Fix raw TLS overflow for large uploads

This commit is contained in:
Sergey Lyubka
2024-07-03 16:40:04 -03:00
committed by Sergio R. Caprile
parent 5ad2b0531a
commit 509fbcc4f8
2 changed files with 28 additions and 20 deletions
+14 -10
View File
@@ -7522,17 +7522,21 @@ static void read_conn(struct mg_connection *c) {
size_t len = c->recv.size - c->recv.len;
long n = -1;
if (c->is_tls) {
if (!ioalloc(c, &c->rtls)) return;
n = recv_raw(c, (char *) &c->rtls.buf[c->rtls.len],
c->rtls.size - c->rtls.len);
if (n == MG_IO_ERR && c->rtls.len == 0) {
// Close only if we have fully drained both raw (rtls) and TLS buffers
c->is_closing = 1;
} else {
if (n > 0) c->rtls.len += (size_t) n;
if (c->is_tls_hs) mg_tls_handshake(c);
n = c->is_tls_hs ? (long) MG_IO_WAIT : mg_tls_recv(c, buf, len);
// Do not read to the raw TLS buffer if it already has enough.
// This is to prevent overflowing c->rtls if our reads are slow
if (c->rtls.len < 16 * 1024) { // 16k is the max TLS message size
if (!ioalloc(c, &c->rtls)) return;
n = recv_raw(c, (char *) &c->rtls.buf[c->rtls.len],
c->rtls.size - c->rtls.len);
if (n == MG_IO_ERR && c->rtls.len == 0) {
// Close only if we have fully drained both raw (rtls) and TLS buffers
c->is_closing = 1;
} else {
if (n > 0) c->rtls.len += (size_t) n;
if (c->is_tls_hs) mg_tls_handshake(c);
}
}
n = c->is_tls_hs ? (long) MG_IO_WAIT : mg_tls_recv(c, buf, len);
} else {
n = recv_raw(c, buf, len);
}
+14 -10
View File
@@ -276,17 +276,21 @@ static void read_conn(struct mg_connection *c) {
size_t len = c->recv.size - c->recv.len;
long n = -1;
if (c->is_tls) {
if (!ioalloc(c, &c->rtls)) return;
n = recv_raw(c, (char *) &c->rtls.buf[c->rtls.len],
c->rtls.size - c->rtls.len);
if (n == MG_IO_ERR && c->rtls.len == 0) {
// Close only if we have fully drained both raw (rtls) and TLS buffers
c->is_closing = 1;
} else {
if (n > 0) c->rtls.len += (size_t) n;
if (c->is_tls_hs) mg_tls_handshake(c);
n = c->is_tls_hs ? (long) MG_IO_WAIT : mg_tls_recv(c, buf, len);
// Do not read to the raw TLS buffer if it already has enough.
// This is to prevent overflowing c->rtls if our reads are slow
if (c->rtls.len < 16 * 1024) { // 16k is the max TLS message size
if (!ioalloc(c, &c->rtls)) return;
n = recv_raw(c, (char *) &c->rtls.buf[c->rtls.len],
c->rtls.size - c->rtls.len);
if (n == MG_IO_ERR && c->rtls.len == 0) {
// Close only if we have fully drained both raw (rtls) and TLS buffers
c->is_closing = 1;
} else {
if (n > 0) c->rtls.len += (size_t) n;
if (c->is_tls_hs) mg_tls_handshake(c);
}
}
n = c->is_tls_hs ? (long) MG_IO_WAIT : mg_tls_recv(c, buf, len);
} else {
n = recv_raw(c, buf, len);
}