Mario Madersbacher 2463798e03 Fix checks on TFTP filenames to avoid directory escape.
Commit d152e81 which fixed escape via pathname of the form "file/.."
introduced a new bug in which pathnames of the form "file/..dir/.."
are not caught.

Note that to be a practical attack, a directory with name
"..somename" has to exist the correct place in the tree.
This seems unlikely on most systems, and a it's difficult to see
how an attacker could create such a directory and not already have
the read access that it gives them.

Thanks to Mario Madersbacher for spotting this, and supplying a very
complete report and patch.
2026-10-26 21:46:00 +00:00
2012-04-02 20:40:34 +01:00
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