed to be zero.
return = 0 -> error
return = 1 -> extract OK, compare OK, flip OK
return = 2 -> extract OK, compare failed.
return = 3 -> extract OK, compare failed but only on case.
*/
int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
char *name, int isExtract, int extrabytes)
char *name, int func, unsigned int parm)
{
unsigned char *cp = (unsigned char *)name, *p = *pp, *p1 = NULL;
unsigned int j, l, namelen = 0, hops = 0;
int retvalue = 1;
if (isExtract)
*cp = 0;
unsigned int bigmap_counter = 0, bigmap_posn = 0, bigmap_size = parm, bitmap = 0;
int retvalue = 1, case_insens = 1, isExtract = 0, flip = 0, extrabytes = (int)parm;
unsigned int *bigmap = (unsigned int *)name;
if (func == EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT)
isExtract = 1, *cp = 0;
else if (func == EXTR_NAME_NOCASE)
case_insens = 0;
else if (func == EXTR_NAME_FLIP)
{
flip = 1, extrabytes = 0;
name = NULL;
}
while (1)
{
unsigned int label_type;
@@ -46,7 +69,7 @@ int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
cp--;
*cp = 0; /* terminate: lose final period */
}
else if (*cp != 0)
else if (!flip && *cp != 0)
retvalue = 2;
if (p1) /* we jumped via compression */
@@ -85,7 +108,7 @@ int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, l))
return 0;
for(j=0; j<l; j++, p++)
for (j=0; j<l; j++, p++)
if (isExtract)
{
unsigned char c = *p;
@@ -98,6 +121,24 @@ int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
else
*cp++ = c;
}
else if (flip)
{
unsigned char c = *p;
if ((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z'))
{
/* Get the next int of the bitmap */
if (bigmap_posn < bigmap_size && bigmap_counter-- == 0)
{
bitmap = bigmap[bigmap_posn++];
bigmap_counter = (sizeof(unsigned int) * 8) - 1;
}
if (bitmap & 1)
*p ^= 0x20;
bitmap >>= 1;
}
}
else
{
unsigned char c1 = *cp, c2 = *p;
@@ -107,23 +148,35 @@ int extract_name(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char **pp,
else
{
cp++;
if (c1 >= 'A' && c1 <= 'Z')
c1 += 'a' - 'A';
if (c1 == NAME_ESCAPE)
c1 = (*cp++)-1;
else if (case_insens && c1 >= 'A' && c1 <= 'Z')
c1 += 'a' - 'A';
if (c2 >= 'A' && c2 <= 'Z')
if (case_insens && c2 >= 'A' && c2 <= 'Z')
c2 += 'a' - 'A';
if (!case_insens && retvalue != 2 && c1 != c2)
{
if (c1 >= 'A' && c1 <= 'Z')
c1 += 'a' - 'A';
if (c2 >= 'A' && c2 <= 'Z')
c2 += 'a' - 'A';
if (c1 == c2)
retvalue = 3;
}
if (c1 != c2)
retvalue = 2;
retvalue = 2;
}
}
if (isExtract)
*cp++ = '.';
else if (*cp != 0 && *cp++ != '.')
else if (!flip && *cp != 0 && *cp++ != '.')
retvalue = 2;
}
else
@@ -399,7 +452,7 @@ int do_doctor(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *namebuff)
if (i == ntohs(header->ancount) && !(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->nscount), header, qlen)))
return done;
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, namebuff, 1, 10))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, namebuff, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return done; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -480,7 +533,7 @@ static int find_soa(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, int *sub
for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->nscount); i++)
{
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return 0; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -509,7 +562,7 @@ static int find_soa(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, int *sub
for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) /* MNAME, RNAME */
{
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
{
if (!no_cache)
blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
@@ -660,7 +713,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
namep = p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 || !extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, 1, 4))
if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 || !extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return 2; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -684,7 +737,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
for (j = 0; j < ntohs(header->ancount); j++)
{
int secflag = 0;
if (!(res = extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(res = extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return 2; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(aqtype, p1);
@@ -722,7 +775,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
if (aqtype == T_CNAME)
log_query(secflag | F_CNAME | F_FORWARD | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return 2;
if (aqtype == T_CNAME)
@@ -800,7 +853,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
{
int secflag = 0;
if (!(res = extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 0, 10)))
if (!(res = extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_COMPARE, 10)))
return 2; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(aqtype, p1);
@@ -862,7 +915,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
}
namep = p1;
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return 2;
if (qtype != T_CNAME)
@@ -932,7 +985,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
/* Name, extract it then re-encode. */
int len;
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p1, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
{
blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
return 2;
@@ -965,7 +1018,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, time_t
} while (desc != -1);
/* we overwrote the original name, so get it back here. */
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &tmp, name, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &tmp, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
{
blockdata_free(addr.rrblock.rrdata);
return 2;
@@ -1127,7 +1180,7 @@ void report_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t len, u32 mark)
{
int aqtype, aqclass, ardlen;
if (!extract_name(header, len, &p, daemon->namebuff, 1, 10))
if (!extract_name(header, len, &p, daemon->namebuff, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return;
if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, len, 10))
@@ -1145,7 +1198,7 @@ void report_addresses(struct dns_header *header, size_t len, u32 mark)
{
if (aqtype == T_CNAME)
{
if (!extract_name(header, len, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 0))
if (!extract_name(header, len, &p, daemon->workspacename, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 0))
return;
if (safe_name(daemon->namebuff) && safe_name(daemon->workspacename))
ubus_event_bcast_connmark_allowlist_resolved(mark, daemon->namebuff, daemon->workspacename, attl);
@@ -1195,7 +1248,7 @@ unsigned int extract_request(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name,
if (!(header->hb3 & HB3_QR) && (ntohs(header->ancount) != 0 || ntohs(header->nscount) != 0))
return 0; /* non-standard query. */
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, 1, 4))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return 0; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -1309,7 +1362,7 @@ static int check_bad_address(struct dns_header *header, size_t qlen, struct bogu
for (i = ntohs(header->ancount); i != 0; i--)
{
if (name && !extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, 1, 10))
if (name && !extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 10))
return 0; /* bad packet */
if (!name && !(p = skip_name(p, header, qlen, 10)))
@@ -1559,7 +1612,7 @@ static unsigned long crec_ttl(struct crec *crecp, time_t now)
return daemon->max_ttl;
}
static int cache_validated(const struct crec *crecp)
static int cache_not_validated(const struct crec *crecp)
{
return (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK));
}
@@ -1619,7 +1672,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
nameoffset = p - (unsigned char *)header;
/* now extract name as .-concatenated string into name */
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, 1, 4))
if (!extract_name(header, qlen, &p, name, EXTR_NAME_EXTRACT, 4))
return 0; /* bad packet */
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
@@ -1660,7 +1713,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
/* If the client asked for DNSSEC don't use cached data. */
if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP | F_CONFIG)) ||
(rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_validated(crecp))))
(rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_not_validated(crecp))))
{
if (crecp->flags & F_CONFIG || qtype == T_CNAME)
ans = 1;
@@ -1819,7 +1872,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
the zone is unsigned, which implies that we're doing
validation. */
if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP | F_CONFIG)) ||
(rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_validated(crecp)) ))
(rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_not_validated(crecp)) ))
{
do
{
@@ -1975,7 +2028,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
/* If the client asked for DNSSEC don't use cached data. */
if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP | F_CONFIG)) ||
(rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_validated(crecp)) ))
(rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_not_validated(crecp)) ))
do
{
int stale_flag = 0;
@@ -2157,19 +2210,19 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
if (!ans)
{
if ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_RR | F_NXDOMAIN)) &&
rd_bit && (!do_bit || cache_validated(crecp)))
if ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_RR | F_NXDOMAIN)) && rd_bit)
do
{
int flags = crecp->flags;
unsigned short rrtype;
if (flags & F_KEYTAG)
rrtype = crecp->addr.rrblock.rrtype;
else
rrtype = crecp->addr.rrdata.rrtype;
if ((flags & F_NXDOMAIN) || rrtype == qtype)
if (((flags & F_NXDOMAIN) || rrtype == qtype) &&
(!do_bit || cache_not_validated(crecp)))
{
char *rrdata = NULL;
unsigned short rrlen = 0;
@@ -2232,14 +2285,15 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
}
if (qtype != T_ANY && !ans && rr_on_list(daemon->filter_rr, qtype))
if (qtype != T_ANY && !ans && rr_on_list(daemon->filter_rr, qtype) && !do_bit)
{
/* We don't have a cached answer and when we get an answer from upstream we're going to
filter it anyway. If we have a cached answer for the domain for another RRtype then
that may be enough to tell us if the answer should be NODATA and save the round trip.
Cached NXDOMAIN has already been handled, so here we look for any record for the domain,
since its existence allows us to return a NODATA answer. Note that we never set the AD flag,
since we didn't authenticate the record. */
since we didn't authenticate the record; this doesn't work if we want auth data, so
don't use this shortcut in that case. */
if (cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_IPV4 | F_IPV6 | F_RR | F_CNAME))
{
@@ -2338,7 +2392,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
if (!(ansp = skip_questions(header, qlen)))
return 0; /* bad packet */
anscount = nscount = addncount = 0;
log_query(F_CONFIG, "reply", NULL, "truncated", 0);
log_query(0, "reply", NULL, "truncated", 0);
}
if (nxdomain)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+9 -8
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -742,15 +742,16 @@ static void free_transfer(struct tftp_transfer *transfer)
static char *next(char **p, char *end)
{
char *ret = *p;
size_t len;
char *n, *ret = *p;
/* Look for end of string, without running off the end of the packet. */
for (n = *p; n < end && *n != 0; n++);
if (*(end-1) != 0 ||
*p == end ||
(len = strlen(ret)) == 0)
/* ran off the end or zero length string - failed */
if (n == end || n == ret)
return NULL;
*p += len + 1;
*p = n + 1;
return ret;
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2024 Simon Kelley
/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2025 Simon Kelley
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by